Battle of the Marne (1918)
Use of captured British tanks
| date | July 15 to August 6, 1918 |
|---|---|
| place | on the Marne, France |
| output | Allied victory |
| consequences | The German troops are pushed back to their positions before the spring offensive in 1918, the initiative finally passed to the Allies |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
Erich Ludendorff (First Quartermaster General) |
Ferdinand Foch (Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces) |
| Troop strength | |
|
1st Army 3rd Army 7th Army 9th Army |
French 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th Army British Expeditionary Corps ( 4 divisions) American Expeditionary Corps ( 8 divisions) Italian II Corps (2 divisions) |
| losses | |
|
168,000 men, of which 29,000 were prisoners |
95,000 French, |
.svg){kind=small}
The Second Battle of the Marne was a decisive battle on the Western Front of World War I and took place from July 15 to August 6, 1918. A German offensive initiated on the Marne on both sides of Reims was repulsed by the Allies with heavy losses. The German troops were thrown back on the line before the spring offensive by an Allied counter-offensive beginning on July 18 by the beginning of August .
prehistory
During the Third Battle of the Aisne in June 1918 , the German 7th Army created a large frontal prominence between Reims and Soissons and again (as in September 1914) reached the Marne . On June 25, a Marines brigade of the 2nd US Infantry Division captured the Bois de Belleau with heavy losses and contained further German advances across the Marne.
The German Supreme Army Command under Erich Ludendorff nevertheless planned another attack with the aim of enclosing the strongly fortified city of Reims and binding the French army at this point. Troops that were released should then enable the offensive against the British in Flanders to resume. After the German 7th Army in the Marnebogen could no longer count on reinforcement by fresh divisions for its western front, since all reserves were needed for the newly planned "Reims-Marneschutz attack" , Colonel General von Boehn was forced to stop his warfare between Oise and Marne unfavorable to change. He ordered his groups, set up between the Oise and the Ourcq, François (Gen. Kdo. VII. AK ), Staabs (Gen. Kdo. XXXIX. Res.K. ) and Watter (Gen. Kdo. XIII. AK ) in the event of an early move recognized enemy attack to evade in time and give up terrain voluntarily in order to reduce one's own team losses.
.jpg)
After Boehn's attention had to concentrate because of the new attack on his southern front on the Marne, the command of his three corps groups standing between the Oise and the Ourcq were taken from him on July 5. The corps lying in the area to the west of Soissons , between Oise and Marne, were combined to form the newly formed 9th Army and General of the Infantry Johannes von Eben was entrusted with their command. The main task of the 9th Army was to ensure the connections between the 18th and 7th Armies and to protect the Soissons transport hub from enemy attacks.
On July 6, the Allied Commander-in-Chief Ferdinand Foch resumed his attacks. A violent advance hit the 201st Division west of Chateau-Thierry ; In the process, some of the terrain between the height and the city was lost. On July 8, the French also attacked the left wing of the 42nd Division and the right wing of the 14th Reserve Division . During all of these tactical counterattacks, Foch prepared a new counteroffensive by four French armies ( reinforced by five US divisions) against the German frontier. The necessary march between Aisne and Ourcq was only completed on July 16 and 17. Additional strong accumulations of strength in the forest of Villers-Cotterets were not recognized in time by the German leadership.
course
Company Marneschutz-Reims
_Karl_von_Conta,_Otto_von_Garnier_(Conta_cropped).jpg)
On July 15, at 4:40 a.m., the attack by 26 divisions of the German 1st and 3rd Army against the French 4th Army east of Reims and by 21 divisions of the German 7th Army against the began under the code names Marneschutz-Reims French 6th Army west of the city and on the Marne. Without the defensively remaining 9th Army, a total of 47 divisions had been made available, around 2100 batteries (of which 1300 medium and heavy, together 6,353 guns) supported the attack, which was planned on almost 120 kilometers of the front. In the western field of attack, the 7th Army was to cross the Marne at Dormans and Chateau Thierry and advance 50 kilometers on both sides of the Marne on Epernay .
The attack of the 7th Army had to cross the Marne section between Chartèves and Verneuil and win the Surmelin brook. Colonel-General von Boehn started his main thrust between Dormans and Jaulgonne , the aim was to fight for a bridgehead across the Marne from the French 3rd Corps (General Lebrun ) and to immediately build temporary bridges with pioneer troops. Contact with the attacking 1st Army to the east was to be established via Epernay and south of it. On the left wing of the 7th Army in the Étrépilly area , a mock attack by Gruppe Schoeler ( VIII. AK ) with the 87th and 201st Divisions was supposed to attract the attention of the enemy as far as Chateau-Thierry . To the left, the 10th Landwehr Division had to stay defensive at Mont-Saint-Père . In the middle the group Kathen ( XXIII. Reserve Corps ) and the group Wichura ( VIII. Reserve Corps ) with the 10th and 36th , Saxon 23rd and 200th Divisions should cross the Marne between Gland and Vincelles . The 1st Guard Division led against the French III. Corps (51st Division) carried out the main thrust on the Dormans- Comblizy line with a focus on the dominant ridge along the road from Dormans to Igny . The Conta group on the left wing ( IV. Reserve Corps ) had to cross the Marne with the 37th Division scheduled in the first meeting at Vincelles and to create the preconditions for crossing the Marne by flanking the 113th Division on the right . The French 51st and 125th Infantry Divisions, prepared for the attack, could not withstand the German onslaught on the first day of the attack, but several German divisions were so weakened that they could only maintain their new positions with difficulty. On the left wing of the 7th Army, the Schmettow group ( 195th , 22nd and 103rd divisions ) and the Borne group ( 50th , 86th and 123rd divisions ) in the Montagne de Reims against the Nanteuil-la-Forêt and Attack Bligny .
The attack of the German 1st and 3rd Armies, which was about 40 kilometers wide, with 15 divisions in the front line, was planned on the right against the Marne over the Vesle and between Prunay and Tahure. While the 1st Army was supposed to reach the Epernay- Halons line offensively , the attack of the 3rd Army in the Champagne region between Prunay and Massiges had to cover the movement on the left flank in the south-east. The German 1st Army (Mudra), which with the XV. Army Corps ( Ilse ) remained defensive in front of Reims, the VII and XXIV Reserve Corps ( Group Wellmann , from July 16 Lindequist and Group Langer ) attacked, but reached the French 5th Army (General Berthelot) only little gain in terrain. The advance of the German 3rd Army (one) with the XII. and XVI. Army corps east of Reims began shortly before 5 a.m. with the usual roller of fire , which the infantry followed. In the first French position there was hardly any resistance; The enemy artillery fire was just as moderate. At around 9 a.m. the German storm troops stood in front of the second enemy position north of the towns of St. Hilaire le Grand, Souain-Perthes-lès-Hurlus , Massiges. Here it became evident that the French 4th Army (General Gouraud ) still had enormous defenses and reserves, the German attack finally came to a standstill in the early afternoon.
On July 16, the attack against the German 7th Army was only continued between la Chapelle south and Marfaux, north of the Marne. The Schoeler group and Kathen group attacking on both sides of Chateau-Thierry succeeded neither in a permanent river crossing nor in gaining ground in the battle of Château-Thierry . The German 36th Division (Lieutenant General Arnd von Leipzig), which crossed the Marne at Mézy-Moulins, was pushed back in the Surmelin Valley by a strong counter-attack by the 3rd US Division under General Joseph T. Dickman . Dickman's troops threw back the enemy at Mézy-Moulins over the Marne and retook the southern part of Crézancy . In the 1st Army sector, the changeful fighting continued during the night and in the morning; the new attack, which was ordered to begin at 11 a.m., was hopeless from the outset.
The groups Wichura and Conta of the 7th Army were able to bring six divisions to the south bank of the Marne in heavy fighting in the Dorman area . Violent French counter-attacks hit the XXIII. Reserve Corps, the planned thrust of the VIII. Reserve Corps on Igny-le-Jard was canceled, to the east of it the IV. Reserve Corps was repulsed at Festigny . On July 17, only the left wing of the 7th Army was able to hold its own, the local bridgehead south of the Marne was about 14 km long and 6.5 km wide. However, further successes were no longer possible due to the intervention of British and fresh American troops. To the east of Chateau-Thierry the resistance of the French 38th Corps under General de Mondesir increased . The next day, parts of the 28th US Division (General Muir ) and the French 125th Division (General Antoine Diepold) reinforce this section . The six German divisions (1st and 2nd Guards, 23rd, 200th, 37th, 113th Divisions) engaged in heavy fighting south of the Marne were, like the Marne bridges, under heavy artillery fire. By July 19, the Italian II Corps (Lieutenant General Albricci ) deployed in the French 5th Army had lost 9,300 men. Nonetheless, General Berthelot had two newly arrived British infantry divisions, the 51st (Highland) and the 62nd (West Riding), launch an attack directly along the Ardre Valley at the start of the fighting for Fère-en-Tardenois .
The French counter-offensive
After the German offensive stalled with great losses, the Allies began their previously planned counter-attack on July 18, in which 24 French, as well as several British, American and Italian divisions were involved. The main thrust against the west side of the German front ledge was the French 10th and 6th Armies, which were supported from the south by the 9th Army and from the Epernay area by the 5th Army. The western main attack front, about 30 kilometers wide, beginning north of the Aisne and reaching to Belleau northwest of Chateau-Thierry, was attacked with 16 divisions, 4 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions were provided behind it as reserves for the main thrust of the 10th Army . The French 10th Army had pulled together several hundred Renault FT tanks unnoticed against the German lines on the western arc of the front in the woods of Compiegne and Villers-Cotterêts . At 5.35 in the morning, the artillery strike began without preparation, which immediately passed into the cylinder of fire, which the infantry followed.
- The 10th Army (General Charles Mangin ) opened the battle near Soissons from the west, from the Compiegne area, and attacked the positions of the German 9th Army. 16 infantry divisions were concentrated on 24 kilometers of the front, with 240 light and 231 heavy batteries as well as 41 air squadrons and 375 tanks.
- The 6th Army (General Jean-Marie Degoutte ) advanced from the Villers-Cotterêts area against the section between Ourcq and Clignon , with 8 infantry divisions and 157 tanks in the front meeting.
- The newly formed 9th Army (General Antoine de Mitry ) had cleared the right wing of the 6th Army in the front arc to the east and took over the Marne defense there with the 3rd and 38th Corps between Chateau-Thierry and Dormans, they wrestled with them the German group Wichura south of the river .
- The 5th Army (General Henri Berthelot ) took the brunt of the German attack in the south, but began counter-attacks from the east from the forests of Vassy and Montagne de Reims . The 2nd Italian Army Corps (General Albricci ) had just arrived in the area south of Reims in support of the 1st Colonial Corps.
In the section of the parent French XX. Corps (General Berdoulat) led the III. US Corps under General Robert Lee Bullard with the 1st and 2nd Divisions launched the main attack in the direction of Soissons. The attacked front of the German 241st Division was rolled up in the south , there was a not inconsiderable gap on the left wing of the Staab group (Gen. Kdo. XXXIX. Res.K. ). The front of the 11th Bavarian Division to the south held out until the right wing of the Watter group (Gen. Kdo. XIII. AK ), the 42nd Division at Chaudun , was pushed back. Because of the now open northern flank, the front of the Winckler group to the south (Gen. Kdo. XXV. Res. K. ) with the 40th Division , the 10th Bavarian Division and the 78th Reserve Division could no longer be held.
On both sides of the Ourcq , the French II Corps (General Edme Philippot) attacked with the 33rd and 47th Divisions from the La Ferté-Milon area . This advance in the direction of Oulchy-le-Château was reinforced by the 4th US Division and hit the front of the Winckler group at Neuilly-Saint-Front . On the right wing of the French 6th Army, the I. US Corps under General Liggett led the attack from the Gandelu- Marigny area with the 26th US Division and the assigned French 73rd Division against the German Schoeler group defending at Étrépilly (Gen. Kdo. VIII. AK ). The newly deployed Etzel group (Gen. Kdo. XVII. AK ) destined for the counterattack was entrusted with the leadership between the Watter and Winckler groups. The main focus of the enemy attacks was again directed against the Watter group , the heights around Buzancy and east of Villemontoire were violently attacked. The 20th Division , which had arrived from the reserve and advanced to the west near Villemontoire in the afternoon, was deployed to counterattack this sector. To the south of it, the French of the Etzel group wrested the towns of Saint Remy and Villy. On July 19, General Staabs and his divisions had to go back to Soissons, north of the Aisne the closer connection was made to the Hofmann group defending there (Gen. Kdo. XXXVIII. Res. Corps ).
Because of the risk of cutting off all German units that were still in the southern Marnebogen, Ludendorff decided on July 20 that Germany should generally withdraw from the promontory. The southern Marne bridgehead, struck on July 16, had to be abandoned. The intact positions of the Schmettow group ( Gen. Kdo. 65 ) and Borne (Gen. Kdo. VI. Res. K. ) In the forest southwest of Reims had to be withdrawn from the French 5th Army.
Pursuit battles to Vesle and Aisne
The attack of the French 5th Army began to develop south-west of Reims on July 20, the newly arrived British divisions succeeded in taking the forest heights south of Fort Brigny with heavy losses. The French 10th Army had changed its thrust to the northeast to Soissons and the 6th Army to Fère-en-Tardenois , the 9th Army should finally cross the Marne with both wings and the 5th Army attacked Fismes from the southeast where the connection with the right wing of the 10th Army was sought. On July 21, the Allied attack concentrated again with particular force against the Watter group and reached some ground between Noyant and Villemontoire , but was then stopped by counter attacks by the German 20th and 5th divisions . The Etzel group attacked south of it had to evacuate the town of Plessier Huleu but was still able to maintain their positions.
The withdrawal of the German 7th Army in the first intermediate position Oulchy-la-Ville - Coincy - le Charmel - Vincelles meant a considerable cut in the front on July 24th. The no longer required general command of the XXIII. Reserve Corps was withdrawn, their previous section of the front was taken over by the VIII Reserve Corps. On the right wing of the 7th Army, the XIII. Army corps withdrawn and replaced by the I. Bavarian Army Corps (Lieutenant General von Endres ). In the section of the I. US Corps, the 26th US Division (Major General CR Edwards ) had advanced about 17 kilometers, occupied the villages of Torcy, Belleau , Givry and Epieds and captured large amounts of German war material. Despite the fact that it had lost 5,300 officers and soldiers since July 18, that division remained in the attack until July 25.
On July 25, the Bavarian I. Army Corps Villemontoire had to give up, the XXV. Reserve corps evacuated Oulchy-le-Château . On 25 and 26 July, the 26th US Division of the 42nd Division (Major General was Charles T. Menoher ) replaced that after they are still on 15 July in the successful resistance to the German attack in the Champagne had been involved and then brought to the Chateau-Thierry region. From July 22nd to 25th she was involved in the fighting over the wooded slopes that led to the village of Le Charmel , which were captured on the evening of July 25th.
On July 28th, the troops of the German 7th Army from the left wing of the XVII. Army corps beginning to General Command No. 65 and the extreme right wing of the 1st Army went back to the intended line north bank of the Ourcq - Fère-en-Tardenois - Ronchères - Bligny without pushing the enemy . The divided 28th US Division fought within the French 3rd Corps during the attack and gained general recognition there. On July 30th, she was replaced at Ronchères by the 32nd US Division (Major General William G. Haan ) after she had lost around 7,900 men. The 42nd Division crossed the Ourcq sector on July 28th and captured Sergy on the morning of the 29th Sergy.
On July 29th the new Allied artillery deployment for the next strong attack was over. To the west of Beugneux , a counterattack by the Guard Replacement Division blocked a French intrusion; at Fere-en-Tardenois and Romigny , however, the entire southern apron was lost. On the night of August 2, the German troops took up the intermediate position south of the Vesle from Missy via St. Gilles to Trigny, and in the second half of that night the general retreat to Vesle took place. On August 2nd, Soissons was liberated by the American 1st Division under Major General Charles P. Summerall ; on August 3rd, the German troops moved to their old positions along the Aisne and Vesle , which they were able to hold against further Allied attacks. On August 6, the Allied counter-offensive in this section was stopped for the time being.
consequences
The German casualties during the battle were an estimated 168,000 men, of whom 29,000 were prisoners. Allied losses amounted to 95,000 French, 16,500 British, 12,000 Americans and 10,700 Italians. The failure of this last German offensive and the battle of Amiens that began on August 8 mark the final transfer of the initiative to the Allies.
literature
- Jean-Jacques Becker / Gerd Krumeich : The Great War. Germany and France in the First World War 1914–1918 , Klartext Verlag, Essen 2010, ISBN 978-3-8375-0171-1 .
- Michael S. Neiberg: The Second Battle of the Marne. Indiana University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-253-35146-3 .
Web links
Individual evidence
- ↑ The since June 18, 1918 charged with the leadership Fritz von Below was fatally ill, therefore, the previous commander General of Infantry Johannes von Eben continue in command in representation to early August, although at the same time the supreme command of the army division A held.
- ↑ a b Lawrence Sondhaus: World War One: The Global Revolution. Cambridge University Press, 2001, ISBN 978-0-521-51648-8 , p. 413.
- ^ Jaggi: Dormans - 1918 from Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung, year 1939, pp. 714–720.
- ↑ George B. Clark: The American Expeditionary Force in World War I, McFarland Company 2013, page 85.
- ^ New York Times, July 16, 1922, on the Italian II Corps