Battle of Mons

This article covers the battle in World War I; for further battles see Battle of Mons .

Battle of Mons

Part of: First World War

Map of the battle

date	23rd to 24th August 1914
place	Area around the Belgian city of Mons
output	German victory
consequences	Continuation of the advance of the 1st Army, failure of the planned encirclement of the left wing of the Franco-British front

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	United Kingdom of France
Commander
Alexander von Kluck Ferdinand von Quast Ewald von Lochow Friedrich Sixt from Armin Georg von der Marwitz	John French Douglas Haig Horace Smith-Dorrien Edmund Allenby Albert d'Amade
Troop strength
4 Corps of the 1st Army: II., III., IV. And IX. Army corps with a total of 8 infantry divisions (each 13,000 men). Higher cavalry commander 2: 2nd, 4th and 9th cavalry divisions, a total of about 110,000 men, including on August 23. in battle: III., IV. and IX. Army corps with 6 infantry divisions (about 78,000 men)	British Expeditionary Force: I. and II. Corps (with a total of 4 infantry divisions of 18,000 men each) as well as the British cavalry division and another independent cavalry brigade, a total of around 77,000 men plus on August 24th: parts of the French 83rd and 88th territorial divisions
losses
unknown	on August 23: approx. 1,600 dead, wounded and prisoners on August 24: approx. 2,600 dead, wounded and prisoners

The Battle of Mons took place from 23 to 24 August 1914 between units of the German 1st Army and the main forces of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). In operational history it is assigned to the so-called border battles. At Mons , the BEF evaded the threat of encirclement and annihilation by an orderly retreat which, after another defeat at Le Cateau (August 26), led them to the Marne . The battle, which is almost forgotten in Germany, plays - with a view mostly limited to the events of August 23 - an important role in the memory of the Great War , especially in Great Britain, and is discussed repeatedly in popular scientific accounts of the First World War .

prehistory

Field Marshal John French

The two BEF corps were ready for action on the evening of August 20, 1914 in the area east and south of Le Cateau . The British cavalry division stood north-east near Maubeuge on the Belgian border, individual cavalry patrols had advanced on Belgian territory beyond Mons without encountering German troops. The BEF formed the extreme left wing of the Entente troop deployment area . The unit's commander, Field Marshal French , decided to advance on August 21 in a north-easterly or north-easterly direction towards Mons in order to counter a feared overflanking by German troops. The French commander-in-chief Joffre asked the British shortly afterwards to join the general offensive movement of the French 3rd, 4th and 5th Armies to march to Soignies , 15 kilometers northeast of Mons. In the south of this city, British and German cavalry patrols met on the morning of August 22nd. This and numerous intelligence reports convinced the British commander that strong German units were approaching from Brussels . He decided to stop his own advance and to meet the Germans in the favorable positions he had reached (from Thieu along the Canal du Center to Nimy and from there along the Mons-Condé Canal to Thulin , front width about 30 kilometers). The troops dug trenches on the south side of the canals or barricaded themselves in the densely packed residential and industrial buildings. Tertre , north of the canal line and well suited for defense, was also occupied.

The general task of the German 1st Army after August 18 - the beginning of the advance of the German swing wing (see Schlieffen Plan ) - was to encompass the northern flank of the opposing line-up if possible. The Army High Command (AOK) 1 was subordinated to AOK 2 by the Army Command . The latter turned against the long swing to the west desired by AOK 1 and pushed through an advance of the 1st Army that was closely based on the right wing of the 2nd Army. Because of this disposition, the divisions of the 1st Army collided head-on with the British units on August 23. The German leadership was informed of the landings of British troops in French canal ports, but had no information about their whereabouts until August 22nd. Despite the strong reconnaissance activity by planes and cavalry found that day, the AOK 1 suspected the BEF to be further south-west or south near Valenciennes or Maubeuge on French territory. Reports from German airmen about kilometers of marching columns near Mons did not reach AOK 1 for unknown reasons. The advance into the area northwest of Maubeuge was ordered for August 23.

course

August 23

Map of the combat area west and south of Mons

Map of the battles of Charleroi and Mons from August 21 to 24, 1914

A (false) report about enemy troop concentrations near Tournai - on the right flank of the 1st Army - prompted its commander (Colonel General von Kluck ) to issue a general stop order at 9:30 a.m. The designated stopping point ( Leuze -Mons- Binche road ) was partly on the other side of the canal line and had not yet been reached, especially by the left wing of the army. General von Quast , the commander of the IX. Army Corps therefore decided to continue the advance and commissioned the 18th Division to fill the crossings over the Canal du Center at Nimy and Obourg . Fierce fighting developed at the crossings, which the attackers won. Nimy was stormed around 4 p.m. Mons, which is adjacent to the south, was occupied shortly afterwards without a fight. British troops resisting in the south-east and east of the city were thrown back to the south-west in conjunction with the 17th Division, which had crossed the Channel further east .

General von Lochow, commander of the German III. Army Corps

When in the early afternoon the error that had led to Kluck's stop order was proven and it was now established with some certainty that the main British power was located directly south of the front of the 1st Army, AOK 1 ordered the right to the IX. Corps subsequent III. Corps to advance towards St. Ghislain and Jemappes towards the Mons-Condé Canal . The two divisions of this corps, made up of Brandenburg core troops of the Prussian army, had to overcome a more than a kilometer wide, almost uncovered depression and then enter into the battle for the few undestroyed canal crossings against a "tough, almost invisible enemy". A brigade of the 5th Division was able to storm Tertre , but remained south of it in the gun and machine gun fire coming from the south side of the canal; Another brigade was able to cross the canal at Wasmuël in the late afternoon after a hard fight and take the place around 8 p.m. After dark, the canal was also overcome at the railway bridge southwest of Tertre. The 6th Division , attacking directly across from Jemappes, did not advance against the fire of the defenders entrenched in the houses of this industrial location. In the late afternoon, however, a surprising combat group, supported from close range by field guns, was able to secure a bridge. The division stormed the place over this and advanced in a southerly direction towards Frameries that evening .

The west of the III. Corps subsequent IV. Corps went against the British left flank in since 15:00 POMMEROEUL ago. Here two canals and a railway embankment had to be overcome. The 8th Division was able to force the passage over the first water hazard, but had to stop the attack on the second (the Mons-Condé Canal) after dark. Further east, parts of the 7th Division did not make the first break-in until around midnight. A weak detachment dug in about 400 meters behind the canal on the southward road to Thulin. The majority remained further north for the time being.

Individual British counterattacks against positions of the III. and IX. Corps were turned away at night. AOK 1 planned to continue the attack on August 24. Above all, IV Corps on the right wing was supposed to cross the Mons-Condé Canal. In principle, it was intended to prevent the British from retreating to the west or south-west, which they believed to be likely, and instead to force them into the Maubeuge fortress. All three corps were assigned to Bavay or the area west of Bavay. For the intended containment, the army command also brought the II. Corps and the IV. Reserve Corps to the right wing. These associations, which were still far apart on the 23rd, were to advance in the direction of Condé on the 24th . The higher cavalry commander 2 (HKK) Georg von der Marwitz was asked to bypass Valenciennes to the west with his three cavalry divisions and to advance into the Denain area in order to block the retreat routes leading to the west.

August 24th

Defense against English cavalry attacks at Maubeuge

In the early hours of the morning it became certain at the BEF headquarters that the left wing of the French 5th Army on the right was retreating to Maubeuge. The French advised the British to follow this movement. In view of the threat of encirclement on the right wing, French issued the appropriate orders between 1 and 2 a.m. Between 4 and 7 a.m. the British troops began to move from east to west. At the time of the renewal of the German attack, however, the bulk of the British units were still in their positions.

The IX. Corps attacked in a south-westerly direction at dawn and, against stubborn British resistance, reached the Eugies - Genly - Asquillies line in the evening . In the meantime, the attack had been interrupted for a few hours because of the unsafe situation on the left flank - the connection to the Second Army had been severed.

As on the previous day, the III. Corps also carried the brunt of the fighting on August 24th. In bitter house-to-house fights, the 6th Division brought the villages of Frameries, La Bouverie and Pâturages under control by noon , and then took action against Warquignies in support of the 5th Division . The 5th Division had previously taken St. Ghislain after several hours of house-to-house fighting and had advanced south beyond Hornu . At around 3 p.m. the resistance of the British infantry and artillery defending the railway embankment between Dour and Wasmes was broken and the Warquignies captured. A pursuit of the retreating enemy did not take place because of the extreme exhaustion of the German units.

The IV Corps, which was to lead the main attack, found no opponent at dawn. All canal crossings had been destroyed during the night. After a few hours proceeding over temporary bridges, the 8th Division reached French territory at Quiévrain around noon and was supposed to advance further west towards Valenciennes. This advance had to be stopped, however, because the rear guards of the enemy, which was now evidently moving away - above all the British cavalry division - involved the 8th Division in combat in the Baisieux-Audregnies area. The 7th Division meanwhile reached Angre via Thulin .

On the right flank, the II Corps reached and occupied Condé that day against weak resistance from French troops. The units of HKK 2 took part in battles against parts of two surprisingly appearing French territorial divisions Tournai and Marchiennes .

Results and consequences

Memorial at the base of the hotly contested bridge at Nimy

Unlike the British, the German losses at Mons have not yet been seriously researched. The figure of 5,000 dead and wounded on 23 August alone, often cited by British authors, is nowhere proven and apparently more or less fictitious. Since the total losses of all 6 corps of the 1st Army from August 20 to 31, 1914 amounted to a total of 2,145 dead and missing and 4,932 wounded, a significantly lower number of losses can be assumed.

The German troops had pushed the British units out of some ideal defensive positions and held the battlefield. However, tactical success turned out to be a serious strategic failure in the long run. The 1st Army had encountered the extreme left wing of the opposing deployment head-on - and had not bypassed it with its main forces, as had been planned in the concept. This was mainly due to the narrowing of this association by the AOK 2, which was enforced against Kluck's resistance. The BEF was able to evade the subsequent outflanking from the battle in good time and in good order on August 24th. This strong fighter association remained operational.

The Battle of Mons also made it clear that Britain was able to make more than a symbolic contribution to a modern land war on the European continent. The careless underestimation of this potential by the top German military - Moltke had commented on the news of the landing of the British troops to Tirpitz with the words "We arrest them!" Meaning.

literature

• John French: 1914. Boston / New York 1919.
• Raimund von Gleichen-Rußwurm, Ernst Zurborn: The battle at Mons. Stalling, Oldenburg i. Cit. 1919 ( digitized version ).
• Reichsarchiv (ed.): The border battles in the west (The World War 1914 to 1918, Volume 1). Berlin 1925.
• David Lomas: Mons 1914. The BEF's tactical triumph. Praeger, Westport 2004, ISBN 0-275-98290-4 ( limited preview on Google Books).
• Philip Watson: Audregnies. The Flank Guard Action and the First Cavalry Charge of the Great War, August 24, 1914 . Helion & Company Limited: Warwick, 2019, ISBN 978-1-911628-97-2
• Terence Zuber: The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle . The History Press Ltd., 2010, ISBN 978-0752452470 .

Web links

Commons : Battle of Mons  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

1. ↑ See The Battles and Skirmishes of the Great War 1914–1918. Source work according to the official names compiled by the Great General Staff, Berlin 1919, p. 12 as well as Otto, Helmut, Schmiedel, Karl, The First World War. Military historical outline, 3rd, completely revised and supplemented edition Berlin 1977, p. 62.
2. ↑ See Reichsarchiv (ed.), Die Grenzschlachten im Westen (The World War 1914 to 1918, Volume 1), Berlin 1925, pp. 429, 495 and Otto, Schmiedel, World War, p. 62.
3. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 501.
4. ^ "For the British - both soldiers and the public at home, both then and now - Mons became one of the great legends of the war." Herwig, Holger H., The Marne, 1914. The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World, New York 2011.
5. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 492.
6. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten Vol. 1, p. 493f.
7. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 495 and John Keegan , Der First World War. A European tragedy , Reinbek 2001, p. 148.
8. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 365f.
9. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 369.
10. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 418.
11. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 419f.
12. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 424.
13. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 421f.
14. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 422.
15. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 422.
16. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 426.
17. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 498f.
18. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 426f.
19. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 427.
20. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 428f.
21. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 429.
22. ↑ See, for example, Keegan, World War, p. 151.
23. ↑ See Heeres-Sanitätsinspektion in the Reichswehr Ministry (ed.), Medical report on the German Army in the World War 1914/1918 (German War Medical Report 1914/1918). Volume 3. The sick movement in the German field and occupation army in the World War 1914/1918, Berlin 1934, p. 36.
24. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 430.
25. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Grenzschlachten, p. 501.
26. ↑ See Tirpitz, Alfred von, memories, Leipzig 1920, p. 251.