Battle of Soissons (1918)

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of Soissons (1918)
Sketch for the attack on July 18, 1918
Sketch for the attack on July 18, 1918
date July 18 to July 22, 1918
place Area southwest of Soissons , France
output Allied victory
consequences The German troops are pushed back onto the Aisne
Parties to the conflict

German EmpireThe German Imperium German Empire

FranceFrance France United States
United States 48United States 

Commander

Theodor von Watter
Hermann von Staabs
Johannes von Eben (9th Army)

Émile Fayolle (Groupe d'Armées de Réserve)
Charles Mangin
Charles P. Summerall

Troop strength
9th Army
234,000 men
French 10th Army (16 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions)
American Expeditionary Corps (3 divisions)
345,000 men, 478 tanks

The Battle of Soissons (French: Bataille du Soissonnais et de L'Ourcq ) from July 18 to 22, 1918 was part of the second Battle of the Marne and a decisive combat operation on the western front of the First World War . An Allied flank thrust from the forest of Villers-Cotterêts , which was supported by around 400 tanks in the direction of Soissons , forced the retreat of the German troops from the Marne front arc. The battle was for the most part carried out by the troops of the American Expeditionary Forces under French high command, which, with heavy losses of their own, brought the Germans' last major offensive to failure. After this successful offensive, the military initiative passed completely to the side of the Entente until the end of the war . For the Americans, the victory at Soissons together with the fighting at Château-Thierry was immediately stylized as a turning point in the war.

prehistory

At the end of May 1918, the German high command began the so-called Blücher-Yorck attack over the Chemin des Dames in the direction of the Marne, which threatened both Paris and the rail link between the French capital and Verdun . The result of this third battle on the Aisne was a semicircular front arc on the western front, which was 48 kilometers wide at the base and extended at a depth of about 40 kilometers south to Chateau-Thierry on the Marne. The city of Soissons fell into German hands on May 29th.

The Allied commanders Foch and Persching

On the evening of May 30th, a few days after the start of the German offensive, the Commander-in-Chief of the AEF , General John Pershing , arrived in Sarcus to consult with General Ferdinand Foch , the Commander of the Groupe d'Armées du Nord , to take countermeasures. On June 1, Pershing attended a meeting of the Supreme War Council in Versailles . Two weeks later, on June 14th, Foch wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, General Philippe Pétain : “I have the honor to draw your attention to the importance of the communications network at Soissons , which is used to supply four German divisions on the Marne Front and at the same time represents the only junction of all railways available to the enemy on the Aisne and to the south of it. ”Foch's letter to Pétain also reached General Charles Emmanuel Mangin . The commander of the French 10th Army responded on June 20 with a plan for an offensive operation to retake the plateau southwest of Soissons, stating: “From here the long-range artillery could expose the bridge and railway network on the Aisne to intense bombardment. Access to the Villers-Cotterêts forest should be secured on the heights of Villers-Hélon and not on the Longpont plain.

German armed forces

General of the Infantry Johannes von Eben, Commander in Chief of the 9th Army

On June 19, before the start of the German offensive over the Aisne , the German Army High Command 9 (General of the Infantry Johannes von Eben ) was transferred from the Eastern Front to the Western Front. On June 23, the 9th Army was assigned the sector to the left of the 18th Army and to the right of the 7th Army from Noyon south to Noroy-sur-Ourcq , which, from the German point of view, represented the right section of the conquered front arc. At the beginning of July, the 9th Army was assigned to three corps groups, each with three divisions:

In addition, four divisions ( 47th Reserve - 14th , 23rd and 34th Inf. Divisions ) were held in army reserves, while a fifth division ( 28th ) was in the section of the 9th Army as a reserve of the German Crown Prince Army Group . The Staabs group , the XXXIX. Reserve Corps had the Bavarian 11th Division on the south bank and the 241st Division on the north bank of the Aisne, the Watter group , the XIII. Corps was south of it as far as the Ourcq .

The German aerial reconnaissance advised General von Eben that Allied infantry columns had been identified moving east from Taillefontaine . On the evening of July 11th he ordered the 9th Army to reinforce the important points of the positions at Pernant, on the Beaurepaire farm west of Villers-Hélon and on the hills of Chouy. A second resistance line with concentration at Saconin-et-Breuil , Chaudun , Vierzy and on the western edge of the Bois de Mauloy in the area of ​​St. Rémy- Blanzy-lès-Fismes should be prepared. From July 12th, 9th Army artillery began firing at assembly points and approach routes in order to delay these Allied preparations as much as possible. Despite Foch's efforts to keep the attack a secret, the German leadership had already received clues from deserters on July 11th, informing them of large troop concentrations in the Forêt de Retz and of an imminent major attack. To strengthen their defense south of the Aisne, the Germans placed more artillery batteries in the sector of the 241st Division. The 46th Reserve Division was called in to reinforce the Woyna Group (VII Army Corps). The 14th Division was in support of the XXXIX. Reserve Corps was deployed north of the Aisne and the 34th Division was brought into reserve to support the Staabs group south of the Aisne. The 6th division was also at the seam between the XXXIX. Reserve Corps and the XIII. Corps placed. The 47th reserve - and the 28th division behind the section of the XIII. Corps contracted. Eventually, the artillery of the 211th Division (from VII Corps) was transferred to the 28th Division.

The concentration of the OHL , however, according to the will of the Chief of Staff Ludendorff, was to carry out the Marneschutz-Reims attack on July 15 as planned.

In the early morning of July 15th, three German armies attacked. 23 divisions of the German 1st and 3rd Armies under Generals Mudra and Eine attacked the French 4th and 5th Armies on both sides of Reims , while another 17 divisions of the 7th Army attacked the French 6th Army ( Degoutte ) in the south the Marne attacked. Ludendorff wanted to split the French armed forces by attacking both sides at Reims.

Consequences of the Marneschutz offensive

Location on the Marne on July 15 and 18, 1918
Colonel General Max von Boehn

The German attack in the eastern arc to the south failed due to the resistance of the French 5th Army (General Berthelot ) and had stalled at 11 a.m. on the first day. The offensive west of Reims, on the other hand, was more successful: Colonel-General Max von Boehn , the commander of the German 7th Army, managed to bring seven divisions across the Marne. It broke through the right wing of the French 6th Army and was able to bridge the Marne at Dormans , with a bridgehead being formed over a width of 8 kilometers across the river. Along the Marne at Chateau-Thierry opposite the 3rd US Division (General Joseph T. Dickman ), the Germans were not so successful. Although some Allied positions were overwhelmed there, with the infantry and machine gun departments suffering losses of 50 percent in some cases, no German soldier was able to cross the road from Fossoy to Crézancy . On July 16, the German 7th Army was only able to continue its attack on the Marne on the route between la Chapelle south and Marfaux north of the river; the XXIII. Reserve Corps was responsible for protecting the right flank.

The course of the Battle of the Marne then offered the opportunity for the Allied counter-offensive, which was supposed to remove the threat to Paris and the Paris-Nancy railway line. The 1st US Division was bivouacked in the Forêt de Compiegne on July 16 and spent the whole day in the forest in order to remain hidden from the German aircraft. The 2nd Artillery Brigade of the American 2nd Division had already been pulled up to Betz on the night of July 14th to 15th. Brigadier General Albert J. Bowley preceded his brigade to Chantilly to consult with General Mangin about the use of American artillery. The division platoons were ordered to concentrate near Lizy-sur-Ourcq . The American 2nd Division had arrived in Marcilly, its troops arrived on the morning of July 17, 15 miles from their attack position, west of the Forêt de Retz. As part of the XX. Corps, the Moroccan 1st Division standing there was familiar with the area; its task was to pull back its flanks to make room on the right and left for the two American divisions to move in.

Allied attack plans

Original Allied attack plans
General Emile Fayolle
General Charles Mangin

In mid-July 1918 there were 26 American divisions in northern France in various readiness, of which 7 were trained in the Villers-Cotterêts area and on the Marne. 5 other divisions were in French sectors south of Verdun and another 5 between Ypres and Arras in British sectors. The rest were still in education and training. The 1st and 2nd Divisions were relocated after their missions in Cantigny and the Battle of Belleau Wood . Both divisions were brought up to full strength in early July with troops from the 41st US Division. On July 12, the 1st and 2nd US divisions were assigned to the newly formed American III. Corps (General Robert L. Bullard ) assigned to the French 6th Army.

The French chief of staff, Pétain, instructed the leadership of the Groupe d'Armées de Réserve (General Fayolle) and the centre's army group to prepare immediately for an offensive, stating: “The minimum success of the attack should be to prevent the enemy from using the To withdraw the supply and transport hub of Soissons. ”This meant the deployment of the French 10th and 6th Armies against the western flank of the Marne front arc. The French 10th Army was to lead the main attack against the communication routes between Soissons and the Marne. In support of the main attack, the French 6th Army also had to attack south of the River Ourcq, while on the eastern flank the French 5th Army would attack along both banks of the Marne and with its right flank on the heights south of the River Vesle. At least the attacks of the 5th and 6th French Armies would mean that German reserves could not be used against the main attack of the 10th Army (General Charles Mangin ). The following day, Pétain stated that the attack would start on the morning of July 18, while emphasizing the need for secrecy.

Fayolles Chief of Staff sent a telegram on July 14th assigning the 1st and 2nd American Divisions to the French 10th Army. Fayolle himself issued a memorandum in which the entire Army Group of the Reserve was instructed not to trust anyone who is not personally known to be reliable, only to move at night, not to light fires and to report anything and every suspect. In order to deceive the Germans as to their real intentions, General Mangin decided to keep his artillery in a position that the Germans considered defensive, far from the German forward territories - within range of the German front but unable to prevent the arrival of hostile areas To slow down replacement or reinforcement forces.

Generals Pershing and Bullard (center right) with French officers

At 11 a.m. on July 16, General Fayolle sent a telegram to the French headquarters in which he stated that Mangin advised the French 10th Army not to open barrages before the attack in order to achieve a complete surprise of the enemy. The telegram also recommended starting the following infantry attack at 4:35 a.m. behind a rolling barrage. For tactical reasons, the French 6th Army in the south needed an immediate preparatory fire. General Fayolle left the starting time for the attack to General Jean-Marie Degoutte , the Army Commander, on the condition that the barrage should not precede the attack. At around noon on July 17, General Pétain approved General Fayolle's orders and set July 18 as the date of the attack.

On July 17th, the 1st US Division advanced to the area near Mortefontaine and at 9:00 p.m. the troops began to move through the forest to their starting positions. The evening before, the commander of the 2nd US Division met James Harbord and his staff at the headquarters of the III. Corps in Taillefontaine on the northern edge of the Forêt de Retz . Here Harbord and his chief of staff, Colonel Preston Brown , spent the remainder of the night studying maps and preparing the attack.

The German 7th Army fought until July 17th on the south bank of the Marne between Epernay and Chateau-Thierry . Colonel-General von Boehn threw 6 divisions in the 9 mile long and 4 mile deep bridgehead before the French 9th Army (de Mitry) could stop this advance on July 17th. After the Germans finally failed with their attempts at breakthrough, General Foch approved the order for a counter-offensive. The attacks by the Allies were directed in particular against the section of the German VIII and IV reserve corps. During Harbord's visit to General Berdoulat, his operations officer offered to work out the combat orders for the American 2nd Division. The commander of the Moroccan 1st Division, General Albert Daugan in Vivières , presented the Americans with combat orders that had been drawn up by Colonel Henri Giraud . Harbord declined both orders and later stated, "If I had accepted any of these orders and disaster had occurred, who would have stood up for my position?"

Final preparations

On the night of 17./18. In July 1918 the 10th and 6th French armies were ready to attack on the front from the Aisne to the Clignon Bach over a total of 36 kilometers. East of the Forêt de Retz in the direction of Soissons was a treeless plain with waist-high wheat fields. The aim of the Allies to cut off the road and rail network that ran south from Soissons to the Marne, 12 kilometers away, was not visible due to the sloping terrain. Four deep, swampy depressions ran through this plain to the villages of Missy, Ploisy, Lechelle and Vierzy, which consisted of buildings made of sturdy masonry, which offered the enemy good defenses. Two main traffic routes that were important for the German troops were to be brought under control by the attack: the Soissons-Château-Thierry road ran perpendicular to the line of attack to the south and the Soissons-Paris road, which ran through Longpont directly through the starting positions of the American 2nd Division. The Allied divisions should reach this main route south at Noyant-et-Aconin and Oulchy-le-Château .

The 2nd Tank Brigade deployed at Soissons under Colonel Chedeville had a total of 478 tanks, of which 324 were deployed with the 10th Army and 154 tanks with the 6th Army. On the day before the attack there were a total of about 540 tanks within the French armed forces, which were divided into three regiments of three light compartments each with 75 Renault FT-17s and one division each with 30 Schneider CA1 and St. Chamond , as well as five independent ones Departments that included medium vehicles of both types. In Mangin's section, however, only 225 tanks could be used on July 18 due to technical problems.

The battle of Soissons

Counteroffensive from the forest of Villers-Cotterêts and Battle of Soissons, 18./22. July 1918
General Pierre Émile Berdoulat

On the morning of July 18, 1918, at 4.35 a.m., French and American troops started a counter-offensive between Fontenoy and Courchamps . The 10th Army attacked the German 9th Army from the west, 3 American, 16 French infantry and 3 cavalry divisions were deployed on a 24 km wide section. The artillery comprised 240 light and 231 heavy batteries with around 1,500 guns, 581 aircraft were used to achieve air supremacy and 375 tanks were used to support the ground forces. Within the 10th Army, the main blow was with the XX. Corps (General Pierre Émile Berdoulat ), to whom the removal of the high plateau of Chaudun fell to with strong American troops . The corps had the Moroccan 1st Division (General Albert Daugan) and the 1st and 2nd US Divisions . The 19th, 58th, 69th Divisions and the 2nd Cavalry Corps (General Félix Adolphe Robillot ) had been made available as reserves for this section in the hinterland to expand the breakthrough . On the left wing of the 10th Army, the I. Corps (General Gustave Paul Lacapelle ) initially remained in the north with the 162, 72 and 153 divisions in defense, while the center (XXX. Corps) and right wing (XI. Corps) were absent attacked the forest of Villers-Cotterêts. The southern flank of the Mangin Army between Ourcq and Alland -Bach covered the II. Corps (General Edme Philipot with the 33rd, 2nd and 47th Divisions), which was the left wing of the French 6th Army ( Degoutte ) against the German XXV . General von Winckler's Reserve Corps deployed.

July 18th

Theodor von Watter, Kdr. Gen. XIII. AK
General Hippolyte-Alphonse Penet
Maj. Gen. James Harbord,
GOC 2nd US Division
Maj. Gen. Charles Summerall, GOC 1st U.S. Division

On July 18 at 4:45 a.m., the troops of the French XX. Corps from the Coevres - Saint-Pierre-Aigle line made the main attack in the direction of Chaudun and Missy-aux-Bois. The 1st US Division (Major General Charles P. Summerall ) was supported by 48 French Schneider tanks. The 1st Moroccan Division (General Albert Daugan) attacked at St. Pierre-Aigle, on the left flank covered the 18th US Regiment of the 1st US Division and the right flank the 5th Marine Regiment of the 2nd US -Division. The Moroccan division was one of only three French divisions that still consisted of 12 battalions and had been fighting on the same site since May. To the right of it from the Forêt de Retz , the French XXX. Corps (General Hippolyte-Alphonse Penet ) with the 38th and 48th Divisions on both sides from Longpont against the German 14th Reserve Division (Lieutenant General Robert Loeb ). The French XI. Corps (General Marie Léon Prax ) attacked the positions of the German 115th Division (Major General Friedrich Kundt) south of it with the 5th, 41st and 128th Divisions . A first major obstacle for the 1st US Division was directly on the advance of the 2nd Brigade. The battles over the kilometer-wide Missy Gorge were difficult, here the Bavarian 11th Division (Lieutenant General von Kneussl ) had posted a large number of machine guns and small artillery pieces for defense. The 2nd Battalion of the 28th Infantry Regiment under Major Clarence R. Huebner lost about 50 percent of their combat troops in two unsuccessful attacks through the Missy Gorge. The success, however, enabled the 1st Brigade to advance faster until it was stopped in the Chazelle Gorge 4.0 km further east. The 2nd Brigade was able to fight its way 2.7 km through the Missy Gorge to the depression in Ploisy . The 2nd US Division (Major General Harbord) fought its way through the Vierzy Gorge with two columns, while the Moroccan 1st Division advanced through the Chazelle- Léchelle Gorge.

The French 153rd Division (General Fernand Jules Goubeau), however, got stuck with its right wing at German entrenchments that dominated the plateau southwest of Vauxbuin . Despite desperate resistance, the German troops were pushed back and the land gains made secured. At 11:00 am, Colonel CS Babcock , commander of the 28th US Infantry Regiment, asked the commander of the French 153rd Division to return the 2nd Battalion to its own sector. The defensive position at Vauxbuin and the holding back of the French enabled the Germans to fire on the now open flank of the 28th Infantry Regiment. After the general command of the German XIII. Corps faced the strongest Allied attack, it was also the first to be reinforced by Army High Command 9, initially by one brigade and later in the day by three other brigades. Heavy German artillery and machine gun fire stopped elements of the 1st US Division and the Moroccan Division shortly before the gorges of Chazelle and Ploisy and blocked further advance. The French 153rd Division was finally able to break through to Saconin-et-Breuil and sent the requested battalion to relieve the Americans. The entire 2nd Battalion was back in the attack zone of the 28th Infantry Regiment at 2:00 p.m. The neighboring 26th Infantry Regiment had reached its first target at 5:30 a.m. and stopped halfway to Missy-aux-Bois.

Meanwhile, the 1st Moroccan Division attacked Villemontoire . The attacked front of the German 241st Division (Lieutenant General August Forthmüller) was rolled up in the south, on the left wing of the Staabs group (Gen. Kdo. XXXIX. Res.K.) there was a gap in the front. The front of the 11th Bavarian Division still held out, but the right wing of the Watter group (Gen. Kdo. XIII. AK), the 14th Reserve and 42nd Divisions had already been pushed back on Chaudun. Due to the now open northern flank, the front of the 40th Division of Gruppe Winckler (Gen. Kdo. XXV. RK), defending east of Ancienville , could no longer be held. The newly deployed Etzel group (Gen. Kdo. XVII. AK with the 51st and 45th Reserve Divisions ), destined to counterattack in this gap in the front, was entrusted with the leadership between the Watter and Winckler groups . At 5:30 p.m., parts of the 1st Division captured the town of Ploisy and advanced east of the town through the Chazelle Gorge. At 6:00 p.m. the German 20th Division attacked the left flank of the 2nd Division and tried in vain to regain the ground it had lost during the day. Although the US 1st and 2nd Divisions attracted the most attention due to the particular importance of their attack, they were not the only American divisions participating in the July 18 offensive. A little further south in the section of the French II Corps, the 4th US Division (Major General George H. Cameron ) had been divided up among the French attacking troops and served as a reserve until they too took part in the attack in the Marnebogen from July 22nd.

July 19

American troops advance on French Renault tanks

On July 19 at 4:00 am the 1st US Division resumed the attack in the direction of Buzancy and Berzy-le-Sec. This attack began without preparatory artillery fire but with strong barrages and armored support. The attacked front of the German 241st Division was rolled up, there was a gap in the front on the left wing of the Staabs group (Gen. Kdo. XXXIX. Res.K.). The main focus of the Allied attacks was again directed against the Watter group , the heights around Buzancy and east of Villemontoire were violently attacked. At Buzancy the German 20th Division, which had arrived from the reserve, was deployed to counterattack at Villemontoire, which started in the afternoon. In the sector of the 2nd US Division Harbord ordered the 6th Marine Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee ) to continue the attack. The other three regiments in the division were too exhausted to take part in any further attacks. When the attack of the 6th Regiment began at 9:00 a.m., the accompanying French tanks attracted German artillery fire, which resulted in about a third of the tank force being incapacitated. Around noon the 2nd Division had advanced to La Râperie via Parcy-et-Tigny . The losses of the Marines during the advance were extremely high with 1145 men. The French 2nd Corps took Neuilly-Saint-Front on July 19 in battle with the 10th Bavarian Division . To the south of it the French of the Etzel group were able to wrest the towns of Saint Remy and Billy . The 1st Moroccan Division and the 6th Regiment struck back another German counterattack west of Villemontoire.

In the evening General Staabs and his divisions had to go back to Soissons, north of the Aisne the closer connection to the Hofmann group (Gen. Kdo. XXXVIII. Res. Corps ) took place. The French 2nd Corps took Neuilly-Saint-Front in battle with the Bavarian division on July 19 .

The 1st US Division has had losses of 7,000 men since its baptism of fire, 60% percent of the infantry officers were killed or wounded. It had advanced seven miles during four days of constant fighting and occupied Berzy-le-Sec and the heights southwest of Soissons. It brought in around 3,500 prisoners and 68 field guns from seven different German divisions. The 2nd US Division advanced 8 kilometers in the first 26 hours and stood across from Tigny by the end of the second day. In addition to a lot of war material, it brought in around 3,000 prisoners, 2 batteries with 150 mm cannons, 66 light cannons and 15,000 rounds of 77 mm ammunition. The French 58th Division began to relieve the 2nd Division on the evening of July 19-20 and took over its front completely the next afternoon. The 2nd Division lost 4,135 men between July 18 and 20, including over 700 dead. Harbord was convinced that the advance, despite the heavy casualties, had made an extremely important contribution to the Allied victory. He wrote in his memoir that the successes of the 2nd Division in Soissons would have been worthwhile, "even if every member of the division had fallen from the commanding general to the last available replacement." The 2nd Division was in reserve after Pierrefonds and Taillefontaine withdrawn from the 10th Army. The attack by the 6th Regiment on July 19 had been particularly heavy. The unit suffered the highest number of casualties of any unit in the 2nd Division that were involved in the offensive, which was in large part due to the precise German artillery fire.

20th of July

Because of the danger of cutting off the six divisions that were still in the southern Marnebogen, Ludendorff ordered the general German withdrawal of the 7th Army from the promontory on July 20. The southern Conta and Wichura groups fought stubbornly to prevent their troops from being encircled south of the Marne.

After the replacement of the 2nd US Division, the 1st Division remained in line and ordered the advance to continue the next day. The XX. Corps adjusted the division boundaries on July 20 at 2:30 am and set the courtyard La Folie east of Buzancy as the new target of the 1st Division. From 14:00, after two hours of artillery preparation, the American attacks made progress before they stalled again in front of Berzy-le-Sec. The XX. Corps ordered another attack on July 21, but by this time the units of the 1st US Division were already so mixed with French units that the further organization had to be largely improvised. The 28th Infantry Regiment had gained control of Berzy-le-Sec at 10:15, but during the day the entire 1st Division came under heavy artillery and machine gun fire and had to fend off a German counterattack. On the evening of July 21, the 1st US Division had secured a permanent position on the Soissons-Château-Thierry road on the outskirts of Buzancy. On the night of July 22nd to 23rd, the 1st US Division was replaced by the Scottish 15th Division for several days . In four days of fighting the 1st Division had advanced 11 kilometers deep, but had lost 6,870 men (including 1,500 dead).

consequences

Major General George H. Cameron, GOC 4th US Division

East of Chateau-Thierry and south of the Marne, the 3rd Division (Major General Joseph T. Dickman ) received the order to join the counterattack on July 20th. She had crossed the Marne by the 22nd without encountering serious resistance because of the German withdrawal. The aim of the American attack, the city of Soissons, was reached on July 21st after the German retreat, but only fell into the hands of the Allies on August 2nd. On August 3, the troops of the retreated German 7th Army moved to their old positions along the Aisne and Vesle, which they were able to hold against further Allied attacks for the time being. The regiments of the 4th US Division (Major General George H. Cameron ) used separately in this battle were reunited and replaced the 42nd US Division on August 2 in the Fère-en-Tardenois area. The 42nd US Division deployed at the front had lost around 5500 officers and men in the pursuit of Vesle alone.

Up until the beginning of August, a total of around 250,000 US soldiers with 7 divisions and 2 corps commands (I Corps and III Corps) were involved in the reconquest of the Marne front arc. Three American divisions, the 3rd, 28th, and 42nd, faced the Germans alongside the 4th division, closely following the 26th and 32nd, and were preparing for the further advance over the rivers Vesle and Aisne. On August 5, the entire front of the French 6th Army was essentially held by two American corps. On August 6, the Allied counter-offensive on the Aisne sector was stopped for the time being. The result of this counter-offensive was of decisive importance, the war turned in favor of the Allies and remained in their hands until the end of the war. After the war, the American memorial Château-Thierry was built between 1930 and 1932 to commemorate the victory .

literature

  • George W. Browne: Divisional records of the American expeditionary forces in Europe, compiled from official sources by GW Browne and Rosecrans W. Pillsbury, Overseas Book Company 121, 19211851-1930.
  • Stephen C. McGeorge / Mason W. Watson: The Marne 15 July - 6 August 1918 , Government Printing Office, Center of Military History, Washington 2018, pp. 40 f.
  • Reichsarchiv: The World War 1914 to 1918. Volume 14: The conduct of war on the Western Front in 1918 . Mittler, Berlin 1944.
  • Alfred Stenger: Turn of fate: From the Marne to the Vesle 1918 , printed and published by Gerhard Stalling, Berlin 1930.
  • Douglas V. Johnson / Rolfe L. Hillman: Soissons 1918 , Texas A&M University Press; 2000, ISBN 0-89096-893-4 .
  • James G. Harbord: The American Army in France 1917-1919 . Boston 1936, Little, Brown and Company. OCLC 238838905.
  • Barrie Pitt: 1918 The Last Act. Barnsley, South Yorkshire 2003, Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 978-1-4738-3476-7 .

Remarks

  1. The since June 18, 1918 charged with the leadership Fritz von Below was fatally ill, therefore, the previous commander General of Infantry Johannes von Eben continue in command in representation to early August, although at the same time the supreme command of the army division A held.

Web links