Schlieffen plan

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The Schlieffen Plan was a strategic and operational plan of the Great General Staff in the German Empire , which goes back to a memorandum by Field Marshal Alfred Graf von Schlieffen . After thorough revision by Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke, it formed a basis for German operations at the beginning of the First World War .

In the event of a war on two fronts , the memorandum, written in 1905, provided for the mass of the German army to be deployed in the west against France , to circumvent the French fortifications with the north wing and to take the French army at the rear. After a victory over France within a few weeks, the troops were to be relocated to the east to take action against Russia . Schlieffen's intention was to divide the war against France and Russia into two successive campaigns. In 1905, General von Schlieffen assumed that Russia would be weakened in the Russo-Japanese War , whose slow advance against Germany would be effectively delayed by the Austro-Hungarian Army .

The implementation of corresponding plans in the First World War in 1914 failed because the political and military situation on which the plan was based had meanwhile changed further to the disadvantage of Germany. The German attack on neutral Belgium , which had not consented to the march of German troops into France, prompted Great Britain to enter the war .

In the history of science, the question of how far the memorandum written by Schlieffen influenced or corresponded to the actual planning.

The German plan of attack in the West in 1914 based on Schlieffen's basic ideas from 1905
The German attack plan of 1914 based on the so-called "Schlieffen Plan" from 1905

German planning in front of Schlieffen and the Eastern deployment plan

With the German-Russian reinsurance treaty of 1887, Germany tried to reduce the risk of a two-front war against a Franco-Russian alliance. The secret treaty concluded for three years guaranteed both states mutual neutrality in the event of a war with a third major power. On the advice of Bismarck's successor Caprivi, Kaiser Wilhelm II refused to renew the treaty after it had expired in 1890.

Thereupon Russia concluded a secret military convention with France in 1892, from which the two union between France and Russia developed (1894). From this and from the Entente cordiale (1904) between France and Great Britain, the Triple Entente emerged in 1907 with the Treaty of Saint Petersburg . The German General Staff had to prepare a plan for a two-front war. However, instead of working to avoid a war on two fronts, the General Staff sought to win one.

Schlieffen's predecessor, Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke , had devised an " eastern deployment " in the event of a war on two fronts , which provided a strategic defensive. The army was to be divided roughly equally between east and west. According to this, the German Reich was to remain on the defensive in the west and repel the expected French attack in the well-defendable belt of fortifications in Alsace-Lorraine . Moltke expressly warned against marching against Paris, as the experience of 1871 had shown how difficult it was to negotiate a peace treaty under these circumstances. The plan for the east was to push back the Russian attack, then to push back and to repel the Russian armies to a strategically important point. The troops available in the event of a repelled attack would then be available at any time to reinforce the other front. True to the primacy of politics, Moltke wanted to leave open the possibility of a compromise peace at all times.

From 1886 the tensions in Europe and in France the revisionist tendencies increased. Due to heightened tensions in the Balkans, the Mediterranean Entente came about in 1887 through the direct mediation of Chancellor Bismarck , which was directed against further expansion of Russia. In the fall of 1887, influential figures from the military and diplomacy such as Friedrich von Holstein , Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke and Alfred von Waldersee pleaded for a preventive war against Russia. The Quartermaster General Alfred Graf von Waldersee saw a war with Russia already as inevitable: "The chancellor still hopes to win the war with Russia around. Nothing will help him, we are drifting into the war, in the spring. ”Moltke took account of the fear of an imminent war with Russia by demanding that military talks begin with the Austrian General Staff, and military talks in the event of war Agreements should be made. His deployment plan from the spring of 1888 now provided for a joint offensive with Austria against Russia in the event of a two-front war; in the west the German Reich was to remain defensive until the end of the campaign against Russia.

In August 1888 Moltke was followed by Count von Waldersee, which he himself had chosen. Waldersee was plagued by a fear of a Russian attack that was widespread in the German ruling class at the time. Several times (especially in 1887, but also in 1889) he therefore called for a concerted preventive strike against Russia. Under him, the Eastern deployment initially remained the basis for a two-front war against France and Russia. However, he gradually changed Moltke's plan. In good weather, Waldersee wanted to continue a limited offensive against Russian Poland together with Austria-Hungary ; a total of up to seven army corps were planned for this. In the west he wanted to remain defensive with the 13 to 15 corps stationed there and defend the Rhine line under all circumstances. After the French attack, which was inevitable in the event of war, had been repulsed, he envisaged a limited counterattack, as far as possible from the overall situation, which was to destroy as large parts of the French field army as possible before it could retreat to its fortress belt between Belfort and Verdun. Again, under no circumstances should the conquest of Paris be aimed at. In the case of more unfavorable winter weather conditions, however, Waldersees provided for further plans to initially remain strictly defensive in the east; the plan in the west should be maintained.

In 1891, Count von Waldersee had to vacate his post as Chief of Staff after falling out with Wilhelm II. His successor was Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, who developed the basic ideas of his plan in his first memorandum in April 1891: attack on France by neutral Belgium and, after the defeat of France, the attack in the east. But it was not until the spring of 1913 that the German General Staff had ceased to work on the great plan of deployment to the east as an alternative plan, which, according to Fritz Fischer , which is now controversial in history, is probably due to the emperor's agreement in principle to the preventive war in the war council of December 8, 1912 .

Schlieffen's plans and memorandum

Strategic planning

Schlieffen gradually reversed the strategy of his predecessors. Russia had expanded its rail network in the west and built a series of fortresses, known as the Narew Line. Schlieffen therefore did not believe in the possibility of a quick victory over Russia. From 1892 to 1905 he worked out a plan that envisaged German mobilization in a short period of time and relied on first defeating France in a short campaign before the Russian army could be fully mobilized. After defeating France in the west, Germany could concentrate its troops in the east against Russia. France's eastern border from Verdun to Belfort was increasingly fortified against Germany after 1871 by the Barrière de fer . Schlieffen ruled out a frontal attack on this line of defense. It was based on the battle of Cannae , in which Hannibal had defeated a numerically superior Roman army by attacking it from the flanks and from the rear. The German troops were to bypass the French fortification belt west of Metz and Strasbourg and carry out an encircling maneuver. A pincer movement was planned. The main part was to form the right wing, advance through Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg into the northern French hinterland, then turn south, cross the lower Seine and then turn east. Then he should take hold of the French forces that were being fought by the German left wing in the fortified terrain of Lorraine.

In the years before the First World War, a number of strategic railway lines were built for the necessary transport of troops .

In 1893/94 he planned 4 army corps, 6 reserve divisions and 4 cavalry divisions for the east in his deployment plan; the remaining three quarters of the German army he now planned for the west. In his General Staff Tour (East) in 1894, he provided for an additional army corps in the event of a Russian attack (which would include two armies and foresee the actual course of events up to the Battle of Tannenberg ).

In the General Staff trip (East) in 1903, Schlieffen returned to the idea of ​​not being able to destroy France in a simulation game; In this simulation game, 7 army corps for the east and an "appropriate number of reserve units as well as Landwehr and Landsturm units" are provided, which would be reinforced by troops from the west after at least the French army had been forced to retreat behind its fortress belt. Analogously, Schlieffen provided for 25 army corps and 15 reserve divisions for the war against France in his deployment plan (variant I) , but only 3 corps and 4 reserve divisions were planned for the east. In the alternating deployment plan (variant II), on the other hand, which served as reinsurance and followed Moltke's earlier plans, he only planned to deploy around half of the troops in the west and the other half (a total of 14 army corps) in the east.

Around 1904 the plan was revised again. Due to the weakening of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War , it was now assumed - optimistically - that it would be a one-front war. Schlieffen's first version now bore the unmistakable title “War of Aggression against France”. In the course of the First Morocco Crisis , Schlieffen saw the time had come to implement the plan, but Kaiser Wilhelm II rejected a war.

Memorandum

1st page of Schlieffen's memorandum from 1905

When it was decided that Schlieffen would leave for reasons of age, he laid down his plan again in the form of a memorandum in December 1905, which is still known today as the Schlieffen Plan. The position of the Moselle became the fulcrum of German deployment planning: 7/8 of the troops were to be set up north of it and only small forces south of it. In violation of Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg neutrality, the French fortresses were to be bypassed. After encircling their left flank, the French army should be defeated. If this withdrew, it was planned to continue the enclosure south of Paris back to the Swiss border in order to push the French army against their own fortress front and to smash them in a cauldron. The 1905 plan was mainly geared towards a one-front war, but provided for a two-front war. Schlieffen reduced the risk of war with Great Britain to fighting an expeditionary force . In fact, the Franco-British military convention of November 1912 provided for only four to six British divisions to be sent to France in the event of a German attack.

In this last memorandum there is the admission that the German army is too weak to carry out the plan and that it can only succeed under very favorable circumstances. However, Schlieffen and the General Staff did not draw any conclusions from this insight.

In May 1900, Schlieffen informed Friedrich August von Holstein that the General Staff would not be bound by international agreements in the event of a war on two fronts. Holstein replied: "If the Chief of the Great General Staff, and definitely a strategic authority like Schlieffen, consider such a measure necessary, then it is the diplomat's duty to adapt to them and to prepare them in every possible way." No Chancellor, neither Hohenlohe yet Bulow raised an objection to the plan. Because of the special position of the military, which was subordinate only to the Kaiser and not to the Reich Chancellor, there was not a single meeting of the War Council before 1914 in which government politicians could participate in discussions about the plans of the military.

Schlieffen was so convinced of his plan of deployment and encirclement against France that his last words were said to have been on his deathbed: “Make my right wing strong!” Schlieffen's successor, Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke , refrained from continuing the deployment plan to the east from 1913 to edit, whereby Schlieffen's 1905 submission became the only possible deployment plan. Up to this point in time it had been routinely continued and was presented by Schlieffen in an updated form as Ostaufmarsch II . Schlieffen envisaged the deployment of 44 divisions in the east.

Operational elaboration under the younger Moltke

When Alfred Graf von Schlieffen resigned from the post of Chief of Staff in 1905/06 , he left his successor Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke the memorandum containing the main features of the plan. Although Schlieffen had updated his concept several times as a civilian, the actual elaboration of the operational campaign plans came from Moltke, who, unlike von Schlieffen, reinforced the left wing of the army to the detriment of the right.

Moltke ("the younger one") adapted the Schlieffen Plan to the changed strategic situation. The offensive right wing, which was supposed to push through Belgium, retained the strength provided in the original plan, but additional forces were assigned to the defensive left wing. Contrary to Schlieffen's advice, the balance of power between the right and left German wings was changed in 1909. In Count Schlieffen's plan, this ratio was 7: 1, but it has now been changed to 6: 2. Furthermore, the already too weak right wing of the German army was bared even further by troops during the advance in 1914 because - here too, against Schlieffen's planning - they let themselves be held back too much by the fortresses whose sieges tied up troops, and also - in view of the Russian Invasion of East Prussia - to strengthen the Eastern Front , withdrew two corps prematurely without these having been requested. After the military regained strength of Russia, Moltke assumed in his revision of the plan that East Prussia might have to give up temporarily in order to be able to deploy sufficient troops in the west. To accept the loss of East Prussia for the first time turned out to be politically impossible in 1914. Moltke refrained from attacking the Netherlands because he wanted to keep it as a "windpipe" in order to import food from there in the event of a lengthy war. The Great General Staff erroneously believed that this would prevent Great Britain from entering the war. In addition, the conquest and occupation of the Netherlands would have required the deployment of additional troops. On the other hand, Moltke saw the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg as a necessary evil, because the space between the Vosges and the Belgian-French border was considered too narrow for the deployment.

The general staff's plans, in accordance with the prevailing strategic doctrines, assumed that they would penetrate far into France and defeat the French army in a great battle. For logistical reasons, however, the German army needed a broader military base than the Franco-German border for such a deep advance. This necessity, as well as the intended bypassing of the southern French fortifications, were the reason for the occupation of Belgium after a previous ultimatum . According to the German army command , the war against France could only be waged offensively if Belgium were occupied.

The plans of France

The thrust of the plans modified by Moltke was probably known to France or was foreseen or anticipated by at least some generals ( Victor-Constant Michel , Joseph Gallieni , Charles Lanrezac ). For a long time, French planning concentrated on deepening the defense and delaying doctrine in the form of reinforced fortress construction, but also on deepening the French-Russian alliance that had existed since 1894 and the demand for a rapid Russian attack on Germany in the event of war. With the appointment of Joffres as Chief of Staff and the Plan XVII developed under him , France changed from a defensive to an offensive military doctrine: "Under his leadership, the defensive maxim, which was binding for several decades, was given up and the primacy of unrestricted attack was adopted." was no longer a limited counterattack, but an offensive with all available forces to carry out a "crippling preventive strike". In the event of a conflict, French reluctance to declare war would put the enemy under time pressure and force him to strike against France in a morally disreputable manner, if he did not want to wait for the Russian attack and thereby risk the two-front war. Similar to Schlieffen and Moltke, Joffre originally wanted to violate the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, but unlike in Germany, his government forbade him to do so for political reasons - ie with regard to Great Britain.

Great Britain's plans

Even before the war the Admiralty of Great Britain had developed the plan to bring Germany to its knees in a global economic war in the event of war; The plan was to block the sea and communication routes, censor the submarine cables and cut off the German Empire from the international financial markets. The British plans under Lord Desart were abandoned after the US government learned of it and opposed it, although the British Cabinet had previously approved the Admiralty's plan in 1912.

The Schlieffen Plan in the First World War

July crisis and escalation

In the July crisis of 1914, the basic assumptions of the Schlieffen Plan and its inflexible offensive orientation towards the west were initially to have a negative effect. Since slow Russian mobilization had been assumed and the alternative of an eastern deployment was dropped by the military in 1913, decision-makers in Germany were under time pressure when Tsar Nicholas II ordered Russian mobilization on July 30, 1914. The mobilized Russian army was not supposed to start fighting immediately, but the German Reich was now forced to act. If the Schlieffen Plan was to be carried out successfully, the army had to be given the order to march immediately, in order not to be attacked by an already mobilized Russia while France was still fighting. This finally prevented a diplomatic solution.

As a war plan of the General Staff, the Schlieffen Plan was a result of the direct cooperation between the military leadership and Commander-in-Chief, Kaiser Wilhelm II, without the need for the involvement of the Reich government and the Reich Chancellor (see also Clausewitz and the primacy of politics ). The Chief of the General Staff had had immediate rights with the Kaiser since 1871 (right to speak at any time). Before 1890 there had been an abundance of military plans that came from the pen of the elder Moltke and provided, for example, an offensive war in the east with a simultaneous strategic defensive in the west ("Great Eastern Deployment"). This was no longer pursued after 1913 on the instructions of the younger Moltke, but would have made possible a limited regional war in the east in 1914. Thus the Schlieffen Plan in 1914 was the only German deployment plan; but it did not fit the political scenario in any way. It should be emphasized that Schlieffen and his successor Moltke were prepared to violate the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg for purely tactical reasons . The violation of Belgian neutrality, which had been guaranteed by the major European powers (including Prussia) in 1830/39, implied the risk of England entering the war. The decision of the military was never problematized or prevented by Chancellors Bülow and Bethmann Hollweg .

Initial successes and failure of the plan

In practice, the plan failed. After a series of successful battles on the advance, the German offensive to the west and with it the Schlieffen Plan as a whole failed in the Battle of the Marne . The Russian army had unexpectedly entered East Prussia faster than expected . As a result, the German Reich saw itself in great distress at the beginning of the war, so that Moltke ordered two army corps to the east, which were then no longer available in the battle of the Marne.

In addition, the border battles for German troops were, contrary to expectations, so successful that the French marching into Alsace were thrown far back, but just because of this, their units were still available for transfers inland and thus in the Battle of the Marne. Schlieffen himself had wanted to allow the French to gain some space in Germany in order to tie up their troops, but Moltke gave the 6th and 7th German armies under the Bavarian Crown Prince - also through unclear general staff instructions - in principle free hand over their own actions decide what they interpreted offensively, taking advantage of their successes. After successfully defending against large French attacks, Moltke decided not to move free forces from the left wing to the right wing by rail as originally planned and prepared for implementation and, strangely enough, instead let the Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht and his troops take action against the strong French fortification belt - exactly avoiding this was the reason for violating Belgium's neutrality.

The great initial successes gave the German headquarters the impression that the war had already been won. The rapid conquest of the Liège railway junction was successful, and the supply of the advancing German troops by rail was thus initially secured. The French and British had clearly underestimated the strength of the German right wing, but the German army deployed reserve corps as full-fledged units from the beginning and was thus able to ensure an unexpected superiority and use it for their stormy advance. The British and French had to withdraw a long way without finding a stop, always pursued by the advancing German units. The Entente was defeated in the battles of Mons , Le Cateau and St. Quentin , counterattacks merely delayed the German advance and failed. The Belgians holed up in the fortress of Antwerp . Moltke himself, on the one hand, subscribed to the excessive optimism and, on the other hand, sent two army corps, which he now considered dispensable, to hard-pressed East Prussia, although they had not been requested from there (and also arrived too late to successfully defend against the Russians help). The French and British had to withdraw hundreds of kilometers with heavy losses. The Schlieffen plan seemed to be working.

The opposing retreat took place in good order and with reinforcement and relocation of the forces previously deployed against the Crown Prince, the initial numerical German superiority waned. It was not possible to encompass larger associations. The Germans had to deploy more troops to siege Antwerp . The advance became logistically much more difficult, Moltke's optimism turned into pessimism in view of the still undefeated enemy troops. The French succeeded in regrouping their troops outside Paris, which they could use for a counteroffensive. The battle of the Marne began.

On the decisive right wing, through his emissary Richard Hentsch , Moltke broke the battle out of fear of a French counter-attack in a gap between the first Army under Alexander von Kluck and the second Army under Karl von Bülow and withdrew to one Line of defense on the Aisne back. The commander of Paris, Joseph Gallieni , and Joseph Maunoury had been about to use the gaps that had arisen with the newly combined 6th Army and to advance into it, which had greatly worried Moltke. The British expeditionary forces had been ordered to fight in close coordination with the French and they too had identified the gaps. To what extent Moltke and Hentsch saved the German army from a catastrophic defeat by being surrounded with the withdrawal order, or rather the badly battered French army from collapse, “cannot be said with certainty” to this day. Both parties had overloaded their associations and suffered from a lack of ammunition, their information situation was unclear. The size of the German gap was apparently unknown to the French. The German 1st Army, threatened by encirclement, still fought successfully in their battles, the French - including Joffres Chief of Staff Berthelot - considered whether a further retreat to the Seine would be necessary or not. Possibly - according to Wilhelm Groener's later assessment - Bülow's 2nd Army could have grabbed the enemy in the back and pushed against the 1st Army. But even another German victory on the Marne would not necessarily have decided the campaign in the west. It seems conceivable - the French commander in chief Joffre showed no signs of a moral crisis - that the French army would have retained its internal order even after another defeat and that the front line would simply have frozen in trench warfare 50 to 60 km further south. The advantage of the initial numerical superiority of the right wing over the opponents had been lost through French relocations, the logistical difficulties of the war of movement were hardly solvable, a further advance would have taken the Germans too far away from their railroad terminals, whereas the British and French could use the French railroad network for relocations could use.

The Schlieffen Plan revised by Moltke had failed. In view of this, Moltke collapsed psychologically from the overload and was in fact, soon officially, replaced by Erich von Falkenhayn . French counter-attacks against the German line of retreat were repulsed in the battle of the Aisne , the front froze in trench warfare.

Excessive forces

From a military point of view, the plan overran the German forces:

  • The assumption that France could be defeated within a few weeks - as in 1870 - did not take into account the fact that it was a very favorable constellation at the time, nor the more recent developments in weaponry that put the defender at an advantage and have been since then Russo-Japanese War 1905 were foreseeable.
  • Even after the victory at Sedan in 1870, it had taken three months to persuade France, which was then alone, to surrender. During this period, the German troops were tied up on site. Although the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine had shortened the distance from the German border to Paris and weakened France's heavy industry, which was important for the war economy, there was no reason to assume that a France supported by England and Russia would surrender more quickly this time.
  • Since 1897, the fleet was preferred to the army in the allocation of funds - u. a. also against Schlieffen's protest. Under these circumstances, a quick win was unrealistic.
  • The German General Staff believed Russia would need six to eight weeks to mobilize. The possibility that this could happen faster had never been seriously debated.
  • Even the original concept of Schlieffen's plan was ultimately unable to solve the logistical problems that arose from the planned, concentrated and rapid advance of around 30 army corps in a confined space, especially on the right wing of the attack.

Basil Liddell Hart and Bernard Montgomery saw the main flaw in the Schlieffen Plan in the inadequately considered expansion of the capacity of the transport system in the decades before the war:

“The plan might have fitted into the Napoleonic era, but now the French were able to move troops by rail along the 'sickle swing' chord behind the front, so there was little chance of success in modern times had. In 1914 the Schlieffen Plan failed for logistical reasons. The advance of German infantry and horse units was stopped by destroyed bridges and railroad lines, while the French were faster on the railroad. "

Planning similarities in World War II

During the Second World War , the Army High Command (OKH) planned an operation similar to the Schlieffen Plan of the First World War. The plan pursued the goal of the Allies means of a fast attack by Belgium in the cross to fall. The opposing armies were to be separated and driven back, but not completely destroyed. After the Mechelen incident on January 10, 1940, this plan was abandoned; Hitler took over the sickle-cut plan developed by Erich von Manstein (attack focus in the Ardennes ), which was successfully implemented in the western campaign in 1940.

Source problems and reception history

Evaluation of the Schlieffen Plan after the First World War

After its defeat in World War I, the Schlieffen Plan was discussed affirmatively in circles of high-ranking military leaders in Imperial Germany and, in this context, was published in excerpts as a facsimile (two apparently slightly different versions).

Assuming that the plan had obviously been changed by the younger Moltke, it was claimed - for example by Wilhelm Groener - that these changes were responsible for the defeat, while the original plan would have worked, had it been implemented correctly. The dispute at the time concentrated on the alleged failure to secure the victory by Moltke and the resulting military failure of Germany.

Another characteristic of this discussion was that Schlieffen's memorandum had not been published in full at the time and was in fact kept in secrecy in the Reichsarchiv (which housed the Prussian Army Archives) together with other documents (mobilization and deployment plans, records of war games, constellations, orders), so that only a select few people had access to the memorandum itself.

Discovery of the memorandum and its evaluation after the Second World War

During the Second World War, the Potsdam Army Archives , founded in 1936 (to which the military files from the Reich Archives had been transferred), was badly hit by an air raid; the holdings of the Prussian army and files of the Great General Staff were also among the largely destroyed holdings . Since then, the sources of the military plans in Germany before the outbreak of World War I have been very poor and generally make it difficult to reconstruct German strategy. The original of the memorandum was probably also destroyed.

In the fifties, however, two typewritten copies of the memorandum, together with Moltke's marginal notes subsequently transferred from the original, were rediscovered and evaluated by Gerhard Ritter as part of Count Schlieffen's estate .

Ritter assessed the plan (and, in his opinion, Moltke's plans based on it) as militarily over-optimistic and politically blind to consequences. The primacy of an aggressive military automatism, including the violation of Belgian neutrality, carried out a fatal escalation at lightning speed and thus caused the First World War in its well-known and devastating form for Germany. This interpretation of the plan became constitutive in historiography.

Zuber controversy and Moltke plan

From 1999 onwards, the historian and retired US major Terence Zuber expressed massive doubts about this interpretation: The Schlieffen Plan was not a concrete "plan" at all, but just a memorandum that was instrumental in addressing the War Department on the need to support a reinforcement of the German armies by deploying additional troops. In this respect, it should not be understood as an expression of a planning doctrine, but as an internal and intellectual contribution to an open opinion-making at the time. This is proven u. a. by the fact that in the memorandum a significant number of divisions were listed that actually did not exist and their use was as fictitious as the entire plan must be. The actual plans of Schlieffen - readable from his general staff exercises - were more defensively oriented. Different representations in the twenties are a supplementary myth of failed military leaders and have a strong exculpatory character, as they blamed the defeat on the late Moltke and his employees.

Overall, this representation found no support. Despite the difficult source situation, the memorandum can be understood as an expression of planning thinking that found its way into Germany's deployment plans and strategy during the First World War.

It was admitted, however, that the memorandum could not have been a rough plan for a conquest of France, but had to have been part of a strategy-finding process and therefore could not - as often understood in the literature since Gerhard Ritter - be regarded as largely identical to the plans of Germany in the First World War . However, it is not to be understood as an arbitrary thought game, as von Zuber, but rather reflects strategic ideas that have found their way into the actual plans, which are difficult to reconstruct due to the sources.

In connection with the problem of the memorandum as an expression of Germany's planning in the First World War, Annika Mombauer therefore suggested using the term "Moltke Plan" for the actual planning under Chief of Staff Moltke and Germany's 1914 approach.

See also

literature

  • Hans Ehlert , Michael Epkenhans , Gerhard P. Groß (eds.): The Schlieffenplan. Analyzes and documents . Schoeningh, Paderborn 2006, ISBN 3-506-75629-X .
  • David Fromkin : Europe's last summer. Blessing, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-89667-183-9 .
  • Stig Förster : The German General Staff and the Illusion of the Short War, 1871-1914. Metacriticism of a Myth. In: MGM. 54 (1995), pp. 61-95.
  • Sebastian Haffner : The seven deadly sins of the German Empire in the First World War . Bergisch Gladbach, Lübbe-Verlag 1964/1981/2001.
  • Sebastian Haffner: The miracle on the Marne - reconstruction of the decisive battle of the First World War . Lübbe-Verlag, Bergisch Gladbach 1982, ISBN 3-7857-0314-7 .
  • Peter Haric: The roots of defeat: status or profession? On the institutional, social and intellectual history of the Prussian-German army 1740–1914. Berlin 2005.
  • John Keegan : The First World War. A European tragedy , Rowohlt , Reinbek 2001, ISBN 3-499-61194-5 .
  • Erich von Manstein : Lost victories, memories 1939–1944. 12th edition. Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1991, pp. 67–171 (The Western Campaign 1940 in the "successor" of Schlieffens).
  • Annika Mombauer : Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
  • Annika Mombauer: Of War Plans and War Guilt. The Debate Surrounding the Schlieffen Plan. In: Journal of Strategic Studies. 28/2005, pp. 857-885.
  • Peter Rassow: Field Marshal Count Moltke's plan for the two-front war (1871–1890). In: Hermann Aubin, Gisbert Beyerhaus, Joseph Vogt (Hrsg.): Breslauer historical research. Issue 1, Priebatsch's Buchhandlung Verlag, Breslau 1936.
  • Gerhard Ritter : The Schlieffen Plan. Criticism of a myth. With the first publication of the texts and 6 map sketches . Publisher R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1956.
  • Bernd F. Schulte: The German Army: 1900–1914; between persistence and change . Droste, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0451-5 .
  • Mark R. Stoneman, Wilhelm Groener: Officering, and the Schlieffen Plan. Dissertation . Georgetown University, 2006.
  • Barbara Tuchman: August 1914. 2nd edition. Verlag Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2001, ISBN 3-596-15395-6 .
  • Jehuda Wallach: The dogma of the battle of annihilation. dtv, Munich 1970.
  • Terence Zuber: Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. German War Planning 1871-1914. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford et al. a. 2002, ISBN 0-19-925016-2 .

Web links

Commons : Schlieffen Plan  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Münkler, Herfried: The Great War: The World 1914 to 1918 . 6th edition Rowohlt-Berlin-Verl, Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-3-87134-720-7 , pp. 83 f .
  2. ↑ David Stevenson: 1914-1918. The First World War. Albatros-Verlag, Mannheim 2010, p. 65.
  3. ^ John CG Röhl: Wilhelm II. , 3 volumes, 1993-2008; Volume II, pp. 388/89.
  4. ↑ Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich, Irina Renz (eds.): Encyclopedia First World War. Paderborn 2009, ISBN 978-3-506-73913-1 , p. 352.
  5. ↑ Fritz Fischer: War of Illusions. German politics from 1911–1914. 2nd Edition. Düsseldorf 1970, ISBN 3-7700-0913-4 , p. 565.
  6. ^ Henry A. Kissinger: The reason of the nations. Siedler, Berlin 1998, ISBN 3-88680-486-0 , p. 219.
  7. ^ Terence Zuber: Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. German War Planning 1871-1914. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford et al. a. 2002, ISBN 0-19-925016-2 , p. 57 ff.
  8. ^ Wolfgang J. Mommsen: Great power position and world politics. Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main 1993, ISBN 3-548-33169-6 , p. 94.
  9. ↑ Holger H. Herwig: The Marne. Random House, New York 2009, ISBN 978-1-4000-6671-1 , pp. 33 f.
  10. ↑ Sebastian Haffner : From Bismarck to Hitler: A Review. Knaur, 2001, ISBN 3-426-77589-1 , p. 121 f.
  11. ^ Richard F. Hamilton, Holger H. Herwig: War Planning 1914. Cambridge University Press, New York 2009, ISBN 978-0-521-11096-9 , p. 48.
  12. ↑ Fritz Fischer: War of Illusions. German politics from 1911–1914. 2nd Edition. Droste, Düsseldorf 1970, ISBN 3-7700-0913-4 , p. 241.
  13. ^ Robert Foley: Alfred Von Schlieffen's Military Writings. Frank Cass, New York 2002, ISBN 0-415-40862-8 , p. 13 f.
  14. ^ Robert Foley: Alfred Von Schlieffen's Military Writings. Frank Cass, New York 2002, ISBN 0-415-40862-8 , pp. 61 f.
  15. ^ Wolfgang J. Mommsen: Great power position and world politics. Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main 1993, ISBN 3-548-33169-6 , p. 168.
  16. ^ Wolfgang J. Mommsen: Great power position and world politics. Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main 1993, ISBN 3-548-33169-6 , p. 170.
  17. ↑ Gerhard Ritter: The Schlieffenplan. Criticism of a myth. With the first publication of the texts and 6 map sketches . Verlag R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1956, p. 141 ff.
  18. ^ Dictionary of German military history . Military publishing house of the GDR, Berlin 1985.
  19. ↑ Vladimir Petrovich Potjomkin: History of Diplomacy. Second volume. The diplomacy of modern times (1872-1919). SWA-Verlag, Berlin 1948, p. 259.
  20. ↑ John Keegan: The First World War. A European tragedy. 2nd Edition. Reinbek near Hamburg 2003, ISBN 3-499-61194-5 , p. 60.
  21. ↑ Gerhard Ritter: The Schlieffenplan. Criticism of a myth. With the first publication of the texts and 6 map sketches . Verlag R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1956, pp. 153, 192.
  22. ^ A b Gordon Craig: German History 1866-1945. From the North German Confederation to the end of the Third Reich. Munich 1999, ISBN 3-406-42106-7 , p. 345.
  23. ↑ Sebastian Haffner: The Seven Deadly Sins of the German Empire in the First World War .
  24. ↑ Sebastian Haffner: From Bismarck to Hitler: A Review. Knaur, 2001, ISBN 3-426-77589-1 , p. 120.
  25. ^ Terence Zuber: The Real German War Plan, 1904–1914. The History Press, Stroud 2011, ISBN 978-0-7524-5664-5 , p. 178.
  26. ↑ Münkler, Herfried: The Great War: The World 1914 to 1918 . 6th edition Rowohlt-Berlin-Verl, Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-3-87134-720-7 , pp. 83 ff .
  27. ↑ Annika Mombauer: The Moltkeplan: Modification of the Schlieffen Plan with the same goals? In: Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard P. Groß (eds.): The Schlieffenplan. Analyzes and documents . Schoeningh, Paderborn 2006, ISBN 3-506-75629-X , p. 85 f.
    Gerhard Ritter: The Schlieffen Plan. Criticism of a myth. With the first publication of the texts and 6 map sketches . Verlag R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1956, p. 81.
  28. ↑ David Stevenson: 1914-1918. The First World War. Albatros-Verlag, Mannheim 2010, p. 70.
  29. ↑ Liddell Hart : Foch - Der Feldherr der Entente , pp. 46f., 52f., 56f. Vanguard Verlag Otto Schlegel, Berlin 1938.
  30. ↑ Stefan Schmidt: France's foreign policy in the July crisis 1914. A contribution to the history of the outbreak of the First World War (= Paris historical studies. Volume 90). Oldenbourg, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59016-6 , pp. 107, 361.
  31. ↑ Stefan Schmidt: France's foreign policy in the July crisis 1914. A contribution to the history of the outbreak of the First World War (= Paris historical studies. Volume 90). Oldenbourg, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59016-6 , p. 105.
  32. ↑ David Stevenson: 1914-1918. The First World War. Albatros-Verlag, Mannheim 2010, p. 71.
  33. ↑ David Stevenson: 1914-1918. The First World War. Albatros-Verlag, Mannheim 2010, p. 70.
  34. ↑ Afflerbach, Holger: On a knife's edge: how the German Reich lost the First World War . Special edition for the Federal Agency for Civic Education. Bonn 2018, ISBN 978-3-7425-0345-9 , pp. 25; 57 .
  35. ↑ Stephen Kotkin: Stalin. Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928 . Pinguin, New York 2014, ISBN 978-0-14-102794-4 , pp. 146 .
  36. ↑ Sebastian Haffner: From Bismarck to Hitler. Knaur, Munich 1987, ISBN 3-426-77589-1 , p. 120.
  37. ↑ Afflerbach, Holger: On a knife's edge: how the German Reich lost the First World War . Special edition for the Federal Agency for Civic Education. Bonn 2018, ISBN 978-3-7425-0345-9 , pp. 58 f .
  38. ↑ Herfried Münkler: The great war. The world 1914–1918. Rowohlt, Berlin 2014, p. 179.
  39. ↑ Afflerbach, Holger: On a knife's edge: how the German Reich lost the First World War . Special edition for the Federal Agency for Civic Education. Bonn 2018, ISBN 978-3-7425-0345-9 , pp. 70 ff .
  40. ↑ Quoted from: Bernard Montgomery : War History. Frechen undated, ISBN 3-933366-16-X , p. 463.
  41. ↑ cf. from Gerhard P. Groß: There was a Schlieffen Plan. In: Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard P. Groß, Military History Research Office (ed.): The Schlieffenplan. Analyzes and documents. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, p. 125.
  42. ^ Mark Stoneman, Wilhelm Groener: Officering, and the Schlieffen Plan. Dissertation. Georgetown University, 2006, pp. 106 f.
  43. ^ A b c Gerhard P. Groß: There was a Schlieffen Plan. In: Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard P. Groß, Military History Research Office (ed.): The Schlieffenplan. Analyzes and documents. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, p. 126.
  44. ↑ Gerhard Ritter: The Schlieffenplan. Criticism of a myth. With the first publication of the texts and 6 map sketches. Verlag R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1956, p. 94 ff.
  45. ^ Terence Zuber: The Schlieffen Plan reconsidered. In: Was in History. Issue 6, 1999, pp. 262-305.
  46. ^ Terence Zuber: Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. German War Planning 1871-1914. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford et al. a. 2002.
  47. ↑ a b Terence Zuber: The myth of the Schlieffenplan. In: Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard P. Groß, Military History Research Office (ed.): The Schlieffenplan. Analyzes and documents. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, p. 46 f.
  48. ↑ Terence Zuber: The Myth of the Schlieffen Plan. In: Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard P. Groß, Military History Research Office (ed.): The Schlieffenplan. Analyzes and documents. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, p. 56 f.
  49. ↑ Terence Zuber: The Myth of the Schlieffen Plan. In: Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard P. Groß, Military History Research Office (ed.): The Schlieffenplan. Analyzes and documents. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, pp. 49-56 f.
  50. ↑ see also the contributions by A. Mombauer, RT Foley and Gerhard P. Groß in: Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard P. Groß, Military History Research Office (eds.): Der Schlieffenplan. Analyzes and documents. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, p. 126.
  51. ^ Gerhard P. Groß: There was a Schlieffen Plan. In: Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard P. Groß, Military History Research Office (ed.): The Schlieffenplan. Analyzes and documents. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, pp. 117-161, 160.
  52. ↑ Annika Mombauer: The Moltke Plan: Modification of the Schlieffen Plan with the same goals? In: Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard P. Gross (eds.): The Schlieffenplan: Analysis and documents. F. Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, p. 79.