Plan XVII

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Général Joseph Joffre , as Chief of the General Staff, initiator of “Plan XVII”.
Departure of a transport train with mobilized people from Paris-Est station on August 2, 1914

The Plan XVII was a strategic planning of the French army in case of war with Germany . The first version, created in 1913, was modified on April 15, 1914 and implemented on August 2 with the beginning of the First World War . It was the 17th of these plans drawn up since the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870.

It was a plan to mobilize and deploy the French armed forces. Furthermore, it was about the massive reinforcement of the troops by calling up the reservists, then the troop transport by rail to the deployment areas under the protection (la couverture) of the "shielding units". The bulk of the combat units were intended for the Franco-Belgian and Franco-German borders (from Givet to Belfort ). It was assumed that the German troops were marching through Belgium. The war plan of the opposing party - the Schlieffen Plan  - provided just that. Plan XVII came into effect on August 2, 1914 , by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armed Forces, Général Joffre . He envisaged a French offensive in Upper Alsace from August 7th, in the German part of Lorraine from August 14th and in the Belgian Ardennes from August 21st. All of these plans became obsolete with the border battles.

The plans between 1871 and 1914

The defeat in the Franco-Prussian War made a complete restructuring of the French army in the Third Republic necessary. The Prussian model was imitated and the conscription system was abandoned in 1872. This was followed in 1873 by the establishment of 19 “Régions militaire” (military regions - a kind of military area / district). In peacetime, each region was responsible for the staffing of an army corps .

The “Plan for Mobilization and Deployment” (Plan de mobilization et de concentration) laid down an order of battle in which any threats at the borders were to be countered. He referred to the transport, the dislocation and the organizational structure of the French army (the navy was not affected by this - the sea transport of land forces was excluded). The plan did not consider the operations in detail, but it was designed with foresight in them. It was regularly updated to take account of the changing circumstances, such as the various recruitment laws (which determined the number of staff), the filling of positions for the commanders-in-chief (most of whom were offensive) and the international situation (which determined possible opponents) and finally to the knowledge gained from the reconnaissance of foreign forces (as a task of the Deuxième Bureau ). A total of 17 such plans were drawn up between 1875 and 1914.

After the start of the mobilization, the deployment of troops (called "concentration") should be carried out immediately by rail transport. For this purpose, the newly formed "Upper Railway Commission" was responsible for the smooth handling in cooperation with the various railway companies. The major railway lines were seized by the "operations office" (troisiéme bureau) of the Army General Staff and also by the "railway office" (quatrième bureau), which was then declared legally valid by the Supreme War Council.

The plans took into account the details of rail transport (as well as the transport of troops from Africa by sea) for the various units. At the beginning of the mobilization, each had a fixed date for departure and arrival. The first troops to leave were those assigned as shielding troops, followed by the bulk of active troops. The reserve units followed behind them and at the end came the territorial units ( comparable to the Landwehr in Germany ) and the supply units . The army corps, scattered all over the country, were brought over the railway lines to their staging rooms in the east of France and formed the armies there.

Scheduling the plans
designation Come into effect
Plan I. 1875
Plan II 1877
Plan III 1878
Plan IV May 5, 1883
Plan VII March 15, 1887
Plan VIII April 15, 1888
Plan IX May 10, 1889
Plan X April 1891
Plan XI February 15, 1893
Plan XII February 15, 1895
Plan XIII April 1898
Plan XIV March 1903
Plan XV May 22, 1907
Plan XVI May 1909
Plan XVII April 15, 1914

Plan XVII from 1914

The Mobilization and Deployment Plan XVII of the French Army was drafted at the beginning of 1913 by the General Staff under the responsibility of the Chief of General Staff as a general draft (the document was called Bases du plan XVII - Principles of Plan XVII) and the Supreme War Council at its meeting on April 18 Submitted in 1913. The Minister of War Eugène Étienne accepted the draft on May 2, 1913.

Various documents were then prepared and, at the end of winter, sent to the units and to the generals concerned (so to the commanders of the armies), the guidelines for the deployment on February 7, 1914 by Général Émile Belin , first assistant (premier sous- chef d'état-major de l'Armée) of Chief of Staff Edouard de Castelnau and his successor from August 2, 1914. When the shielding plan was feasible through the establishment of the 21st Army Corps from the end of December 1913, the entire mobilization and deployment plan was approved by General Joffre on May 28, 1914, and put into effect on April 15, 1914 in place of the previous one. It was foreseen that every unit of the army would be activated in three steps: mobilization, deployment and finally combat deployment.

mobilization

With the mobilization, the army was put into a state of war. This happened primarily through the massive increase in the workforce with the summoning of the reservists and the establishment of the territorial units.

Active troop

In 1914 the French territory (i.e. the motherland and French Algeria) was divided into 21 military regions. The map shows the state of 1907 with the 19 military regions of the mother country (the 21st region was not added until 1913), the fortresses and the existing railway network.

The soldiers who were uniformed in peacetime and were in military service were designated as active. This affected both conscripts (compulsory military service extended to the period between 21 and 23 years of age) and professional soldiers, officers and NCOs, as well as officers of the colonial regiments and the Foreign Legion. In contrast, there were the reserve and territorial units, which were only called up in the event of mobilization.

At its request, the French General Staff was able to enforce an increase in the number of active personnel during peacetime with the help of a series of laws:

  • the law on infantry troops of December 23, 1912 allowed the establishment of six new infantry regiments, resulting in a total of 173 infantry regiments. There were also 12 colonial regiments, 12 Algerian rifle regiments (Tirailleurs algériens), four Zouave regiments and 31 hunter battalions, each consisting of 140 men (200 in the border troops - all of which were increased to 200 men in the event of mobilization). In addition, the number of active officers could be increased in order to assign them to the reserve units and upgrade them .;
  • With the decree of March 19, 1913, eight new Algerian rifle regiments and two Zouave regiments were set up.
  • With the framework law of March 31, 1913, four new cavalry regiments were set up. The cavalry now consisted of 12 cuirassier regiments, 32 dragoon regiments, 23 regiments of hunters on horseback, 14 hussar regiments, six regiments "Chasseurs d'Afrique" and four regiments of Spahis. Each army corps was assigned a cavalry regiment as support, the rest formed 10 cavalry divisions.
  • The "Law of the Three Years" (also called Barthou Law ) of August 7, 1913 increased military service from two to three years (born in 1912 was affected from October, born in 1913 from November.)
  • With the decree of September 26, 1914, the 21st Army Corps in Épinal and the 43rd Infantry Division in Saint-Dié to strengthen the border guard.
  • The law of April 15, 1914 regulates the formation of five new regiments of heavy artillery. They were subordinated to the army commands and equipped with the Obusier de 120 mm C modèle 1890 howitzer and the Obusier de 155 mm CTR modèle 1904 howitzer . In addition, there were 14 new batteries of field artillery with the Canon de 75 mm modèle 1897 field cannon , which were assigned to the cavalry divisions.

The establishment of the Protectorate of French Morocco tied a number of units of the African Army (Armée d'Afrique) in North Africa, so the 19th Army Corps could not be completely relocated to the mother country. To compensate for this, the divisions in Constantine and Algiers are each to deploy troops to form an infantry division when mobilizing. They should get numbers 37 and 38. The formation of the 44th Infantry Division should be made up of active units from the 14th and 15th military regions. These were deployed on the Alps and would become free in the event that Italy did not enter the war.

Active divisions in May 1914
Military region
(army corps)
Defense area Peace garrisons of the divisions
GMP Paris 1st Cavalry Division ( Paris ), 7th Cavalry Division ( Melun ) 1st Colonial Infantry Division (Paris)
I. Lille 1st Infantry Division ( Lille ) & 2nd Infantry Division ( Arras )
II. Amiens 3rd Infantry Division ( Amiens ), 4th Infantry Division ( Mézières ) & 4th Cavalry Division ( Sedan )
III. Rouen 5th Infantry Division ( Rouen ) & 6th Infantry Division (Paris)
IV. Le Mans 4th Infantry Division ( Le Mans ) & 7th Infantry Division (Paris)
V. Orleans 9th Infantry Division (Orléans) & 10th Infantry Division (Paris)
VI. Châlons-sur-Marne 12th Infantry Division ( Reims ), 40th Infantry Division ( Saint-Mihiel ), 42nd Infantry Division ( Verdun ), 3rd Cavalry Division ( Compiègne ) & 5th Cavalry Division (Reims)
VII. Besançon 14th Infantry Division ( Belfort ), 41st Infantry Division ( Remiremont ) & 8th Cavalry Division ( Dole )
VIII. Bourges 15th Infantry Division ( Dijon ) & 16th Infantry Division ( Bourges )
IX. Tours 17th Infantry Division ( Châteauroux ), 18th Infantry Division ( Angers ) & 9th Cavalry Division ( Tours )
X. Rennes 19th Infantry Division ( Rennes ) & 20th Infantry Division ( Saint Servan )
XI. Nantes 21st Infantry Division ( Nantes ), 22nd Infantry Division ( Vannes ) & 3rd Colonial Infantry Division ( Brest (Finistère) )
XII. Limoges 23rd Infantry Division ( Angoulême ) & 24th Infantry Division ( Périgueux )
XIII. Clermont-Ferrand 25th Infantry Division ( Saint-Étienne ) & 26th Infantry Division (Clermont-Ferrand)
XIVe. Lyon 27th Infantry Division ( Grenoble ), 28th Infantry Division ( Chambéry ) & 6th Cavalry Division (Lyon)
XV. Marseille 29th Infantry Division ( Nice ), 30th Infantry Division ( Avignon ) & 2nd Colonial Infantry Division ( Toulon )
XVI. Montpellier 31st Infantry Division (Montpellier) & 32nd Infantry Division ( Perpignan )
XVII. Toulouse 33rd Infantry Division ( Montauban ), 34th Infantry Division (Toulouse) & 10th Cavalry Division (Montauban)
XVIII. Bordeaux 35th Infantry Division (Bordeaux) & 36th Infantry Division ( Bayonne )
XIX. Algiers Divisions "Algiers", "Oran" & "Constantine"
XXe Nancy 11th Infantry Division (Nancy), 39th Infantry Division ( Toul ) & 2nd Cavalry Division ( Lunéville )
XXI. Epinal 13th Infantry Division ( Chaumont ) & 43rd Infantry Division ( Saint-Dié )

Reserve and Territorial Units

At the beginning of the 20th century, the reserve consisted mainly of serviced men between the ages of 24 and 34 who were generally called "Réservistes". They only needed a brief refresher course in the event of mobilization. The reservists were also intended to strengthen the active units. Plan XVII also provided for the establishment of reserve regiments and battalions, which were formerly known as "régiments régionaux" (regional regiments) and "régiments de place" (local regiments). They should consist mainly of reservists with a small cadre of active soldiers.

A reserve infantry regiment was set up from the depot of an active regiment and its number increased by a factor of 200. (The reserve regiment of the 77th Infantry Regiment , for example, was assigned the number 277.) The reserve fighter battalions used a different system; the reserve battalions began with number 40 and up. The reserve regiments did not have three battalions like the active ones, but only two. This enabled the percentage of active officers and NCOs to be kept higher. No new regiments were set up for the cavalry, only the personnel of the individual regiments was increased and a 5th and 6th escadron were set up for some regiments. New companies and detachments were created among the pioneers. These reserve units formed the reserve divisions (according to Plan XVI, 22 were provided) which, according to Plan XVII, consisted of 25, which were intended to reinforce the army corps. For the forest areas, one reserve regiment in each reserve division was to be replaced by two reserve hunter battalions.

In the territorial units, the men served between the ages of 35 and 48 years. The Territorial Infantry Regiments, Territorial Cavalry Escadrons and Territorial Engineer Battalions were set up for maneuvering purposes in the event of mobilization and in peacetime. Several of these units formed the territorial infantry divisions (Divisions d'infanterie territoriale - DIT), from which the territorial field divisions (Divisions territoriales de campagne - DTC) and the territorial fortress divisions (Divisions territoriales de place - DIP), the latter with little mobility , were set up.

Divisions to be formed when mobilizing
Military regions Command in: Active divisions Reserve divisions Territorial Divisions
I. Lille - 51st Reserve Division ( Arras ) -
II. Amiens - Mezieres) 81st Territorial Field Division (Amiens)
III. Rouen - 53rd Reserve Division (Rouen) 82nd Territorial Field Division (Rouen)
IV. Le Mans - 54th Reserve Division (Le Mans) 83rd Territorial Fortress Division ( Chartres ) & 84th Territorial Field Division ( Laval )
V. Orleans - 55th Reserve Division (Orléans) -
VI. Châlons-en-Champagne - 56th (Châlons), 69th (Reims) & 72nd Reserve Division (Verdun) -
VII. Besançon - 57th Reserve Division (Belfort) -
VIII. Bourges - 58th Reserve Division ( Dijon ) -
IX. Tours - 59th Reserve Division ( Angers ) 85th ( Châteauroux ) & 81st Territorial Fortress Division (Angers)
X. Rennes - 60th Reserve Division (Rennes) 87th Territorial Field Division (Saint-Servan)
XI. Nantes - 61st Reserve Division ( Vannes ) 88th Territorial Field Division (Nantes)
XII. Limoges - 62nd Reserve Division ( Angoulême ) 89th Territorial Fortress Division (Angoulême)
XIII. Clermont-Ferrand - 63rd Reserve Division (Clermont-Ferrand) -
XIV. Lyon 44th Infantry Division (Lyon) 64th ( Grenoble ) & 74th Reserve Division ( Chambéry ) -
XV. Marseille 65th (Nice) & 75th Reserve Division ( Avignon ) -
XVI. Montpellier - 66th Reserve Division (Montpellier) 90th Territorial Field Division (Perpignan)
XVII. Toulouse - 67th Reserve Division (Montauban) 91st Territorial Field Division (Toulouse)
XVIII. Bordeaux - 68th Reserve Division (Bordeaux) 92nd Territorial Field Division (Bordeaux)
XIX. Algiers 37th ( Philippeville ) & 38th Infantry Divisions (Algiers) - -
XX. Nancy - Neufchâteau) & 73rd Reserve Division (Toul) -
XXI. Epinal - 71st Reserve Division (Épinal) -

Army strength after mobilization

The mobilization massively increased the staff of the French army in order to put it in a state of war. In the mother country (without the units remaining in the depots) the plan provided for the following lists:

  • from 598 infantry battalions to 1,525 battalions, (624 active, 404 reserve battalions and 410 territorial battalions of 1,100 infantrymen each);
  • from 300 escadrons of cavalry to 545 escadrons, (316 active 176 reserve cadrons and 37 territorial cadrons of around 120 riders in four pelotons of 30 riders)
  • from 816 artillery batteries to 1468 batteries, (1042 active, 263 reserve batteries and 161 territorial batteries each with four cannons) Three batteries formed a group.
  • from 189 pioneer companies and pioneer detachments to 508.

The 43 infantry divisions, three colonial infantry divisions and six peacetime cavalry divisions were increased to 18,000 men (infantry divisions) and 5,250 men (cavalry divisions) through the mobilization reinforcements. The two divisions in Africa (3rd & 38th) and the 44th division in the Alps were also active. Furthermore, 25 reserve divisions (each with 18,000 men) and 12 territorial divisions (each with 15,000 men). These 95 divisions brought together 1,681,100 men. In addition there were the garrison troops - 821,000 men, the depots - 680,000 men, troops assigned to guard the infrastructure - 210,000 men, army administration - 187,000 men. Then there were the various troops in the colonies. Together, 3,580,000 men formed the first contingent. It was supplemented by various services, such as the air force and the motor service.

  • Each infantry division consisted of two brigades, each with two infantry regiments, one escadron cavalry and one artillery regiment with three groups, as well as a pioneer company.
  • Each cavalry division consisted of three brigades of two cavalry regiments and a group of cyclists, a group of artillery and a detachment of pioneers on bicycles.
  • Each army corps consisted of two infantry divisions (with the exception of the 6th Corps) of three infantry divisions each, a cavalry regiment not assigned to the cavalry divisions consisting of four escadrons, an artillery regiment consisting of four groups and an engineer battalion consisting of four companies.

March

The deployment (called “la concentration”) consisted of the transport of the combat troops to their respective operational area and the division into the combat sections there. The individual combat sections were determined by the General Staff and took into account, among other things, the terrain, the use of the railway network, diplomatic backgrounds, as well as the own and the opposing intentions.

In Europe, Plan XVII focused on the German Reich as France's main opponent. The Kingdom of Italy was believed to wait and see, then turn to those it believed would benefit the most. Austria-Hungary was hardly an option as an opponent, as it was threatened even in the Balkans and had a long border with Russia, in Spain the pro-France Bourbons ruled, from whom no threat was to be expected. Russia was France's most important ally, and if mobilized it would raise 150 divisions (Joffre had visited Russia in July 1912 and August 1913). Great Britain had also concluded a defensive alliance with France, since the Entente cordiale undertook to send an expeditionary corps of four or six infantry divisions and a cavalry division to France in the event of a defense. Belgium, with only six infantry and one cavalry division, and Switzerland, with six divisions of three brigades each, were neutral and declared that they wanted to repel any invasion with all their might.

The fact was that the German Army had a peacekeeping strength of 25 army corps, to which 15 reserve corps were added in the event of mobilization. The main deployment area of ​​the Germans was in the west on the French border. The French enemy reconnaissance ( Deuxième Bureau ) had determined the intended concentration of 20 army corps, 10 reserve corps, eight cavalry divisions and eight reserve divisions. In order to be able to counter a surprisingly massive advance in the first days of a conflict, the so-called "couverture" was planned - a screen of movable forces that was supposed to delay the movements of the enemy until the main forces had taken up their positions. The passage of the German troops through Belgium or Switzerland had to be considered, which is why a French transfer to these territories - with or without the consent of the government concerned - was planned.

organization

The "Great Maneuvers" in 1912 in the East. Generals Castelnau and Joffre with two referees (recognizable by the white armband).

The plan envisaged an almost complete concentration of the active troops in the northeast area against the main German forces. The General Staff had reservations about using the reserve units:

“There is no doubt that there is no case in which reserve units have been deployed with active units. It is precisely the latter who are required to carry out the attack maneuvers, on which the success of the operations depends. They are better trained, better equipped and have better cohesion. "

Plan XVII strengthened the reserve units, to which a number of active officers were assigned, and provided for use in the rear areas where they should find time to increase their combat effectiveness.

All 20 army corps (plus the colonial corps) were intended for use in the mother country, where they were to form the five armies. These would be used on the eastern border and reinforced by seven cavalry divisions. Three cavalry divisions were intended for the formation of the "Sordet Cavalry Corps" and for use on the left wing. The majority of the reserve divisions made up three of the four reserve division groups ("groupes de divisions de réserve" - ​​GDR). The Alpine Army, charged with monitoring the Italian border, was mainly charged with setting up local reserve divisions. Some territorial divisions were intended to garrison the Paris fortifications, as well as to monitor the coasts and the Spanish border. Some units have been classified as a reserve for use. The commander-in-chief designated the 37th, 38th and 44th infantry divisions, which were to be commanded to Laon, Besançon and Châlons-en-Champagne. The Ministry of War also had the 67th infantry division in Camp de Mailly, as well as the 61st and 62nd Infantry division planned as a reserve near Paris.

In the event of mobilization, the chief of the general staff would become the commander-in-chief (generalissimo), the commanders of the reserve division groups and the divisions of the cavalry corps ( Archinard , Victor-Constant Michel , Édouard Laffon de Ladebat , Fernand Louis Langle de Cary , Auguste Dubail , André Sordet , Pierre Ruffey , Édouard de Castelnau , Charles Lanrezac , Albert d'Amade , Émile Belin) would then belong to the highest council of war, like the commanders of the army corps and the active divisions.

The functioning of the development of the troop units, the chain of command, the cooperation of the allied forces and the tactics were regularly tested independently by the higher troop leaders (corps, divisions, brigades) in annual, large maneuvers. For example, in the cavalry maneuver of September 1913 at the "Camp de Sissonne " military training area, the prerequisites for the establishment of the Sordet Cavalry Corps were created.

Like the members of the General Staff, those of the War School had to take part in training courses twice a year - once in theoretical simulation games in winter and once in spring in the field ("Reise des Generalstabes"), for example in Bar-le-Duc 1912, Auxerre 1913 and Saint- Quentin 1914.

Deployment according to Plan XVII
Intended
commanders
Staging area Composition:
Army Corps & Divisions
Workforce assignments
1st Army
(Armée de Dole)
Auguste Dubail Area Remiremont to Charmes (Vosges) 5 Corps: 7th Army Corps, 8th Army Corps, 13th Army Corps, 14th Army Corps, 21st Army Corps, a total of six infantry divisions and the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions 266,452 men Attack on Mühlhausen in Alsace and Saarburg
2nd Army
(Armée de Dijon)
Edouard de Castelnau Area Pont-Saint-Vincent and Neufchâteau (Vosges) 6 Corps: 9th Army Corps, 15th Army Corps, 16th Army Corps, 18th Army Corps, 20th Army Corps, a total of 10 infantry divisions and the 2nd and 10th cavalry divisions 323,445 men Attack on Mörchingen
3rd Army
(Armée de Châlons)
Pierre Ruffey Area Saint-Mihiel and Verdun 3 Corps: 4th Army Corps, 5th Army Corps, 6th Army Corps, together seven infantry divisions and the 7th cavalry division 237,257 men Supervision of the fortress of Metz
4th Army
(Armée de Fontainebleau)
Fernand Langle de Cary Area Saint-Dizier and Bar-le-Duc 3 Corps: 12th Army Corps, 17th Army Corps and the Colonial Army Corps (CAC), a total of six infantry divisions and the 9th Cavalry Division 159,588 men as a reserve in the Argonne
5th Army
(Armée de Paris)
Charles Lanrezac from Hirson to Dun-sur-Meuse 5 corps: 1st Army Corps, 2nd Army Corps, 3rd Army Corps, 10th Army Corps, 11th Army Corps, a total of 10 infantry divisions, plus the 6th Cavalry Division and the 52nd and 60th Reserve Divisions. 299,350 men Surveillance of the border with Belgium in the Ardennes .
Sordet Cavalry Corps André Sordet Mézières area 1st, 3rd and 5th Cavalry Divisions 15,750 men Advance into the Ardennes in the event of a German invasion of Belgium
1st Reserve Division Group Louis Archinard Area Luxeuil , Vesoul and Montbeliard 58th, 63rd and 66th Reserve Divisions 54,000 men Surveillance of the Swiss border and as a reserve of the 1st Army
2nd Reserve Division Group Léon Durand on the Grand Couronné near Nancy 59th, 68th and 70th Reserve Divisions 54,000 men Reserve behind 2nd Army
3rd Reserve Division Group Paul Durand on the Moselle heights 54th, 55th and 56th Reserve Divisions 54,000 men 3rd Army Reserve
4th Reserve Division Group Mardochée Valabrègue Vervins area 51st, 53rd and 69th Reserve Divisions 54,000 men 5th Army Reserve
Armée des Alpes
(Armée de Lyon)
Albert d'Amade in the Alps and in Lyon 44th Infantry Division, 64th, 65th, 74th and 75th Reserve Divisions, and the 91st Territorial Field Division 105,000 men Surveillance of the Italian border
Fortified camp Paris Victor-Constant Michel Paris area 61st and 62nd Reserve Divisions, 83rd Territorial Field Division, 84th, 85th, 86th and 89th Territorial Fortress Division 111,000 men Defense of Paris
Eastern fortifications - Area Verdun, Toul, Épinal and Belfort 71st, 72nd, 73rd and 57th Reserve Divisions 72,000 intended for mobile protection of paved areas
independent divisions Joseph Brugère in the coastal areas of ( Hazebrouck , Rouen , Nantes , Valognes , Perpignan and Bordeaux ) 81st, 82nd, 88th, 87th, 90th and 92nd Territorial Field Division 90,000 men Surveillance of the coasts and the Spanish border

Each of the five army corps was assigned 12 batteries of heavy artillery (only the 4th Army had only three batteries), plus the assigned squadrons for aerial reconnaissance. A “mobile heavy artillery” was planned for the Army Group Northeast, which was to consist of 15 batteries equipped with the 120 mm Canon de 120 mm L modèle 1878 field cannon and six batteries equipped with the Mortier de 220 mm modèle 1880 mortar .

transport

The main railway lines for the transport of the army corps during mobilization.

The rolling stock was to be confiscated by a simple order from the War Department. A train was required to transport a battalion or an escadron, three for a regiment (four for a cavalry regiment), seven for an infantry brigade, 26 for an infantry division and 117 for an army corps. The trains had 34 wagons for an escadron and 47 cars intended for a battalion. Passenger cars, freight cars (40 men or eight horses), as well as platform cars for guns and train vehicles were to be used as required. The total length of such a train was up to 500 meters. (As an example: the 125 e régiment d'infanterie in Poitiers was loaded in three steps, first a battalion and a machine gun platoon on August 5th in a train with 40 cars - two for the officers, 30 for the men, 10 for the men Horses and seven for the baggage.) All French railway companies ( Compagnie des chemins de fer de l'Ouest , Compagnie des chemins de fer du Nord , Compagnie des chemins de fer de l'Est , Compagnie des chemins de fer de Méditerranée , Compagnie du chemin de fer de Paris à Orléans and Compagnie des chemins de fer à la Garonne ) were involved in the preparations for the march. The railroad tracks were consequently expanded for military reasons, all sub-prefectures were interconnected and the lines to the east (especially the Paris-Nacy line and the Paris-Belfort line). Furthermore, a number of train stations had been enlarged (such as the Gare de Paris-Est ).

With the "General Instructions for the Execution of the Deployment" (Instruction générale sur l'exécution de la concentration) of February 15, 1909 (modified on April 4, 1914) were 10 lines for the transport of the troops of two army corps each from the military regions concerned and the Reserve divisions to the unloading stations in the rear of the deployment area have been established. These lines were used entirely for military transport from the start of mobilization. In every line there were stops with field bakeries, for receiving coffee, with improvised latrines and medical stations - the same applied to the railway junctions (Gare régulatrice de concentration). These railway junctions were managed by commissions (Commission régulatrice - dt .: about Verkehrskommandantur), which directed the corresponding trains to their predetermined deployment areas. Each train received a route map from the station of departure to the junction - issued by the commander of the station of departure and a kind of travel order, a duplicate of which was given to the commander of the unit to be transported. From the regulating train station onwards, the locomotive was operated alternately by two teams, and a rest car for the off duty crew and a car for coal or wood as fuel for the locomotive was also attached.

Each line had to deal with 56 convoys (called “marches”) per day. 48 troop transports were planned, four surplus ones (called “marches blanches”) for the unforeseen and four material transports.

Two transit lines through the greater Paris area were already available for mobilization. This concerned the storage of water for the steam locomotives, the provision of additional locomotives for the steep inclines, keeping the accompanying personnel available for night duty, etc. The route from Dole in the Jura to Laon was for 56 trains and that from Chagny to Busigny for 30 trains laid out daily. In order to accelerate the shielding of the front and the deployment in comparison to the previous plans, the number of trains and the speed (depending on the condition of the route, from 25–30 km / h to 30–35 km / h) were increased. The towing mass was increased from an average of 480 tons to 550 tons.

The lines were already guarded by security organs when the front screen was set up, for example by the DRS - "Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité" - provided by active troops and the police, as well as by the GVC - "Garde des voies de communications" by the territorial forces. In cases of sabotage, the régulatrice commissions were available to eight pioneering railway companies to keep the train running.

From the 2nd to the 4th day after the mobilization the shielding corps (stationed along the German border) were transported, on the 3rd and 4th day the cavalry, from the 4th to the 10th day the bulk of the army, starting with the " hasty divisions ”(divisions“ hâtives ”) from the 4th to the 6th day; on the 11th day there were no scheduled trains, a period of 12 hours was planned to compensate for delays, on the 13th day all reserve divisions were unloaded, the 16th day was assigned to the first troops from Africa, and on the 17th day all territorial units were assigned , the artillery and engineer parks and the logistics associations. Eleven to twelve lines were provided for the transport of the British expeditionary force. Some of the railway lines were opened again after the mobilization, but five lines were still reserved for military rail traffic. There was also a railway junction per army:

Planned railroad movements when mobilizing
Military regions Troop contingent Main departure stations Transit stations Main unloading stations
Line A 7th and 14th military region Parts of the 7th Army Corps and the 8th Cavalry Division (shielding troops), then the 14th Army Corps, the 66th Reserve Division and the "Valence Heavy Artillery Regiment" Grenoble , Chambéry & Lyon Bourg-en-Bresse , Lons-le-Saulnier, Besançon (junction station), Vesoul , Lure & Luxeuil Plombières , Épinal and Bruyères (14th Army Corps)
Line B 8th, 13th and 21st military region Parts of the 21st Army Corps and the 6th Cavalry Division (shielding troops), then the 8th and 13th Army Corps as well as the 58th, 63rd, 64th and 74th Reserve Divisions Clermont-Ferrand , Saint-Étienne , Bourges and Dijon Auxonne , Gray (Haute-Saône) (hub), Vaivre , Port-sur-Saône, Port-d'Atelier and Jussey Darney (8th Army Corps), Châtel and Charmes (13th Army Corps)
Line C 15th and 16th military region 15th and 16th Army Corps Nice, Toulon, Marseille, Avignon, Montpellier and Perpignan Mâcon , Dijon , Is-sur-Tille (junction), Chalindrey , Langres and Merrey Vittel (16th Army Corps) and Mirecourt (15th Army Corps)
Line D 9th, 18th and 20th military region Parts of the 20th Army Corps (shielding troops), then the 9th and 18th Army Corps, the 59th and 68th Reserve Divisions and the "Rueil & Fontainebleau Heavy Artillery Regiment" Bayonne , Bordeaux , Châteauroux , Angers & Tours Orléans , Montargis , Sens , Troyes, Bar-sur-Seine , Bricon (hub station) and Chaumont Neufchâteau (Vosges) (18th Army Corps), Toul and Pont-Saint-Vincent (9th Army Corps)
Line E. 12th and 17th military region 7th Cavalry Division (shielding troops), then the 10th Cavalry Division, the 12th and 17th Army Corps and the 67th Reserve Division Toulouse, Montauban , Périgueux and Angoulême Limoges , Bourges , Cosne-sur-Loire, Clamecy , Auxerre , Saint-Florentin , Troyes- Saint-Julien (central station), Brienne-le-Château and Wassy Joinville , Gondreville (17th Army Corps), Vaucouleurs , Pagny-sur-Meuse and Commercy (12th Army Corps)
Line F 5. Military region Parts of the 6th Army Corps (shielding troops), then the 5th Army Corps, the Colonial Army Corps, the 55th, 65th and 75th Reserve Divisions and the "Poitiers Heavy Artillery Regiment" Brest, Cherbourg , Orléans, Étampes , Melun & Paris Noisy-le-Sec & Nangis or Fontainebleau & Montereau , then Flamboin-Gouaix, Nogent-sur-Seine , Troyes-Preize (junction station), Mailly-le-Camp & Vitry-le-François Revigny-sur-Ornain , Bar-le-Duc , Ligny-en-Barrois (Colonial Corps) , Saint-Mihiel and Troyon (Meuse) (5th Army Corps)
Line G 4th, 6th and 11th military region Parts of the 6th Army Corps (shielding troops), then the 4th and 11th Army Corps, the 54th and 56th Reserve Divisions, the 9th Cavalry Division and the "Le Mans Heavy Artillery Regiment" Vannes , Nantes , Mans and Paris Via Dreux , Versailles , Choisy-le-Roi , Noisy-le-Sec , Meaux , La Ferté-Milon , Fismes , Reims (junction station) and Suippes Sainte-Menehould (11th Army Corps) and Verdun (4th Army Corps)
Line H 3rd and 10th military region the 3rd and 10th Army Corps, the 53rd and 60th Reserve Divisions Rennes , Saint-Servan, Evreux , Rouen and Paris via Mantes , Pontoise , Creil , Compiègne , Soissons , Laon (junction station) & Reims Rethel (3rd Army Corps) and Vouziers (10th Army Corps)
Line I. 2. Army region Parts of the 2nd Army Corps (shielding troops), then the 52nd Reserve Division and the "Douai Heavy Artillery Regiment" Amiens via Ham , Laon (junction station), Montcornet , Mézières, Sedan Stenay and Dun (2nd Army Corps)
Line K 1. Military region the 1st Army Corps and the and 51st Reserve Divisions Lille and Arras via Douai , Valenciennes and Avesnes Hirson (junction station) and Rimogne (1st Army Corps)
Line W - British Expeditionary Force Ports of Havre and Rouen (for infantry), Calais and Boulogne-sur-Mer (for cavalry and logistics) One train each via Amiens , Arras , Douai, Cambrai , Busigny , Nouvion and Wassigny , the others via Amiens, Chaulnes , Ham and Saint-Quentin Le Cateau and Maubeuge .
Dijon - Laon transit line - - from Gare de Dole-Ville via Gare de Dijon-Ville, Gare de Nuits-sous-Ravières, Gare de Montereau, Gare de Moret - Veneux-les-Sablons, Gare de Melun, Gare de Brunoy, la Grande Ceinture est , Gare de Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, Gare du Bourget, Gare de Villers-Cotterêts, Gare de Soissons to Gare de Laon
Chagny - Busigny transit line - - from Gare de Chagny via Gare de Montchanin, Gare de Nevers, Gare de Saincaize, Gare de Bourges, Gare de Vierzon-Ville, Gare des Aubrais, la Grande Ceinture ouest , Gare de Juvisy, Gare d'Achères - Grand-Cormier, Gare de Pontoise, Gare de Creil, Gare de Compiègne, Gare de Tergnier to Gare de Busigny

The regiments of the cavalry corps were also transported to the deployment areas by rail, but on branch lines:

shielding

In order to ensure the protection of the mobilization and the deployment of the first day against enemy surprise attacks, a plan was drawn up to shield one's own troop movements in the first six days after the general mobilization.

One of the greatest fears of the French General Staff was that of a massive surprise attack:

"... the break-in on the national territory by enemy troops before their own cover troops were able to arrive at their foreseen places"

For this reason, six points of preventive measures were established which were implemented after mobilization:

  • Group A (precautionary measures), drafting officers, those on leave and inactive troops
  • Group B (surveillance measures), surveillance of borders, telephone and telegraph offices.
  • Group C (protective measures), guarding bridges and viaducts;
  • Group D Coastal Surveillance;
  • Group E (measures for the preparatory organizations), calling up the training of the gendarmerie, the reserved reservists and the territorial units to guard the communication routes near the front, recording the necessary horse stocks
  • Group F (preparatory measures for the operations), loading the explosive mines on bridges and viaducts near the front, bombarding suspicious airships, mobilization exercises of the front organization, interruption of the international power lines

In peacetime, the units assigned to shield themselves had a higher staffing level than the rest - 200 men per company instead of 140 - which, in the event of mobilization, were increased to 240 by calling up reservists living close to the front.

As a first step, more barracks were built near the border, which were also more densely staggered than in the rest of the country and were manned by relatively more units. In the event of mobilization, they should move out first and monitor the border. The forts of the Système Séré de Rivières were immediately occupied by reservists and local territorial forces at the beginning of the war, who had to dig trenches in the defensive sections, pull barbed wire barriers and build battery positions between the fort. The shield was assigned to five army corps, each of which was reinforced by a cavalry division. Each corps commander was responsible for his section to the commander in chief until the main forces arrived on the morning of the 5th day:

  • the 7th Army Corps with the 14th Infantry in Belfort, the 41st Infantry Division in Remiremont and the 8th Cavalry Division in Dole (Jura) for the sector of the Upper Vosges (Secteur des hautes Vosges) from Belfort to Gérardmer
  • the 21st Army Corps with the 43rd Infantry Division in Saint-Dié , the 13th Infantry Division in Épinal and the 6th Cavalry Division in Lyon for the Upper Meurthe sector (Secteur de la Haute-Meurthe) from Fraize to Avricourt
  • the 20th Army Corps with the 11th Infantry Division in Nancy, the 39th Infantry Division in Toul and the 2nd Cavalry Division in Lunéville for the Secteur de la Basse-Meurthe from Avricourt to Dieulouard
  • the 6th Army Corps with the 40th Infantry Division in Saint-Mihiel, the 42nd Infantry Division in Verdun and the 7th Cavalry Division in Melun for the sector of the southern Woëvre (Secteur de la Woëvre méridionale) from Pont-à-Mousson to Conflans
  • the 2nd Army Corps with the 4th Infantry Division in Mézières, the 4th Cavalry Division in Sedan, the 3rd Cavalry Division in Compiègne and the 5th Cavalry Division in Reims for the sector of the northern Woëvre (Secteur de la Woëvre septentrionale) from Conflans to Givet

Thus, 127 infantry battalions, 168 cavalry squadrons and 159 artillery batteries were available for the shielding measure. Their mandate under Plan XVII was:

"At the beginning, to prevent the reconnaissance attempts of enemy detachments that want to penetrate into their own territory, and to stop the advance of troops that could disturb or hinder their own deployment."

Theoretically, the corps were deployed in two stages:

  • the first with the time between the third and eighth hour after the call of mobilization
  • the second from the 2nd to the 4th day after mobilization

the 12th Infantry Division as the third division of the 6th Corps in Reims was kept in the reserve.

The shielding was carried out between the fourth and the sixth day by three hastily deployed divisions (divisions «hâtives») from Amiens, the 3rd Infantry Division of the 2nd Army Corps, from Orléans the 9th Infantry Division of the 5th Army Corps and from Dijon the 15th Infantry Division of the 8th Army Corps All these units had to build cover (trenches, batteries, shelters) as well as cut down the glacis of the forts and reinforce the obstacle zones that had already been created in peacetime - so south and north of Montmedy, on the Moselle heights, on the Grand Couronne near Nancy , in the foothills of the forest near Charmes in the Vosges, on the plateau of Ortoncourt and Essey . Until the 11th day after the mobilization, the reserve divisions had to reinforce the shielding troops. The units in the fortifications in the northeast received their orders after seven days, those in the southeast after six to ten days. In the southeast, the shielding was carried out by eight groups of hunters on foot (five from the 14th Division and three from the 15th Division). On the 10th day after the mobilization, they were replaced by reserve battalions of the mountain troops.

Operations

In accordance with Plan XVII, the routes of deployment were recorded in the relevant directives (Directives pour la concentration) of February 1914 and passed on to the designated army commanders.

The offensive was to begin as soon as the active corps were ready in their deployment areas. They had to comply with the regulations for the management of large associations of October 1913. as well as according to the regulations on the field service of the armies of December 1913. It was also necessary to coordinate with Russia, since both countries wanted to start their offensives on the 15th day after the mobilization. In order to be able to carry out the offensives, the general staff was extensively equipped with maps of northeast France, eastern Belgium and Alsace-Moselle.

"The Supreme Commander's intention is to use all the forces gathered to oppose the attack of the German armies."

The main task of the French armed forces was to develop in two main actions:

  • to the right in the Vosges and on the lower reaches of the Moselle near Toul,
  • to the left (i.e. to the north) on the Verdun - Metz line.

These two actions were closely integrated by the forces acting on the Meuse heights and in the Woëvre plain.

The three proposed offensives

Scheme with the proposed offensives according to Plan XVII. The French armies in blue, the Belgian and the fortifications of the Système Séré de Rivières in gray , the German fortresses in red.

Two large French offensive movements were planned, one on the Lorraine plate between the Vosges and Metz by the 1st and 2nd Armies, and a second in the area of Thionville into Diedenhofen and Luxembourg (or into the Belgian province of Luxembourg in the event of a German invasion of Belgium ) by the 4th and 5th Army. One group was assigned to the 1st Army (7th Army Corps and 8th Cavalry Division). This was at the disposal of the commander in chief and had to attack Upper Alsace on the 4th day after the mobilization.

"The special mission is to return to Alsace and to attack the opposing forces that are trying to evade over the western slope of the Vosges to the north to the Col de la Schlucht . Furthermore, an uprising of the Alsatian populations, who have remained loyal to the French cause, be favored. "

Even more, the group was supposed to block the Rhine bridges at Basel and Neubreisach , combined with the capture of Colmar and, in a second step, an investigation against Strasbourg .

On day 12 of mobilization, the core of the 1st Army (four army corps)

"... an attack in the general direction Baccarat , Sarrebourg , Sarreguemines , the right wing reaches the edges of the Vosges , the extreme right reaches the Rhine."

while the 2nd Army with five army corps at the same time

"... attacks in the direction of Château-Salins and Saarbrücken ."

Both armies were separated by the Pays des étangs (a landscape with several ponds between Château-Salins and Saarburg).

The encirclement of the fortress Metz in the west and north-west was assigned to the 3rd Army (three army corps under the command of Général Ruffey) in the south-west on the Meuse heights of the 3rd reserve division group and in the south-east of the 2nd reserve division group.

The 4th Army (three corps) had temporarily been placed in the second line.

“... should be ready on the 12th day of mobilization to line up south of the Woëvre and later on to the activities of the 2nd Army north through the region in the west of the Meuse , on the left side of the 3rd Army, towards Arlon to participate. "

The mission of the 5th Army (five army corps) was to operate against the right wing of the Germans. If the fighting was limited to Franco-German territory, it had to attack from the bridgehead at Montmédy in the direction of Diedenhofen - Luxembourg. However, if Belgium were involved, the target would be in the direction of Neufchâteau .

"Case Belgium" and "Case Switzerland"

The concentration of the French as well as the German main forces naturally extended along the common border. This concentration could, however, shift if, on the one hand, a march through Belgium and Luxembourg, or on the other hand, a march through Switzerland were carried out. At the request of the General Staff in the winter of 1911/1912, France had initially reserved the right to disregard Belgium's neutrality if necessary, but this was rejected by the Supreme War Council at its meeting on January 9, 1912. Mann didn't want to lose British support.

Plan XVII provided for a French reaction to a German attack through neutral territory, such as a limited action against the Belgian province of Luxembourg or the Mittelland (Switzerland) . The prerequisite was a massive German attack against Basel or Liège . In a possibly limited German attack against the Swiss Porrentruy , the 1st Reserve Division Group in the Jura had to turn to the east and rely on the (outdated) fortifications. The Swiss Army was able to mobilize quickly, which would be protected by the permanent front brigades. The Swiss would still be able to defend their border fortifications and destroy all Rhine bridges near Basel. The possibility of an Italian attack over the Swiss passes Grosser St. Bernhard , Simplon and St. Gotthard were unlikely, but were taken into account. (Findings of the 2nd and 3rd offices of the General Staff)

In the event of an attack over Luxembourg and Belgian territory, a counter-offensive by the 4th Army in the direction of Arlon and the 5th Army in the direction of Neufchâteau was planned. The left wing was to be secured by the Cavalry Corps (operational on the 4th day) and the 4th Reserve Division Group. The French invasion of Belgium, also for reconnaissance purposes, was only possible on the orders of the Commander-in-Chief - after the latter had received permission from the Belgian government. To ensure control over the Belgian Meuse bridges , the "148 e régiment d'infanterie" from Givet was immediately transported to Dinant in order to quickly occupy the bridges as far as Namur . A column of 40 buses (each with 35 seats) was used for the shuttle service.

Since information about the opposing actions was of the utmost importance, an "information plan" ("plan de renseignements") was drawn up in March 1914. The findings of the "special service" (espionage), as well as the air and cavalry reconnaissance were used.

Implementation in 1914

During the mobilization, the shielding and the deployment in August 1914 were implemented according to the specifications of the plan. The first operations were all done in one step.

Shielding and mobilization

In July 1914, French President Raymond Poincaré and Council President René Viviani visited Russia. It was then discussed that France would not implement the shield too early in order not to appear as a provocateur. The general diplomatic situation at the end of July and beginning of August confirmed what had been foreseen: Luxembourg and Belgium would be overrun (both had already asked for help), Italy, despite its contractual obligations, would not take part in a war for the time being, Switzerland would remain among everyone Circumstances neutral. Spain would also remain neutral, while Britain would stand alongside France.

Implementation of the shield

Cuirassiers on a boulevard in Paris.

On July 26, 1914, all generals and all corps commanders were informed that they would be available immediately. On the same day, all units were ordered into the barracks (so on the military training or firing ranges). The 4th Office of the General Staff, responsible for rail transport, alerted the military commissions of the various departments. On July 27, the marching orders for the troops of the five army corps on the Eastern Front were issued and the corps initially remained in the status of heightened alert. In addition, the protection of the communication channels (especially the bridges) was increased. At midnight between July 27 and 28, the War Department issued marching orders for the forces of the Interior .; from July 29th the fortifications were guarded, the military installations and the wireless telegraphy installations in the area of ​​the six front corps (1st Corps in Maubeuge, 2nd Corps in the Ardennes, 6th Corps in Verdun, 20th Corps in Toul, 21st Corps in Épinal, and the 7th Corps in Belfort) On the evening of July 30th, the War Ministry ordered a mobilization exercise for the garrisons close to the front, including the deployment of part of the active force.

“... however, for diplomatic reasons, it is imperative that we do not cause an incident. As a result, no part of the troops and no patrol, not even under a pretext, should approach the border more than ten kilometers "

The four affected fortress governors in the east received the order to begin the necessary work on the fortifications (digging trenches, pulling barbed wire entanglement and creating battery positions). On the morning of July 31, the five army corps in the east were ordered to conduct a mobilization exercise, while Général Joffre was already demanding the general mobilization order:

"... it is absolutely necessary for the government to know that any delay of 24 hours from this evening, when calling up the reservists and sending the telegrams to carry out the shielding program, throws us back in carrying out the deployment, which is what we per day of delay will result in a loss of area of ​​15 to 20 kilometers. The Commander-in-Chief cannot assume this responsibility "

On July 31, rail traffic between Germany and France was interrupted and preparations were made to evacuate the locomotive depots near the border in ( Pagny-sur-Moselle , Conflans - Jarny , Baroncourt and Audun-le-Roman ) and the railway organization was given military status. On July 31, the Council of Ministers approved the shielding operation, then preparations were made to seize the railways. On August 1, at 6:00 p.m., the regimental commanders concerned were sent telegrams to carry out the shielding measures and the call-up of the reservists living near the border began. As before, however, the 10 km distance to the border had to be maintained. The transport for the shielding began on August 3 at noon with a total of 538 trains, 293 of which were used to transport troops (mainly cavalry). 89 trains were used to transport food.

General mobilization

The departure of the Poilus in August 1914 , painting by Albert Herter 12 × 5 meters from 1926 in the Gare de Paris-Est

.

Crowd in front of the Gare de l'Est in Paris on August 2, 1914; only the reservists have the right to enter the station on that day.

On August 1, 1914 at 3:45 p.m. the French government announced the general mobilization for the next day. The telegrams of the general mobilization to the commanders of the army corps, divisions and regiments left Paris on August 1st at 3:55 p.m. During the mobilization, civil rail traffic was suspended, 467 trains were used daily for the establishment of the shield and the deployment. There were also 172 trains on the Paris light rail . The mobilization took place in the first half of August without any problems. The number of objectors was only 1.5%, although 15% had been expected.

The Gendarmerie Nationale, as the military police, only had to become active in a few cases, mostly cases of self-mutilation, as well as a number of objectors in the Loire department . For security reasons, the "1 er régiment de cuirassiers" was relocated to the barracks of the École militaire for three days "for political reasons" in order to strengthen the Garde républicaine . An amnesty was announced for those who did not show up on the date and for the deserters if they volunteered.

The first 71,000 volunteers registered. As of August 15, the instructions for accepting French volunteers from the age of 17 during the war period were in effect. The law of the three years of 1913 approved the convocation of the presentation classes from 1914, the reactivation of veterans from the Franco-German War, the deployment of non-French (26,000 men) were explicitly affected by this the Alsace-Lorraine, the members of the Polish population group in Paris , and the Italians, if they were not already part of the Foreign Legion.

Incidents during the shield measure

The first incident occurred on August 2, 1914: a patrol of the Jäger Regiment on Horseback No. 5 from Mulhouse carried out a reconnaissance in the direction of Joncherey and ended up on French territory. They came across a train of 44 e régiment d'infantry from Montbéliard , the monitored the border. The 21-year-old French Caporal Jules-André Peugeot and the 22-year-old German Lieutenant Albert Mayer were killed in a brief firefight . Further German reconnaissance measures explored the French positions at Longwy and Lunéville . On the morning of August 2nd, the Chief of the General Staff sent a note to the government:

“We have to give up some positions that we consider important for the development of our campaign plan. We will have to regain these positions in the future, which will not go away without losses. "

The answer was:

"You have absolute freedom to carry out all measures that lead to the crossing of the German border."

Général Joffre informed the corps commanders of the shielding troops:

"For national reasons, to maintain national morality and for reasons of diplomacy, it is imperative to leave the Germans fully responsible for starting the hostilities."

On August 3, Joffre reassembled the five army commanders at the War Department before setting up his Grand Headquarters on August 4 in Vitry-le-François . On August 2nd at 6:45 p.m., the German ambassador in Paris had already handed over the declaration of war on the grounds of French air strikes on German territory.

Individual evidence

  1. Law of July 27, 1872 on compulsory military service, published in the Journal officiel of August 17, 1872, Bulletin des lois, n ° 101, p. 97 in Gallica .
  2. Law of July 24, 1873 on the general organization of the army, published in the Journal officiel of August 7, 1873, Bulletin des lois, n ° 147, p. 113 in Gallica .
  3. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 pp. 53–54
  4. Joffre 1932 p. 182 id Joffre2.
  5. Directives pour la concentration, Armees francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 pp. 53–54 Appendix n ° 8, p. 21.
  6. Joffre 1932 p. 187 id Joffre2
  7. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 p. 91
  8. Instruction of November 21, 1913 on the framework conditions of the units during the infantry mobilization , Armees francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 6, pp. 18-19
  9. Law of December 22, 1913 on the establishment of a new Army Corps region on French territory, published in the Journal officiel of December 24, 1913, Bulletin des lois, n ° 120, p. 3178 in Gallica . Decrees of September 22nd and December 31st, 1913 establishing the 21st Territorial Region, published in the Journal officiel of January 3rd, 1914, Bulletin des lois, n ° 120, p. 3429 on Gallica .
  10. Joffre 1920 p. 11 id Joffre
  11. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 pp. 517-520, 525 & 530-532
  12. AFGG 1936 tome 1, volume 1, p. 526 id AFGG_1_1
  13. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 pp. 53–54
  14. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 pp. 44–45
  15. Armees francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 p. 63
  16. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 pp. 53-65
  17. Armies francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 p. 48
  18. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 p. 59.
  19. "Répartition et emplacement of the troupes de l'Armée française" Paris Éditeur Imprimerie nationale 1 May 1914 passage 10
  20. Journal des marches et des operations du 3e régiment de hussards
  21. ^ R. Alexandre "Avec Joffre d'Agadir à Verdun - Souvenirs 1911-1916" Nancy, Paris et Strasbourg Éditeur Berger-Levrault 1932 passage 18-19
  22. AFGG 1936 tome 1, volume 1, pp. 517-585.
  23. ^ Joseph Joffre “Mémoires du maréchal Joffre” Paris Éditeur Plon 1932 Réimpression 1935 et 2008 deux volumes pages totales 491 et 468 gallica.bnf.fr passage 170
  24. Decree of February 5, 1889 regarding the organization for the inclusion of the railroad in military use and the decree of December 8, 1913 regarding the regulation of the strategic troop transport by rail . Digitized on Gallica .
  25. Jean Mallouy “Les Transports stratégiques” Armée et Marine: revue hebdomadaire illustrée des armées de terre et de mer numéro 24 June 14, 1914 passage 615, digitized on Gallica .
  26. 125 régiment d'infanterie, Journal des Marches et Opérations du 5 août 1914 au 31 December 1916 , Service historique de la Défense, p. 6
  27. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 p. 56.
  28. Marchand 1926 p. 7 id C ° Est.
  29. Marchand 1926 p. 37 id C ° Est
  30. Marchand 1926 p. 21 id C ° Est
  31. Marchand 1926 pp. 25-26 id C ° Est
  32. Marchand 1926 p. 14 id C ° Est
  33. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 carte n ° 10; Marchand 1926 pp. 22-23 id C ° Est; this list of lines and stations was part of the “Journaux des marches et des opérations” of the units.
  34. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 p. 88
  35. Instruction on la preparation de la mobilization du 15 février 1909, mise à jour le 4 avril 1914, annexe 2, to be read in: Armees francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 p. 94
  36. Journal des marches & opérations du 152e Régiment d'Infanterie pendant les marches de reconnaissances, grandes manœuvres, tirs de guerre, etc. du 16 June 1913 to 20 June 1915 , Service historique de la Défense, 26 N 697/13 p. 44 .
  37. AFGG 1936 tome 1, volume 1, p. 527 id AFGG_1_1
  38. Decree of October 28, 1913 Décret du 28 October 1913 regarding the command of large units, Chapter IX.
  39. Ministère de la Guerre Conduite des grandes unités - service des armées en campagne Paris Editeur Henri Charles-Lavauzelle 1914 Bulletin officiel du ministère de la Guerre numéro dans collection 76-1 gallica.bnf.fr bnf 339817098.
  40. Ministère de la Guerre Service des armées en campagne - Service en campagne - droit international, volume arrêté à la date du 2 December 1913 Paris Éditeur Henri Charles-Lavauzelle 1914 Bulletin officiel du Ministère de la guerre numéro dans collection 76-2 gallica.bnf .fr bnf 33981716j
  41. Pierre Rigoux "Tannenberg 1914 - sacrifice russe pour la France" Paris Éditeur Economica 2010 collection Campagnes et stratégies numéro 82 ISBN 978-2-7178-5831-0 passage 32-33 id Rigoux
  42. ^ Arthur Lévy Le Service geographique de l'Armée 1914-1918 - les coulisses de la guerre Nancy, Paris et Strasbourg Éditeur Berger-Levrault 1926 bnf 34084611v gallica.bnf.fr id Lévy
  43. Directives pour la concentration , "Directive générale: intentions du général commandant en chef", February 1914
  44. AFGG 1922 tome 1, volume 1, annexe n ° 8, p. 23 id AFGG_1_1a
  45. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 8, p. 32
  46. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 8, pp. 23-25.
  47. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 8, pp. 25-27
  48. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 8, p. 29
  49. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 8, pp. 30–31
  50. ^ Marie-Thérèse Bitsch "La Belgique entre la France et l'Allemagne - 1905-1914" Paris Éditeur Publications de la Sorbonne 1994 CollectionHistoire de la France aux XIXe et XXe siècles numéro dans collection 48 ISBN 2-85944-239-1 Passage 461 books.google.fr
  51. Martin Barros “Quand la France surveillait les cols suisses (1815-1914) - Revue historique des armées” Numéro 243 2006 pp. 65–70 rha.revues.org
  52. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 10, p. 48
  53. AFGG 1922 tome 1, volume 1, annexe n ° 8, p. 34 id AFGG_1_1a
  54. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 8, p. 35
  55. Armes francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 10, pp. 38-49
  56. ^ Telegram from Commandant Pageot, French military attaché in Switzerland, arrived in Bern on July 28, 1914 at 1.30 a.m. - answered at 2:50 p.m. from the Swiss Foreign Ministry to the French War Ministry, received there at 5:45 p.m. To be found in: Armees francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 13, p. 52
  57. Telegram n ° 310 sent on July 26, 1914 at 05:00; available in the Journal des marches et opérations de l'État-Major de la 42e Division d'Infanterie, from 30 June 1914 to 15 May 1915. Service historique de la Défense .
  58. Journal des marches & operations du 152e Régiment d'Infanterie pendant les marches de reconnaissances, grandes manœuvres, tirs de guerre, etc. du 16 June 1913 to 20 June 1915 , Service historique de la Défense
  59. Les 9 jours qui ont précédé la guerre. In: Service historique de la Défense : Journal des marches et opérations du 158e regiment d'infanterie, du 30 juillet 1914 to 15 May 1915. ( combattant.14-18.pagesperso-orange.fr ).
  60. Journal des marches et opérations de l'État-Major du 20e Corps, du 25 June 1914 to 13 March 1915 , Service historique de la Défense, memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr
  61. Telegram from the War Ministry to the relevant army corps at 5:50 a.m. on July 28, 1914 - to be viewed in AFGG 1936 tome 1, volume 1, p. 99 id AFGG_1_1
  62. Telegrams from the War Ministry to the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th, 20th and 21st Corps at 1 p.m. on July 29, 1914, to be read in: Armees francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. . 1 p. 102
  63. Telegrams from the War Ministry to the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 20th and 21st Corps at 4:55 p.m. on July 30, 1914, Armees francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 15 , Pp. 55-56.
  64. Telegrams from the War Ministry to the commanders of Verdun, Toul, Épinal and Belfort, received at 6:40 p.m. and at 7:10 p.m. on July 30, 1914, available in: Armees francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1936 Volume 1 No. 1 P. 104
  65. ^ Note from Général Joffre to the Minister of War of July 31 at 3:30 a.m. Armies francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 17, p. 58
  66. Marchand 1926 p. 44 id C ° Est
  67. Marchand 1926 p. 45 id C ° Est
  68. ^ Journal des marches et d'opérations du 44e régiment d'infanterie pendant la campagne contre l'Allemagne , July-août 1914, Service historique de la Défense
  69. Decree of August 1 on the announcement of the army and navy, published in the Journal officiel de la République française of August 2, 1914, Bulletin des lois, n ° 133, p. 2228 in Gallica
  70. H. Mingat "Des hommes aux obligations militaires Imposées of réserves en temps de paix et en cas de mobilization" Paris Éditeur H. Charles Lavauzelle 1914
  71. Dominique Lejeune La France de la Belle Époque - 1896-1914 Paris Éditeur Armand Colin 2007 (année première édition 1991) numéro d'édition 5 collection Cursus ISBN 978-2-200-35198-4 passage174
  72. ^ Journal des marches et opérations du 1er régiment de cuirassiers pendant la Campagne contre l'Allemagne, du 31 july 1914 to 19 novembre 1914 , Service historique de la Défense , memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr
  73. Loi du 5 août 1914 relative à l'amnistie pour les insoumis et déserteurs de l'Armée de terre et de l'Armée de mer, promulguée au Journal officiel du 6 août 1914, Bulletin des lois, n ° 135, p. 2277 on Gallica
  74. Bulletin officiel du Ministère de la guerre, No. 33, p. 931 on Gallica .
  75. The decree of August 3rd regulated the use of regiments of the Foreign Legion during the war, published in the Journal officiel du 6 août 1914, Bulletin des lois, n ° 135, p. 2276 on Gallica .
  76. Le drame de Joncherey ( Memento of the original from January 12, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.joncherey.fr
  77. ^ The First to Fall: Peugeot and Mayer, August 2, 1914
  78. ^ Note from the Chief of Staff at 10:00 a.m. on August 2, 1914, quoted from: AFGG 1936 tome 1, volume 1, p. 116.
  79. Telephone call from the War Ministry at 2:10 p.m. on August 2, quoted from: AFGG 1936 tome 1, volume 1, p. 117.
  80. Secret instructions for shielding , August 2, 1914, 5:30 p.m., Armees francaises dans la Grande guerre - AFGG 1922 Volume 1 No. 1 Appendix n ° 31, pp. 69–70.

Footnotes

  1. they formed a defensive screen on the border
  2. On August 1, 1914, of the 173 infantry regiments, 164 had three battalions and nine four battalions. The colonial regiments consisted of three battalions each, the rifle regiments of between two and six battalions (altogether 40 battalions), the Zouave regiments of six battalions each (the 7th battalion of the 4th Zouave regiment was in the line-up in 1914). There were also two regiments of the Foreign Legion, each with six battalions, six colonial marching battalions , five battalions of light African infantry, five battalions of Moroccan auxiliaries, 14 divisions “Goumiers morocains” (Moroccan tribal militia), four regiments of Tonkinese riflemen, four regiments of Senegalese riflemen Madagascar riflemen, a regiment of Annamite riflemen, two indigenous regiments from Gabon and Chad - plus ten cycling groups, set up from the hunter battalions and assigned to the cavalry divisions.
  3. Each cavalry regiment consisted of four escadrons (except for the Spahis, they had five, six or seven escadrons, a total of 25 escadrons). A fifth Spahiregiment was created by halving the 2nd regiment in August 1914. There were also an Escadron Spahis from Senegal and 12 Escadrons from Moroccan auxiliaries.
  4. On August 1, 1914, the French artillery consisted of 62 field artillery regiments (42 regiments of nine batteries each as division artillery) and 20 regiments of 12 batteries each as corps artillery, 11 foot artillery regiments (for the fortresses), five heavy artillery regiments at the disposal of the Army commands, three colonial artillery regiments (in the colonies), two mountain artillery regiments and ten African artillery groups.
  5. On August 1, 1914, there were 61 of the 102 battalions, 35 of the 62 escadrons and 22 of the 39 batteries of the Africa Army, which consisted of 82,000 men in Morocco.
  6. The group thus roughly corresponded to a German artillery division or a battalion in the foot artillery.
  7. The hypothesis of a German attack by Belgium has been dealt with in 300 publications. Read in: Maxime Lecomte & Camille Lévi "Neutralité belge et invasion allemande - Histoire, stratégie" Paris Editeur H. Charles-Lavauzelle 1914.
  8. cf. Henri de Lacroix & Edmond Buat “Un voyage d'état-major de corps d'armée - Compte rendu détaillé” Paris Éditeur = R. Chapelot 1908 http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5606380c
  9. Until the beginning of 1914 Général Paul Pau was planned for this, but he was replaced by Castelnau because of his advanced age
  10. Joseph Gallieni was intended for this command, because of his advanced age he was replaced on April 24, 1914 by Larenzac.
  11. As an example, the 152 e régiment d'infanterie in Gérardmer with its depot in Langres (belonging to the 7th Army Corps, 41st Infantry Division in Remiremont ) had a peace level of 2,296 men, which was increased to 3,290 men through the addition of reservists
  12. The latter were German maps, the so-called measuring table sheets, or topographic maps, which were made by the Geographical Department of the General Staff in Berlin and were freely available. It was possible to procure 25,000 of these cards, which are considered to be very precise.
  13. After France had agreed to respect Switzerland's neutrality under all circumstances, the question was asked what Switzerland would do in the event of a violent use of the train station in Basel and an occupation of the Porrentruy enclave. Thereupon the chief of the Swiss military department and the chief of the general staff declared that they would oppose such actions by all means. The statements made in this regard left no room for doubt. (As can be seen in the telegrams between the military attachés of Switzerland and France of July 28, 1914).
  14. The majority of the French cavalry (seven out of 10 divisions) were used for shielding. However, the 1 er régiment de cuirassiers and the 2 e régiment de cuirassiers were seconded to Paris from July 31 to August 3, 1914 to maintain order.
  15. A battalion with 712 men of the 152 e régiment d'infanterie was on a multi-day exploratory march from July 16 to 26 in the Vosges. The order to return reached the battalion at 1:30 a.m. on July 27 between Vagney and Gérardmer , where the battalion arrived at 6:45 a.m.
  16. Any soldier in the reserve who is recalled to active duty and who, unless force majeure prevents this, has not reported to his destination on the specified day in accordance with his marching order, is deemed to be absent without permission after 30 days and is declared in accordance with Article 230 of the Military Code.
  17. Voluntary commitments for the duration of the war were accepted from the 20th day of mobilization on August 12th