Sea battle at Tsushima

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Sea battle at Tsushima
Admiral Tōgō aboard the Mikasa at the start of the battle
Admiral Tōgō aboard the Mikasa at the start of the battle
date May 27. bis 28. May 1905
place in front of Okinoshima Island near Tsushima , Korea Strait
output Japanese victory
Parties to the conflict

Russian Empire 1883Russian Empire Russia

Japanese EmpireJapanese Empire Japan

Commander

Russian EmpireRussian Empire (naval war flag) Zinowi Roschestvensky Nikolai Nebogatow Oskar Enkwist
Russian EmpireRussian Empire (naval war flag)
Russian EmpireRussian Empire (naval war flag)

JapanJapan (naval war flag) Tōgō Heihachirō Kamimura Hikonojo Dewa Shigetō Uryū Sotokichi
JapanJapan (naval war flag)
JapanJapan (naval war flag)
JapanJapan (naval war flag)

Troop strength
7 ships of the line
1 ironclad
3 coastal armored ships
3 armored cruisers
8 cruisers
1 auxiliary cruiser
9 torpedo boat destroyer

supply ships
4 ships of the line
1 ironclad

8 armored cruisers
17 cruisers
7 auxiliary cruisers
20 torpedo boat destroyers
31 torpedo boats
losses

5,045 dead
6,016 prisoners
21 ships sunk
7 ships surrendered

116 dead
583 wounded
3 ships sunk

The sea ​​battle at Tsushima ( Japanese 日本 海海 戦 , Nihon-kai kaisen , German "Sea battle in the Sea of ​​Japan "; Russian Цусимское сражение ) took place on May 14th July. / May 27, 1905 greg. until the following day in the Korean Strait between the Japanese fleet under Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō and a Russian squadron under the command of Admiral Sinovi Petrovich Roschestvensky .

The naval battle ended with a crushing defeat on the Russian side and was decisive for the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War . Military historians consider it to be the first modern sea battle in world history.

prehistory

The Baltic fleet had to travel about 18,000 nautical miles from their home ports before they met the Japanese.

The Russian unit consisted of units of the Baltic Fleet , which had been sent from the Baltic Sea on the eight-month and 18,000 nautical miles long voyage to the Far East to break the siege of the Port Arthur fortress on the Yellow Sea , which was included in the Russo-Japanese War . There, blocked by the Japanese siege, lay the remnants of the Russian Pacific fleet, which had been damaged by a surprise attack at the beginning of the war. After the fall of Port Arthur on January 2, 1905 and the associated loss of the remnants of the Pacific Fleet, the Russian relief squadron was ordered to Vladivostok . This march, which had been delayed by the Dogger Bank incident , was not hidden from the Japanese side , and they succeeded in catching the Russian unit as they passed the Koreastrasse .

The fleets

The Japanese fleet

Contrary to the expectations of the Russian leadership, the Japanese fleet was in excellent condition when the war broke out. Most of the Japanese ships of the line and cruisers were built before the turn of the century, but were in no way inferior to the more modern Russian ships in terms of equipment and combat power. The association also included the most modern units supplied by Great Britain, an ally of Japan.

The level of training in the Japanese fleet was considered excellent by experts. Compared to Russian sailors, who often only carried out their maneuvering exercises during the summer months, Japanese seamen spent almost the entire year at sea. As a result, they knew the ship and equipment better and were able to complete more extensive combat exercises. Admiral Tōgō and some of his subordinate officers had learned naval warfare at British naval academies.

Last but not least, the Japanese had gained important combat experience in the siege of Port Arthur and in the Yellow Sea . Encouraged by these first successes, they went into the battle very confident and motivated.

The Russian fleet

Admiral Zinovy ​​Roshestvensky

The Second Russian Pacific Squadron consisted of a large number of different ships. Only the four ships of the line Knjas Suvorov , Emperor Alexander III. , Borodino and Orjol were of a newer design and of the same type ( Borodino class ). The rest of the unit consisted of partly outdated cruisers and various light units. Because of the slow coastal armored ships, the squadron could only travel at a speed of just under 10  knots . The auxiliary ships carried along (transport ships, workshop ship and hospital ship) represented an additional burden. All of these factors reduced the combat strength of the Russian fleet considerably.

What weighed heavier than the technical factors, however, was the fact that the morale of the Russian sailors was worn down by the looming revolution , constant conflicts with the officers and the long and difficult journey. Only in the face of the enemy did many Russians regain their fighting spirit.

A detailed description of the journey of the Second Russian Pacific Squadron and the events during the battle can be found in the novel Tsushima by the author Alexei Silytsch Novikow-Priboi , who experienced the battle as a non-commissioned officer on board the liner Oryol .

course

The Russian squadron was to break through to the Russian port of Vladivostok , which would serve as the future base of operations , after the fall of the Port Arthur fortress . Admiral Roschestwenski chose the direct route through Koreastrasse. As a result, there has been repeated speculation about the meaning and reasons for this decision. Alternatively, the squadron could have chosen the route around Japan and then through the La Pérouse Strait or the Tsugarus Strait into the Sea of ​​Japan . Probably the lack of coal and the no less great risk of circumnavigating Japan were the main reasons for choosing this route.

The march

At dawn on May 27, the Russian squadron approached the Korea Strait. Shortly after 5 a.m., a ship was discovered starboard which briefly escorted the squadron and then quickly departed. It was the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru , which - attracted by the bright lighting of the Russian hospital ships - had spotted the squadron around 04:45 a.m. and was on its course. Shortly thereafter, the Shinano Maru notified the squadron Admiral Tōgōs lying in the Korean Masampo Bay by radio . Tōgō immediately set course for the Japanese coast and wanted to cut off the route of the Russian fleet. However, since the commander of the auxiliary cruiser had overestimated the speed of the Russian ships, there was initially no clash. Admiral Tōgō then turned his fleet and headed for the southern half of the Korea Strait. At the same time two other Japanese divisions under the admirals Dewa Shigetō and Kataoka Shichirō took course to the grid square in which the Russians had been sighted. Already in the face of the enemy, Roschestvensky had the first four ships of the line swivel into a second battle line to starboard in order to be better armed against possible frontal attacking opponents. However, this quickly proved to be a mistake, because around 1:20 p.m. the Japanese main forces approached portside within sight. At first it looked as if the two fleets were going past each other and a skirmish would ensue . Roschestvensky now tried to bring the four ships of the line back into their original position. But since the speeds of the individual departments were not coordinated with each other, the rear Russian ships had to reduce their speed. The liner Osljabja finally had to stop completely.

The main battle

Map of the sea battle at Tsushima

At this time - around 1:50 p.m. - Admiral Tōgō had his fleet turn around and go on a parallel course to the Russian squadron. The Japanese battle line now formed a loop for several minutes, which obstructed the field of fire of the Japanese ships behind. The Russians could have used this moment for a frontal attack, but that did not happen. Instead, both lines of battle moved parallel to each other.

Both fleets had twelve ships each in their main battle line in the battle. On the Japanese side, in addition to the four ships of the line Fuji , Shikishima , Asahi and Mikasa in the 1st Division since the Battle of the Yellow Sea, these were the two armored cruisers Kasuga and Nisshin delivered by Ansaldo in 1904 . The second division was formed by the six armored cruisers from the original construction program of 1894 with the four British-built Asama , Tokiwa , Izumo and Iwate , the French-built Azuma and the Germany-built Yakumo . Thus, the Japanese fleet had only 16 305 mm guns and one 254 mm gun, but 30 203 mm guns. A major advantage of the Japanese was their higher speed, as in previous battles, even if the Japanese ships no longer reached their test drive speeds. Her first division could run at 15 knots (kn) when closed, her second division at 18 kn when closed.

The Second Russian Pacific Squadron was to reach kn after the long walk from Europe only able a dressing speed of 12 or less. In terms of heavy artillery, the Russian ships had 26 305 mm guns (albeit six older versions) and fifteen 254 mm guns. They were divided into three divisions, the first of which was formed by the four ships of the Borodino class ( Knjas Suvorov , Emperor Alexander III , Borodino and Orjol ). The second consisted of Osljabja , Sissoi Veliki , Navarin and the old armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov and the third consisted of the old battleship Imperator Nikolai I and the three coastal armored ships General-Admiral Apraxin , Admiral Senjawin and Admiral Ushakow . By the evening of the battle four of these ships had already been sunk. Only the four ships of the Russian battle fleet that surrendered on the 28th under Rear Admiral Nikolai Nebogatow survived the battle.

The battle opened at 2:05 p.m. near Okinoshima Island by the main artillery of the Russian flagship Knyaz Suvorov at a distance of 8,000 to 9,000 meters. The Japanese responded immediately to the fire, focusing their fire on the Knjas Suvorov and Osljabja . The flag of Admiral Dmitri Gustawowitsch von Fölkersahm , who had died three days before the battle after a serious illness , was still flying on the latter . However, apart from Admiral Roschestvensky and the crew of the ship, no one had been informed of this, as it was feared that it would have a negative impact on the morale of the Russian sailors. The Japanese believed that the Osljabja was still the flagship of the 2nd Division and immediately took it under violent fire.

The ship had not started moving again after the unsuccessful maneuver and received several severe hits in the bow area. The Osljabja finally capsized around 3:15 p.m. without being able to intervene on a large scale beforehand. Russian torpedo boats rescued some of the castaways, but had to retreat under the strong Japanese attack. More than 500 of the 900-strong crew lost their lives in the sinking.

The Japanese ship of the line Mikasa in 2004. A monument to Admiral Tōgō can be seen on the left edge of the picture.

The Russian squadron continued on its path northeast 23 degrees . However, the Russian ships could not travel more than 9 knots in order not to lose their supply ships. The Japanese pushed their tip ahead of that of the Russian fleet thanks to the superior speed of about 15 knots. This finally enabled Admiral Tōgō to perform a Crossing-the-T maneuver twice in a row . The respective top Russian ship was exposed to the concentrated fire of the foremost Japanese units. The distance was reduced to up to 3500 meters, whereby the projectiles were more likely to penetrate the armor. Even the Russian ships of the line could not withstand this concentrated bombardment for long. Around 3:30 p.m. the Suworow left and was replaced by the Alexander III. replaced. Later the Borodino took over the lead. At around 5 p.m., the main battle was briefly suspended when the battle lines could no longer be seen in the smoke and haze. The Russian squadron - as they wanted to avoid the Crossing the T - let themselves be pushed further south and finally described a circle.

At around 6 p.m., the Japanese approached the Russian ships again from starboard aft. Shortly afterwards the battle began again. The Russian ships of the line, which were already badly affected, could no longer oppose the Japanese. At 7 p.m. the ships of the line Suvorov and Alexander III sank . with everyone on board. Admiral Roschestvensky, some staff officers and sailors had recently been taken over from the Suvorov on a torpedo boat. Against 19:20 then also dropped the battleship Borodino . This ended the main battle for May 27 and the battle lines separated. The following map gives an impression of the intricate and confusing fighting during the battle.

The fighting ended on May 27, 1905

Night battles

At this point, Admiral Nebogatow took over the command of the Russian squadron. He remained on course for Vladivostok, although it became apparent that the breakthrough had failed. During the night, the Russian ships had to defend themselves against numerous torpedo attacks . The Russian ships Admiral Nachimow , Wladimir Monomakh , Navarin (under the command of Baron Bruno von Vietinghoff ) and Sissoi Veliki fell victim to these attacks . They still sank in the immediate vicinity of Tsushima Island .

May 28th

During May 28, the remaining Russian cruisers and torpedo boats were forced into decisive battles by strong Japanese units. Although the torpedo boats in particular often offered bitter resistance, they all had to surrender to the superior Japanese. Some ships still tried to reach the Korean coast in order to be able to save at least part of the crew on land. But this only succeeded in a few cases.

The Russian torpedo boat Buiny , which Admiral Roschestvenski and the surviving staff officers had taken over from the later sunk flagship Suvorov , was handed over to the Japanese. With this, Admiral Roschestvensky and his staff also fell into Japanese captivity.

The surrender

Only the old ironclad Nikolai I under the flag of Admiral Nebogatow, the heavily damaged battleship Oryol and the coastal armored ships General-Admiral Graf Apraxin and Admiral Senjawin remained of the original association . They had to surrender to the Japanese associations at around 10:30 a.m. Surrender was not accepted by all officers, but given the low combat strength, the admiral had no other choice. Nikolai Jung , the captain of the Oryol , was unconscious at the handover due to his severe wounds and died the following day.

Nebogatow and the captains subordinate to him later had to answer in court for the handover of the ships and were sentenced to several years in prison.

Other ships

The cruiser Isumrud was able to evade surrender thanks to its superior speed of 24 knots and tried to get to Vladivostok on its own way. However, the ship hit a reef in Vladimir Bay shortly before its destination and was blown up by its own crew.

The Russian cruiser division led by Admiral Oskar Enkwist , to which the armored deck cruiser Aurora belonged, moved south on the morning of May 28. The Aurora , the Shemchug and the badly damaged cruiser Oleg made their way to the Philippines , where all three ships were interned in the port of Manila . Three other Russian ships managed to escape to neutral ports, where they were interned. All ships were returned to Russia after the end of the war.

Only a few Russian ships - the torpedo boats Grozny and Brawy and the admiralty yacht Almas  - managed to break through to Vladivostok. Due to the low combat value of these units, the Japanese supremacy in the East Asian region was not endangered.

losses

Russian losses

The following map gives an overview of the losses of the Russian fleet in the sea battle.

Sea battle at Tsushima 1905 - losses of the Russian fleet.
The damaged cruiser Oleg after internment in Manila Bay

The Russian squadron was almost completely destroyed. Three of the four new ships of the line had sunk, the fourth was delivered to the Japanese, badly damaged. In total, the Japanese sank 21 Russian warships or damaged them so badly that they had to be abandoned by their crews. During the battle, 5,045 Russian sailors were killed and many more, some seriously wounded.

Of the surviving Russian officers and sailors, 6,016 were taken prisoner by Japan when the remnants of the squadron surrendered on the morning of May 28. Among the prisoners were also the admirals Roshestvensky and Nebogatov. The majority were allowed to return to Russia after a general amnesty in 1906.

Japanese losses

In contrast to the Russians, the Japanese fleet had suffered comparatively low losses. Admiral Tōgō's flagship, the Mikasa, had received the heaviest damage . It had been hit by over 30 heavy shells that severely damaged the deck and all of the upper superstructures. Six officers, one non-commissioned officer and 106 men of the crew were killed or wounded. Furthermore, the Japanese cruisers Naniwa and Kasagi received heavy hits at or below the waterline and had to withdraw from the battlefield as a result of these leaks. Two other ships of the line and nine cruisers were damaged by the Russian fire. During the night fighting, three Japanese torpedo boats were sunk and a large number of other boats were badly damaged. A total of 116 Japanese sailors were killed and 583 wounded.

However, the Japanese were able to more than make up for their material losses with more than 60 ships captured at Tsushima and Port Arthur. Your fleet emerged stronger from this war.

Final considerations

Causes of the Russian Defeat

The better level of training and the fighting tactics of the Japanese helped them to victory. The reasons for the destruction of the Russian fleet were varied. Many errors can be directly or indirectly blamed on the Russian squadron chief Roschestvensky:

  • There was no battle plan that had been discussed in advance and coordinated with the other admirals.
  • The admiral only ordered that every ship should try at all costs to break through to Vladivostok.
  • The mixing of new and obsolete warships led to an overall slower speed of the Russian fleet, which allowed the Japanese to perform the Crossing the T.
  • Since the Russian cruiser division was deployed to protect the transport ships, the combat strength of the Russian fleet was also reduced.
  • The effect of the Russian artillery shells on impact was difficult or impossible to assess for the artillery command officers and gun crews. Ammunition was used that produced hardly any smoke. Although the Japanese fleet suffered severe damage on board, the morale of the Russian sailors was further undermined by the fact that their artillery fire was ineffective.

In the event of the flagship's departure, the following ship should take over command of the squadron. This repeatedly resulted in the entire squadron with the still living admirals and staff officers following a single ship. The top ship was always the most exposed to enemy fire. Very few Russian commanders were able to decide to act independently. The Russian fleet as a whole was too passive, and the course of the battle was dictated by Admiral Tōgō all the time.

To make matters worse, serious mistakes had been made in the preparation phase of the squadron in the armament and manning of the ships, which only became apparent during the battle. Among other things, the moisture content of the Russian grenades had been increased in order to minimize the risk of spontaneous combustion while driving through tropical waters. As a result, only a fraction of the Russian shells exploded on impact during the battle. The Russians used armor-piercing projectiles, which only exploded inside the ship and had a low smoke effect. This made it difficult for the Russian gun commanders to assess their accuracy, so that no reasonable error correction could be made. The Japanese bullets also contained more chimose explosives , which were also far more effective than the pyroxilin used by the Russians .

Ultimately, the level of training of the Russian crews, mostly consisting of reservists and recruits , was significantly lower than that of Japanese sailors. In the case of the gunmen this was most evident in a lower accuracy of hits.

Military knowledge

The evaluation of the course of the battle by the navies of that time led to the realization that the sea battles of the future would be fought over greater distances. For this reason, new ship designs concentrated on heavy artillery to the detriment of medium-sized artillery. This development was already the first step on the way to the all-big-gun battleships of the dreadnoughts .

Political Consequences

The defeat at Tsushima set the course for an end to the war. Japan's military victory over Russia was a clear sign of the successful development of Japan from a feudal state to a modern great power.

The resentment of the Russian population in the face of ever new bad news grew and was exacerbated by the already existing domestic political problems. The Russian Tsar Nicholas II was then forced to accept an offer of mediation by the American President Theodore Roosevelt for the start of peace negotiations. On September 5, 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed.

Under the influence of the battle, the Hague Convention of 1899 was revised in 1907 , which the Geneva Convention of 1864 had adopted for naval warfare. The revised version was based on the Geneva Convention in its 1906 version.

literature

  • Vladimir Ssemenov: Rassplata. Diary of the Port Arthur Blockade and the Departure of the Fleet under Rojestwensky. At the instigation of the editorial staff of the Marine-Rundschau, translated by Lieutenant for the Sea Hermann Gercke. Mittler and Son, Berlin 1908.
  • AS Novikov-Priboi : Tsushima. Military publishing house of the GDR, Berlin 1986, ISBN 3-327-00251-7 .
  • Richard Connaughton: Rising sun and tumbling bear. Russia's war with Japan. Cassell, London 2003, ISBN 0-304-36184-4 .
    • First edition: Richard Michael Connaughton: The War of the Rising Sun and the Tumbling Bear. A military history of the Russo-Japanese War 1904-5. Routledge, London a. a. 1988, ISBN 0-415-00906-5 .
  • Frank Jacob : Tsushima 1905: East Asia's Trafalgar . Schöningh, Paderborn 2017, ISBN 978-3-506-78140-6 .
  • Constantine Pleshakov : The Tsar's last armada - The epic voyage to the battle of Tsushima. Basic Books, New York NY 2002, ISBN 0-465-05792-6 .
  • Bernd Martin: The fall of Tsarist Russia. Tsushima, May 27 and 28, 1905 . In: Stig Förster, Markus Pöhlmann, Dierk Walter (ed.): Battles of world history. From Salamis to Sinai . Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-423-34083-5 , pp. 264-278.
  • Frank Thiess : Tsushima - The novel of a naval war , Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 1941

Movies

  • Nihonkai daikaisen ( Great Battle of the Japan Sea / Port Arthur - The Battle of the China Sea , Japan 1969, directed by Seiji Maruyama , with Toshirô Mifune in the role of Admiral Togo). The German version has been shortened by a good 40 minutes compared to the original.
  • The battle was themed in 2011 in episode 12 of the Japanese television series Saka no Ue no Kumo .

comics

  • The Hell of Tsushima , in: Adventures in World History. Exciting factual reports from the life of all peoples , No. 51 (Walter Lehning Verlag, Hanover) undated [approx. 1955].
  • Dimitri: Sous le pavillon du Tsar , Grenoble Cedex 1995, German: Under the flag of the tsar

Web links

Commons : Battle of Tsushima  - Collection of images, videos and audio files