Hitachi Maru incident
| date | June 15, 1904 |
|---|---|
| place | Tsushima Street |
| output | Russian victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
|
|
| Troop strength | |
| 3 armored cruisers | 3 transport ships |
| losses | |
|
no |
2 transport ships sunk |
Port Arthur (Sea Battle) - Chemulpo - Yalu - Nanshan - Te-li-ssu - Hitachi-Maru Incident - Motien Pass - Tashihchiao - Hsimucheng - Port Arthur (Siege) - Yellow Sea - Ulsan - Korsakov - Liaoyang - Shaho - Sandepu - Mukden - Tsushima - Sakhalin
The Hitachi-Maru Incident ( Japanese 常 陸 丸 事件 , Hitachi-maru jiken ) was a maritime incident that occurred on June 2nd during the Russo-Japanese War . / June 15, 1904 greg. Occurred when three transport ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy were attacked by three armored cruisers of the Imperial Russian Navy .
background
On the night of February 8th to 9th, 1904, the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the Imperial Russian Pacific Squadron lying off Port Arthur . Although a partial success was achieved in which three Russian ships were immobilized, the Pacific Squadron still had considerable combat strength. In order to protect the coasts of their homeland from attack, the Japanese were forced to block the Russian fleet in Port Arthur with the majority of their fleet.
In addition to Port Arthur, the Russians remained in Vladivostok as a naval base from which they could conduct operations. Admiral Karl Jessen had the supreme command of the independent cruiser squadron Wladiwostok stationed there . Jessen ordered Rear Admiral Pyotr Besaobrasov to leave Vladivostok on June 12 with the three armored cruisers Rossija , Rurik and Gromoboi and to disrupt the Japanese trade routes south of the Korean coast. Besaobrasov was supposed to go through the eastern Tsushima Strait and cross the transport routes there for two days. Then he was supposed to drive through West Korea Street on the way back . If the situation so required, he was allowed to head for Port Arthur to join the Pacific Fleet.
June 15, 1904
On June 15, two important Japanese transport ships left the port of Shimonoseki . The ships were the Hitachi Maru and the Sadu Maru , both with a displacement of over 6000 t. The Hitachi Maru had over 700 men from the 1st Reserve Regiment of the Imperial Guard on board, destined for Ta-ku-shan, where the 1st Guard Brigade had its headquarters, and another 350 men from the 10th Division . The Sadu Maru was headed for Dalny and had a railway battalion and electrical engineers on board. Both transport ships also had a large amount of supplies loaded, as well as pre-war locomotives that were the gauge of Russian railways and 18 280mm siege guns destined for the siege of Port Arthur . A third transport ship, the Izumi Maru (3200 t), was on its way from Korea to Japan with over 1000 wounded and sick.
No special protection had been taken for the three transport ships except for the stationing of the two squadrons of Admiral Kamimura and Admiral Uryū , which were cruising around Tsushima. Both squadrons were united at Osaki, whereby the two cruisers Takachiho and Niitaka from Urius squadron had to go to Takeshiki for repairs. That left only Urius' flagship, the Naniwa , and the Tsushima , which crossed on the island of Okinoshima . This meant that the transport ships had no direct protection on June 15th.
By daybreak, the Tsushima had circled the southeast coast of Okinoshima and was between Okinoshima and the island of Tsushima at around 7:15 a.m. Through the rain she could see a ship going in the opposite direction. Immediately the Tsushima changed direction to intercept the unidentified ship when she saw smoke from four chimneys one behind the other. Shortly afterwards, two more ships became visible and the master of the Tsushima realized that he was facing the Russian Vladivostok squadron. A radio message was sent immediately. When he received no answer, he set off at top speed in the direction of the Tsutsu radio station on Tsushima. The Tsushima continuously transmitted the radio message "Three three-masted ships of the Vladivostok squadron are cruising south of Okinoshima".
The Russians did not pursue the Tsushima , but kept their course.
At 8:15 am, the Tsushima finally received a radio message from the Takachiho , which was with Takeshiki, that their warning call had been received. 20 minutes later, the Tsushima turned around with the intention of making contact with the enemy. In the meantime, the remaining Japanese cruisers set off towards Okinoshima at 15 knots. Torpedo boats were sent south to warn ships of the danger and to ask them to take shelter in ports.
At 9:00 a.m., the Tsushima had made contact with the Russian armored cruisers again and radioed the fleet that the Russians would fire at transport ships south of Okinoshima. The Naniwa with Admiral Uriu on board was already on its way, but the Niitaka , whose repairs had been completed, needed until 9.45 a.m. to be ready to sail.
The Russian ships could now attack the transport ships unhindered. At 9:00 am they sighted the Izumi Maru driving home . The Gromoboi pursued them and opened fire on them. Over 30 crew members of the Izumi Maru were killed or wounded, so that they stopped and surrendered. The Gromoboi took about 100 wounded and sick on board, while the rest refused to surrender. Then the Izumi Maru was sunk.
The noise of the guns could be heard on the Tshushima and the two remaining transport ships, but the enemy could not be identified because of the sudden heavy rain. At around 10:00 a.m., the enemy ships appeared out of nowhere in front of the Sadu Maru . Since she was unarmed, she also capitulated. The Russians gave her 40 minutes to evacuate, but shortly before the deadline had expired, they received a radio message from Admiral Besaobrasov to retreat. The Rurik then fired a torpedo at the Sadu Maru . Since she did not sink immediately, another torpedo was fired, whereupon the Rurik retreated. The Sado Maru, on the other hand, stayed afloat even after the second hit and was later towed into port.
In the meantime the Hitachi Maru had also encountered the Russians, but surrender was out of the question for the Imperial Guard. As the Gromoboi approached, the Hitachi Maru tried to escape and was then taken under fire. After a very short time their British captain John Campbell was killed and other officers on the bridge were either killed or wounded. A grenade exploded in the engine room, killing the chief engineer, also British. In view of the hopeless situation, Lieutenant Colonel Suchi had the regimental flag burned and then committed suicide in the presence of his men. When it sank, most of the guards were still on board and sank with the ship. Only 150 men could be saved.
At this point, Admiral Kamimura was still far away and could not make visual contact due to the persistent bad weather. A radio message was received from the Tsushima that the enemy was retreating north. The Japanese tried to catch up with the Russians at top speed, but could not see 3,000 meters. The Japanese repeatedly lost sight of the Russians, but around 1:30 p.m. the Tsushima spotted the enemy armored cruisers again. Shortly afterwards she finally lost contact.
Thanks to the Japanese radio messages, Admiral Besaobrasov had been warned of the arrival of the Japanese cruisers and had retreated in good time. His ships then called at the port of Vladivostok.
consequences
The sinking of the ships, especially the Hitachi Maru , came as a shock to Japan and sparked public protests. Admiral Kamimura even received death threats for failing to provide adequate protection for the transports. He rehabilitated himself by sinking a Russian cruiser and seriously damaging two others in the battle at Ulsan .
The sinking of the Hitachi Maru was the greatest loss of life in a shipwreck during the Russo-Japanese War.
additive
After the sinking of the Hitachi Maru (1898), the name was given twice to ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
- Hitachi Maru (ship, 1906), seized by SMS Wolf on September 26, 1917 and sunk on November 7, 1917.
- Hitachi Maru (ship, 1939), sunk by American B-17 bombers on February 14, 1943 .
Web links
- Russo-Japanese War research society , English
- New York Times article , English
literature
- Kowner, Rotem : The A to Z of the Russo-Japanese War. Scarecrow Press, Lanham 2009, ISBN 978-0-8108-6841-0 .
Individual evidence
- ^ Kowner, p. 147
- ^ Kowner, p. 413
- ↑ Kowner, p. 336
- ^ Kowner, p. 147
- ↑ Japanese Ammunition Ships , English
- ↑ Pacific Wrecks , English