Battle of Te-li-ssu
Contemporary Russian depiction of the Battle of Te-li-ssu, known in Russia as the 'Battle of Wafangou'
date | June 14. bis 15. June 1904 |
---|---|
place | Te-li-ssu, near Wafangdian |
output | Japanese victory |
Parties to the conflict | |
---|---|
Commander | |
Lieutenant General Georgi Stackelberg |
General Oku Yasukata |
Troop strength | |
33,500 men
|
40,000 men
|
losses | |
3,772 total losses
|
1,163 total losses
|
Port Arthur (Sea Battle) - Chemulpo - Yalu - Nanshan - Te-li-ssu - Hitachi-Maru Incident - Motien Pass - Tashihchiao - Hsimucheng - Port Arthur (Siege) - Yellow Sea - Ulsan - Korsakov - Liaoyang - Shaho - Sandepu - Mukden - Tsushima - Sakhalin
The Battle of Te-li-ssu (also known as the Battle of Wafangou ) was a land battle in the Russo-Japanese War and was held from June 1 to July. / June 14th, Greg. until June 2nd jul. / June 15, 1904 greg. between the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Russian Army . The battle took place near the village of Te-li-ssu (today Delisi) that is near today's Wafangdian in the Liaoning Province ( China ) and ended in a Japanese victory.
prehistory
Russian lineup
The Russian commander-in-chief, General Alexei Kuropatkin, still wanted to wait for reinforcements to raise a large army before going on the offensive. But after the lost battle on the Nanshan , Kuropatkin received direct orders from Viceroy Evgeny Alexejew in June 1904 to immediately relieve the enclosed Port Arthur . Kuropatkin was forced to leave a large part of his army at Liaoyang, as Japanese troops were a few days' march southeast of this. The unfortunate relief attempt was made by the southernmost positioned Russian troops, the 1st Siberian Army Corps , under Lieutenant General Georgi Stackelberg . The Army Corps was strengthened by the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Infantry Division, which had arrived from western Russia a few months earlier and was considered an elite unit.
By May 19, 1904, Stackelberg's troops were about 60 kilometers south of Liaoyang. On May 28, Kuropatkin visited the advancing units to discuss the next steps with Stackelberg. On June 5, 3/4 of Stackelberg's units had arrived around Te-li-ssu, but orders from Kuropatkin prevented him from advancing. Kuropatkin did not want to risk sending Stackelberg's 30,000 men into battle against a superior enemy, as had been the case five weeks earlier in the Battle of Yalu . In the days that followed, Stackelberg and Kuropatkin discussed how to proceed when they received a telegram on June 13, 1904 announcing the advance of the Japanese. Stackelberg immediately set up 25 battalions with 90 guns about 5 kilometers south of Te-li-ssu on both sides of the railway line. Redoubts had been laid out and the infantry dug in. These hastily dug trenches were about 25 cm deep and 90 cm long. The excavated earth was heaped up in front of the “dig” to form a 40 cm high hill, which was camouflaged with bushes. In the past few weeks the Russians had repeatedly dug up defensive positions on their advance at irregular intervals, so that on the day of the battle only one redoubt of the last five laid out could be included in the defensive position. Although on the offensive, the Russians had suddenly become defensive.
Stackelberg had been informed by his cavalry that the Japanese were advancing with about 20,000 men. His opinion on this was that this number was probably exaggerated and that it was more of a Japanese Enlightenment. But on June 14, 1904, the Japanese began their attack on the Russian positions.
Japanese lineup
After the Battle of Nanshan , the Japanese 2nd Army under General Oku Yasukata was instructed to counter any attempted Russian relief. When General Oku identified the enemy forces at Te-li-ssu, he did not hesitate for a moment and on June 13 issued the order to attack the Russians head-on and on the left flank (attempted encirclement) the next day. To do this, he extended his front to up to 30 kilometers. Oku refrained from further clarification and formulated detailed attack plans for all units. He therefore refrained from making spontaneous decisions on current conditions on the day of the battle.
The battle
On June 14th the 3rd and 5th Japanese Divisions advanced in the middle and had no enemy contact for the time being. On the right Japanese wing, the 34th Regiment, a battery and two squadrons of the 3rd Division advanced towards Ssu-chia-tun on Te-li-ssu. They attacked the Russians and suffered heavy losses. The attack at this point prompted Stackelberg to order reinforcements here - and thus played in General Oku's hands. Oku had planned this and the bandages he had set up the day before now followed his instructions.
The Russians, positioned on higher ground, now opened a cannonade with their field guns, which made visibility difficult due to smoke development in the sometimes impassable terrain. The Japanese 41st Regiment occupied Chu-chia-tien and the hill 1050 from 1:00 p.m. A battery was immediately ordered to the hill, which spied the Russian general staff near Wu-chia-tun and fired at them. In return, 3 Russian batteries were now aimed at Hill 1050 and forced the Japanese artillerymen to seek protection and for the time being to give up their guns. Now more Japanese artillery took part and the artillery battle lasted until 7:00 p.m. It turned out that the Japanese gunners were not only numerically superior, but were also well trained. At the end of the day, some Russian artillery units ran out of commanding officers.
On the evening of June 14th, General Oku issued new instructions for the following day and the Japanese units approached Russian positions during the night. As a result, the focus of the Japanese attack had remained hidden from the Russians. While the Japanese took the initiative, the Russians remained rigidly defensive. Okus opposite Stackelberg had also issued orders: order 104. But the order seemed to have reached only a few. General Glasko, Commander of the 2nd Battalion / 35. Brigade, was ordered to attack the Japanese with the help of a battalion of the 34th East Siberian Regiment in front of Wa-fang-wo-pu. When asked by his commander, General Gerngross, Glasko received an assurance of help, but Gerngross did not seem to know anything about the order. The internal communication and thus the coordination of the defense of the Russians obviously did not seem to work.
On June 15, shortly after 4:00 a.m., Japanese artillery began firing on the Russian left flank. The fire lasted until 9:00 a.m. In between, the Russians had received reinforcements in the form of 6 battalions of the 9th Division, which should actually have arrived 24 hours in advance. These units were hastily ordered onto the Russian right flank.
At 9:00 am the attack of the Japanese 2nd Army began, which, set up in a semicircle, moved concentrically towards Te-li-ssu. The Japanese threw every man and gun forward.
At 10:00 am, Stackelberg wanted to start a counterattack on his left flank, and all Russian guns opened fire. The following artillery duel lasted without a break until 10:45 a.m. It turned out that the Japanese fire with shrapnel and high-explosive projectiles led to considerable losses among the Russians. The Russian counterattack consequently got stuck and from 12:45 p.m. the first Russian units withdrew in a well-ordered manner. The Russian right wing was now in danger of being encircled. General Stackelberg showed great discipline in retreating, but the Japanese artillery took a heavy toll on the retreating Russians.
The victorious Japanese occupy the battlefield cleared by the Russians.
losses
The Russians officially had total casualties of 3,772 men (489 dead, 2,494 wounded and 889 missing) although the actual casualties may have been higher. In addition, the Japanese were able to capture 16 guns and 46 ammunition wagons. The total losses of the Japanese amounted to 1,163 men (217 dead and 946 wounded) only a third of the Russians. The major losses on the Russian side are mainly due to the Japanese artillery.
consequences
The well-buried Russians had missed dealing a blow to the Japanese and thus terrifying Port Arthur. Instead, they lost precious time regrouping and launching another attack. A month later, the battle of Tashihchiao broke out about 100 kilometers northeast .
literature
- Connaughton, Richard (2003): Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear . Cassell, ISBN 0-304-36657-9 .
- Kowner, Rotem (2006): Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War . Scarecrow, ISBN 0-8108-4927-5 .
- Nish, Ian (1985): The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War . Longman, ISBN 0-582-49114-2 .
- Sedwick, FR (1909): The Russo-Japanese War . Macmillan.
- The Japanese in Manchuria, 1904, Volume 1 , by Emilien Louis Victor Cordonnier
- The official history of the Russo-Japanese war, Volume 2 , from Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense
- The Russo- Japanese War: Reports from British Officers Attached to ..., Volume 3 , by Great Britain. Was office
Web links
notes
- ^ The official history of the Russo-Japanese war, Volume 2 By Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 136
- ^ The official history of the Russo-Japanese war, Volume 2 By Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 133
- ^ The official history of the Russo-Japanese war, Volume 2 By Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 137
- ^ The official history of the Russo-Japanese war, Volume 2 By Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 137
- ↑ The Russo- Japanese War: Reports from British Officers Attached to ..., Volume 3 By Great Britain. War Office, p. 83
- ↑ The Russo- Japanese War: Reports from British Officers Attached to ..., Volume 3 By Great Britain. War Office, p. 83
- ↑ The Russo- Japanese War: Reports from British Officers Attached to ..., Volume 3 By Great Britain. War Office, p. 84
- ↑ The Japanese in Manchuria, 1904, Volume 1, By Emilien Louis Victor Cordonnier, p. 244
- ^ The Japanese in Manchuria, 1904, Volume 1, By Emilien Louis Victor Cordonnier, p. 262
- ^ The Japanese in Manchuria, 1904, Volume 1, By Emilien Louis Victor Cordonnier, p. 255
- ^ The official history of the Russo-Japanese war, Volume 2, By Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 138