Battle of Tashihchiao

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Battle of Tashihchiao
Japanese night raid during the battle
Japanese night raid during the battle
date July 24. bis 25. July 1904
place Tashihchiao, today's Dashiqiao
output Japanese victory
Parties to the conflict

Russian Empire 1883Russian Empire Russia

Japanese EmpireJapanese Empire Japan

Commander

Russian Empire 1883Russian EmpireLieutenant General Nikolai Sarubajew Lieutenant General Georgi von Stackelberg
Russian Empire 1883Russian Empire

JapanJapan (war flag)General Oku Yasukata

Troop strength
about 60,000 men

105 guns

about 65,000 men

252 guns

losses

approx. 1000 to 2000 total losses

1044 total losses

  • 148 dead
  • 895 wounded
  • a missing person

The Battle of Tashihchiao ( Japanese 大 石橋 の 戦 い , Taisekikyō no Tatakai ) was a land battle in the Russo-Japanese War and was from July 11th . / July 24th greg. until July 12th jul. / July 25, 1904 greg. between the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Russian Army . The battle took place near the village of Tashihchiao (today Dashiqiao , Japanese reading: Taisekikyō ), which is in the province of Liaoning ( China ) and ended with a Japanese victory.

prehistory

After the victorious battle of Te-li-ssu on June 14th and 15th, 1904, the Japanese 2nd Army rested for four days. During the rest period, it was with the 6th Division strengthened and included in addition to the 3 ., 4 . and 5th Division now four divisions with over 60,000 men, including 46,000 infantry, and over 250 guns.

Japanese cavalry meanwhile moved further northeast on Tashihchiao parallel to the Port Arthur-Mukden railway line and explored the Russian positions.

Due to a lack of locomotives, Japanese soldiers pull railroad cars to the front.

Heavy rains made it difficult to supply the Japanese 2nd Army and thus delayed the further advance. The Japanese army advanced along the railway line, but could not use it due to the lack of locomotives. The Russians had left over 300 railroad cars behind when they withdrew from Dalny , but they had thought of getting the locomotives to safety. Locomotives bought by Japan for this purpose before the war, which had the gauge of the Russian railways, had been sunk by Russian warships with their transport ships on the crossing from Japan to Korea . So the entire supply of the troops had to be managed with the help of Chinese porters, which greatly delayed the further procedure. However, the strategic situation required the 2nd Army to advance rapidly if it wanted to keep up with the other two Japanese attack columns. In order to get the supply under control and still be able to use the captured railway wagons, instead of the locomotives, around 16 men were harnessed to the existing railway wagons. In addition, 70 Chinese junks were rented, which landed the supplies in Liaodong Bay, in order to then bring them by land from one to two miles to the Japanese troops. As a result, the supply situation improved and at the beginning of July the 2nd Army marched towards Tashihchiao. This resulted in minor skirmishes in which the Russian defenders could easily be driven away. On July 6th, they reached Kai-ping, which is 10 miles south of Tashihchiao. The Japanese were informed by the local population that around 20,000 Russians were stationed around Kai-ping under Lieutenant General von Stackelberg . More Russian forces, it was reported, would be in fortified positions ten miles north.

The 2nd Army formed to attack and on July 9, 1904 from 5:30 a.m. Japanese guns opened fire on the Russians in Kai-ping. At 8:00 a.m. the Russians withdrew to their positions on the Tashihchiao-Tapinling line.

Both sides spent the following 10 days with artillery duels and cavalry skirmishes without major fighting.

With the capture of Kai-ping, the supply situation of the 2nd Army improved considerably, since the front line ran directly on the coast and the goods could be landed and distributed without delay.

Meanwhile, news of the Russian defeat at Motien Pass reached the troops. In order to keep up with the advance of the other Japanese armies, the 2nd Army had to attack the Russian positions near Tashihchiao. On July 20, orders were issued for the July 23 attack, but renewed heavy rains delayed the attack, which was postponed for 24 hours.

The Japanese 5th Division formed the right wing. The 3rd Division was posted to the left of it, next to it the 6th Division and the 4th Division were on the left wing. The Japanese cavalry was distributed on the outer wings and should, if necessary, advance into the rear of the Russians.

Protected by kao-liang ( black millet ) Japanese NCOs scout out Russian positions.

The Russians had dug two army corps with four divisions in the hills ten miles wide. On the right wing the Russians had a good field of fire, while on the left wing the area was provided with small gorges and only allowed limited visibility. General Alexei Kuropatkin himself had chosen the position and had countless trenches , redoubts , artillery positions, wire barriers and mines built. The defensive positions surpassed those of the Nanshan and Te-li-ssu , although the geographical conditions on both battlefields were much more advantageous for the defenders than here at Tashihchiao. During July 23, the Japanese forces moved into their attack areas. At the time of the battle there were large fields of kao-liang ( black millet ) on both sides of the railway line leading to Tashihchiao , which reached a height of two meters. The rapprochement of the Japanese remained hidden from the Russians to a certain extent.

Around 1:30 p.m. General Sarubajew, who was in command of the Russian troops at Tashihchiao, received a message from General Mishchenko that he was in front of the Japanese 10th Division , which belonged to the Japanese 4th Army , from Hsiu, east of Tashihchiao -yen had to withdraw. At the same time he was informed of the advance of the Japanese on the positions near Tashichiao by Lieutenant General von Stackelberg. Sarubayev's staff anticipated an attack by three Japanese divisions and gave final instructions for the coming battle.

General Oku also gave his troops final instructions on the eve of the battle. The 3rd, 5th and 6th Divisions were to attack their sections head-on, while the 4th Division and the 14th Artillery Regiment were to remain in reserve.

Units involved

Japanese

2nd Army , General Oku Yasukata

Total strength: approx. 65,000 men, including approx. 46,000 infantry and 252 guns.

Russians

  • 1st Siberian Army Corps , Lieutenant General Georgi von Stackelberg
    • 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, Major General Gerngross
    • 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, Major General Kondratovich
    • 1st East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Major General Luchkarski
    • Siberian Cossack Division, Major General Kossakovsky
  • 4th Siberian Army Corps , Lieutenant General Nikolai Sarubajew
    • 2nd Siberian Rifle Division, Major General Levestam
    • 3rd Siberian Rifle Division, Major General Kosovich
    • 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade
    • Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade, Major General Pavel Mishchenko

Total strength: approx. 60,000 men 105 guns.

The battle

Contemporary Map of the Battle of Tashihchiao.

Fighting on July 24th

At 5:30 a.m. on July 24, 1904, the Japanese guns opened fire on the Russian positions. Indirect fire from Russian guns hidden behind the hills countered the fire. An intense artillery duel developed on the Russian right wing, with the infantry on both sides staying in cover because of the open field of fire and, in the Russian case, not even occupying the trenches. Although there was no direct danger for the 1st Siberian Army Corps deployed at this point , von Stackelberg sent a messenger to Sarubajew at 1 p.m. with the warning that the Japanese would probably focus their attack on the Russian left flank, with the 4th Siberian Army Corps , would put. If, according to von Stackelberg, the Russian troops were to occupy the trenches under artillery fire, heavy losses would occur and this could not be in line with the strategy of Commander-in-Chief Kuropatkin. In these circumstances, he recommends withdrawing. General Sarubaev replied that retreating in daylight was not recommended, but that he was considering retreating at night.

At 2:00 p.m., 13 Japanese batteries fired at the 1st Siberian Army Corps, 12 of which wanted to destroy the two Russian batteries that were streaking the area around the Russian positions. The two Russian batteries successfully returned fire for more than nine hours without suffering any significant losses, and from 3 p.m. they were supported by the 4th battery in the reserve.

The attacks by the three Japanese divisions had stalled because of the unexpectedly strong Russian artillery fire. The 4th Division had advanced slightly on the Japanese left wing, but also came under artillery fire and stopped. At this time, General Oku received reports of strong enemy movements and concluded that a Russian counterattack could possibly be expected.

On the Japanese right wing between 7:00 and 8:00 the 3rd and 5th Divisions had crossed the hills near the Russian positions. As soon as they were in visual contact, the concealed Russian artillery opened fire on them and the attack stalled here too. At 10:00 the 3rd Division renewed its attack and some Russian units had to withdraw from the front positions. Immediately thereafter, Japanese infantry and artillery occupied the abandoned positions and put pressure on the Russian center. The Russians were aware of the danger and caught the Japanese in crossfire . Within a very short time, 56 Russian guns, 32 of which were rapid-fire guns, fired at the endangered point and 72 Japanese guns from the 3rd and 5th Divisions responded. Although outnumbered, the Russian artillery had a greater range and a higher rate of fire. The Japanese pulled more guns on this section and from 3:30 p.m. the 3rd and 5th Divisions renewed their attack. From 4:00 p.m., both sides reinforced their troops in this section. While fighting on the rest of the front subsided, bitter fighting broke out between the Japanese 3rd Division and the right wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps in the evening hours, which lasted until 7:30 p.m.

At the end of the day, the Japanese had only one regiment in reserve, while the Russians had only 6 battalions in reserve. After 15 hours of fighting, the Russians had maintained their positions against an artillery superior enemy. By contrast, the frontal attack by the Japanese 2nd Army had failed and gave the Russian soldiers confidence that they would win the battle. However, while the Japanese were preparing for another attack the next day, General Sarubaev was preparing to withdraw.

Fighting on July 25th

At nightfall, the commander of the 5th Division, Lieutenant General Ueda Arisawa , presented to General Oku. Ueda felt it was a shame that the expectations placed in his division to conquer Tai-ping Ling could not be fulfilled and asked to be allowed to carry out a night attack. The request was granted and as soon as the moonlight lit the night, the 5th Division moved towards the enemy lines west of Tai-ping Ling. The foremost Russian line fell without much resistance and the Japanese stormed up the hill. At 3:00 a.m., the second and third Russian lines were also overrun. Now the 3rd Division also attacked and captured Pin-han-kou and the hill north of Shan-hsi-tou, which the day before had been the Russians' most important point of defense.

On the left Japanese wing, the guns opened fire on the Russian positions from 6:40 a.m. When the fire was not returned, parts of the 6th Division advanced cautiously. At 8:00 a.m. the 4th Division also took part in the advance and at around 1:00 p.m. occupied the Russian positions without resistance.

Lieutenant General Sarubaev had decided to retreat after the Japanese night attack. In his opinion, he did not have sufficient reserves to successfully survive a battle like the day before. He was also concerned about the advance of the Japanese 4th Army in the east. The Russians had left their positions as early as 11:00 a.m. and withdrew in a disciplined and well-ordered manner towards Liaoyang. By the time the Japanese reached the Russian positions, the Russians were already more than 2 hours ahead and so there was no pursuit.

The battle was over and the Japanese had won the victory.

losses

According to Russian sources, around 1,000 men were killed and wounded, but independent sources give up to 2,000 total casualties. Although the Japanese had attacked the Russian positions, they had suffered relatively few losses: 148 men were killed and 895 men were wounded.

consequences

The withdrawal of the Russian troops was well-ordered and on July 27th they reached Hai-cheng, 50 km north . The Japanese rested at Tashihchiao for two days, while their cavalry kept in contact with the retreating Russians. The Japanese 5th Division was transferred to the 4th Army on July 28th and reached them in time to take part in the Battle of Hsimucheng . Due to the Japanese successes at Tashihchiao and Hsimucheng, the 2nd Army was able to unite with the 4th Army at Hai-cheng on August 1st. With the success at Motien Pass, the three Japanese armies had reduced the distance between them from 140 miles to 45 miles.

In late August 1904, the opposing armies faced each other at the Battle of Liaoyang .

literature

Web links

notes

  1. ^ Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 142.
  2. ^ Kowner, p. 372.
  3. ^ Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 53.
  4. ^ Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 55.
  5. ^ Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 59.
  6. ^ Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 142.
  7. United Service Institution of India, p. 391.
  8. United Service Institution of India, p. 391.
  9. ^ Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 59.
  10. ^ Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 62.
  11. ^ War Office, p. 33.
  12. ^ Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 63.
  13. ^ War Office, p. 33.
  14. ^ Committee of Imperial Defense, p. 63.