Battle of Motien Pass
date | July 3. bis 17th July 1904 |
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place | Motien Pass, between Antung and Liaoyang . |
output | Japanese victory |
Parties to the conflict | |
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Commander | |
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Troop strength | |
25,000 men | 11,000 men |
losses | |
1,243 total losses |
357 total losses |
Port Arthur (Sea Battle) - Chemulpo - Yalu - Nanshan - Te-li-ssu - Hitachi-Maru Incident - Motien Pass - Tashihchiao - Hsimucheng - Port Arthur (Siege) - Yellow Sea - Ulsan - Korsakov - Liaoyang - Shaho - Sandepu - Mukden - Tsushima - Sakhalin
The Battle of the Motien Pass (also called the Battle of the Mo-tien-Ling ) was a minor land battle in the Russo-Japanese War and was held on June 20 . / July 3rd greg. until July 4th jul. / July 17, 1904 greg. fought between the armies of the empires of Japan and Russia . The Motien Pass is located in the mountains between Antung and Liaoyang and was eventually captured and held by the Japanese. They could use it to march on Liaoyang.
prehistory
Russian lineup
The situation for the Imperial Russian Army, especially for the trapped troops in Port Arthur, began to deteriorate rapidly in the period before the battle. The Russian commander of the land forces in the Far East, Alexei Kuropatkin came under increasing pressure to achieve success against the Japanese and to restore the interrupted railway connection to Port Arthur. His plan was to establish a numerical superiority locally against the Japanese armies, which were still operating separately, and so overpower them. His focus was on the rail link from Mukden to Port Arthur, where most of the Russian troops were stationed. His left flank, standing in the mountains between Antun and Liaoyang, he neglected in his planning and assigned it only minor forces under the command of Lieutenant General Fyodor Keller .
Keller had arrived from Europe on May 17, 1904 and took command of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps from General Michail Sassulitsch , who was returning to his 2nd Siberian Army Corps at Hai-cheng. Up until this point, Lieutenant General Keller had no practical experience in leading a corps-sized unit.
Kuropatkin and Keller had come to the conclusion from the tactical-strategic analysis of the first Sino-Japanese War that the Japanese strategy now aims to bring together their three field armies at Haicheng, 50 km southwest of Liaoyang. In order to be prepared for this attack, Kuropatkin had a large-scale defensive position built at Haicheng and began to deploy troops on a large scale. Keller, who had already lost parts of his troops in the battle of Te-li-ssu , had to surrender the 11th and 12th Siberian Rifle Regiment on June 15, 1904. Furthermore, Keller's artillery units, which had lost guns in the Battle of Yalu , had not yet been equipped with replacement equipment.
Sent out Russian cavalry on the left wing was supposed to clear up enemy movements, but withdrew after slight contact with the enemy without having gathered comprehensive information. As a result, both Kuropatkin and Keller were not aware of extensive Japanese troop movements on their left flank and concentrated on the railway line.
Keller's units consisted of the 9th and 10th Regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, the 22nd and 24th Regiment of the 6th East Siberian Division, two battalions of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division and some batteries of field guns. The 11th and 12th Siberian Rifle Regiments had also reunited with his troops after several exhausting forced marches. In total he had about 25,000 men. Keller had been tasked with these units to hold various passes between Feng-huang-cheng and Liaoyang in difficult, confusing terrain. On June 26th, the 9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was withdrawn from Keller's command area, as a result of which some passes, including the Motien Pass, were no longer occupied.
Japanese lineup
While most of the Japanese army had turned east after the Battle of Yalu to isolate Port Arthur in the Battle of Nanshan , the 1st Army advanced north to Feng-huang-cheng . From there on June 24th, General Kuroki Tamemoto and the 12th Division set out for Motien Pass, which they unexpectedly found unoccupied on June 30th.
The battle
Battle on 4th / 5th July
Heavy rains in the following days caused the supply routes to collapse, whereupon the Japanese temporarily withdrew to Feng-huang-cheng. On the morning of July 4th, the advance guard of the 2nd Division with 3 companies of the 30th Regiment reached the Motien Pass. These were attacked at dusk by a battalion of the 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. There were close range skirmishes in which the Russians had the upper hand before two other companies of the 30th Regiment were able to repel their left flank. This flank had even been reinforced by a battalion of the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, but the darkness and poor coordination among the Russians caused the attack to collapse. The next morning the two Russian battalions repeated their attacks, but without result.
Skirmish on July 17th
In the meantime Kuropatkin had become aware of the danger on his left wing and ordered Keller to launch a second attack against the Japanese at Motien Pass. The Japanese had meanwhile arrived at the pass with the entire 2nd division. 14 1/2 Russian battalions and 12 mountain guns prepared for an attack in the center, while other units were posted on both flanks.
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9c/Battle_of_Motienling_Pass.jpg/220px-Battle_of_Motienling_Pass.jpg)
Shortly after midnight, at 12:30 a.m. on July 17, the Russians began a diversionary attack on the flank, which the Japanese knocked off lightly. General Kuroki Tamemoto was not fooled, and when the main Russian attack began at 3:00 am, the entire 30th regiment was in position on the crest of Motien Pass. In addition there was a battery of field guns that were in well-protected positions that had been put on a few days earlier. The Russian infantry could easily drive out the Japanese outpost chain. Nevertheless, their advance was slow and uncoordinated. The Russian right flank did not reach the main fighting line of the Japanese until 5:00 a.m., while the left flank lagged about 1,500 meters behind. The Russians outnumbered them as the Japanese had to thin out their line to occupy the entire ridge. However, when it became apparent that the Russians had set their focus on the Japanese left wing, all Japanese guns were aimed at this point on the battlefield. The result was that the attack by the Russians collapsed under gunfire. When the light morning fog cleared at 8:00 a.m., the view was clear for the Japanese gunners and they spotted two Russian attack columns. One of the columns was moving towards the Japanese left wing to reinforce the attack there, while the other column was moving towards the center of the Japanese. The soldiers of the last-named column marched shoulder to shoulder and made an excellent target for the Japanese artillery. Shortly afterwards, the Japanese grenades struck the dense rows and mowed down the Russians. In the meantime, three Japanese regiments faced four Russian regiments at Motien Pass, so that the defenders had a complete advantage. After the Russians could not record any more land gains, their attack collapsed and from 9:00 a.m. they withdrew with heavy losses. The Japanese 30th Regiment, reinforced by the 3rd Battalion of the 29th Regiment and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, pressed on. The Russian retreat took place with disdainful slowness, but covered by Russian artillery which had not participated in the attack.
From 8:00 a.m. on the Japanese right wing, eight Russian companies had attacked a Japanese company on outpost duty. The Japanese desperately defended their position for an hour and asked for reinforcements by telephone. Fortunately, more and more Japanese reinforcements gradually arrived and the situation stabilized here too. At 4:30 p.m. the Russians broke off the fight and withdrew.
The scene just described was repeated even further north when at 11:30 a.m. eight Russian companies, supported by a squadron of cavalry, also advanced against a Japanese company. However, this attack was not carried out forcefully enough and could easily be repulsed.
All four Russian attack columns had been defeated and the Japanese had maintained the Motien Pass.
losses
The Russians lost 1,243 dead, wounded and missing. The Japanese had 72 dead and 285 wounded.
consequences
The Russians had failed to design the easy-to-defend Motien Pass as an insurmountable obstacle for the Japanese. Due to the loss of the passport and the Russian defeat in the Battle of Tashihchiao on 24/25 a few days later . July 1904, the Russians were forced to withdraw further north to Liaoyang. Their ultimate goal of reconnecting with Port Arthur was more distant than ever.
literature
- Connaughton, Richard (2003): Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear . Cassell, ISBN 0-304-36657-9 .
- Kowner, Rotem (2006). Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War . Scarecrow, ISBN 0-8108-4927-5 .
- Nish, Ian (1985): The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War . Longman, ISBN 0-582-49114-2 .
- Sedwick, FR (1909): The Russo-Japanese War . Macmillan.
- The Japanese in Manchuria, 1904, Volume 1 , by Emilien Louis Victor Cordonnier
- The official history of the Russo-Japanese war, Volume 2 , from Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense
- The Russo- Japanese War: Reports from British Officers Attached to ..., Volume 3 , by Great Britain. Was office
- Jukes, Geoffrey (2002): The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 . Osprey Publishing, ISBN 978-1-84176-4467 .
- The Japan Weekly Mail , July 23, 1904
Web links
notes
- ^ The Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense, 1908, p. 94.
- ^ The Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense, 1908, p. 95.
- ^ The Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense, 1908, p. 100
- ^ The Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense, 1908, page 103
- ^ The Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defense, 1908, page 104