Naval riots in the summer of 1917

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In the summer of 1917 there were widespread unrest in the navy of the German Reich after the imperial ocean-going fleet was hardly used in the First World War due to poor strategic planning . This exacerbated the already existing conflicts between the naval officers and the crews. Large parts of the crew felt that they were treated inhumanely and provoked by the arrogant display of better care for the naval officers. The conflict took on a strong political dimension when the peace efforts were intensified after the overthrow of the Russian tsar and the naval officers thereupon carried out Pan-German propaganda on the ships for victory peace , far-reaching annexations and reparations. In the course of this development, groups of the crews, including those around the cruet commissions, organized themselves and carried out protests. Leading members of these groups began to contact the USPD and to discuss a strike to speed up peace. After a major protest against arbitrary punishments in August 1917, the naval leadership made extensive arrests. She tried to portray the riots as USPD-controlled insurrection efforts. A total of ten sailors and stokers were sentenced to death. The sentences of Max Reichpietsch and Albin Köbis were carried out on September 5, 1917, the other death sentences commuted to penitentiary or prison sentences. In addition, a number of sometimes severe sentences were imposed. The justifications of the military tribunal were legally untenable. Investigations against the USPD did not reveal anything incriminating. A Reichstag debate on the subject contributed to the resignation of Reich Chancellor Georg Michaelis . The organizations in the fleet were smashed, but the increasing bitterness over the experienced and ongoing injustices played an important role in the events in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel at the end of 1918 .

The Imperial Navy - aspiration and reality

The massive naval armament operated by Alfred von Tirpitz on behalf of Kaiser Wilhelm II drove England into the camp of Germany's opponents, devoured a considerable part of the national wealth and ultimately proved to be useless: The Royal Navy did not face a major naval battle as expected right from the start of the war, but instead carried out a large-scale blockade, inaccessible to the German deep sea fleet. A self-critical processing of the mistakes was beyond the imagination of the naval officers. Most of them came from the upper middle class. For them, the navy as an all-German armed force was the symbol of the new national self-image. They felt like champions in the pursuit of international recognition. The naval officers developed a provocative, arrogant corps spirit.

When, after the Battle of the Skagerrak at the latest, it became increasingly clear that most of the battleships would remain in the ports, the high expectations fueled by the naval propaganda led to disillusionment and frustration. With the intensified submarine warfare, large numbers of older, experienced officers were transferred to the submarine weaponry. They were replaced by inexperienced younger officers who tried to cover up their insecurity in relation to the crews, who had often been serving for years, by increasing class arrogance and continued harassment against their subordinates.

The crews consisted to a large extent of skilled workers, without whom the high-tech ship units could not be mastered. Some of them had come into contact with union or social democratic ideas. Many had entered the Navy out of a thirst for adventure. But also enthusiasm for technology and commitment to the fatherland must have played a role.

In the dramatic supply situation at the time, the crews complained again and again about bad food, while the sea officers continued to dine as they did before the war and that many lavish parties with high alcohol consumption were celebrated. The crews, however, were not allowed to drink alcohol on board.

The inactivity of the ocean-going fleet caused the conflicts to intensify and led to the formation of smaller groups that went over to open protest actions. Regulski mentions actions in late 1916 / early 1917 on the ships SMS Helgoland, Möve and on minesweepers.

The situation after two years of war

The battle for Verdun lasted almost the whole of 1916. Germany wanted to get the western front moving again. In the bitter fighting, however, Germany suffered enormous losses and finally had to withdraw to a shortened front line. Then came the notorious turnip winter . Large parts of the population were starving. The military leadership resorted to a desperate means in February 1917: the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare . In doing so, she risked the USA entering the war. Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff declared that this could bring England to its knees in a few months and that the war would be over before the USA could intervene. As a result, the Navy published embellished sinking numbers. The United States declared war in April 1917.

One of the last photographs of the tsar before his fall.

While the military maneuvered Germany into an increasingly critical position, the hope for peace emerged on the Eastern Front. The tsar was overthrown in March 1917 . From the point of view of the German labor movement, the most important reason for war no longer existed: the fight against tsarism. For many years this had posed a threat to progressive movements across Europe. The USPD , newly formed from opponents of the SPD , called for a quick peace agreement without annexations and contributions. A formula that was followed some time later by the SPD, the center and the liberals . From June to September 1917 the European socialists and social democrats then tried to organize conferences to end the war as quickly as possible.

The protest groups in the fleet followed the events through the left-wing press, some of which could be read and some of which came on board illegally. The naval leadership intensified the " patriotic instruction ". To do this, she brought representatives of the right-wing Pan-Germans and the DNVP on board, who tried to convince the crews that only a victory peace with far-reaching annexations and high reparations could be considered for Germany and that democratic reforms violated the natural order. This made it clear to the crews that their officers were opposed to a quick peace agreement. Around mid-1917 Richard Stumpf , sailor on SMS Helgoland noted that the sailors wanted peace as soon as possible and the prevailing opinion was that only the officers wanted to continue the war.

First major protests

In order to bring about an end to the war and thus also the end of their mistreatment, the crews had to organize themselves better and consult with the forces who advocated a speedy end to the war, in particular with the USPD.

Max Reichpietsch in front of SMS Friedrich the Great on a GDR postage stamp from 1967.

A system of shop stewards began to be built up on the ship of the IV. Squadron SMS Friedrich der Große , which was the flagship of the high seas fleet until mid-March 1917 . The leader was the sailor Max Reichpietsch , who was popular with his comrades because of his calm and considered manner and who was close to the USPD. On various ships there were now major protests against the food, which was perceived as a special part of the inhumane treatment by the naval officers. An action on June 6, 1917 on the SMS Prinzregent Luitpold provided the template for the crews of a number of other ships: sailors and stokers on the Luitpold refused to pick up spoiled food. The ship's command remained stubborn. The food was thrown away and there was no replacement. But it was the first time a crew had struck a strike and this method quickly spread across the ships. There were similar actions on SMS Friedrich the Great, Posen, Moltke, and Nuremberg. There were three other actions on the Prinzregent Luitpold. More and more often, the crews were able to assert their demands.

Contacts to the USPD

Wilhelm Dittmann around 1924.

After there had already been many letters of complaint to members of the Reichstag from various parties, including the USPD, crew members had personal contacts with the USPD and probably also the SPD from mid-June. Max Reichpietsch made the start. On the occasion of his vacation in Berlin, he first met the USPD MPs Wilhelm Dittmann and Luise Zietz . The conversation was informal. Reichpietsch handed over an envelope with complaints and asked for information material. The possible consequences of the "Bachmann order" were discussed. The Kiel governor, Admiral Gustav Bachmann , had only allowed Marian members to attend social democratic events after obtaining permission. In addition, Bachmann had issued a ban on socialist newspapers. It was feared that this could lead to a total reading ban on progressive newspapers. The cruet commissions were also discussed. The commissions ordered by the State Secretary in the Reichsmarineamt Eduard von Capelle in response to the various complaints were either refused or appointed by the ship's command. At a second meeting a few days later with the chairman Hugo Haase , the marine expert Ewald Vogtherr and again Dittmann, these Reichpietsch warned of the great dangers should there be an organized sailor movement on the ships and referred to the international Stockholm conference. Reichpietsch largely ignored the warnings of the USPD MPs and felt encouraged in his efforts. Reichpietsch probably also met the MSPD MP Daniel Stücklen , but nothing more is known about this meeting.

Albin Köbis in front of the SMS Prinzregent Luitpold on a GDR postage stamp from 1967

Also Albin Köbis , heater on the Prince Regent Luitpold, Willy axis , heater on Frederick the Great and Paul Calmus of SMS Rheinland met USPD deputies, but only for short conversations. There were also various meetings with politicians on site in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel.

Further actions

At the beginning of July 1917, the crews learned from a Wilhelmshaven newspaper that the state secretary in the Reichsmarineamt Eduard von Capelle had declared that there were also commissions in the navy in which the crews were given a say in catering, as they had for a long time in the army. The crews were now demanding elections that had been withheld until then. Now they could get commissions and crew participation on a number of ships. These soon formed a cross-ship network in which all possible complaints were dealt with and which, after some time, led to the formation of a "soldiers' union".

Parallel to the cross-ship networking, there were more extensive actions on the ships against bad treatment and bad food.

All but four sailors left the ship on the small cruiser SMS Pillau lying in the shipyard because vacation applications had not been approved. They did not return until the end of duty and were given three hours of detention.

On the small cruiser SMS Bremen there was a hunger strike and a subsequent protest march. There were other incidents on Bremse , Regensburg , Bavaria , Thuringia . Königsberg and King Albert , as well as Friedrich the Great and Prince Regent Luitpold. On King Albert, the ship's commander was later killed under unexplained circumstances after a violent dispute between the ship's command and the crew. On Prince Regent Luitpold, the stokers refused to continue working during the passage through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal because the food was "teeming with worms". The ship then lay across the canal and blocked the passage of subsequent ships. Only when the team's demands were met did the stokers resume work.

Organized peace agitation

On July 23, 1917, Alfred Herre , the former editor of the Leipziger Volkszeitung , who had been drafted into the navy, gave a speech at a meeting of the sailors' movement in the German House in Wilhelmshaven. He spoke about the peace resolution of the German Reichstag. He warned against violence, but praised the collection of signatures among the teams in support of the USPD and the Stockholm Conference. Beckers saw in this the beginning of the organized peace agitation in the deep sea fleet. The further course of action of the growing movement was discussed a day or two later in the Tivoli pub in Wilhelmshaven. It was agreed to set up a comprehensive fleet center. The political ideas of those present were sometimes far apart. However, there was broad consensus not to use force against superiors. Reichpietsch called for a naval strike to be organized if all other possibilities for peace efforts should fail. Willy Sachse campaigned for teams and workers to act together. Demonstrations in Wilhelmshaven or Kiel were also proposed.

Arrests

Prince Regent Luitpold before the First World War.

When the rumor spread on SMS Prinzregent Luitpold that military service was planned on the parade ground on August 1st, and that a cinema screening was to be canceled and a free watch withdrawn, 49 men from a stoker watch disembarked without permission that morning. After that, eleven of the men were arrested and detained. One day later, on August 2, 1917, “the great march” took place on SMS Prinzregent Luitpold. About 600 men left the ship. The entire team, with the exception of a few crew members who ensured the combat readiness, supported the protest against the arrest of the comrades. Smaller groups of two other ships also joined. The previous evening, a corresponding resolution had been passed at a meeting called by Albin Köbis on the shipyard site. Now, after the shipyard guard was taken by surprise, they marched to the dike at Rüstersiel. Köbis gave a speech in the town hall there and asked for his release. Then you marched on for about an hour to the White Swan restaurant. Here Reichpietsch gave a speech and called for peace. The call to him to break the fetters by force cannot be proven according to the sources. In fact, the whole course of the action clearly speaks in favor of passive resistance. Then they marched back on board, refusing to be taken away by naval personnel. As a result, they had to make various detours and missed the battle readiness they were aiming for by 90 minutes.

The squadron commander gave a battle alarm. The Prince Regent Luitpold ran out; According to Beckers, "probably under siege". However, since there is no state of siege on a warship, Beckers must have meant the isolation of the ship from any outside influence. Investigations and controls began. When the ship returned, several of the participants were arrested. It had actually been agreed that the other ships should go on a sympathy strike, but the ensuing wave of arrests, including SMS Markgraf and Kaiserin, made the organized crew members resigned.

The legal and political processing

Initially, the investigation was carried out in a direction that would have resulted in comparatively minor penalties. The interrogations took an ominous turn when Naval Assistant Judge Dr. Dobring took over the management. He tried to portray the actions as the endeavors of a secret organization, controlled by the USPD, with which the clout of the fleet should be undermined. He extended the repetitive interrogation to many hours, threatened those arrested and got them to sign statements he had dictated. USPD lawyers requested by the defendants were unlawfully denied them. They did not have the indictments.

On August 23, 1917, twelve defendants were convicted of marching out on the Prince Regent Luitpold on August 1 for “military uprising in the field in unity with mutiny”. The stoker Bernhard Spanderen received the death penalty as a "ringleader" , the other 12 years in prison. Admiral Scheer converted all sentences into relatively short prison sentences, four years for Spanderen and two years for the other, because none of the defendants had any contact with or advertising for the USPD. Another five sailors and stokers (Max Reichpietsch, Willy Sachse , Willi Weber, Albin Köbis, Hans Beckers ) were on 25/26. Sentenced to death in August 1917 for “complete, treacherous uprising” . The military tribunal equated attempted insurrection with completed insurrection. This was justified by the fact that a revolutionary organization that could strike at any time at a wink from the USPD had been created. However, the legal expert Wolfgang Semmroth proves in an extensive investigation that the alleged organization was a loose grouping around the cruet commissions, which in particular would not have been able to strike at any time. Statements by the judge-martial de Bary and the judicial officer in the Reichsmarineamt Paul Felisch also emphasized that an uprising had not been realized.

The judgments against Max Reichpietsch and Albin Köbis were carried out shortly afterwards on the morning of September 5, 1917, by a Landsturm command under the orders of a major. The other death sentences were commuted to prison sentences. In addition, a number of punishments, some of them severe, were imposed (e.g. against Carl Richard Linke ) and a number of those arrested were transferred to the front in Flanders.

The judgments were discussed in a Reichstag debate in October 1917. The Chancellor Georg Michaelis accused Ledebour and Dittmann of the USPD of treason. However, he exposed himself for relying on obvious false statements despite internal warnings. This contributed to the resignation of the Chancellor. An investigation by the Imperial Court against USPD MPs brought by the naval leadership did not reveal anything incriminating.

Although the censors did not allow reports on the events, rumors of the riots were widespread among the public.

The end of the movement

The sailors' movement continued despite the measures. Attempts were continued to collect signatures for peace and to work towards a strike. This affected the ships SMS Westfalen , SMS Moltke , SMS Rheinland , SMS Ostfriesland and SMS Nassau . Westphalia had been lying in the dock next to Frederick the Great in July and there had been a lively exchange between the crews. Only towards the end of August could the movement be completely crushed by the extensive use of informers. In the following trials there were also four death sentences against the sailors Hans Haase and Johann Siegfried, the mechanic guest Paul Brügge and against the stoker Michael Hiller, but these were commuted to long prison sentences. A number of other crew members were punished further. A total of 47 trials for rioting or disobedience had taken place by the end of the First World War.

consequences

The movement had expressed the mood of large parts of the crews. The organization was broken, but the causes for the protests were not eliminated. In view of the injustices experienced, the bitterness of the teams increased. It had been made clear to them that the naval leadership did not want to put an end to the provocative behavior or the mistreatment. In addition, the naval officers resisted a timely peace agreement, which could have provided the basis for international understanding, and they opposed corresponding political efforts, in particular the Reichstag resolution on the peace agreement . All of this was to play an important role in the events in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel at the end of 1918 .

The first soldiers' council, formed on November 4, 1918 in the barracks in Kiel-Wik, demanded not only the abdication of the Hohenzollern House , the lifting of the state of siege and the release of crew members arrested shortly before, but also the release of all those in the prison in Celle [in the original "cell"] Comrades from the sailors' uprising in 1917. In the course of the November Revolution, the condemned were given their freedom back.

reception

From the conservative point of view, the crews were considered mutineers and traitors who had reached a fair judgment. In Regulski’s opinion, the fact that the sailors and stokers did not use any violence against their superiors and that they apparently did not feel threatened either is ignored. It was discussed about organizing a strike in the fleet to enforce the peace, but for Semmroth the accusation of mutiny is "more than doubtful", because Köbis, to whom this could most likely be the case, advised moderation and took care of it Ensuring combat readiness. The reason for the actions and the penalties usually pronounced for them (maximum 14 days of arrest) must also be included in the assessment.

From the perspective of the radical left, the occupations were seen as revolutionary champions. Regulski, however, does not see a clear political orientation even in the most determined representative of the movement, Reichpietsch. Similar to Horn, Regulski sees the movement as the endeavor of the crews to demand the human dignity that has been denied them and to set an example for peace.

It was discussed whether the events with the sailors' uprising at Cattaro in February 1918 in the Austro-Hungarian fleet are comparable. However, Kuhl sees more parallels with the Kiel sailors and workers' uprising in November 1918. Violent measures occurred in both Cattaro and Kiel, the officers were disempowered and red flags were hoisted on the ships. However, none of this applied to the events in the German fleet in the summer of 1917. However, death sentences were passed in both Wilhelmshaven and Cattaro, and some were carried out. Against this background, the approach of the German naval command turns out to be completely disproportionate.

Places of remembrance

Gravestone of Max Reichpietsch and Albin Köbis in today's Luftwaffenkaserne Wahn .

The graves of Max Reichpietsch and Albin Köbis located on the grounds of the Wahn Air Force Barracks are still inaccessible to normal public traffic. A permit from the German Armed Forces and the associated registration are required to visit the graves.

In a number of cities, including Berlin (Reichpietschufer and Köbisstraße), streets and squares are named after Reichpietsch and Köbis.

Movies

  • ZDF 1969: Marinemeuterei 1917 , 90 min., Director: Hermann Kugelstadt, script: Michael Mansfeld, with Dieter Wilken, Karl-Heinz von Hassel (as Max Reichpietsch), Volkert Kraeft, Claus Wilcke and others (this film describes the events and the Process).
  • WDR (1986): Eyewitnesses report on the naval riots in 1917/18, 44 min., By Wolfgang Semmelroth and Claus-Ferdinand Siegfried (director).

Play

Ernst Toller processed the events of 1930 in the historical drama "Fire from the Kettles".

novel

Theodor Plievier wrote his novel "Des Kaisers Kulis. Roman der Deutschen Flotte" in 1930. He dedicated it to Köbis and Reichpietsch.

literature

  • Hans Beckers : How I Was Sentenced to Death. The naval tragedy in the summer of 1917. Frankfurt a. M. 3rd edition 1986.
  • Franz Brüninghaus , Rear Admiral ret. D .: The political disintegration and the tragedy of the German fleet. Shown using official files. Berlin 1926. Reply in the parliamentary committee of inquiry to Wilhelm Dittmann's report (see below).
  • Wilhelm Deist: The unrest in the navy 1917/18. In: Marinerundschau, 1971, no. 68, pp. 325–343.
  • Wilhelm Dittmann : The naval justice murders of 1917 and the Admiral's rebellion of 1918. Berlin 1926, pp. 78–90. The work is based on the official files that Dittmann evaluated on behalf of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the World War (4th subcommittee).
  • Frank Ganseuer: Death sentences in the Imperial Navy 1917. A sketch of the events and their reception. In: Yearbook of the German Society for Shipping and Marine History e. V. Berlin 2013, pp. 126-137.
  • Daniel Horn: The German Naval Mutinies of World War I. New Brunswick, New Jersey (USA) 1969.
  • Stephan Huck : naval strikes and sailors' uprisings. Menetekel der Revolution ?: In: Tillmann / Kinzler (Ed.): 1918 - the hour of the sailors. Darmstadt 2018, pp. 78–83.
  • Klaus Kuhl: The rebellion of the sailors from Cattaro in February 1918 - a forerunner of the Kiel sailors' uprising? In: Jürgen Jensen (Hrsg.): Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Kieler Stadtgeschichte, Volume 89, Issue 3, Kiel 2017, pp. 127–140.
  • Ernst Legahn: Mutiny in the Imperial Navy. Herford 1970.
  • Christoph Regulski: Better to be shot for ideals than to fall for so-called honor. Albin Köbis, Max Reichpietsch and the German Sailor Movement 1917. Wiesbaden 2014.
  • Wolfgang Semmroth: The mutinies in the summer of 1917 and the November revolution. The role of military justice on the eve of the revolution. In: The Revolution 1918/19. 70 years later. Lecture event of the city of Wilhelmshaven. Edited and ed. by Norbert Credé on behalf of the city of Wilhelmshaven, Wilhelmshaven 1991 (= Wilhelmshavener Museum Talks, Texts on the History of the City, Vol. 2), pp. 59–80.
  • Wolfgang Semmroth: Judgments of the naval justice as a "weapon against the left socialists". In: Stephan Huck / Gorch Pieken / Matthias Rogg (eds.): The fleet falls asleep in the port. Everyday life in the war 1914-1918 in sailors' diaries. Dresden 2014, pp. 72–87.
  • Werner Rahn: leadership problems and collapse of the Imperial Navy 1917/18. In: German Marine Institute (Ed.): The German Navy. Herford / Bonn 1983, pp. 171-189.
  • Reinhard Scheer: Germany's deep sea fleet in the world war. Personal memories. Berlin 1920.
  • Association of former sailors of the Imperial and Reichsmarine Berlin e. V. (Ed.): Was it the Navy? Berlin 1926.
  • Works of the Committee of Inquiry (WUA) : Fourth row in the work of the Committee of Inquiry. With the participation of Eugen Fischer, Walter Bloch on behalf of the Fourth Subcommittee, ed. v. Albrecht Philipp. Volumes 1-12. 1925–29, here volumes 9 and 10, Marine.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ See the lecture of the naval historian and frigate captain a. D. Dieter Hartwig : Mutiny 1917 as well as refusal of obedience and revolution 1918 in the judgment of the Navy from 1918 to 2018. In: Jürgen Jensen (Ed.): Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Kieler Stadtgeschichte, Volume 89, Issue 4, Kiel 2018, pp. 161– 176, here p. 162 ff.
  2. ↑ Gerhard P. Groß: A question of honor? The naval leadership and the last naval advance in 1918. In: Werner Rahn (Hrsg.): Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. Munich 2005, pp. 287-304, here pp. 294 ff.
  3. ^ Stephan Huck : Naval strikes and sailors' revolts. Menetekel der Revolution ?: In: Tillmann / Kinzler (Ed.): 1918 - the hour of the sailors. Darmstadt 2018, pp. 78-83, here p. 79.
  4. ↑ Christoph Regulski: Better to be shot for ideals than to fall for so-called honor. Albin Köbis, Max Reichpietsch and the German Sailor Movement 1917. Wiesbaden 2014, p. 45.
  5. ↑ Hans Beckers : How I Was Sentenced to Death. The naval tragedy in the summer of 1917. Frankfurt a. M. 3rd ed. 1986, p. 26.
  6. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für Ideale, pp. 69–72, 138.
  7. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für Ideale, p. 59.
  8. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, p. 83.
  9. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, p. 67.
  10. ^ Wilhelm Dittmann (ed.): Richard Stumpf. Why the Fleet Broke up - Christian Worker's War Diary. Berlin 1927, pp. 148, 163.
  11. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, pp. 77, 86.
  12. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, p. 88.
  13. ^ Daniel Horn: German Naval Mutinies of World War I. New Brunswick, New Jersey (USA) 1969, p. 99.
  14. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, pp. 88–91.
  15. ^ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, pp. 67, 101, 103.
  16. ↑ Horn, Naval Mutinies, pp. 65 f.
  17. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, p. 111.
  18. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, p. 113.
  19. ↑ Beckers, sentenced to death, p. 20 f.
  20. ↑ Beckers, sentenced to death, p. 29 f.
  21. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, pp. 135 f.
  22. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, p. 136 ff. Beckers, sentenced to death, p. 33 f.
  23. ↑ Beckers, sentenced to death, p. 34.
  24. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, pp. 151–160.
  25. ↑ Beckers, sentenced to death, p. 52.
  26. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, pp. 159 ff.
  27. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, pp. 173–190.
  28. ↑ Wolfgang Semmroth: Judgments of the naval justice as a "weapon against the left-wing socialists". In: Stephan Huck / Gorch Pieken / Matthias Rogg (eds.): The fleet falls asleep in the port. Everyday life in the war 1914-1918 in sailors' diaries. Dresden 2014, pp. 72–87, here p. 74 ff.
  29. ↑ Semmroth, judgments, p. 78 ff.
  30. ↑ Wolfgang Semmroth: The mutinies in summer 1917 and the November revolution. The role of military justice on the eve of the revolution. In: The Revolution 1918/19. 70 years later. Lecture event of the city of Wilhelmshaven. Edited and ed. by Norbert Credé on behalf of the city of Wilhelmshaven, Wilhelmshaven 1991 (= Wilhelmshavener Museum Talks, texts on the history of the city, vol. 2), p. 59-80, here p. 66 f.
  31. ^ Frank Ganseuer: Death sentences in the Imperial Navy 1917. A sketch of the events and their reception. In: Yearbook of the German Society for Shipping and Marine History e. V. Berlin 2013, pp. 126-137, here p. 126.
  32. ^ Wilhelm Dittmann: The naval justice murders of 1917 and the Admirals rebellion of 1918. Berlin 1926, pp. 78-90. The work is based on the official files that Dittmann evaluated on behalf of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the World War (4th subcommittee) .
  33. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, p. 196.
  34. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, pp. 170 f.
  35. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, pp. 224–227; Semmroth, judgments, p. 79.
  36. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, p. 211.
  37. ↑ Horn, Naval Mutinies, pp. 66, 170, 196.
  38. ^ Beckers, sentenced to death, p. 92.
  39. ^ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, p. 289.
  40. ↑ Semmroth, Meutereien, p. 67.
  41. ↑ Regulski, Lieber für die Ideale, p. 290.
  42. ↑ Klaus Kuhl: The rebellion of the sailors from Cattaro in February 1918 - a forerunner of the Kiel sailors uprising? In: Jürgen Jensen (Hrsg.): Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Kieler Stadtgeschichte , Volume 89, Issue 3, Kiel 2017, pp. 127–140.