Cattaro Sailors Revolt

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The Cattaro Sailors' Uprising occurred during the First World War . He started on 1 February 1918 to then Austria-Hungary belonging to the Adriatic port of Cattaro (now Kotor , Montenegro ). It remained isolated and had to be broken off after three days because of the arrival of loyal troops. Four members of the Navy were then shot dead. The naval historian Halpern sees the event as the final victory of the monarchy over the social forces that ultimately eliminated it.

Starting position

At the beginning of 1918, dissatisfaction with the food situation, with the political situation, and war fatigue continued to grow. After the Russian October Revolution of 1917 and the Bolsheviks' peace offer , large circles, especially among the workers, feared that the German Supreme Army Command could torpedo the hoped-for peace on the Eastern Front with excessive demands. As a protest, there were January strikes with over 700,000 participants across Austria-Hungary . Workers' councils were formed, which also called for better provisions, the abolition of censorship, the end of martial law and the introduction of the eight-hour day. The wave of strikes also reached the naval arsenal in Pola . After most of the strikes in the Reich ended on January 21, work was resumed in Pola on January 28. Presumably ignorant of the end of the actions, the sailors of the warships anchored in Cattaro decided to hold a demonstration, which they hoped would give the movement further impetus.

The base of Cattaro in the south of Austria-Hungary acquired special strategic importance when Lovćen, located on Montenegrin territory and overlooking the bay, was conquered in 1916 during the occupation of Montenegro and northern Albania. Cattaro now became an important base of operations against the Otranto lock , the base for submarine warfare in the Mediterranean, and for supplies to the Balkan front. For this purpose, in addition to destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines (also German), the entire cruiser flotilla was stationed under the flagship (Austrian: flagship) SMS Sankt Georg and the V ship division.

Warships and their positions in the Bay of Cattaro in February 1918.

Destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines as well as the modern rapid cruisers carried the brunt of the sea war, while the large ships were mostly idle at anchor because - as in the German Empire - the risk of destroying the fleet seemed too great ( fleet-in-being ). Again, this was an important reason for increasing tensions between officers and men on these units. The crews felt they were treated unfairly and roughly by their superiors. They complained about senseless drill, about severe punishment for trifles, about insults, humiliation by often young officers, about the poor catering, in contrast to the officers, about torn uniforms, about the few home leave. Many of the crew members were trained metal workers and had come into contact with the ideas of the social democratic labor movement. They demanded democratic reforms. The perceived privileged position of the officers also fueled the suspicion that they were not interested in peace, but wanted to prolong the war, while the common soldiers and their relatives suffered from great hardship.

course

First day of the uprising, February 1, 1918

The uprising, which had apparently been prepared by various loose groups, started on February 1, 1918 around 12 noon from the flagship SMS Sankt Georg .

SMS SANKT GEORG.

The officers ate lunch in the mess room. The crew armed themselves, fired a cannon shot and raised a red flag. The chief officer (Austrian: general detail officer) falling on deck received a shot in the temporal bone. Medical help was initially prevented before he could then be taken to the on-board hospital. In addition, a non-commissioned officer was shot through the chest and a sailor was injured by a ricochet projectile. The ship's commander was also shot, but he was not hit. At the request of the crew, the latter then brought the commander of the cruiser flotilla Rear Admiral Hansa on deck. According to Woodrow Wilson's 14-point program, Anton Grabar demanded an immediate end to the war and complained about the bad treatment, especially by the young cadets, and the inadequate catering. The officers were now given crew meals.

Another center of the action was on SMS Gäa . Gäa was a depot and workshop ship with a large number of older workers on board who had come into closer contact with social democratic ideas.

SMS Gäa with torpedo and submarines in the middle bay of Cattaro, in front of Gjenović (Djenovici).

The movement spread quickly. The red flag was hoisted on all larger ships. Only on the ships that were more frequently engaged in war, on which the crews were treated much better by the officers, did they encounter discomfort (with the rapid cruisers) or resistance (with the destroyers, torpedo and submarines). Under the threat from the armored cruisers that the ships would be taken under fire, some of the smaller units, sometimes with the consent of their commanders, raised the red flag.

The destroyer "Csepel" had already received an order to leave at 3 p.m. to escort a convoy to Durazzo . The commandant let the boilers heat up. Thereupon it was signaled by "Gäa" that fire would be opened in case of departure. However, the commander of the "Csepel" had cast off and threatened to torpedo the "St. Georg". A cannon shot was then fired from the "St. Georg" and from the "Gäa". When the "Csepel" nevertheless continued to approach, the chief of staff on the "St.Georg" ordered the "Csepel" back to the berth.

A total of around 30 warships and around 3,000–4,000 men, out of a total of 5,000 navy members in Cattaro, took part in the uprising. The submarine base, the telegraph magazine, the sea mine command and the sea flight station in Kumbor as well as the flanking battery in Gjenović (today: Djenovici) and the naval station in Caballa were also included.

In place of the officers, sailors' councils or crew committees, formed on call, took the place of the officers and carried on normal operations. A central committee was formed at SMS Sankt Georg . In the evening, the latter handed the cruiser flotilla commander Rear Admiral Alexander Hansa a slip of paper with the crew's demands, which contained both general political and team-specific points:

"What we want

  1. Measures to initiate an immediate general peace.
  2. Complete political independence from other powers.
  3. Peace based on the Russian democratic proposal, 'without annexations etc.'
  4. Complete disarmament (demobilization) and formation of the voluntary militia.
  5. Right of peoples to self-determination.
  6. Loyal response to Wilson's note.
  7. For relatives of those who have been displaced, greater support and sufficient supplies of food and clothing.
  8. Democratization of government.
-----------------------------
  1. As a result of malnutrition, omission of all unnecessary work and exercises. Separate food penalties for korvees.
  2. More shore leave and longer duration.
  3. Home leave necessarily within 6 months once for a period of 21 days without travel days. Equal conditions for staff.
  4. Introduction of a humane, faster transport of holidaymakers, increase in the cost of boarding for home leave and possibly serving of food in kind.
  5. Fair distribution of the ship's food. Standard kitchen for staff and team.
  6. Better supply of smoking materials, equally for staff and crew.
  7. Abolition of the censorship of letters.
  8. Consideration of special requirements of individual ships and boats.
  9. No consequence whatsoever of this demonstration.
Sailor delegations from all units. "

The insurgents sent patrols ashore to get more units to participate. A patrol of the "Gäa" moored in front of Gjenović tried to persuade the nearby torpedo boats and submarines to join in under threats, but without great success. She was partially supported by the population. The St. George patrol received an officer assigned by Rear Admiral Hansa as a companion. Hansa hoped to steer the movement in a calm way and to be able to settle it through negotiations. He had assured the insurgents, with the exception of those who shot, impunity if the insurrection ended. According to Plaschka, the members of the navy had "achieved a unique breakthrough" that day.

The naval port commander in Castelnuovo , Feldzeugmeister von Guseck, had been informed of the course of events by Hansa via a telephone line monitored by the insurgents the next day. Guseck initiated extensive countermeasures. Including the arrival of heavy naval forces from Pola and infantry from the region. The German submarines ran out into the inner bay in the evening, which the insurgents perceived as a threat.

Second day of the uprising, February 2, 1918

In the morning, Guseck's ultimatum was given to the central committee: all teams had to return to order and discipline within three hours, otherwise order would be restored by all means.

The central committee, on the other hand, made new demands against Hansa, including:

"2. Agreement with factors from both houses of the House of Representatives. In addition, representatives (or their shop stewards) should arrive in the Bocche within 14 days for the purpose of direct communication with the delegates of the Navy. "

A senior non-commissioned officer, titular boatman František Rasch from the lighting department in Kumbor , now appeared as the spokesman for the central committee . Hansa promised benevolent examination and renewed his offer of impunity if the movement was stopped. Thereupon there were heated discussions at the St. Georg , many wanted to give up.

František Rasch

Finally, the only officer who had made himself available to the movement, naval ensign Anton Sesan from the naval aviation division in Kumbor, whom Rasch had won over to lead the operation, managed to persuade the crew to hold out. The delegates now drove to their ships and stations. Hansa ensured that the ultimatum was extended. A prerequisite was that no ship movements were allowed to take place.

Sesan suggested that the ships risk breaking out into the Adriatic Sea in order to attract international attention and also encourage other nations' crews to take action. However, he quickly insisted that the advancing troops would show solidarity. The fleet stayed in the bay. Plaschka sees in Rasch the determining element of the revolt, who had clearly addressed the social revolutionary perspective to Hansa: "That the system in the state must be broken."

At around 2 p.m., the team committee of the SMS Crown Prince Archduke Rudolf , deployed as a guard ship at the port entrance in front of Porto Rose, decided to move to the second, inner bay of Teodo to the other rebel ships. The ship was shot at by a land battery. Two dead sailors, including the boatswain's mate Sagner, an important leader on the ship, were the result. The action, which was intended to lighten the mood among the insurgents, caused great consternation among their ranks.

After the delegates of the rapid cruiser Novara came back from the flagship to their ship, the crew voted to keep the red flag as well. But the commander disregarded it and ordered the departure to the inner bay. He allowed those sailors who feared being crushed between the forces to leave the ship. When passing the SMS Kaiser Karl VI. which was not far away, the red flag was deleted. The insurgents' threat to fire at falling ships was not carried out. The other rapid cruiser SMS Helgoland , the torpedo boats and the destroyers followed later . A new front against the revolting ships had arisen in the inner bay. The German submarine commanders also made themselves available to torpedo the insurgent ships if necessary.

During the night the Central Sailors' Council attempted to send two telegrams to Dr. Adler in Vienna and Count Károlyi in Budapest. They were asked to call on the government to intervene immediately in order to prevent a general unrest in the Austro-Hungarian military feared by the advance of the infantry. For the transmission of the telegrams, however, the committee was dependent on the land-based transmitter of the naval command. The stations on board had been manipulated by the specialists there, so that the range was severely limited. Guseck, however, did not let the telegrams pass.

The third and last day of the uprising, February 3, 1918

In the morning at 7:30 am, the 3rd Division from Pola with Archduke Ferdinand Max , Archduke Friedrich , and Archduke Karl as well as torpedo boats and torpedo boat destroyers entered the outer bay of Cattaro. The ultimatum had now been set for ten o'clock. On the remaining red flag ships, more and more crew members wanted to give up. Rasch and Sesan tried that morning to persuade the Gäa team to persevere, but they were no longer able to convince. Sesan went to the airfield. Quickly drove back to the St. Georg . There was another vote and it became clear that only a few were in favor of continuing the uprising.

According to the description at Veselý and the Central Military Archives in Prague, the photo shows the crew gathered at the stern of the "St. George" during the surrender on February 3, 1918 at 10 o'clock. The ship's commander von Scheibenhain can be seen in the middle. However, the description cannot be regarded as reliable as no sources are given.

He quickly dropped the red flag and reported to Rear Admiral Hansa as a prisoner. With that, the few remaining ships also painted the red flag; the uprising was ended. Sesan managed to escape to Italy with an airplane together with Gustav Stonawski, who had headed the central committee, and another non-commissioned officer.

Legal processing

On the same day, the disembarkation and detention of the crews classified by the commanders as "unreliable elements" began. There was no uniform line, so that committee members who had acted in the interests of the officers and crew members who had not joined but were considered unreliable were among the 678 disembarked. Peter Fitl examined the process more closely in a publication published in 2018.

The court martial

Feldzeugmeister von Guseck, the naval port commander, had been charged with the prosecution. He selected 40 people for the stand trial. A quick conviction was important to him. The trial began on February 7th and could not last longer than three days. The indictment was outrage. The defendants were given four defense lawyers. The civil lawyer Dr. Mitrović did not arrive until the end of the last day of the negotiations. After a protest by the defense that the preclusive period had been exceeded, the court declared that it had no jurisdiction over 18 defendants. Fitl complains that in the event of an actual excess (which can no longer be determined today), this should have applied to all of the accused. The defense tried to dispute the responsibility of the defendants: coercion of circumstances, carried away by the others, fear of the cannons of St. George , the Gaea , the monarch . An important question was who had fired shots. In the case of the wounded Chief Officer of St. Georg , Zipperer, it could not be clarified beyond doubt either before the court martial or later in the court martial whether Šižgorić or Ujdur or both had fired at him. Defense lawyers protested when several summoned witnesses were no longer heard on the last day of the trial. They also claimed to have heard exonerations. The applications were rejected, probably also because the court was pressed for time.

Eventually six men were found guilty of the crime of indignation; Franz Rasch, Anton Grabar, Jerko Sisgorić and Mate Berničevič were sentenced to death , Franz Bajzel and Ludwig Szekacs to more stringent prison (10 and five years respectively), and two men were acquitted . The rest were handed over to court martial . On the same day, the judges discussed an application for pardon to Guseck for those sentenced to death (a common procedure according to Fitl) and a majority voted in favor. Guseck denied this request and upheld the death sentences on February 10.

A pardon from civil attorney Dr. Mitrović to the emperor, which was justified, among other things, with the unfair litigation, went unanswered. The execution took place early in the morning on February 11, 1918 below the cemetery walls of the nearby village of Skaljari . They were buried in a common grave.

The investigation

The ship commanders could now report potential defendants to the court martial again. In some cases there was an increase in some cases a reduction in the number compared to the previous report. A total of 45 people were added to the 678 people arrested. But Guseck decided that only 392 people should be investigated.

During the interviews and interrogations that began in April, the requirement that a written copy of the arrest warrant and an order for the preliminary investigation had to be submitted was not complied with. The detainees were also not informed of the possibility of a complaint. A total of ten military lawyers (auditors) identified who also intensively investigated possible exonerating aspects. The suspicions expressed by officers that the Entente had a hand in it or that there had been agitation by political or national agents turned out to be unfounded. In June the investigations were completed and the reports (presentations and applications) submitted. They petitioned 234 of the accused to bring charges of mutiny or indignation and to put the remaining 351 out of prosecution. However, Guseck ordered 392 people to be charged, the remaining 193 were then released, or in some cases disciplined and in a few cases transferred to another court.

The court martial

Guseck issued indictment warrants against 386 accused at the end of August. Fitl suspects that the original indictment was flawed. The trial under Major Auditor Wolf began on September 16, 1918. It took place in a sardine factory in Mulla near Cattaro. Guseck approved a public prosecutor who had been requested by Wolf. According to Fitl, this was also incompatible with contemporary notions of a fair trial.

News of the uprising and the trial should not be leaked. Julius Braunthal, who was stationed there as a lieutenant in an artillery position, had already managed to inform Victor Adler of the SPÖ in February. He spoke to the Minister of War on February 11th. He promised to forbid further executions. In return, the SPÖ refrained from making the events public. It was not until October 8 that the uprising and military court trials in the Reichstag started due to a request from the South Slav MP Dr. Anton Korošec, on the language. Because of the resulting public pressure, Emperor Karl decided to continue the trial only against 31 "ringleaders, main perpetrators and NCOs". Thereupon 348 people were acquitted, but transferred to Pola.

On October 31, the 37th day of the trial, the trial was adjourned to November 5. However, due to political developments, it could not be resumed. According to Fitl, a grotesque situation because the South Slavic nations had already broken away from the Habsburg monarchy; Emperor Karl had given the fleet to the newly founded South Slavic state; the kuk field war court had finally tried on foreign territory against members of the navy of a foreign state. The process did not complete.

consequences

The fleet commander of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, Admiral Maximilian Njegovan, had to ask for his retirement after these events. He was replaced by Miklós Horthy . Rear Admiral Hansa was also replaced, the St. Georg decommissioned and converted into a residential ship. While the army had shown itself to be a decisive opponent during the events, the incidents in this unit increased in 1918.

reception

The events received little public attention. It was not until nine years later that the journalist and philosopher Bruno Frei published a comprehensive study of the events in the newspaper Der Abend. Copies of the minutes of the trial court were also available to him. These are now considered lost. Although Frei's work was rather propagandistic in the sense of his socialist and later communist worldview, it is therefore also of historical interest. In addition, some contemporary witnesses spoke up.

Monographs

In 1958 the Czech Jindřich Veselý presented a short book about the events in Cattaro: "Povstání v Boce Kotorské (Czech: Uprising in the Bay of Kotor)." He also posted a number of photos in the Appendix. According to Fitl, he overemphasized the contribution of the Czech sailors. Plaschka's dissertation from 1963 "Cattaro-Prague" is still regarded as a standard German work. The next most extensive and important study was written by the Croatian Bernard Stulli: "Ustanka mornara u Boki Kotorskoj (Croatian: sailors' revolt in the bay of Cattaro)". Both worked through the files that were now accessible in the Austrian State Archives.

In Italy in 1935 a work was published on the events (La rivolta di cattaro). The author Capitano Neri appropriated the protagonists as champions of the Italian nationalist ideology of irredentism .

Assessments

After the First World War, the uprising in Austria and Hungary was predominantly assessed as subversive and harmful, while in the other successor states a more positive perception could be ascertained. After the Second World War, the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak communist states, as well as the Marxist Eastern European historiography, judged the events as both Slavic and Bolshevik.

Plaschka came to the conclusion that the actions in Cattaro had been designed as a revolutionary demonstration. The red flags turned the demonstration into a rebellion. The events revealed a marked rift in the fabric of armed power. The determining element was less the unsolved nationality question, but primarily the social and political question.

The naval historian Halpern sees the event not as the beginning of the end of the monarchy, but as its final victory over the social forces that ultimately eliminated it.

Using selected historical sources, Kuhl compared the Cattaro uprising with the Kiel sailors and workers' uprising . He found clear parallels between the events. The action in Cattaro had started when the big wave of strikes in the country had just ended. The action came too late and, in contrast to the events in Kiel, remained isolated. In Kiel, the sailors and stokers came across a workforce that supported them immediately.

Novels, short stories, dramas

  • The German writer Friedrich Wolf (1888–1953) wrote the drama Die Sailors von Cattaro in 1930 based on the work of Bruno Freis .
  • The journalist and historian Eva Priester deals with the uprising in the story Encounter at Dawn . The story is contained in the volume: From the tree of freedom. Six historical stories. Globus-Verlag , Vienna 1955.
  • The working-class writer Franz Xaver Fleischhacker, who witnessed the uprising on board a torpedo boat, wrote the novel: Cattaro. A novel from the last days of the Austro-Hungarian Navy. Globus-Verlag , Vienna 1957.

Loidl wrote of the various literary adaptations: the authors agreed that the main cause of the defeat was that the uprising remained isolated. Otherwise, Cattaro could have sparked a broad revolutionary movement.

Commemoration

There is a memorial in front of the Skaljari cemetery, about 15 minutes' walk from Kotor (Cattaro). At this place, below the cemetery wall, the four sailors were shot dead.

There are plaques on both the courthouse and prison in Kotor referring to the events and the sailors who were shot.

literature

  • Peter Fitl: mutiny and court martial. The sailors' revolt in the Cattaro naval port of February 1918 and its aftermath in court martial. Vienna 2018.
  • Bruno Frei : The sailors from Cattaro. An episode from the revolutionary year 1918. New edition Berlin 1963.
  • Paul, G. Halpern: The Cattaro Mutiny, 1918. In: Christopher M. Bell./Bruce A. Elleman (Ed.): Naval mutinies of the twentieth century. An international perspective. London 2003, pp. 54-79.
  • Klaus Kuhl: The rebellion of the sailors from Cattaro in February 1918 - a forerunner of the Kiel sailors' uprising? In: Jürgen Jensen (Hrsg.): Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Kieler Stadtgeschichte, Volume 89, Issue 3, Kiel 2017, pp. 127–140.
  • Simon Loidl: Refusal to obey. The Cattaro Sailors' Uprising. In: Mitteilungen der Alfred-Klahr Gesellschaft, issue 3/2014, pp. 1–5. Accessible online (accessed December 3, 2019) at: [6] .
  • Simon Loidl: “We were free for two and a half days.” On the literary and political reception of the sailors' uprising in Cattaro in Austria. In: Year Book for Research on the History of the Labor Movement , Volume III / 2014, pp. 131–152.
  • Capitano Neri: La rivolta the cattaro. Rovereto 1935.
  • Richard Georg Plaschka : avant-garde of resistance. Model cases of military rebellion in the 19th and 20th centuries. 2 vols. Vienna 2000.
  • Richard, G. Plaschka: Cattaro - Prague. Revolt and revolution. The Austro-Hungarian Navy and Army in the fire of the uprising movements of February 1 and October 28, 1918. Graz 1963.
  • Richard, G. Plaschka / Horst Haselsteiner / Arnold Suppan : Inner front. Military assistance, resistance and overthrow in the Danube Monarchy 1918. Vol. 1: Between strike and mutiny. Vienna 1974.
  • Werner Rahn : Strategic options and experiences of the German naval command 1914 to 1944. On the chances and limits of a central European continental power against sea powers. In: Rahn, Werner (Ed.): German Marines in Transition. Munich 2005, pp. 197-234.
  • Erwin Sieche: The cruisers of the k. and k. Marine. Wölfersheim 1994 (Marine - Arsenal, Vol. 25).
  • Lawrence Sondhaus: Austria-Hungarian Naval Mutinies of World War I. In: Jane Hathaway (Ed.): Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention. Mutiny in Comparative Perspective. Westport 2001, pp. 196-212.
  • Bernard Stulli: Ustanka mornara u Boki Kotorskoj February 1–3, 1918 (Croatian: Sailors' revolt in the Bay of Cattaro February 1–3, 1918). Split 1959.
  • Jindřich Veselý: Povstání v Boce Kotorské. Historická kronika (Czech: Uprising in the Bay of Kotor. Historical Chronicle). Prague 1958. Available online (April 10, 2020) as a PDF document with a different number of pages at: [7] .

Web links

  • Description on Linkswende.org: [8]
  • Description on the website of the Austrian State Archives: [9]
  • Paul Lenormand: Mutiny of Cattaro. In: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. By Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014. doi : 10.15463 / ie1418.10260 .
  • Background material on www.kurkuhl.de: [10]

Remarks

  1. Jindřich Veselý names in his book: Povstání v Boce Kotorské (see under literature) on p. 34 - unfortunately without any evidence (one can only assume that he is based on interviews with eyewitnesses named in the appendix) - the following people who had prepared the action: “Nobody asked, but everyone assumed that the hot-blooded Croatian sailors Matulovič, Uidor, Marusič, Sužek, Grabar and Berničevič, as well as the well-known impetuous Italians Baldini, Pachor, Galigari and Scaramuza were very close to the organizers of the rebellion. There was no doubt that they included a number of Czechs: the serious and happy / brilliant František Rasch , the conscious Social Democrat, the Prague Rudolf Kreibich and Tomas Nitka from "St. Georg", Petr Páral, Viennese Czech from "Gäa", Zahálka from "Monarch", Franta Srbek from "Franz Joseph", Josef Děd from "Karl VI,", Šmahel from "Gäa", Bittner from "Novara", Janousek from "Helgoland", Vošmik from "Balaton" and Mývalt from " Orjen "as well as Pribyl and Fr. Malý from the flight station and from the submarine base Ruda Krčmář, Jíša and Valášek and many others. There was also the Poles Gustav Stonawski, a socialist who had already organized a hunger strike at the Naval School in Pola in 1912, and the aviator Grabowiecki. "Frei mentions similar names, unfortunately without citing a verifiable source (report by the sailor Ujdor) (Frei , Cattaro, p. 42). With reference to Stulli, Plaschka and colleagues describe these statements as problematic. (Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, p. 117).
  2. This referred to the use of crews for work on land. These were particularly unpopular because they were out of scope, involved a lot of physical exertion, and sometimes related to improvements in the lives of superiors; among other things, sports facilities for the officers were built.
  3. František Rasch, b. 1889 in Prerau in Moravia had a German father and a Czech mother. Spelling of his name according to the birth and baptismal register; Scan available online (accessed April 11, 2020) at: [1] . His name is sometimes also written Franz Rasch or František Raš.
  4. Anton Sesan was born in Lopud near Ragusa in 1892 (this is the old name of Dubrovnik, see Veselý, Povstání, p. 41 f.), Came from a seafaring family of Serbian nationality and was a captain in the merchant navy before he was drafted (Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, p. 131).
  5. This debate is also described by Veselý (Povstání, p. 56 f.) And addressed in the report of the auditors mentioned below (p. 1099); see also Fitl, Cattaro, p. 112 f.
  6. On the first day the insurgents tried to telegraph to Pola to ask the sailors there to join. The telegram did not reach Pola, however.
  7. The 40 people are described in Frei, Cattaro, p. 136 f. listed by name.
  8. One example is the report written by the auditors on the events on "St. Georg", which was digitized by the Austrian State Archives and placed on the Internet: Court of the kuk war port command in Cattaro: SMS "St. Georg ". Presentation and application. Typoscript from April 9, 1918, Austrian State Archives / War Archives, signature KA MAG KT.1. Available (accessed April 4, 2020) at: [2] .
  9. Fleischhacker (1891–1976) was a non-commissioned officer in 1918 a. a. on SMS St. Georg ; further information about him can be found in: Manfred Mugrauer: Vergessener Büchlschreiber . The working-class writer Franz Xaver Fleischhacker (1891–1976). In: Mitteilungen der Alfred-Klahr Gesellschaft, 4/07, pp. 13-17. Accessible online (accessed November 29, 2019) at: [3] .

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Paul, G. Halpern: The Cattaro Mutiny, 1918. In: Christopher, M. Bell / Bruce A. Elleman (eds.): Naval mutinies of the twentieth century. An international perspective. London 2003, pp. 54–79, here p. 54.
  2. Peter FITL: mutiny and court martial. The sailors' revolt in the Cattaro naval port of February 1918 and its aftermath in court martial. Vienna 2018, p. 76 ff.
  3. ^ Richard Georg Plaschka : Cattaro - Prague. Revolt and revolution. The Austro-Hungarian Navy and Army under fire from the uprising movements of February 1 and October 28, 1918. Graz 1963, pp. 15-19.
  4. ^ Richard G. Plaschka / Horst Haselsteiner / Arnold Suppan: Inner front. Military assistance, resistance and overthrow in the Danube Monarchy 1918. Vol. 1: Between strike and mutiny. Vienna 1974, p. 108.
  5. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, p. 109.
  6. Halpern, Cattaro, p. 73 f.
  7. Plaschka, Cattaro - Prague, p. 29 ff.
  8. Bruno Frei : The sailors from Cattaro. An episode from the revolutionary year 1918. New edition Berlin 1963, pp. 25 ff., 35 ff.
  9. Plaschka, Cattaro – Prague, p. 41.
  10. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, p. 117 ff.
  11. Fitl, Cattaro, p. 94.
  12. ^ Halpern, Cattaro, p. 61.
  13. Fitl, Cattaro, pp. 268, 270-273.
  14. Plaschka, Cattaro – Prague, p. 59.
  15. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, p. 119 ff.
  16. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, pp. 121–125.
  17. Plaschka, Cattaro – Prague, p. 67.
  18. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, pp. 128–132.
  19. Frei, Cattaro, p. 66 f.
  20. ^ Richard G. Plaschka: Avant-garde of resistance. Model cases of military rebellion in the 19th and 20th centuries. 2 vol. Vienna 2000, p. 255.
  21. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, p. 132 f.
  22. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, p. 133 ff.
  23. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, pp. 118, 136 f.
  24. Halpern, Cattaro, pp. 60 f., 71 f.
  25. Plaschka, Cattaro – Prague, p. 158 f.
  26. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, p. 141.
  27. Fitl, Cattaro, p. 149 f.
  28. Fitl, Cattaro, p. 157.
  29. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, pp. 141–146.
  30. Fitl, Cattaro, p. 89 f.
  31. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, p. 144.
  32. Fitl, Cattaro, p. 158 ff.
  33. Markéta Kachlíkova: German Böhme [Franz Rasch] at the top of the mutiny at Cattaro. Radio CZ broadcast in German on February 3, 2018. Accessible online (accessed on March 23, 2020) at: [4] . The historian Jindřich Marek was interviewed in the program.
  34. Fitl, Cattaro, p. 164.
  35. Fitl, Cattaro, pp. 165-168.
  36. Fitl, Cattaro, pp. 189 ff.
  37. Fitl, Cattaro, pp. 213f.
  38. Fitl, Cattaro, pp. 224-228.
  39. Fitl, Cattaro, p. 226 f.
  40. Plaschka, Cattaro – Prague, p. 147 f.
  41. Free, Cattaro.
  42. Fitl, Cattaro, pp. 228-233.
  43. Fitl, Cattaro, pp. 233-235.
  44. FITL, Cattaro, S. 235th
  45. ^ Paul Lenormand: Mutiny of Cattaro. In: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
  46. Plaschka / Haselsteiner / Suppan, Innere Front, pp. 107 f., 112, 129.
  47. Halpern, Cattaro, p. 54.
  48. Klaus Kuhl: The rebellion of the sailors from Cattaro in February 1918 - a forerunner of the Kiel sailors uprising? In: Jürgen Jensen (Hrsg.): Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Kieler Stadtgeschichte, Volume 89, Issue 3, Kiel 2017, pp. 127–140, here p. 137.
  49. Simon Loidl: Refusal of obedience. The Cattaro Sailors' Uprising. In: Mitteilungen der Alfred-Klahr Gesellschaft, issue 3/2014, pp. 1–5. Accessible online (accessed December 3, 2019) at: [5] .