October reforms

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Reich Chancellor Max von Baden (center, in a light coat) on his way to the Reichstag, October 3, 1918

October reforms are a series of constitutional and legislative changes in Germany. They came into force on October 28, 1918, towards the end of the First World War . Through the reforms, the parliamentary system of government was formally introduced in the German Empire . In general, the parliament, the Reichstag , was strengthened. However, the Kaiser should continue to appoint the Chancellor and retain the authority of command.

Parliamentarism had already established itself de facto in 1917 when representatives of democratic parties joined the Reich leadership . Since then, the parties have chosen the Reich Chancellor and appointed the State Secretaries. With the October reforms, the parties wanted to secure this new parliamentarianism in the constitution. Another reason was the attempt to present Germany internationally as a state that has become more democratic. This should give Germany better peace conditions with the war opponents.

Behind the reforms were majority Social Democrats , the Catholic Center , the left-wing and right- wing liberals , who also supported the Baden cabinet . The Conservatives on the one hand and the Independent Social Democrats on the other voted against this ; The reforms did not go far enough for the latter. The electoral reform in the Reich and in Prussia was also not yet complete.

The reforms were not enough to satisfy the people and the opposing foreign countries. Shortly thereafter, the Kiel sailors' uprising led to the so-called November Revolution . On November 9th, Imperial Chancellor Prince Max von Baden proclaimed the emperor's abdication and left government power to the Social Democrats. In the summer of 1919 Germany received a new constitution, the Weimar Constitution , and finally became a republic.

Starting position

Political system of the empire

Assembly room of the Reichstag on Leipziger Strasse, 1889

According to the constitution , the empire founded in 1867/1871 was a federal state whose presidium was held by the King of Prussia . As head of state he carried the title of German Emperor . He was also commander in chief of the army and navy. Other constitutional organs were the Federal Council, representing the federal states, and the Reichstag , whose members were elected according to the general, equal and secret male suffrage. The business of government was conducted by the Chancellor , who was not responsible to parliament, but to the emperor. The government, usually referred to as the Reichsleitung, was not a classic cabinet with responsible ministers, but consisted of the chancellor and state secretaries appointed by the emperor, who headed the Reich offices. It was only after the Act of Representation of 1878 that a State Secretary was able to act independently to a limited extent.

The parliament, the Reichstag, had considerable powers. Only the Reichstag and the Bundesrat could propose laws. In order to become legally binding, as is not unusual internationally, every proposal required the consent of both bodies. A major power of the Reichstag was the right to approve the state budget. However, within the framework of the so-called septnate, he was only allowed to vote en bloc for a period of seven years on its largest item, military expenditure . The Reichstag was also only able to exercise its parliamentary control over the army and navy to a limited extent.

First World War

Max Liebermann : Kindervolksküche , drawing from 1915. Even if only a few areas of Germany were briefly occupied by enemy troops, the effects of the war on everyday life were decisive.

When the First World War began in 1914 , the parliamentary groups in the Reichstag supported the conduct of the war, including the always opposition Social Democratic Party of Germany . But in the course of the war, the willingness to follow the imperial policy decreased. In July 1917, the majority in the Reichstag passed a peace resolution in which a rapid mutual peace was sought. It was not possible to get the Reich leadership to change their policy, but the factions that stood behind the resolution continued to work together. Their forum for cooperation was called the Intergroup Committee and already resembled a coalition. In addition to the Social Democrats, these included the Catholic Center Party and the left-wing liberal Progressive People's Party .

In the second half of 1918, the situation in Germany came to a head. Although the Reich was still able to make peace on its terms in the east in March 1918 , the German front in the west collapsed in August. This was due, among other things, to the intervention of American troops in the fighting and the increasing weariness of the German troops. At the end of September, the military leaders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff spoke out in favor of appointing members of the parties of the Intergroup Committee to the Reich leadership, who should then try to find a favorable peace agreement. It was assumed that the USA would rather negotiate with a new Reich leadership. This also saw the chance to pass responsibility for a bad peace to these parties.

Max von Baden was an independent grand ducal prince, but he was considered liberal and was appointed Chancellor on October 3, 1918. State secretaries were, like under his predecessor Georg Graf von Hertling , partly politicians of the parties, this time also from the SPD. Prince Max obtained the emperor's dismissal of Ludendorff and the cessation of unrestricted submarine warfare, but the USA expected further democratization of the empire.

adoption

The two government bills

Undersecretary of State Lewald in the Reich Office of the Interior (Ministry of the Interior) initially prepared a reform proposal on October 3, which would have changed little in the political system. In the constitution, Art. 21, Paragraph 2 would have been deleted so that a member of parliament could take on a Reich or other state office without losing his mandate as a member of the parliament. The Act on Deputies would have been amended so that a deputy of the Reich Chancellor would not become a member of the Bundesrat. The Federal Council approved the draft, and the Reich Chancellor submitted it to the Reichstag on October 10th.

Foreign policy developments continued, and the aim was to support the German peace negotiators by having the Reichstag formally participate in decisions on declarations of war and peace agreements. Art. 11 of the constitution should therefore have new paragraphs so that not only the Bundesrat but also the Reichstag had to agree to declarations of war (paragraph 2), and that peace agreements had to be approved by the Bundesrat and Reichstag (paragraph 3). The Federal Council accepted this proposal on October 15. However, individual German state governments complained about the time pressure, so some did not have their votes written in the minutes.

Some members of the Federal Council protested against the fact that Chancellor Max von Baden wanted to announce at the next session of the Reichstag that he wanted to introduce a bill for parliamentary responsibility. This would have meant the disempowerment of the Federal Council. Because of resistance from the individual states, Max von Baden postponed his plan until October 22nd.

At its meeting on October 17, the Intergroup Committee was unanimously against the two bills, as they did not decisively advance parliamentarization. In their opinion, the Reich Chancellor must be accountable to parliament and the military should be subordinated to civil power. The parliamentary groups have not protested about it yet.

Reichstag speech by the Chancellor and motion by the parliamentary groups

The future Chancellor Max von Baden in 1914

On October 22nd, Max von Baden did not commit himself in the Reichstag to the Chancellor's formal responsibility to parliament. He only said that a Chancellor or State Secretary could of course not remain in office without the confidence of the majority in the Reichstag. Germany should not resort to forms of government that do not correspond to the country's tradition. He announced a bill according to which a state court will punish in future if the head of government acts unconstitutionally. The speakers of the majority factions, however, called for formal constitutional norms for the transition to a parliamentary system of government.

A corresponding draft of the majority factions was then adopted and revised by the Reich leadership. The parliamentary groups submitted the result as an initiative motion on October 26th. So there was no need to involve the Federal Council, since the motion was not considered a government motion (although in essence it was). From the point of view of the Rules of Procedure, it was also questionable that the motion was tabled in the third reading on the government bills, even though only amendments were allowed to be tabled there. Objections by the opposition were overruled by the majority in the Reichstag. The Conservatives saw the proposals as the path to radical democratization and the Independent Social Democrats only a patch on the militarist coat.

As in anticipation of the new system, the Reichstag formally expressed confidence in the Chancellor on October 24th. The majority parliamentary groups voted for this with 193 against 52 votes from the Conservatives and the Independent Social Democrats, 23 MPs (German parliamentary group, Poland, Alsace-Lorraine) abstained. The government bills as amended by the Reichstag were adopted by the majority of the Reichstag on October 25 and 26; Incidentally, these were the last two sessions of the Reichstag elected in 1912 . The Federal Council approved them on October 28, and on the same day they came into force after the imperial issue and proclamation.

On October 28, Kaiser Wilhelm II wanted to give the reform laws their own meaning by means of an imperial decree. With the transfer of fundamental rights from the emperor to the people, a constitutional epoch was concluded that enabled the people to achieve great achievements in the four years of the war. The emperor accedes to the resolutions of the Reichstag. The Reich Chancellor, however, delayed the publication so that Wilhelm's statements could not have any effect on the public.

The individual reforms

Position of the State Secretaries

According to the first reform law, members of the Reichstag could be appointed to the Reich leadership and remain members (Art. 21). However, as MPs, they could still not become members of the Bundesrat (unlike other government members who were not MPs). The MPs Erzberger , Gröber , Trimborn (all center ), Haußmann ( progress ) and Scheidemann (SPD) had previously only been charged with performing the duties of state secretary, now they could also be appointed state secretaries and remain MPs. The same applied to the deputy Fischbeck in the Prussian State Ministry (government).

In addition, according to the amended Acting Representation Act, a State Secretary without a portfolio could become “Deputy” of the Reich Chancellor, so that he was given the power to countersign and was responsible to Parliament. Those state secretaries who were not members of the Bundesrat were now given the right to speak in the Reichstag. Ernst Rudolf Huber saw "full equality and collegialization" realized, which was also of importance in the transition period from November to February 1919, as the state secretaries remained in office even when the Reichstag no longer met.

However, Parliament did not dare to insist that Art. 9 Clause 2 of the Constitution be reformed. This article also prohibited anyone from being a member of the Bundesrat and the Reichstag at the same time. A Chancellor or State Secretary who wanted to remain a member of the Reichstag could not become a (Prussian) Federal Councilor. But it was a matter of course for the previous chancellors that they were Prussian prime ministers at the same time and also cast the Prussian votes.

war and peace

According to the second law, declarations of war and peace agreements have since required the approval of both the Reichstag and the Bundesrat. The emperor could no longer declare war on his own, not even in a purely defensive case. It should be noted, however, that in August 1914 the Federal Council approved the declarations of war and the Reichstag approved the war credits. The Reichstag and Bundesrat were already involved in the peace agreements in the east in early 1918.

Confidence of the Chancellor in Parliament

Constitutional diagram: The reformed constitution differed from the old state mainly in that the Reichstag could ensure the dismissal of the chancellor (red arrow)

With the new Article 15, Paragraph 3 of the constitution (also amended by the second law), the Reichstag was able to force the Reich Chancellor to resign by expressing mistrust in him. The emperor then had to dismiss the chancellor. The appointment of a new chancellor still seemed to be the emperor's initiative.

Responsibility of the Chancellor and the Deputy

According to the new Article 15, Paragraph 4, the Chancellor was responsible for all political actions of the Emperor, provided that the Emperor exercised his constitutional powers. This has already been the case, for example with ordinances, but also with statements such as speeches which, given the nature of the matter, were not formally countersigned by the Chancellor. What was new was that the emperor's military command now also belonged to the responsibility of the chancellor (and was thus subject to parliamentary control).

The new Art. 15 Para. 5 meant that the Chancellor and Deputy were also responsible to the Bundesrat and the Reichstag for their own administration. This clarified applicable law. This created the situation that the responsibility also existed towards the Federal Council - the system should continue to be federal. But only the Reichstag could force the Chancellor to resign. The state secretaries (deputies) became responsible, as did the Reich Chancellor, but the Reichstag could not express its distrust. Huber: “The different rules were more improvised than fully thought out. After all, the intention was clearly to give the Reichstag constitutional priority over the Bundesrat with the right to vote of confidence and no confidence. The October Acts unmistakably relegated the Federal Council to second place. "

Defense constitution

Standard of the emperor as supreme warlord

The German army was composed of the contingents of the individual states of Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg and Saxony, even though the emperor was in command. The second law ended the previous independence in the command area of ​​the armed forces. Since then, the Reichstag was to have direct or indirect control over the military leadership personnel of the army and navy through the Reich Chancellor. Nevertheless, military administration and command matters remained separate, the latter was not subject to parliamentary control.

The war minister of the state concerned had to countersign the appointment, transfer, promotion and dismissal of the army officers and civil servants (new Art. 66 Para. 3). The four ministers of war were responsible to the Federal Council and the Reichstag (new Art. 66 Para. 4). In the case of the Navy, the Chancellor countersigned accordingly (new Art. 51, Paragraph 1, Sentence 3). The Chancellor also signed against the appointment of the highest commanding officers of the contingents and other high-ranking military officers (new Art. 64, Paragraph 2).

Further development

Philipp Scheidemann proclaims the republic from a balcony of the Reichstag, November 9, 1918

On October 29, the day after the reform laws were promulgated, the mutiny of the German high seas began. It was directed against the militarily senseless and politically counterproductive order of the naval command to fight one last battle against the Royal Navy. The mutiny of some of the ship's crews developed within a few days into the Kiel sailors' uprising and finally into a nationwide revolution. In more and more German cities, the insurgents formed workers 'and soldiers' councils , which took over power at the local and largely also at the federal level.

In addition, US President Woodrow Wilson had implicitly requested the emperor's abdication in his reply to the German request for a ceasefire . While the SPD leadership, like the bourgeois parties, was still ready in principle to come to terms with a parliamentary monarchy under a new emperor, their supporters, the workers 'and soldiers' councils, the Independent Social Democrats and the Spartakusbund , left-wing splits from the majority SPD, for the abolition of the monarchy. In order to forestall such demands, Max von Baden tried in vain for several days to get Wilhelm II to abdicate. Fearing that he would lose control of the situation in Berlin and prevent a civil war, the Chancellor proclaimed the emperor's abdication on November 9th and handed over the business of government to the Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert . Such a procedure was not covered by the imperial constitution, not even after the October reforms. In order to anticipate the proclamation of a socialist soviet republic planned by the Spartacist Karl Liebknecht , the social democrat Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed the republic on the same day. On November 11, Germany signed the Compiègne armistice .

The government led by Social Democrats announced elections for a national assembly that was to give Germany a new constitution. On August 11, 1919, the democratic Weimar constitution was promulgated. It provided for a Reich President whose powers were similar to those of the former emperor. The Reich President appointed and dismissed the Reich Chancellor and the ministers, who, unlike in the Empire, were dependent on the confidence of the Reichstag majority. Parliament could force the Chancellor or the ministers to resign, but was not obliged to elect a new government at the same time, as the Basic Law later prescribed with a constructive vote of no confidence . This contributed significantly to the political instability of the republic. Constitutional lawyer Huber was of the opinion that the parties had already accepted the risk of an inability to hold a majority in the October reforms.

research

Less than two weeks after the reform laws were passed, a revolutionary interim government, the Council of People's Representatives, took power . Therefore, it cannot be said how the Empire - together with the electoral reforms that were completed in the Reich and were still on the way in Prussia - would have developed under the changed constitution. According to Gunther Mai, the reforms under time pressure "ultimately only codified the change in constitutional practice that had already taken place, as emerged when the government of Max von Baden was set up".

According to Mai, areas of conflict remained open due to unclear regulations, so that it was not certain whether democratization through parliamentarization would have resulted in the long term. This includes the unanswered question of whether it should primarily continue to be the emperor who proposed a chancellor and whether he had to involve the Reichstag in the decision. The reforms were profound and hasty, but too half-hearted to stave off the threat of revolution from below. After all, people and symbols of the old power remained.

The constitutional reform was only possible in consultation with the majority parliamentary groups, which had also taken the initiative in September. Therefore it is insufficient to speak of a revolution "from above", says Thomas Nipperdey . "The parties did not allow themselves to be ordered to revolution, they made their own demands, and it was they who forced changes." The demands of the majority factions were largely met. The new system was improvised, remnants of the old remained, and it was not known whether the emperor and the military would accept parliamentarisation in the long term. Above all, the domestic political situation came to a head: "The October reforms no longer had an independent effect, but were absorbed in the radicalization of the November revolution." Militarism "much more than that it could have been eradicated by some, albeit fundamental, changes in constitutional norms." The reform therefore came too late and was not enough despite a change of power, according to Nipperdey.

literature

  • Werner Frotscher, Bodo Pieroth : Constitutional history . 5th edition. Beck, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-406-53411-2 , Rn 462 ff.
  • Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978

Web links

supporting documents

  1. ^ WD 1 Stefan Schmidt: German Bundestag - Reichstag in Leipziger Strasse . In: German Bundestag . ( bundestag.de [accessed November 1, 2018]).
  2. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, pp. 584/585.
  3. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914-1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 585.
  4. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914-1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 585.
  5. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 586.
  6. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 586.
  7. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Renewal of the Reich: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 587.
  8. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, pp. 587/588.
  9. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, pp. 587/588.
  10. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 592.
  11. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914-1919, Stuttgart 1978, pp. 588/589.
  12. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Renewal of the Reich: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 589.
  13. Willibalt Apelt: History of the Weimar Constitution . 2nd edition, Munich, Berlin: CH Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1964, p. 33.
  14. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Renewal of the Reich: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 589.
  15. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914-1919, Stuttgart 1978, pp. 589/590.
  16. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 590.
  17. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914-1919, Stuttgart 1978, pp. 590/591.
  18. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Renewal of the Reich: 1914-1919, Stuttgart 1978, pp. 591/592.
  19. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 591.
  20. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 591.
  21. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume V: World War, Revolution and Reich renewal: 1914–1919, Stuttgart 1978, p. 590.
  22. Gunther Mai: The end of the empire. Politics and warfare in the First World War. dtv: Munich 1987, p. 166.
  23. Gunther Mai: The end of the empire. Politics and warfare in the First World War. dtv: Munich 1987, p. 166.
  24. Thomas Nipperdey: German History 1866-1918. Vol. 2: Power state before democracy . 2nd edition, Beck: Munich 1993, pp. 866-868.
  25. Thomas Nipperdey: German History 1866-1918. Vol. 2: Power state before democracy . 2nd edition, Beck: Munich 1993, pp. 868/869.