Free banking

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Free Banking (also free banking ) describes the idea of a banking system in which banks the same (state) regulations as other subject companies and no special government regulations, restrictions or privileges exist for companies in the banking sector. Even among the laissez-faire proponents, only a minority is in favor of realizing this idea.

overview

Today banking is one of the most regulated areas of the economy. In the past there were phases in which individual restrictions or privileges did not exist or were lifted in individual states, in which restrictions on banking freedom were therefore lower than they are today. Complete banking freedom did not exist in these phases either.

Representatives of free banking often demand that there should be no central banks and that everyone should have the right to issue banknotes without restriction and without any currency cover. In return, there should be no legal tender, i.e. market participants should not be legally obliged to accept money put into circulation by certain institutions as payment for goods and services.

If implemented consistently, this would mean a change from today's two-tier banking system with public or quasi-public central banks for supplying money and private commercial banks for supplying credit to a single-tier banking system consisting only of commercial banks with bank notes. Theoretically, the transition to a single-tier banking system, consisting only of a central bank with lending without commercial banks, would be theoretically just as conceivable, but this is in exact contrast to the free banking approach.

This position is in the minority in economics. Followers can be found particularly in the environment of the Mont Pèlerin Society , the Austrian School and among followers of the economists Friedrich August von Hayek , Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard . Mostly the opposite position is taken that the special features of the credit system make banking regulation necessary. Few economists now and historically endorse free banking theories. The reception of corresponding publications in the specialist field is low.

features

Below are the characteristics of banking as it evolved under Free Banking. Since historical examples are rare and historical peculiarities are abstracted, this description is based primarily on theoretical considerations, which are, however, in line with historical knowledge.

Competing currency providers

A bank note issued by a store. Their value is maintained by a promise to pay (here payable as goods).

Banking developed in a situation in which gold and silver coins were the common currency . Since paying with coins is impractical, people began to store their gold with people who had to keep large amounts of it anyway, such as goldsmiths and traders. The goldsmiths issued certificates as receipts that entitle the owner to withdraw a certain amount of gold from a goldsmith. Instead of gold coins, these certificates became common means of payment. Since only a small part of the gold deposited with a goldsmith was withdrawn, the goldsmith was able to issue more gold certificates than he could cover with gold. This procedure is now known as the partial reserve procedure . From this point on, the goldsmiths ran the business of a bank. It became attractive for them to pay interest on the deposits, as they competed among themselves for them. In addition, banks competed in ensuring that the certificates (banknotes) they issue retain their value. The most convincing guarantee of this was that the certificates could be converted into gold. This guarantee tied the value of the notes to that of the gold. Some representatives of free banking, such as JG Hülsmann , criticize that the partial reserve procedure actually constitutes fraud and that the breach of contract that occurs when a bank fails to meet its obligation to exchange notes for gold is not adequately punished. With the partial reserve procedure, there is an inevitable risk of bank runs .

Clearing systems

The business of a bank is limited by the acceptance of the notes it issues. Two banks can gain a competitive advantage by obliging each other to accept each other's notes, which also increases general acceptance. It turns out that the most practical way of organizing the exchange of notes is to hold regular central clearing meetings in which the banks get their notes back and the differences are paid out. A historic example is the New York Clearing House Association in the late 19th century. Clearing systems fulfill an important function because they remove over-issued money, i.e. money that is not used as a means of payment and could cause inflation or instability, from circulation more quickly.

Money markets

Banks' liquidity is subject to random fluctuations. Although these can be largely offset by the bank selling investments, there is still a risk of unforeseen large fluctuations, which can drive the bank into illiquidity . This risk can be countered by banks that are short of liquidity borrowing short-term money from those that have excess funds. In a monetary system with a central bank , the banks can trust that the latter will lend them the funds they need. Since this money can provide unlimited amounts, it is possible for the banks to reduce their reserves to a level with which they would not be able to survive under free banking (see also money market ).

Option clauses

Since the banking system as a whole is unable to meet all payment obligations at the same time, the situation can arise in which the money markets have dried up, i. H. even at unusually high interest rates, no one is willing to lend money to the banks. Then a collapse of the financial system is conceivable. Banks can avoid this risk by changing the payment obligations of the banknotes. Instead of the obligation to exchange the notes for hard money at any time, they can reserve the right to suspend the payment for a predetermined period of time and to pay interest as compensation. The exact conditions will be chosen in such a way that the banks will only use these option clauses in emergencies, otherwise the notes would not be accepted. The interest rate would be set slightly above the average of the money market interest rate of the last few months, so that it is ensured that it is normally cheaper for the bank to obtain liquidity in the money markets than to trigger the option clauses.

In times of crisis, however, interest rates on the money markets can rise to such an extent that it is cheaper for banks to suspend payments than to burden the money markets. You can even suspend the payment and loan the money on, helping to overcome the liquidity shortage. Most importantly, the option clauses eliminate the risk of bank runs resulting from the self-fulfilling expectation that one is about to happen. If a bank with no option clauses suffers a cash storm, the investors who are the last to request the redemption of their notes go away empty-handed. In a bank with an option clause, however, the available money is divided among everyone who has requested the redemption. Therefore, there is no advantage of being the first to redeem the notes. Notes with option clauses were found in Scotland from 1730 to 1765.

Speculative free banking concepts

In free banking theory, there have been various speculations about how the financial system would develop without government influence. JG Hülsmann doubts that the partial reserve procedure is compatible with property rights. The partial reserve procedure has negative effects, it leads to inflation and conjures up the risk of bank runs. According to Hülsmann, any money in an economy without state influence would be commodity money, since money that has no value beyond monetary use carries the risk of total loss of value.

Further development after Kevin Dowd

Kevin Dowd describes a development that the financial system could take based on the partial reserve system.

In a first step, notes would increasingly be redeemed not for gold but for other forms of investment, such as claims against other banks or companies. The public would accept this as long as the forms of investment offered are stable in value and accepted as a means of payment. She would even prefer these to gold because they are easier to work with. The banks initially have the advantage that it is cheaper to keep such redemption media than gold. More importantly, the banks can buy the repayment media in broader markets and are able to use their notes to pay higher prices than parity with the gold price . The banks are contractually forbidden to buy less gold with their notes than their face value, as they have to keep the value of the gold notes stable. The likelihood that they will be able to buy new repayment media in the markets increases, which enables banks to reduce the reserve ratio. Such a step is positive for the economy as a whole, as the financial system no longer has to react to large-scale repayment demands by raising interest rates, which would have negative economic effects.

In a second step, the obligation to exchange notes for gold can be replaced by the obligation to exchange notes for financial instruments with the same value as gold. The banks can meet such an obligation by intervening in the gold market or, more cheaply, in the futures market for gold. If one bank issues more notes than are held by others, money would be over-issued and this will lower the value of the notes; this will ultimately also affect the exchange ratio between notes and gold. The bank would have to stabilize the exchange ratio again through suitable transactions on the gold markets. Such transactions reduce the number of outstanding notes (i.e. the bank's liabilities), while at the same time the bank would have to sell assets to finance the transactions. The funds that have been over-issued are therefore withdrawn from the market. The banks are no longer dependent on holding gold reserves, but only need sufficiently liquid assets.

In a third step, the role of gold can be replaced by a commodity or a basket of goods whose value in relation to other goods fluctuates less than is the case with gold. Since the banks' assets depend on the value of all possible goods, but the liabilities are quoted in gold, a standard with fluctuating purchasing power creates a risk for them. Therefore, it makes sense for them to replace the standard. A stable standard also has positive effects for the general public, as the price signals become more reliable and misallocations can be avoided.

Free banking according to Friedrich August Hayek

Hayek has also speculated about free banking. He describes his idea in Denationalization of Money . Unlike Dowd, Hayek assumes that the banks will not enter into any contractual obligations to stabilize the value of issued notes. It is sufficient for the public to reject currencies from banks that are unable to keep the exchange rate stable. Banks would have to maintain the value of money in order to stay in business. The method by which they pursue this goal is different from what Dowd proposed. Since banks are able to buy back their currency at market value and they are not set to a standard of value, it makes sense for them to offset the obligations arising from the notes with assets whose value is proportional to that of the notes. Short-term loans would be suitable. To regulate the value of notes, banks would expand or restrict the supply of short-term credit, much like central banks do today. That way, banks would avoid the risks that arise because the value of assets and liabilities may fluctuate in relation to one another.

Hayek emphasizes that central banks can achieve a permanent excess return because they can borrow at zero interest (compare Seigniorage ). This can be illustrated as follows: for an individual, keeping the cash and investing are separate actions, but not for the economy as a whole, for which all money that is not used for consumption represents savings. A central bank can access the savings that arise when someone builds up stocks of a currency by expanding the money supply and thereby devaluing the savings. (The relationship between the amount of money and the value of money is described by the quantity theory of money.) A central bank that keeps the value of its currency constant can only expand the amount of money if the demand for stocks of this currency increases. The savings that the holders of the currency create correspond exactly to the money that the central bank is putting into circulation and for which it can buy investments. If the holders access their savings again and reduce their currency holdings, the central bank has to buy back the same amount of money. With this in mind, the holders of the central bank have borrowed their savings. Hayek fears that the excess returns will lead to political desires.

Historical experiences

Scotland between 1716 and 1844

Banknote with an option clause from the Scottish free banking period

In Scotland there were 1,716 to 1,844, a period of low limitations of free banking in which banks own banknotes based on a gold standard brought into circulation. The banking system was dominated by the Bank of Scotland , the Royal Bank of Scotland and the British Linen Bank, which were granted the privilege of limited liability by the Scottish Parliament. Competing banks were only given permission to put their own banknotes into circulation if the shareholders agreed to accept unlimited liability for the bank's liabilities with their private assets .

Note duels were occasionally fought between individual banks . A bank collects notes from a competitor over a longer period of time and then demands their redemption in one fell swoop with the aim of driving the competitor into insolvency and thus gaining market share. This behavior is beneficial for the system as a whole, as excess liquidity is quickly withdrawn from the market and has a disciplining effect on the individual banks.

In 1730 the Bank of Scotland had to close temporarily after such a duel. As a result, she equipped her notes with option clauses in order to be better protected against such attacks. That was the first time in history that such clauses have come down to us. The Bank of Scotland took the right to postpone repayment for six months if it paid six pence per pound in compensation (which is an annual interest rate of 5%). The other big banks did not initially adopt this innovation. Nevertheless, notes with and without option clauses circulated side by side at face value. This shows that option clauses were accepted by the public even when alternatives were available. At that time the banking business was new and it took some time to gain experience of how many reserves were needed, how to deal with liquidity bottlenecks and how to deal with the competition. It was not until 1771 that a clearing system was set up.

There was a liquidity crisis in the 1760s. Interest rates in London rose sharply - at times the interest rate differential was 4 to 5%. As a result, gold flowed out of Scotland, which threatened the liquidity of the banks. They looked for ways to protect themselves. In 1762 all banks had introduced option clauses. In addition, the loan volume was reduced and the interest rates on deposits were raised. After a short-term recovery, the crisis flared up again when an Amsterdam bank collapsed in 1763 and a flight into gold began across Europe, causing interest rates to rise again in London. In March 1764, both the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank applied their option clauses. They also cut lending further and increased investment rates. The public was very dissatisfied with these measures and called on the legislature to intervene. In 1765 a law was passed prohibiting notes under a pound face value and option clauses. The public perception was that the option clauses were destabilizing monetary value. However, it can be speculated that the Scottish economy suffered an external, deflationary shock during the crisis. By using the option clauses, the connection between note value and gold value was broken, so that the value of everyday goods did not increase in the sizes of notes. The option clauses would then have warded off the external shock.

Rondo Cameron noted that in the free banking period, Scotland grew more favorably than England or France. It is considered successful by economic historians. The economist and political philosopher Murray Rothbard doubted that Scotland was a free banking period between 1716 and 1844. Between 1797 and 1821, the Scottish banks refused to repay outstanding notes and balances in hard currency, which was illegal under Scottish law but was possible thanks to the backing of the English government. The Scottish banks did not rely on their own gold reserves but relied on help from England.

Rothbard rejects the thesis that the Scottish banking system was superior to the English one. Although there were fewer bank failures in Scotland than in England, what is relevant for the economy is that the inflationary expansion of the money supply is limited. There was no advantage here as the Scottish banks cyclically expanded and contracted the amount of credit.

USA from 1837 to 1865

In 1837, the American federal government withdrew from banking legislation, and responsibility for the legal framework for the banking industry rested entirely with the states. Some of them passed laws that allowed banks to put their own banknotes into circulation.

However, the freedom to bank was still significantly restricted. Often banks were legally obliged to use government bonds as cover for notes put into circulation. The depreciation of such bonds led to the bankruptcy of many banks.

More experiences

Australia in the 19th century had a financial system with extremely few regulations. In the 1890s, a property crash caused several banks to fail. These could be restructured and reopened later.

Canada had a free banking system from 1817 to 1935. Even during the Great Depression , there were no bank failures here. In 1935 a central bank was founded in the hope of warding off depressions by inflating the money supply.

In Sweden, the Riksbank's monopoly on issuing banknotes was abolished in 1824 and only reintroduced from 1897 to 1904. Various economic historians such as Lars Sandberg and Ögren argue that the development of an advanced banking system explains the economic success of Sweden before the First World War.

In the course of the liberal revolutions in Switzerland in the first half of the 19th century, the banking system was also deregulated. Several cantons allowed the banks to issue their own notes. As a result, there were three types of bank note-issuing banks: commercial, cantonal, cantonal government-run, and local, owned by both private individuals and municipalities. The cantonal banks had some privileges such as exemption from taxes and fees as well as full value for tax payments. In 1881 the private issuing of banknotes was banned completely and banks were forced to accept banknotes from other people at face value. This greatly reduced the need to differentiate between individual notes, and overemission was the result. In the 1890s the banking system was further centralized and in 1907 a central bank with a money monopoly was established.

In 1860, Chile passed a law that allowed anyone to enter the banking business and issue private notes. In practice, this law was undermined by privileges given to banks that financed the state deficit. Their grades were accepted by the state at face value, which gave them a strong competitive advantage. These banks had the incentive to monetize the public debt; H. To finance loans to the state by expanding the money supply. This undermined convertibility, which led to a financial crisis in 1878, in the course of which convertibility ceased entirely. In 1879 the state itself began to issue inconvertible notes as legal tender. Convertibility was reintroduced in 1880, but remained useless as the banks fulfilled their exchange obligations with the legal tender. In 1895 Chile returned to the gold standard by exchanging its own notes for gold. In 1898, the issuance of notes was finally monopolized again. Despite the problems mentioned, it was possible to expand the banking business during the free banking phase. This phase coincided with a period of strong economic growth.

Consequences of state intervention for the financial system

The price level in Great Britain from 1750 to 2003. At the end of the 19th century a central banking system developed in Great Britain.

According to free banking theories, state intervention in the financial system leads to the destabilization of the financial system and a long-term reduction in the purchasing power of the respective currency . According to the monetary overinvestment theory, lowering the interest rate through monetary policy measures leads to artificial boom phases, which in turn lead to sharp economic downturns.

Consequences of State Interest Rate Policy

According to the business cycle theory developed by Friedrich August von Hayek , in a free market the equilibrium interest rate results from the time preference rates of savers and the investment opportunities that can be realized at a given interest rate. According to the theory, monetary policy measures allow the interest rate to fall below the market price. This in turn prompts entrepreneurs to expand their operations by making investments that would previously have been unprofitable. However, since the additional supply of credit is not linked to an additional supply of goods available for investment, the additional demand for factors of production leads to rising prices for factors that are scarce, such as wages or raw materials.

If the rising factor prices are passed on to customers, they will miss their desired time preference, they would have consumed less than intended in relation to their savings. They would reduce their savings and thus trigger an economic crisis, since the same economic performance can no longer be maintained because of the lower savings and investment volume. If the companies fail to pass on the rising factor prices, some investments become unprofitable and have to be stopped, which also leads to an economic crisis.

Competing business theories sometimes lead to different results. There is no consensus among economists about what triggers business cycles.

Consequences of State Intervention for Stability

According to free banking theories, certain government interventions in the financial system undermine its stability.

Historically early examples of such interventions are the granting of privileges to individual banks, which in return offer the state preferential access to credit. Such privileges are typically monopoly rights on the issue of banknotes. Monopoly rights prevent competing currency providers and the subsequent characteristics of a free financial economy from developing. The quality of the money given out by the monopoly provider will be worse than money in a free market. This manifests itself, according to Kevin Dowd, in an over-issuance of money that leads to inflation. Another effect is that other banks will keep their reserves as notes of the monopoly bank and not in gold, as this is cheaper and is expected by the public. This leads to the fact that the nationwide gold reserves are centralized at the monopoly bank and this must take on the role of the “guardian of the monetary system”.

Another type of destabilizing regulation is those that restrict the way banks are organized. In 1708, the British Parliament passed a law prohibiting banks from being owned by more than six people. Banks of this size were too small to withstand larger shocks. Knowing this by depositors, any disruption in the financial markets led to bank runs .

Kevin Dowd argues that states tend to put pressure on banks in times of crisis to obtain discounted loans. These loans weakened the banks and increased the instability of the financial system.

Further interventions are being made to combat the instability of the financial system. A statutory deposit guarantee is often installed. Although this can avert runs against individual banks, it does lead to moral hazard : it is more beneficial for banks to take high risks, as the costs in the event of failure are assessed by the general public. This problem does not apply to voluntary deposit insurance schemes, as banks will only participate in them if it is ensured by conditions that the risk of another bank failing is not too great.

If a bank encounters financial difficulties, it can argue to politicians that valuable capital could be preserved if it were allowed to temporarily suspend payments. These interventions also lead to moral hazard . In some cases the suspension of payments remained permanent, such as that decreed by Nixon in 1971; this is the introduction of a paper money system.

State intervention in the banks' business policy leads to a reduction in the efficiency of the capital markets. It is also possible that the desired results will not be achieved. Reasons for the latter can be, for example, neglected financial innovations or incompetence in the supervisory authorities.

Objections to banking freedom

According to Diamond's model , the peculiarities of the financial industry lead to a market failure, which consists of a fundamental instability. Bank runs are the consequence of this market failure. Attempts were made to design government interventions that would eliminate the possibility of such runs in the model. According to Kevin Dowd, however, these state interventions can only be successful if the assumptions of the model for normal agents (isolation) do not apply to the state. So if there are ways to eliminate the risk of runs, then, according to advocates of banking freedom, market players can also use them. Intervention by the state is therefore not necessary. In addition, proponents of free banking assume that there is no inherent instability in banking. If they did exist, there could be no decades of crisis-free free banking periods, a statement that contradicts historical evidence. Empirical studies have not been able to confirm that the financial system would be more unstable under free banking, in some cases they suggest the opposite.

One point of criticism that is often raised is that banking is a natural monopoly . Such a situation exists when the entire market of an industry can be covered by a single supplier at a lower cost than if the market were divided between several suppliers. Possible sources of such economies of scale are, on the one hand, keeping reserves and, on the other hand, the diversification of risks. The positive economies of scale of maintaining reserves come about because the amount of payments that are required with a certain probability is only scaled with the square root of the amount of outstanding claims. This means that with a larger amount of outstanding receivables, a larger proportion of the deposited capital can be invested profitably. The economies of scale that are based on the reserve hold, however, disappear relatively quickly, as the following example shows: Assuming that one euro invested, the reserve must be exactly one euro, then, according to the law of the roots, ten must serve as a reserve for a hundred invested euros. The reserve costs were then already saved by 90%. At 10,000 euros, 99% have already been saved, larger savings are hardly worth mentioning.

Douglas W. Diamond was able to show that larger banks have lower costs to monitor their loan portfolio . However, these advantages also disappear in the limits of large banks. It is therefore doubtful whether the aforementioned economies of scale are sufficient to establish a natural monopoly. Empirical studies have shown that while there are economies of scale in banking, there is no tendency towards a natural monopoly. A bank could only achieve a monopoly position if it had been given appropriate privileges.

Some critics continue to argue that under free competition, issuers will continue to put additional money into circulation until it is practically worthless, since bringing additional money into circulation causes very little costs for the issuer. However, under freedom of banking there is no obligation to accept money from any issuer as payment for goods and services. According to Friedrich von Hayek, with the freedom of banking, the demand for money from a particular issuer depends on whether the issuer is able to keep the value of the money constant. If an issuer increases the amount of money with constant demand for the money it issues, the value of the money decreases. Market participants lose confidence in the issuer, refuse to accept money from the issuer and switch to competitive money.

Some critics do not consider free banking useful because transaction costs would be reduced if all subjects in an economic area used the same unit of account. This is not guaranteed under free banking. Proponents do not consider this criticism to be valid, since standards can also develop on a private basis . Such a standard would only be undermined if alternative units of account could offer greater advantages than the standard for individual market participants. In such a situation, however, it does not make sense to make a standard legally binding.

See also

literature

Primary literature

Secondary literature

history

  • Lawrence Henry White: Free banking in Britain: theory, experience, and debate, 1800-1845 . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984, ISBN 0-521-25859-6 .

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Vera Smith: The Rationale of Central Banking and the Free Banking Alternative. Minneapolis [1936] 1990, Liberty Fund, p. 169.
  2. ^ Melvin W. Reder: Economics: The Culture of a Controversial Science. The University of Chicago Press, 1999, ISBN 0-226-70609-5 , p. 253.
  3. ↑ Kevin Dowd: Laissez-faire banking. ISBN 0-415-13732-2 , p. 27 ff.
  4. ↑ Jörg Guido Hülsmann: The ethics of money production. ISBN 978-3-937801-19-3 , p. 110 and p. 130.
  5. ↑ Jörg Guido Hülsmann: The ethics of money production. ISBN 978-3-937801-19-3 , p. 47 f.
  6. ↑ Kevin Dowd: Laissez-faire banking. ISBN 0-415-13732-2 , p. 62 ff.
  7. ↑ Kevin Dowd: Laissez-faire banking. ISBN 0-415-13732-2 , pp. 65 f.
  8. ↑ Kevin Dowd: Laissez-faire banking. ISBN 0-415-13732-2 , p. 66 ff.
  9. ↑ Paul Terres: The logic of a competitive monetary order. 1999, ISBN 3-16-147127-X .
  10. ↑ a b c d e f Briones, Ignacio and Hugh Rockoff: Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Free-Banking Episodes? In: Econ Journal Watch. Vol. 2, No. 2, August 2005, pp. 279-324.
  11. ↑ Kevin Dowd: Laissez-faire banking. 1993, p. 52 ff.
  12. ^ Murray N. Rothbard: The Myth of Free Banking in Scotland. (PDF; 1.5 MB)
  13. ↑ Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr .: Wildcat Banking, Banking Panics and Free Banking in the United States. ( Memento of the original from September 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review. 81, 1996. (PDF; 213 kB) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.frbatlanta.org
  14. ↑ George A. Selgin, Lawrence H. White: How Would the Invisible Hand Handle Money? In: Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. 32, No. 4 December 1994, American Economic Association, p. 1731.
  15. ↑ Kevin Dowd: Laissez-faire banking. 1993, p. 136 ff.
  16. ↑ Thorsten Polleit on wirtschaftsfreiheit.de (accessed on 26 February 2008)
  17. ↑ Kevin Dowd: Laissez-faire banking. 1993, p. 33 ff.
  18. ↑ Jörg Guido Hülsmann: The ethics of money production. P. 179.
  19. ↑ Kevin Dowd: Laissez-faire banking. 1993, p. 87 ff.
  20. ↑ KH Chu: Is Free Banking More Prone to Bank Failures than Regulated Banking? ( Memento from August 2, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) In: Cato Journal. 1996.
  21. ^ D. Glasner: How Natural is the Government's Monopoly over Money? Washington, DC, paper presented to the seventh Cato Institute monetary conference, 1989.
  22. ^ Douglas W Diamond: Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Review of Economic Studies. Vol. 51, 1984, pp. 393-414. See also model from Diamond@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.stanford.edu  
  23. ↑ Kevin Dowd: Laissez-faire banking. 1993, p. 85 f.
  24. ↑ Kevin Dowd: Laissez-faire banking. 1993, p. 81 f.
  25. ^ Friedrich August von Hayek: Denationalization of Money ( Memento of April 23, 2008 in the Internet Archive ). Institute of Economics Affairs, London 1976 (PDF; 11.97 MB)