Peace of 363

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The peace treaty between the Roman Empire and the Sassanid Empire in 363 is sometimes referred to in ancient historical research as the Peace of 363 (sometimes also the Second Peace of Nisibis ) .

background

Julian's Persian campaign

In the spring of 363 the Roman Emperor Julian set out from Antioch on the Orontes to the east with a strong army of around 65,000 men . His aim was to defeat the Persians, who posed a constant threat to Rome's eastern border (see Roman-Persian Wars ), possibly with the Alexander imitation and domestic political motives also playing a role. Unlike Julian's predecessor Constantius II , who was able to fight the constant battles with only part of the entire Roman field army - the conflicts with his brothers who were co-rulers in the west, later the threat from the Teutons on the Rhine border and the usurpations of Magnentius and Julians had made this impossible - Julian had the resources of the entire empire.

In fact, Julian was initially successful: The Persian great king Shapur II had to gather his troops first, and so the Persians avoided a decisive battle for the time being. Before Ctesiphon , the Persian capital, the tide turned: Julian saw himself unable to take the heavily fortified city. In the days that followed, the Roman army, which was already in retreat, was pushed aside by the Persians. Julian was wounded in the Battle of Maranga and died on June 26, 363, leaving the army unmanaged.

A college of officers, consisting of Dagalaifus , Nevitta , Arintheus and Victor , finally agreed on the Christian and guard officer Jovian as Julian's successor, whom the beleaguered army proclaimed as the new emperor. The retreat continued, but it was not possible to cross the Tigris . This made the situation of the Romans increasingly desperate. Shapur, who in the meantime had brought in the main Persian army, recognized his opportunity and continued to attack the Romans, who were struggling with massive supply problems. Under this pressure Jovian inevitably agreed to negotiate, which the Persian king dictated.

Content of the contract

Schapur's demands were far-reaching. On the one hand, the Romans were supposed to give up the conquests that Diocletian and Galerius had acquired in the First Peace of Nisibis in 298 (the so-called transtigritan provinces ). But Shapur also laid claim to areas in Mesopotamia , which was Roman before 298 , which meant a considerable loss of prestige for Rome: Two important cities, Nisibis , which Shapur had besieged three times in recent years, and Singara , and 15 fortresses were to be ceded to Persia become.

The loss of these cities also meant a significant loss from an economic and strategic point of view, since they were core components of the Roman fortress network that protected the Eastern provinces of Rome. For this reason the defensive reaction of the Romans was understandable, but it was of no use. A continuation of the fighting would have meant a certain risk for Shapur as well, but the Romans threatened the fate of being completely wiped out in the middle of the desert.

So Jovian, whose army suffered more and more from hunger and thirst, finally consented. Allegedly he managed to keep the peace limited to 30 years (and thus not have a final character), but this is perhaps a later invention by Roman authors. The garrisons of the Roman fortresses were given free retreat, and the population of Nisibis and Singara was allowed or had to be evacuated. This definitive abandonment and evacuation of imperial territory was a unique process in Roman history; because, unlike usual, this time the fiction that the area remained de iure part of the empire could not be upheld : The fact that the Roman civilian population was expelled shows that the abandonment of the territories was final. The Romans themselves carried out this deportation, overseen by Sassanid dignitaries. Rome also had to agree not to come to the aid of the King of Armenia , whose country was a constant point of contention between Rome and Persia, in the event of a Persian attack. On July 11th, Jovian was finally able to march back.

rating

In the late antique sources, the contract met with a majority of rejection, both from the pagan and from the Christian side, with the loss of the important city of Nisibis in particular being a constant thorn for Rome. Ammianus Marcellinus , our best source for this time, who also reports in detail on the negotiations (25.7), said in retrospect that Jovian should have fought. It must be noted, however, that Ammianus was an admirer of Julian and had also rejected the more defensive, but overall more successful strategy of Julian's predecessor Constantius II. Also Agathias (4.26), Eunapius (frg. 29.1), Festus ( Breviarium 29) or Libanios rejected the results of the negotiations. Others, such as Eutropius ( Breviarium 10.17), Orosius (Hist. 7.31), several church historians and Zonaras , regretted the contract and saw it in some cases as a shame for Rome, but also said that Jovian had hardly any other option would have. Around 485 it seems to have been claimed in Ostrom that Nisibis was left to the Persians for only 120 years and could therefore now reclaim it (cf. Joshua Stylites 7). Since no fourth-century source mentions such a limitation, it is undoubtedly a later invention that emerged when the Eastern Romans believed they were in a position of strength against the Sassanids.

In modern research, the military necessity of a peace treaty is occasionally disputed (Demandt, p. 86), but overall account is taken of the threatening situation in which the Roman army found itself during Julian's Persian campaign. Jovian had preferred security to risk and took care of stabilizing his rule. What is certain is that the treaty had far-reaching consequences and initially worsened Rome's position; the Roman border defense in the east had to be completely restructured. At the same time, however, both great powers could all in all live well with the new border in Mesopotamia - this was an important prerequisite for the largely peaceful nature of relations in the 5th century . For almost 230 years, the border in the previously so bloodily contested Mesopotamian country remained practically unchanged. It was not until the end of the 6th century that Emperor Maurikios was able to revise the provisions of the treaty in parts by regaining Nisibis and the surrounding region for Eastern Europe in 591 - but only for a few years.

literature

  • Evangelos Chrysos: evacuation and abandonment of imperial territories. The contract of 363 . In: Bonner Jahrbücher . 193, 1993, ISSN  0938-9334 , pp. 165-202.
  • Alexander Demandt : History of Late Antiquity. The Roman Empire from Diocletian to Justinian 284-565 AD. CH Beck, Munich 1998, ISBN 3-406-44107-6 , ( Beck's historical library - ancient history ), p. 86 f.
  • Geoffrey B. Greatrex , Samuel NC Lieu (Eds.): The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars . Part 2: AD 363-630. A narrative sourcebook . Routledge, London et al. 2002, ISBN 0-415-14687-9 , pp. 1 ff. (Excerpts from sources in English translation and provided with a brief commentary).
  • Klaus Rosen : Julian. Emperor, God and haters of Christians . Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2006, ISBN 3-608-94296-3 , p. 366 ff.
  • Engelbert Winter , Beate Dignas: Rome and the Persian Empire. Two world powers between confrontation and coexistence . Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2001, ISBN 3-05-003451-3 , ( Study books History and Culture of the Old World ), p. 155 ff.