Genetic Epistemology

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As genetic epistemology is called one of Jean Piaget developed (1896-1980) epistemology . This tries to empirically explain the acquisition of knowledge, the growth of scientific knowledge and its phylo- and ontogenetic conditions of development, based on the methodology of biology . Piaget saw "the cognitive mechanisms on the one hand as a continuation of the organic regulations from which they emerged, and on the other hand as specialized and differentiated organs of these regulations in the interactions with the outside world." Piaget is thus a representative of naturalism .

Piaget examined the ontogenesis of cognitive abilities in children not as a substitute for lost historical knowledge about the origin of knowledge, but as a necessary complement to it. Since the cognitive processes that were effective in the creation of historical works are seldom documented, whether as in evolutionary biology , it is necessary to get information about them by means of ontogenesis. At first, Piaget assumed that the cognitive mechanisms of children were similar to those of adults as well as those of established scientists of the past and present. Towards the end of his life, he and Rolando García developed the hypothesis of the functional invariance of cognitive mechanisms.

Piaget's theory of knowledge is empirical; That is, he demanded that hypotheses that had been put forward also be empirically proven. With this he turned decisively against abstract philosophical positions, which he saw in both positivism and apriorism , while he saw himself connected to the operationalism of Percy Bridgman , but also to the neo-Kantian epistemology of Paul Natorp . One of the basic assumptions of Piaget's epistemology is that humans are an open system

  • seeks the actively questioning exchange of the autonomous subject with the environment and
  • strives for a balance with information from the environment through self-regulation.

According to Piaget, humans are problem-solving beings who, in a step-by-step process of knowledge development, increasingly open up the environment for their use. The stages and stages of the increase in knowledge are fixed (invariant) because they are logically based on one another.

“The reader will thus find an epistemology that seeks to be naturalistic without falling into positivism, that emphasizes the activity of the knowing subject without becoming idealistic, and that relies on the object although it can only be reached within limits viewed and existing as independent of us, although it will never be fully accessible to us. "

Building blocks of knowledge

Interactionism

From the infant's perspective, the starting position of recognition is characterized by an "adualism". This does not mean that an infant is imbued with the awareness that he and the external reality are in fact one. On the contrary: Piaget describes the beginning of cognitive development as adualistic, because his research suggests that there is still “no conscious subject ” and “no fully developed objects ” in the infant . However, Piaget is of the opinion: "Both the object and the objective structures already exist before their discovery." Thus the question arises of how this discovery takes shape, i.e. how a subject who knows neither of himself nor of the objects, gets to know the objects and the objective structures. That the discovery does not take place immediately, as when an object comes to light in its entirety after the disclosure, is understood from the long duration of the genesis of cognitive abilities. Instead, the discovery is based on a mediation between inside and outside. However, this mediation does not always stay the same; genetic epistemology shows that the mediating instruments are also subject to continuous change. Although there is no immutable instruments of exchange with the outside world is, there is still the possibility of a general form of the cognitive process by using functional invariants (Unveränderlichkeiten over individual laws) highlight. Such invariants are functional sub-processes of the development of knowledge such as assimilation, accommodation, self-regulation through equilibration or reflective abstraction (for the content of the term see below). Coming back to the adualistic starting position of the infant, from the point of view of an epistemologist there are two poles: reality with objects and objective structures on the one hand and a knowing subject on the other. According to Piaget, it is not the objects but the activity of the subject that is decisive for mediation between the poles. Since "the subject can only get to know reality with the help of his actions or influences [...]", the subject must act with it in order to obtain information about objects and facts. This means, among other things, that objects that are not exposed to any influence do not become the object of knowledge. Furthermore, the results of this influence are only known to the extent that the degree of development of the internal structures, the schemes, is able to utilize them.

Piaget compares the process of utilization to the incorporation of digestion and uses the term assimilation for this . Since the scheme is not only responsible for utilizing the results of an action, but also regulates the action itself, it is solely decisive for the quality of the knowledge. Thus, depending on the adequacy of the schemes, “deforming [r] assimilation” or “conserving [r] assimilation” occurs. However, a scheme is not a rigid structure; it is also changing. On the one hand, it modifies itself during assimilation in order to better adapt to the circumstances - this is what Piaget calls accommodation; on the other hand, it is in the “genetic circle”: assimilation takes place in schemes, while the schemes themselves result from assimilation.

Schemes and habit

Illustration of the concept of schematism by Jean Piaget

In genetic epistemology, schemata are structured patterns of thought and behavior that serve as rules of action to “experience the world”. The newborn child has a few, simple patterns such as the sucking reflex or the grasping reflex that it instinctively uses. Due to his active interaction with the environment, the child develops increasingly complex and abstract schemes. This process is based on an interplay of assimilation and accommodation, each of which is aimed at establishing a balance (an equilibration) in the form of a new scheme. If a person is confronted with something new in the course of his exploration of the environment, he tries to assimilate this experience by assigning it to his existing schemata and thereby expanding them. If the adaptation does not work, the organism tries to adapt its schemes to the experience (the object) and in this way to create a balance. This accommodation leads to a change in existing schemes or to a differentiation in that new, additional schemes are created. Imbalances and accommodation are therefore an engine of the development of knowledge.

"The more the schemes differ, the more the distance between the new and the known decreases, so that the new now becomes a problem and provokes exploration, instead of being just a disruptive factor that was avoided, as was previously the case."

Learning is the adaptation of existing schemes or the acquisition of new schemes that can be used as rules, as patterns or as a plan for future action. According to Piaget, learning processes take place on three levels. On the one hand, the instincts acquired at least partially through heredity trigger behavior that is determined by exogenous influences. Second, experience leads to learning processes that range from everyday life to scientific knowledge. And thirdly, higher-level intelligences construct logical-mathematical forms of knowledge. All of these findings are generalized and kept stable through schemes across different situations. "The concept of the schema thus forms, as it were, the leitmotif that connects the physiological stimulus-response cycles on the level of concrete behavior with the level of knowledge and abstract thinking."

Schemas are used to develop habits that are an essential and necessary element in the self-regulation of an organism. Schemas are usually created in several stages. For example, the scheme of opening a door includes both unlocking and pressing a handle. Equilibrium processes (equilibration), which lead to a habit with sufficient practice, also take place when schemes are linked. So are z. B. to reconcile subsystems like “number” and “length” or the relationship between part and whole.

“A habit (and this applies a forteriori to all schemas of a higher order than it) is firstly an overall system that functions as a whole. And it is precisely this overall activity that ensures that it is maintained as a system, however elementary it may be. This system is also self-contained and thus represents a schema (this is also true and even more so if this schema is nested as a subsystem in a more comprehensive system, such as in the "hierarchical families" Hulls ) "

In the course of his empirical investigations, Piaget and his co-workers have described a large number of schemes and postulated a kind of step structure for them, i. H. the order of their development within the framework of the learning process is assumed to be invariant. This assumption of invariance led him to a developmental phase concept. In the early sensorimotor phase, movement patterns that are learned as motor schemes predominate. Feelings of pleasure and displeasure are expressed in affective schemata. But logical-mathematical schemes such as the formation of orders, classes and rows also emerge very early on. According to Piaget, people can only form more abstract cognitive schemes in a later phase of cognitive development, the operational phase (from around 11 years of age).

constructivism

Based on the assumption of an active process of schema development, Piaget called his epistemology constructivism. The schemes and complex structures are the result of a cognitive process that begins at birth and develops step by step. Knowledge arises through action, as the organism integrates experience into its conception of the world through assimilation, accommodation and equilibration. From this constructivist view, interpreters have concluded that Piaget is close to radical constructivism or evolutionary epistemology , that is, rejects realism or, at best, represents a very limited realism.

On the other hand, there is a multitude of statements in Piaget's work that are more in line with the ideas of critical realism . The content of the assimilation schemes and their development over time result from the adaptation to the experience of concrete objects that originate from a reality independent of consciousness and observer. Piaget only resisted ideas of a simple association psychology , which he equated with empiricism, and also against a rationalistic nativism , which assumes innate cognitive abilities. He described the relation between reality and the constructively created ideas as isomorphism . For Piaget, constructive knowledge has always been adaptive. The fact that in the development of knowledge there are regularly conflicts between experience and the existing schemata plays a role here, which can only be resolved through accommodation.

“[The problem of knowledge] is reduced to the question of how the subject becomes increasingly capable of recognizing objects adequately, that is, how it comes to objectivity. For this is not an original property, as the empiricists assume; rather, their acquisition is based on a series of successive constructions, which represent an ever closer approximation to objectivity. "

The objectivity of the representation of reality, like the schemata themselves on which it depends, has undergone a change that can also be examined in cognitive development. According to Piaget, objectivity is “a process and not a state”. Piaget saw two complementary mechanisms in the process, namely "decentering" on the one hand and "approximating reconstruction" on the other. These mechanisms interlock, but can be represented separately.

Decentering

For the simple reason that, according to Piaget, we can only get to know the environment by actively interacting with it, subjective participation is the basic requirement of any knowledge. Therefore, the question of objectivity is not about whether the subject is involved in the creation of knowledge of the environment, but to what extent this participation has a deforming effect.

Against this background, the pair of terms centering and decentering gains a certain meaning. Centering expresses that humans only have limited resources, i.e. the developing instruments of exchange, to come into contact with the environment. As a result, the inadequacy of these tools is reflected in his experience of the environment. Piaget calls this one-sided view of the environment self-centered, because the environment is unconsciously recorded according to one's own level of development:

“On the one hand, egocentrism is the primacy of need satisfaction over objective determination [...]. On the other hand, egocentrism is a deformation of reality as a function of action and one's own point of view. In both cases it is of course unconscious, because it is essentially a mixture of the subjective and the objective. "

Piaget used the term egocentrism at the beginning of his cognitive research; in later phases he increasingly replaced it with centering.

Decentration refers to the increasing ability of the subject to “take the point of view of other subjects or the point of view of objects.” As a counter-term to centering, this is the process that breaks down and ultimately overcomes the egocentrism associated with centering. As a result, decentration must eliminate the deficit in consciousness that leads to the confusion of the subjective and the objective, counteract the self-satisfaction of the assimilation process through increased accommodation, and remove the unconscious bias in one's own point of view.

The decentering is not straight, but cyclical. Piaget seems to have fluctuated back and forth between a linear and a cyclical development several times before he settled in the later work phases. At the beginning of a new stage of cognitive development, a centering arises, which at the end evades a decentered state. The general style of this development is from the periphery, ie from the achieved result of the action, to the center of the activity, that is, an awareness of the hidden participation of the knower in the emergence of the action goal. Furthermore, although the cycle repeats itself at each new stage, a progress in decentration can be seen over the entire development from the sensorimotor to the formal operational stage. Piaget therefore compares the progress of decentering with a spiral.

Two mechanisms are involved in the spiral development of decentration: reflective abstraction and equilibration. “Abstraction” in Piaget's terminus technikus “reflective abstraction” refers to the ability to isolate structures from an overall network of schemes. “Reflection”, on the other hand, has a twofold meaning: On the one hand, it has the optical meaning of a projection, because the structure that has been extracted is projected onto a new level; on the other hand, the spiritual sense of a mental processing, because the already existing network of schemes is integrated into a richer structure of a higher level in the light of the new. The reflective abstraction thus lifts a cognitive content from one level to a higher one and thereby gives it a new form; it proceeds in a conservative manner.

The upheaval of internal schemes caused by reflective abstraction is not without consequences. Their effects inwardly on the other schemata and outwardly on their relationship to the outside world must be rebalanced. The equilibration is responsible for this.

Approximate reconstruction

This term is initially intended to express that in the course of decentering a transformation of the representation of reality takes place. The transformation has its origin in the mutual assimilation of schemes, thus a reorganization or new composition of the original representation emerges exclusively from internal structures. However, the reconstruction is not arbitrary in terms of experience; it arises in accordance with experience. As a result, as the mutual assimilation of the schemes progresses, the schemes can adapt to the circumstances the better, so that successive constructions offer an ever better approach to reality. In other words, the successive designs, which are of endogenous origin, try to take into account the empirical conditions optimally, so that their compositions increasingly approximate the external objects and facts.

perception

Contrary to the widespread opinion that the eyes are like windows whose shutters only need to be opened to let in the preformed image of the outside world, perception is a construction according to Piaget . It is a construction in two respects: on the one hand with regard to its creation, because the constancy of size and shape , space and object permanence are, for example, demonstrable stations in the development of visual perception; on the other hand, with regard to functioning, because every perception is instantly constituted according to rules.

The spontaneous construction of perception takes place according to “composition principles”, the field effects, i. H. a “deformation of the parts with the function of the whole”. They cause a systematic distortion in the formation of the perceptual image. This is because the gaze can only aim at one point one after the other, which it systematically enlarges while at the same time reducing the surrounding elements. The selection of the targeted points of a figure plays a role, because although the "figure as such [...] the choice of an optimal fixation point [causes] as little deformation as possible", the field of perception shows a systematic deformation. The systematic nature of this deformation makes the distortion of this field accessible for probability calculations. This is why Piaget calls such compositions "combinations of probability". Sometimes he calls them "irrational" because, as the perceptual illusions sufficiently show, the compositions do not obey the laws of logic .

The fact that the effects of the perceptual illusions hardly diminish throughout life despite the indignation of logic shows on the one hand their independence from logic and on the other hand from the static laws of composition. However, that does not mean that one has to come to terms with the distortion. The field of perception is inadequate for the object because the gaze itself is aiming at the optimal, but only small, section of the possible fixation points. This is what Piaget calls "centering". The means of eliminating the deformation seems to be obvious: one systematically directs one's gaze to the remaining points until the object is fully understood. The catch here, however, would be that every look would again be distorted by field effects, so that instead of an adequate perceptual image one would only exchange one deformed view for another. The prerequisite for actively moving around a figure with one's gaze contributes to compensating for a deformation is that the perceptual images do not remain discrete, but rather that they interact. This guarantees the "perceptual activity".

Perception and feedback at Jean Piaget

However, the original perception does not remain unchanged by the perceptual activity; Piaget believes that the reflection of the perceptual activity enriches the original perception. This takes place in that the perceptual activity works out “perceptual schemes”, which Piaget says are an extension of the coordinating activity that is already effective in action, which allow elements of the sensual content of perception, which Piaget calls “figural” ones, to be picked up and used to give meaning. This construction is basically an act of knowing in perception.

After the productive act of cognition, the figural elements gain “clues” character from now on, but not in the usual sense that they are an internal representation of an external, preformed object, but by pointing to their meaningful scheme. However, the relationship between the sign and the schema is reciprocal: the figural elements point to the schema as signs, while the assimilation to the schema allows them to be integrated into a network of “virtual [r] relationships” which first assign a meaning to them. Piaget illustrates the relationship between indication and scheme using the example of a cube: This can only be viewed from one perspective. By assimilation to the scheme of a cube, this view is assigned to the totality of the possible perspectives on the cube, thus it only becomes a perspective of this cube. In the meantime, it has become pars pro toto a sign for the whole cube - at the moment there is only this view in figural perception - because by assimilating to the schema it implies all the perspectives that could be updated at any time. Piaget comments on the complex of signs, perceptual scheme and perceptual activity as follows:

“It [perception] is the sign of a perceptual scheme that defines the meaning of the perceived object, a meaning that transcends the sensory elements, since it is based on the virtual relationships that perceptual activity could develop with regard to the observed perception . "

representation

According to Piaget, representations arise through the evocation (evocation) of symbols of non-present realities. In contrast to traditional theories of representation of cognition, in which the representation as an image intervenes between the outer world of objects and the inner world of ideas, it plays an important role in genetic epistemology, albeit a secondary one to cognition. For Piaget, the semiotic function, be it in language as a sign or in the pictorial representation as a symbol - which, in contrast to the sign, resembles the designated object - merely offers an aid that represents what has already been recognized. It is therefore indispensable for the manipulation, flexible application and storage of knowledge, i.e. for the handling and availability of knowledge; however, they do not determine the act of knowledge itself.

The semiotic function has its origin in imitation and is basically an internalization of external motor imitations. However , Piaget uses the French term intérioriser to designate two different functions, so Furth suggested: “We can use“ interiorize ”for the functional dissociation between general cognitive schemes and external content and“ internalize ”for the real weakening of imitative movements which, according to Piaget, lead to inner images or inner language. ”Corresponding to the figurative and the operative aspect of a representation, there are two sources from which it feeds: on the one hand, as in perception, the figurative arises from the accommodative activity, on the other it gets a meaning by being based on the operative act of knowledge. Accordingly, a representation arises in that internalized figurative elements provide the material that only becomes meaningful through the association with a schema. The representation forms the signifier, while the schema functions as the signifier.

Think

The term operation is used by Piaget as a synonym for thinking , which for him is behavior. In contrast to the sensorimotor behavior that manifests itself in acts performed with the body, however, Piaget argues that thinking is interiorized behavior.

The deductive nature of mathematics and logic makes another difference to sensorimotor behavior evident: the result of an act of thinking is not outside of thinking. In order to judge the success or failure of a material act, the feedback of the senses is required, whereas the result of a thought act is immediately understandable because it is anticipated in the thought. In cybernetic terms, the logical-mathematical operations thus form perfect feedback loops.

According to Piaget, every act has two aspects: on the one hand, it has certain peculiarities which reflect the adaptation of the execution to the prevailing conditions; Apart from the special features, however, there is, on the other hand, an aspect that can be transferred to similar situations. The last aspect is the generalizable part of behavior that is interiorized and forms the basis of thought. The interiorization brings about the detachment of the generalizable form from the special content. With the help of the mechanisms below, this development of cognitive structures culminates in the general forms of mathematics and logic. On the one hand, this is possible because the object of thinking resides in the thinking structures. By assimilating the results of action into its schemas, thinking constitutes objects of thought. Thus thinking transforms the things of the world into things of thought with which it can intelligently handle. On the other hand, this is related to the main characteristic of the operations, namely reversibility. Insofar as a transformation and its inversion are simultaneously combined in one operation, it frees itself from the binding of material actions to causality and the sequence of time.

memory

The memory is at Piaget no independent knowledge of storage medium on which, if required, and can be drawn from case to case. Rather, he viewed memory as a building block in the structure of cognitive development that reflects the entire cognitive structure by reactivating preserved schemas. Memory in this sense "is a form of primarily figurative organization that is based on the entire scheme of intelligence." If the perception is "interpretation through assimilation to sensorimotor schemes (action schemes) or conceptual and imaginary, pre-operative and operative schemes", thus “a certain actualization can be seen in the memory, which implies a preservation of the whole past or at least that which is usable from the past of the subject in the present actions or knowledge.” Inner images are “the inner extension of an accommodative imitation, [ ...] conveys the meaning. "

Piaget made a fundamental distinction between memory in the broader sense and memory in the narrower sense. A very broad concept arises from biology, in which “any preservation of the results of organic learning or an organic habit is called memory”. In a broader sense, memory is the “preservation of schemes”, which also includes the reproducibility of acquired thought and behavior patterns such as typing or riding a bicycle. “The operative structures of an adult, e.g. Numbers, spatial coordinates or concepts of time are not remembered, but are simply there and available when the opportunity arises. ”Put more narrowly, memory includes“ the maintenance of habits or learning results as well as the evocation of memory images or mere recognition phenomena. ”This is it Remembering objects or events from one's own past that played a role in one's own biography. Piaget subdivided remembering again into recognition, which is linked to perception, and calling oneself to memory (evocation), in which what is remembered is actively generated. Such memories are not necessarily tied to visual images. Since they are based on reconstruction, all forms of memory are fraught with errors. That is u. a. also because assimilation and accommodation are always an interpretive adaptation to the recognized reality.

Piaget highlighted the following points as essential features of memory:

  • Habit presupposes the recognition of certain indices. Habit refers to both the maintenance of sensorimotor schemes and the recognition of perceptual cues that are linked to a meaning through a scheme.
  • Memory includes the maintenance or updating of all other schemes of action, recognition or operation.
  • As preservation, habit refers to memory images (one-time), to repeatable processes (exercise) and also to logical classifications.

In his developmental psychological studies, Piaget found that the type and quality of memory change in different stages of development. In the case of row formation (experiment: 10 different rods arranged according to size), the reconstruction in children of the 1st stage after seven to eight months is significantly better than one week after the presentation of the pattern. The memory can thus become more precise in the course of time if new logical insights were gained in the course of development. In the example mentioned, there are hardly any errors in the reproduction of children in the third stage of development. Another example of memory is the drawing of a red wine carafe positioned at an angle. While the playback quality was still quite good after an hour in the repetition without a template, it got significantly worse after a week. Especially in children between the ages of 8 and 9, the repeated repetition after six months showed a clear improvement. The level of the liquid was now drawn much more often not at an angle, but horizontally. In Piaget's interpretation, the children drew less of the figurative that they had seen, but of what they understood when they saw. With a progress in the development of knowledge, the quality of memory also changed.

intelligence

Piaget used the concept of intelligence to describe the sum of the elements in his theory of the development of knowledge. Because of his naturalistic understanding, he viewed intelligence as a "special case of biological adaptation."

“The intelligence is adaptive behavior. In order to grasp their relationships to the phenomena of life in general, we must therefore specify the relationships that exist between the organism and its environment. "

From Piaget's point of view, intelligence is therefore not a fixed quantity that can be determined on the basis of a systematic analysis in an intelligence test. Rather, it is an ability to solve problems in interaction with the environment. Accordingly, intelligence changes in the course of human development. Piaget did not examine the question of measuring intelligence differences.

In addition to the content of thinking, which in the case of a nurse differs significantly from that of an auto mechanic, for Piaget above all structures and functions were decisive for the development of intelligence. In terms of structures, hereditary factors play a significant role, such as: B. the design of the organs of perception (audible frequencies, structure of the eye) or the structure of the nervous system . Automatic behavioral reactions such as closing the eyelid in sudden glaring light are also inherited. One of the inherited traits is the fact of physical maturation, which increases the ability to act e.g. B. when walking or grasping.

Hereditary structures are indeed the basis of intelligence, but the development of psychological structures (schemas) from experience in exchange with the environment, which leads to an organization that is constantly developing in the adaptation process, is decisive. B. the ever better functioning coordination between sight, hearing and touch in the development of grasping schemes.

The psychological processes that determine human behavior (assimilation, accommodation, equilibration, decentering) are a function of the human organism in order to orientate itself in the environment and to react to its influences. The effort to compensate for disturbances is in the foreground. Accordingly, Piaget also described intelligence as "the form of equilibrium to which all structures strive."

“Our view emphasizes above all the essential role of intelligence in the life of the spirit and the organism; As the most flexible and at the same time most permanent balance structure of behavior, intelligence is a system of living and active operations. It is the highest form of spiritual adaptation to the environment, the indispensable instrument of the connection between subject and world, as soon as this connection exceeds the immediate and instantaneous contacts and takes on a spatially and temporally extended and permanent character. "

Levels of knowledge development

“We call every psychgenetic and historical-critical research into the types of growth in knowledge a special genetic epistemology, as long as it is based on a reference system that is given by the existence of knowledge at the moment in question. In contrast, we speak of general genetic epistemology when the reference system itself is involved in the genetic or historical process that one wants to study. "

Special genetic epistemology

The developmental psychological examinations to which the children are subjected aim to acquire established knowledge from various specialist areas. That is, they always assume the current scientific representation of reality as a frame of reference and only examine the construction of this in children. Piaget describes such psychological investigations as special genetic epistemology, and epistemologically they belong to the category of adequation theories, since the representation, which is considered objective reality, forms the preformed limit of an approximation process.

"The cognitive processes appear [...] as the resultant of organic self-regulation, the main mechanisms of which they reflect, and as the most differentiated organs of this regulation of interaction with the outside world ."

General genetic epistemology

While the special genetic epistemology presupposes an objective reference system, it is also obvious that this system is itself a product of knowing. The fact that there is no knowledge outside of cognition must, however, take into account a general genetic epistemology; it is therefore incumbent on it to include the supposedly unchangeable reference system in the genetic-historical processes of cognition. So from the point of view of general genetic epistemology, in contrast to special genetic epistemology, there is no objective, unchangeable reality.

"However, a methodologically just as radical-relativistic epistemology as general genetic analysis finds itself forced to speak of object and subject, because these two poles of knowledge can be found in the most extreme idealistic or realistic positions [...]"

Since the growth of the entire store of knowledge is based on the progress of the individual sciences, the general genetic epistemology makes use of a generalization of the method of special genetic epistemology in order to emphasize the general laws of evolution of the growing total knowledge.

Of course, the results of this method also remain relative to the level of development of the findings. Although an extrapolation of the laws of evolution into the future is therefore ruled out, according to Piaget one can determine in retrospect the laws of evolution that are at work up to the present.

Circle of Knowledge

The dependence of a truth on the level of thought that results from this generalization of epistemology takes into account the circularity of every act of cognition. This consists in the fact that every new knowledge as well as every theory of knowledge can only be gained on the basis of previous knowledge:

"The psychological explanations sooner or later refer to those of biology, these in turn are based on those of physics and chemistry, the physical explanations are based on mathematics, and mathematics and logic can only appeal to the laws of the mind, which form the object of investigation in psychology. Moreover, one notices that this circular conclusion leads to the expansion of psychology [...] to include genetic epistemology: mathematics is actually not based on psychology as such. [...] Mathematics is based on a set of basic operations of which the naive consciousness only takes note, while they are systematically examined through critical reflection. "

Although the circle of knowing makes an absolute beginning of knowing impossible, it does not, according to Piaget, mean that knowing amounts to a circular reasoning. He imagines that the advance of knowledge will gradually be caught up with, as the findings of the different branches of knowledge increasingly form a self-supporting overall system:

"The more this circle [...] expands, the more the observed convergences in a growing logical context allow us to find certainty that the circle is not a circular argument."

structuralism

As an element of general epistemology, the concept of structure is central to Piaget's later work. For him, a structure has the fundamental properties of wholeness, transformation and self-regulation. What is special about the whole is that it has properties that are not contained in the properties of its elements. Wholes are not based on the addition of atomistic associations (empiricism). Conversely, one cannot deduce the properties of the elements from the properties of the whole (a priorism). Rather, the whole is determined by the relationships and laws of the interaction of its elements. Piaget sees structures as open systems that are constantly developing genetically. A structure is a snapshot that is about to transform itself into a new structure according to its inherent transformation rules. As a whole, a structure also has a certain degree of closure with a tendency towards self-preservation. Transformations do not lead to self-dissolution, but move within the limits of the system and preserve the system as such, even if this can mean the renewal and expansion of its elements.

It is important to Piaget to differentiate between structures and functions. Without transformations, structures would remain static. For dynamization, structures are given functions that are used for active control. In relation to its own specific epistemology, these are the functions of assimilation, accommodation and equilibration, through which the structures (schemes and combinations of schemes) are subjected to a change in a continuous process which, together with the tendency towards habit it contains, is also a mechanism for Contains conservation (self-regulation).

The structuralism , as it understood Piaget, is not a doctrine but a methodology with which one a set of heterogeneous facts integrate and can raise through the production of new relationships new questions. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of his view, Piaget discussed his concept of structures in the areas of mathematics ( Bourbaki ), logic ( Klein's group of four ), physics ( causality as a model assumption) or organisms ( homeostasis , embryogenesis in Waddington ). He critically dealt with structuralisms in linguistics ( Chomsky ), in semiotics ( Saussure and his pupil Strauss ) and finally with the philosophers Althusser (structuralization of Marxism) and Foucault , who he held to be a structuralism without structures.

Piaget's works

collected works at Klett-Cotta
  • 1: The awakening of intelligence in the child
  • 2: The structure of reality in the child
  • 3: The development of the number concept in children (with Alina Szeminska)
  • 4: The development of physical set concepts in children (with Bärbel Inhelder)
  • 5: imitation, play and dream
  • 6: The development of spatial thinking in children (with Bärbel Inhelder)
  • 7: The natural geometry of the child (with Bärbel Inhelder and Alina Szeminska)
  • 8: The development of knowledge. Volume I: Mathematical Thinking
  • 9: The development of knowledge. Volume II: The physical thinking
  • 10: The development of knowledge. Volume III: Biological Thinking. Psychological thinking. Sociological thinking
more titles
  • Biology and knowledge. About the relationship between organic regulations and cognitive processes. translated by Bärbel Erdmann. S. Fischer, Frankfurt 1974. (French biology et connaissance. Paris 1967)
  • Outline of genetic epistemology. translated by Fritz Kubli, introduction by Fritz Kubli. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1980. (French: L'Epistémologie génétique. Paris 1970)
  • Biological adaptation and psychology of intelligence. translated by Luc Bernard. 1st edition. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1975 (French Adaptation vitale et psychologie de l'intelligence. Paris 1974)
  • Introduction to genetic epistemology. translated by Friedhelm Herboth. 6th edition. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1996.
  • My theories of mental development. Edited by Reinhard Fatke. Belz, Weinheim 2003. (Kindler 1981)
  • Structuralism. translated by Lorenz Häflinger. Walter, Freiburg 1973. (French Le Strukturalisme , Paris 1968)
  • with Bärbel Inhelder: memory and intelligence. Walter, Freiburg 1974.

literature

Introductory Works
  • Hans G. Furth: intelligence and recognition. The basics of Piaget's genetic epistemology. trans. By Friedhelm Herboth, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1981, ISBN 3-518-07760-0 .
  • Thomas Kesselring: Development and Contradiction. A comparison between Piaget's genetic epistemology and Hegel's dialectic. 1st edition. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1981, ISBN 3-518-07598-5 .
  • Ingrid Scharlau: Jean Piaget for an introduction. 1st edition. Junius, Hamburg 1996, ISBN 3-88506-937-7 .
  • L. Steinberg, R. Meyer: Childhood. McGraw-Hill, New York 1995, ISBN 0-07-061234-X .
  • Ernst von Glasersfeld: Construction of Reality and the Concept of Objectivity. In: Heinz Gumin, Heinrich Meier (ed.): Introduction to Constructivism. Piper, Munich 1992, ISBN 3-492-11165-3 . (= Publications of the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Foundation, Vol. 5.)
Epistemological discourse
  • Eva-Marie Engels: Knowledge as Adaptation ?: a study on evolutionary epistemology. 1st edition. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1989, ISBN 3-518-58002-7 .
  • Ernst von Glasersfeld: Radical Constructivism: Ideas, Results, Problems. 1st edition. Frankfurt am Main 1998, ISBN 3-518-28926-8 .
  • Ingrid Scharlau: Epistemology as Science: Points of contention between Husserl, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty and Piaget. Fink, Munich 1998, ISBN 3-7705-3301-1 .
  • E. Zeil-Fahlbusch: Perspectivity and decentering. Philosophical reflections on the genetic epistemology of Jean Piaget. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1983, ISBN 3-88479-124-9 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Jean Piaget: Outline of the genetic epistemology. trans. by Fritz Kubli, introduction by Fritz Kubli. Stuttgart 1980, p. 26. (French: L'Epistémologie génétique, Paris, 1970)
  2. ^ Jean Piaget: Biology and Knowledge. About the relationship between organic regulations and cognitive processes. S. Fischer, Frankfurt 1974, p. 355.
  3. ^ Gabriele Neuhäuser: Jean Piaget's constructive realism. In: Reto Luzius Fetz, Benedikt Seidenfuß, Sebastian Ulrich (Ed.): Whitehead - Cassirer - Piaget. On the way to a new way of thinking. Alber, Munich 2010, pp. 134–166, here p. 135.
  4. ^ Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, pp. 18ff; Jean Piaget: Introduction to Genetic Epistemology. (1970) Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1973, p. 21.
  5. ^ Jean Piaget, Rolando García: Psychogenesis and the history of science. Translated into English by Helga Feider. New York 1989. (French: Psychogenèse et histoire des sciences. Paris 1983)
  6. ^ Ingrid Scharlau: Epistemology as Science: Points of contention between Husserl, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty and Piaget. Fink, Munich 1998, p. 28
  7. ↑ Jean Piaget: My Theory of Genetic Development. Beltz, Weinheim 2003, p. 126.
  8. ↑ Hans Aebli in: Hommage à Jean Piaget for his eightieth birthday. Stuttgart 1976, p. 11, given in: Ingrid Scharlau: Epistemology as Science: Points of contention between Husserl, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty and Piaget. Fink, Munich 1998, pp. 136-137.
  9. ^ Jean Piaget: Outline of the genetic epistemology. trans. by Fritz Kubli, introduction by Fritz Kubli. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1980, p. 28. (French: L'Epistémologie génétique, Paris, 1970)
  10. ^ Jean Piaget: Outline of the genetic epistemology. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1980, p. 33. Piaget took over the term 'adualism' from James Mark Baldwin , see Jean Piaget: My theory of genetic development . Beltz, Weinheim 2003, p. 44.
  11. ^ Jean Piaget: Outline of the genetic epistemology. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, p. 31 f.
  12. ^ Jean Piaget: Outline of the genetic epistemology. P. 132.
  13. ↑ Cf. Jean Piaget: Outline of genetic epistemology. P. 32.
  14. ^ Ingrid Scharlau: Epistemology as Science: Points of contention between Husserl, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty and Piaget. Fink, Munich 1998, p. 51.
  15. ^ A b c d Jean Piaget: Outline of genetic epistemology. P. 129.
  16. ↑ On the basis of a distinction made by Piaget in 1966, Furth suggests reproducing the French schéme with scheme and plan; the first denotes the result of the symbol function, the second the result of an operation. See Hans. G. Furth: intelligence and cognition. The basics of Piaget's genetic epistemology. trans. By Friedhelm Herboth, Frankfurt am Main, 1981, p. 151. Corresponding to most of the German texts, in particular “Biology and Knowledge” and deviating z. For example, from the translation “Introduction to genetic epistemology”, the term “schema” is used throughout this article because “plan” is purely cognitively based in German, while schema can also be the basis of reflex-like or instinctive actions. In particular, the concept of plan is inconsistent with that of habit, which is an essential element of Piaget's schema concept.
  17. ↑ a b Jean Piaget: demolition of genetic epistemology. trans. by Fritz Kubli, introduction by Fritz Kubli, Stuttgart, 1980 (French: L'Epistémologie génétique, Paris, 1970), p. 86.
  18. ^ Jean Piaget: Outline of the genetic epistemology. trans. by Fritz Kubli, introduction by Fritz Kubli, Stuttgart, 1980 (French: L'Epistémologie génétique, Paris, 1970), p. 85.
  19. ↑ Hans Aebli: Cognitive aspects of the theory of action. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2001, p. 48.
  20. ↑ Jean Piaget: The structure of reality in the child. (1937) Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1975, p. 349.
  21. ^ Gabriele Neuhäuser: Constructive Realism. Jean Piaget's naturalistic epistemology. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, pp. 70–71.
  22. ↑ Thomas Kesselring: Development and Contradiction. A comparison between Piaget's genetic epistemology and Hegel's dialectic. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1981, p. 87.
  23. ^ Jean Piaget, Bärbel Inhelder: Memory and Intelligence. Walter, Freiburg 1974, p. 32.
  24. ^ Ernst von Glasersfeld : Piaget's constructivist model: knowledge and learning. In: Gebhard Rusch, Siegfried J. Schmidt (eds.): Piaget and radical constructivism. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1994, pp. 16-42.
  25. ↑ Eve-Marie Engels: Knowledge as Adaptation? A study on evolutionary epistemology. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1989.
  26. ↑ Jean Piaget: My theory of mental development. ed. by Reinhard Fatke. Fischer, Frankfurt 1985, p. 26.
  27. ^ J. Piaget: Imitation, Play and Dream. The development of the symbolic function in the child. Stuttgart 1969 (French. La formation du symbole chez l'enfant. Imitation, jeu et reve - image et representation. Neuchatel and Paris, 1945) In: Thomas Kesselring: Development and contradiction. A comparison between Piaget's genetic epistemology and Hegel's dialectic. 1st edition. Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 161.
  28. ^ T. Kesselring: Development and contradiction. 1981, p. 158ff.
  29. ↑ Jean Piaget: My Theory of Genetic Development. Beltz, Weinheim 2003, p. 61.
  30. ^ T. Kesselring: Development and contradiction. 1981, p. 179ff.
  31. ^ T. Kesselring: Development and contradiction. 1981, pp. 130ff.
  32. ^ Jean Piaget: Outline of the genetic epistemology. Stuttgart 1980, p. 107.
  33. ^ Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 171.
  34. ^ Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 165.
  35. ^ Jean Piaget: Collected Works. Study edition. Introduction by Hans Aebli, Vol. 6, Stuttgart, 1991, p. 37.
  36. ^ Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli, Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 174.
  37. ^ Jean Piaget: Collected Works. Study edition. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 162.
  38. ^ Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 175.
  39. ^ A b c Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thought. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 178.
  40. ↑ Hans.G. Furth: intelligence and knowledge. The basics of Piaget's genetic epistemology. trans. By Friedhelm Herboth, Frankfurt am Main 1981.
  41. ^ Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 179.
  42. ^ Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, pp. 178f.
  43. ^ Jean Piaget: Imitation, Game and Dream. Freiburg 1971, p. 342.
  44. ↑ a b Hans. G. Furth: intelligence and cognition. The basics of Piaget's genetic epistemology. trans. By Friedhelm Herboth, Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 120.
  45. ^ J. Piaget: Biology and Knowledge. About the relationship between organic regulations and cognitive processes. transl., by Bärbel Erdmann. Frankfurt am Main 1974 p. 214f. (French biology et connaissance, Paris, 1967)
  46. ^ Thomas Kesselring: Piaget. 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 1999, p. 92.
  47. ^ Jean Piaget, Bärbel Inhelder: Memory and Intelligence. Walter, Freiburg 1974, p. 464.
  48. ^ Jean Piaget, Bärbel Inhelder: Memory and Intelligence. Walter, Freiburg 1974, p. 13.
  49. ^ Hans G. Furth: Intelligence and recognition. The basics of Piaget's genetic epistemology. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1981, p. 213.
  50. ^ Jean Piaget, Bärbel Inhelder: Memory and Intelligence. Walter, Freiburg 1974, p. 15.
  51. ^ Herbert P. Ginsburg, Sylvia Opper: Piaget's theory of intellectual development. 9th edition. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2004, p. 219.
  52. ↑ Hans.G. Furth: intelligence and knowledge. The basics of Piaget's genetic epistemology. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1981, pp. 212-213.
  53. ^ Jean Piaget, Bärbel Inhelder: Memory and Intelligence. Walter, Freiburg 1974, p. 15.
  54. ^ Jean Piaget, Bärbel Inhelder: Memory and Intelligence. Walter, Freiburg 1974, p. 17.
  55. ^ Herbert P. Ginsburg, Sylvia Opper: Piaget's theory of intellectual development. 9th edition. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2004, p. 219.
  56. ↑ illustrated by Hans G. Furth: Intelligence and recognition. The basics of Piaget's genetic epistemology. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1981, pp. 217-218; see similarly in Jean Piaget, Bärbel Inhelder: Memory and Intelligence. Walter, Freiburg 1974, pp. 368-373.
  57. ^ A b Jean Piaget: The awakening of intelligence in the child. (1959) 5th edition. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2003, p. 14.
  58. ^ Herbert P. Ginsburg, Sylvia Opper: Piaget's theory of intellectual development. 9th edition. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2004, p. 29.
  59. ^ Jean Piaget: Psychology of Intelligence. (1947) with an introduction by Hans Aebli. 10th edition. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2000, p. 9.
  60. ^ Jean Piaget: Psychology of Intelligence. (1947) with an introduction by Hans Aebli. 10th edition. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2000, pp. 9-10.
  61. ^ A b Jean Piaget: The development of knowledge I. Mathematical thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli, Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 50.
  62. ^ Jean Piaget: Biology and Knowledge. About the relationship between organic regulations and cognitive processes. S. Fischer, Frankfurt 1974, p. 27.
  63. ^ Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 51.
  64. ^ Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 45.
  65. ^ Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 47.
  66. ^ Jean Piaget: The Development of Knowledge I. Mathematical Thinking. (1950) Collected Works. Introduction by Hans Aebli. Vol. 8, Stuttgart 1991, p. 46.
  67. ^ Jean Piaget: Structuralism. Walter, Freiburg 1973, p. 8.
  68. ^ Jean Piaget: Structuralism. Walter, Freiburg 1973, p. 15.
  69. ^ Jean Piaget: Structuralism. Walter, Freiburg 1973, pp. 69-70.
  70. ^ Jean Piaget: Structuralism. Walter, Freiburg 1973, p. 137.
  71. ^ Jean Piaget: Structuralism. Walter, Freiburg 1973, p. 123.