Consensus theory of truth

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The consensus theory of truth (also consensus theory or discourse theory ) is the epistemological view that the truth of an assertion depends on whether an unconstrained general consensus can be established on this assertion solely through arguments .

Intellectual history background

The consensus theory of truth is to be understood as an answer to positivism . For the positivists, the modern natural sciences are the standard of all science. The natural sciences rely solely on observation and logic . In the natural sciences, truth is claimed for only two kinds of sentences. On the one hand for empirical propositions, i.e. propositions about the nature of reality such as B. “Goethe died in 1832.” or “Smoking increases the risk of lung cancer.” On the other hand, they claim truth for analytical sentences, that is, sentences that are true by definition , such as “Mold are white.” Or “All bachelors are unmarried. ". Logical conclusions based on empirically proven propositional logic are also accepted by positivists.

All other sentences are not truthful in the positivistic sense. Value judgments and ethical norms are interpreted as expressions of feelings.

Such an epistemological position poses problems for scientific disciplines that deal with evaluative and / or normative questions. The consensus theory of truth wants to overcome this “ scientistic ” narrowing of the concept of truth, without falling behind the criticism of the positivists of the logically inadmissible confusion of descriptive and evaluative sentences (→ Hume's law , → naturalistic fallacy ).

“In contrast, metaphysical theories of truth proceed too extensive in that they declare practical questions to be truthful in the same way as theoretical ones […]; and positivistic theories of truth behave too restrictively in that they deny the truthfulness of practical questions at all. "

- Jürgen Habermas : Truth Theories, 1973, p. 230.

The new foundation

Consensus theorists such as Jürgen Habermas , Karl-Otto Apel or Paul Lorenzen start with the concept of truth. You ask: what do we actually mean by the word “true”? What do we do when we say that a theory or a proposition is true? Which rules do we always have to assume to be valid when we argue and argue about the truth? They try to re-establish the concept of truth by reflecting on what the argumentative search for truth entails.

Your answer to these questions is pointed: When we designate a sentence as "true", then we not only affirm that sentence ( redundancy theory of truth ), then we not only say that it is as this sentence says ( semantic theory of the Truth ), but then we also raise an intersubjective validity claim for this sentence (“This sentence applies to everyone.”) And an intertemporal validity claim (“This sentence applies permanently.”): Anyone who claims a sentence to be true raises one for this claim Entitlement to permanent general validity.

A claim to truth differs from a claim to obedience in thinking in that the claim to truth can generally be redeemed through comprehensible arguments .

Capacity for consensus instead of consensus

The ability to consensus as a criterion for the truth of an assertion does not mean, however, that the truth of this assertion depends on whether there is actually a consensus (unanimous agreement) with regard to the assertion . One cannot vote on the truth of an assertion, and in theory one individual can be right against all others. However, one can claim truth and general validity for an assertion to the extent that one has generally comprehensible, i.e. understandable and acceptable arguments to justify this assertion.

“If we were to understand 'consensus' as any coincidental agreement, it obviously could not serve as a truth criterion [...]. That is why 'discursive redemption' is a normative term: the agreement that we can reach in discourses is solely a well- founded consensus . "

- Jürgen Habermas : Truth Theories, 1973, p. 239.

Conclusion

With regard to the position of consensus theory in relation to other theories of truth , the following points should be noted:

  1. According to the consensus theory, not only logical and empirical statements are capable of truth, but all kinds of assertions with which a claim to validity is made (the “truth” of a normative assertion is called correctness ).
  2. The consensus theory of truth does not replace the other theories of truth, but builds on them historically. Logically it precedes these: If one thinks further about the consensus theory, one arrives at the question of how an argumentative consensus can be established with the various types of assertions. The correspondence theory and the coherence theory must be taken into account. With regard to claims about the actual nature of the world, the answer can already be found largely in the methodology of empirical sciences: Consensus-building with regard to empirical questions is the intersubjectively consistent observation or perception.
  3. The consensus theory of truth does not replace traditional ethical theories either. In relation to normative assertions (e.g. moral judgments and ethical norms), if one asks how one can argue about these in order to reach a consensus, then the reflection leads to the non-evasive rules of argumentation or the conditions of a ideal communication does not yet lead to the ethical answers sought, even if the consensus theorists sometimes suggest this.

See also

literature

  • Karl-Otto Apel: Transformation of Philosophy . 2 vols., Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1973:
    vol. 1: Sprachanalytik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik . ISBN 3-518-07764-3 .
    Vol. 2: The a priori of the communication community . ISBN 3-518-07765-1 .
  • Karl-Otto Apel: Discourse and Responsibility. The problem of the transition to post-conventional morality . 1st edition, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1988, ISBN 3-518-57924-X .
  • Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, ISBN 3-7885-0037-9 , pp. 211-265, also printed in: Jürgen Habermas: preliminary studies and supplements to the theory of communicative action . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1984, pp. 127-183.
  • Jürgen Habermas: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1983, ISBN 3-518-28022-8 .