Constabulation

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Constability is the adoption by the armed forces of operational and behavioral rules as well as of procedures that were previously peculiar to the police, as well as their increased use for police-like tasks. The term is used in the entire German-speaking area.

overview

The change in operational principles and procedures of the armed forces, known as constabulation, began after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact , but was only named later. It encompasses the majority of all armed forces, regardless of armed forces, branches of service, ranks or functions.

consequences

The main consequences of constabulation are the increased training, practice and implementation of police-like measures and procedures (much more frequently than before in urban areas) that go beyond self-protection / force protection - also instead of previous procedures - for example in the areas

  • Personnel and vehicle control, placement and handling of people
  • Patrol and patrol service
  • Picking up or arresting people
  • Search houses
  • Transport security and escort
  • Riot control including evacuation of places

In addition, the armed forces' ability to work with other organizations has been increased.

The consequences also include changes in the organization, material equipment and personnel selection. The structure of military forces, which are (also) intended or can be used for police-like measures, is usually roughly based on the structure of military units, for example fighter units (mostly with armored transport vehicles), armored infantry units (with armored combat vehicles) and reconnaissance units. The use of female soldiers to fulfill the order is sometimes indispensable, for example for body searches of local women.

The units deployed for this purpose - such as those of the Austrian Armed Forces  - have often not grown organically, but are only formed into action units a few months before deployment. It is quite common for artillerymen or pioneers (as hunters) to also do their duty in such a company abroad. Therefore, all soldiers must have a basic command of police-like procedures. In general, the following applies: During training and (national and multinational) exercises, the soldiers now learn some basic police-like procedures, even if not always under all aspects of a possible application.

Constabilization only affects the armed forces system . In the near future the degree of constabulation (the proportion of soldiers who - regardless of other skills - are able to carry out police-like measures) of the available troops will be almost 100 percent. Regardless of this, however, due to the reduction in the number of armed forces, fewer (European) soldiers will be available for police-like tasks than before. As an extension of one's own abilities and as a response to new situations , constabulation keeps the state or an alliance able to act in a changed environment. In addition, it can help to contain the violence of various actors at home and abroad and, on a case-by-case basis, to prevent it.

Definition of terms

Constabilization basically means neither the replacement nor the reinforcement of the police by soldiers. Konstabulation is also not a synonym for Verpolizeilichung, because Verpolizeilichung (before no police, afterwards already) suggests that the armed forces are on the way to become a second police force, or that the intention is to become a common security apparatus with the police to merge with exclusively police tasks. That may be the aim of some politicians, but it does not correspond to the intention of constabulation. In general, when the armed forces are constrained (often in addition to their previous tasks), “the application and behavioral rules that were previously more specific to the police are adopted. such as B.

  • Minimizing the use of force,
  • Protection and shield instead of disempowering the enemy (as a target),
  • Orientation not towards complete victory, but towards a constellation with which one can live, so to speak, and which gives politics new opportunities "

This means that the armed forces continue to carry out military tasks, only different or different than before.

Origin of the term

The term constabulation probably originated after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact . The term Konstabulisierung is used in the entire German-speaking area. The first use of the term is unclear. In a technical article from 2001, Hessel traces the word back to "constabulary" (British police, police force), circumscribing it as verpolizeilichung, but at the same time points out that this is "simplifying".

According to Meyer, the word constable is derived from the late Latin comes stabuli (about head stable master). The term Konstabler has a long military history and was used in France (Connétable de France, Supreme Kronfeldherr), in Portugal (Condestável de Portugal) and also in the German-speaking area during the Turkish period. Among other things, it says in the song Prinz Eugen, the noble knight "... you constables on the hill play to this dancing with Kartaunen (cannons; note) big and small ..." (the constables apparently meant the guild of artillerymen, who were not necessarily soldiers at the time). In England and Scotland, the constable was a high official of the crown from the 12th to the 16th centuries with predominantly military functions. The commanders of important castles were also called constables.

The "United States Zone Constabulary" (security force in the US zone of occupation in Germany after the Second World War ) was created from six tank artillery battalions. Today the constable is a police officer (with civil servant status) in the UK and a local public order official (with fewer powers than uniformed police officers) in the US. To translate constable / Konstabler with policeman and constable with verpolizeilichung is semantically imprecise.

Causes of Constabilization

Constability is a product of several factors . The general factors include above all

  • the expansion of peace operations after 1990,
  • the change in the image of war towards urban warfare,
  • the "denationalization" of wars and the change in the image of war towards asymmetrical warfare ,
  • the counter-terrorism measures especially after September 11, 2001 as well
  • the "globalization" of organized crime.

Country-specific factors are also “traditional” domestic tasks of the armed forces, such as B. the k. u. k. Army (among other things as a "regulatory power" in a multi-ethnic state), the Federal Army of the First Republic and the Austrian B-Gendarmerie as well as the change in the type and scope of the assistance services of the Austrian Federal Army after 1990. A notable direct influence of the colonial era on constabulization is present mainly present in countries that were constantly colonial powers in the last few centuries, such as England and France, as well as in some former colonies that have their armed forces z. B. organized on the English model. The country-specific factors are not dealt with in detail in this chapter because they are not generally applicable.

Factor expansion of peace operations

Before the Warsaw Pact collapsed, peace operations were carried out primarily within the framework of the United Nations. They were carried out primarily in the form of keeping conflicting parties apart, who agreed in principle, and much less often in the form of a "power of order" with e.g. T. police-like tasks and procedures.

From 1990 the tasks of peacekeeping (including UN peacekeeping) have changed and expanded significantly. Examples of this are the use of

  • IFOR (Peace Implementation Force),
  • KFOR (Kosovo International Security Force),
  • SFOR (Stabilization Force Bosnia and Herzegovina),
  • EUFOR (European Force) and
  • ISAF (International Security Assistance Force).

For the implementation of police-like measures on site, it is immaterial whether a peace operation is carried out under UN, NATO (PfP) or EU leadership.

When carrying out police-like measures in peace operations, z. In southern Kosovo, for example, the successes achieved by soldiers (of the Austrian Armed Forces) in the high mountains and thus in an area in which "normal" police officers can hardly act were even spectacular: In the so-called "bootleg" (southern tip of Kosovo), in the In the course of a single action against arms smugglers u. a. 6,400 rounds of machine gun ammunition, 72 launcher grenades, numerous night vision and night sights, sniper optics, binoculars and mobile phones were seized. The soldiers deployed lived in tents - with daily temperature fluctuations of up to 30 ° C - and had to be self-sufficient for about a week.

Operations like this already clearly show the limits of other organizations in carrying out such police-like measures, as well as the difference between constabulating armed forces and ordinary police service.

At SFOR (Stabilization Force to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement on the basis of UN Resolution 1088 from 1996) there were e.g. B. Multinational Specialized Units (MSU), which clearly performed police tasks, e.g. B. "Operations in demonstrations and riots to restore security and order in close cooperation with Bosnian and Herzegovinian police forces" and "Participation in the enforcement of the law".

Hauser becomes even clearer: “The army soldiers were part of an MSU (Multinational Specialized Unit) - together with Slovenian and Italian army personnel. The tasks of the MSU were:

  • Carrying out executive tasks of the police (including criminal investigations) to support or represent the local police in order to restore security and public order and to give the population a feeling of security until responsibility is transferred to the civil authorities.
  • Assisting and supervising the local police in their reconstruction and reorganization in accordance with international democratic police standards; ...

and continues "... Therefore the soldiers of the armed forces have the following tasks: patrols, gathering information, deployments to maintain public order, monitoring and support of public order, enforcement of law, ..."

Also EUFOR (to prevent European Force Operation "Althea" to stabilize the military aspects of the Peace Agreement of Paris as a permanent military presence to a renewed threat to peace in Kosovo) "Althea" has MSU-like Integrated Police Units (IPU). In addition, the tasks of the armed forces soldiers in Kosovo also include other monitoring and control tasks, the implementation of escorts and the prevention of smuggling and illegal border crossings.

The police-like measures in action also include house searches. In 2002, Öttl describes in detail the experiences made by the Austrian soldiers deployed in Kosovo under “Lessons Learned” . One goal was u. a. "Arresting criminals".

Schrimpf concludes e.g. B. “that the UN needs means and opportunities to protect civilians who are not involved, especially in internal conflicts”. As the key points of the new peacekeeping , he sees it as essential “to restore law and order. The focus is on the support and deployment of local police forces "and" if trust has dwindled due to the previous conflict, international police forces have to take over their tasks temporarily ". Schrimpf expressly mentions the support of civilian police forces as a possible assignment to the troops in the course of peacekeeping measures.

The line between purely military and police-like tasks becomes blurred. Although z. For example, during the EU mission "Artemis" (Congo, 2003), military procedures were in the foreground, but police-like tasks had to be carried out during this mission - even by the special forces deployed. a. Patrol service and anti-weapon storage company.

Constabilization in the course of such peace operations also affects the armed forces of smaller states, e.g. B. the Austrian Armed Forces. So the infantry parts of AUCON / ISAF (Austrian Contingent / International Security Assistance Force) had in 2005 u. a. to secure the airports in Kunduz and Feyzabad as well as transports and temporary bases outside of Camp Kunduz and to ensure freedom of movement along the main lines of movement.

According to Hofmeister, the development of the Austrian Armed Forces towards constabulization - u. a. With regard to the fulfillment of tasks in peacemaking, multinational operations - discussed as follows: The more intensive the range of operations, the more independently - according to Hofmeister - armed forces would have to be able to perform regulatory tasks in addition to purely military tasks.

Stix also literally uses the term “regulatory power” in connection with missions abroad in Europe.

Malat sees “operations to restore law and order” in general as part of peace enforcement and emphasizes the use of “non-lethal force” in the course of these operations and the need to “support local authorities in maintaining law and order ".

All of this also required knowledge of security procedures. Peace operations of any kind seem hardly possible without police-like measures, which are primarily to be carried out by the armed forces. Regardless of this, soldiers must continue to have full command of the types of combat “attack”, “defense” etc. in terms of training and equipment, even in peace operations (e.g. in peace enforcement or in the course of an escalation).

Urban warfare factor

According to Global Security, “it is estimated that by the year 2010 seventy-five percent of the world's population will live in urban areas. Urban areas are expected to be the future battlefield and combat in urban areas cannot be avoided. " a. also Pesendorfer: "The steadily growing number of the world population and the equally growing importance of cities as economic centers increase the likelihood of deployment in urban areas in future conflicts."

This means an increase in the status of the fight in built-up areas, u. a. also in the course of training. The techniques for entering houses, storming houses and searching are quite similar to police techniques. When fighting in cities (urban warfare) - especially in large cities - a comprehensive horizontal evacuation of the civilian population is hardly possible. Vertical evacuation of the urban population (keyword: shelters) also has narrow limits, even in relatively affluent countries like Austria. Only a fraction of the Viennese population finds z. B. space in the existing shelters, and these are by mass no "air blast protective structures". Accordingly, they offer little protection against artillery fire, bombs and grenade explosions - even if they are not hit directly.

Fighting in cities can also occur relatively surprisingly, especially in internal conflicts. The soldiers have to carry out their assignments - completely different from the Battle of Verdun or the tank battle near Kursk  - in the midst of civil society and are thus in the areas they control, also from an international law perspective. a. according to the Hague Land Warfare Regulations  - to a power of order, regardless of whether they want it or not. They have to do their part on site “... to restore and maintain public order and public life as far as possible” (Hague Land Warfare Regulations, point 43). This also includes police duties in the broadest sense. The more civilians there are in the combat zone, the more important these tasks become.

In urban warfare in particular, however, it is often not possible for the deployed soldiers to differentiate between uninvolved civilians and (uniformed or non-uniformed) opponents - for example, when searching or storming a building from which a shot was made. In relation to the civilians who are not involved, the soldiers - relevant to their behavior - are the power of order, in relation to their opponents they are de facto a war party. Switching between these two functions often has to be done within seconds.

The soldiers must therefore be able (= trained) to perform both functions practically at the same time or to switch from one function to the other. The soldiers deployed to fight in urban regions must have at least a basic command of some police procedures. But not only the latter, because even an apparently quiet peace operation can tip over towards “urban warfare” without warning - at least locally. The March unrest in Kosovo in 2004 offered a foretaste of this.

That is why the types of combat “attack”, “defense” etc. are still indispensable in “Urban Warfare”. For the reasons given above, they are penetrated by police-like measures , but not replaced !

Factor “denationalization” of wars, asymmetrical warfare

Of the approx. 200 wars and armed conflicts between 1945 and 2000, fewer than a fifth were interstate wars in which armed forces from (at least) two countries faced each other. Two thirds, on the other hand, were internal wars against regime, autonomy, secession or decolonization. The typical war of the last decades was therefore the domestic war and not (anymore) the interstate war. The asymmetrical warfare was about the norm rather than the exception. Pleiner shares this view of the change in the security environment.

Creveld uses the term low intensity conflict for this and sees this form as new wars. Gantzl, on the other hand, does not see this type of conflict as new, but confirms the trend towards domestic war and speaks to its actors and others. a. of "militiamen willing to kill". Jung concludes u. a. from this to the possibilities “that

  • the Low Intensity War will replace the interstate war in the future,
  • technological progress makes interstate wars increasingly unlikely and
  • the most powerful and modern armed forces in particular become largely irrelevant to the new forms and types of conflict and could fail in a low intensity war. "

Pesendorfer argued very similarly years earlier, when he responded to previous "painful failures" of conventionally operating conventional armed forces against guerrilla organizations and the like. Ä. (e.g. the fight of the Soviet armed forces against the Mujahideen in Afghanistan) and under the tag "you cannot stop paramilitary murder with airplanes" warns against relying on troop strength and high technology in the future.

The soldiers' opponents are no longer at least rudimentary (in compliance with international humanitarian law, in which they are demonstrably trained), but - according to Mader - "psychopathic civil warriors". These fighters are - also in Europe - "feelings of guilt and moral doubts obviously completely alien", they set "without the slightest feeling of remorse (most brutal) acts of violence" and they are at least partly " Machiavellists " (unrestrained violent people who attack themselves through a special measure Differentiate intelligence from others and benefit from unscrupulousness). Others act according to Carlos Marighella's "Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla". or they are "human bombs". In this way, unlike the combatants in the sense of international martial law (a soldier does not render himself liable to prosecution by participating in combat operations), they are criminal offenses and are therefore criminals.

Another important factor, which is also related to police-like measures by armed forces, is the legal status of the prisoners made or to be made in such conflicts (are now "prisoners of war", "arrested", "illegal combatants", "terrorists" or what else?). For the classic prisoners of war - if the opponent was treated to some extent in accordance with international martial law - the war was generally "over" and the mortal danger ended . In a relatively safe camp, the prisoners awaited the end of the war and thus their return home. They hardly felt the need to kill their guards to return to war at the risk of their lives. For captured “terror suspects” or “criminals”, however, capture is only the beginning of the main risk (criminal trial, then life imprisonment or, in extreme cases, even execution), as they are not legally prisoners of war, but rather criminals - and they are guarded ultimately also a police measure.

All of this also has an impact on the role model and self-image of the military. According to Jung, the wars are, as it were, "denationalized" and the status of non-state actors increases. The state has thus "lost its monopoly on war". The irregular actors are often in the midst of a (relatively) indifferent civilian population and behave like normal civilians between their actions. (One example of this were the “weekend warriors” in the Yugoslav wars . Numerous “guest workers” worked in the host country during the week and drove to their homeland on the weekends from Germany and Austria to perform military or paramilitary tasks.) Irregular actors can by simply not losing, for example against an occupying power, “score”. The soldier, on the other hand, has lost if he does not win relatively quickly, i.e. if he does not make the opponent ineffective.

However, if the opponent is in civilian clothes in the midst of the civilian population and the soldier is to continue fighting him, the use of security police procedures is imperative - and by no means only in cities.

Even low intensity conflicts are therefore still indispensable for the types of combat “attack”, “defense”, etc., although smaller groups than before are usually used, also against irregular forces in the middle of a civilian environment. For this reason and for the reasons given above, the types of combat are also penetrated by police-like measures , but not replaced !

Counter-terrorism factor

According to Schönbohm, there was a “fundamental change in strategy” in the areas of international terrorism in the 1990s, the consequence of which was “that the fight against terrorism has transformed itself from an actual police task into a challenge for the secret services and the military”. In addition, in the fight against terrorists - similar to asymmetrical warfare - the line between fighters and non-fighters is blurred. The unresolved key question “What is the legal status of the imprisoned Taliban?” Was one of the causes of the Guantanamo problem.

According to the chairman of the (Austrian) Armed Forces Reform Commission, domestic and foreign tasks of the Austrian Armed Forces are equal and of equal value. Domestically, these are guaranteeing state sovereignty and providing assistance at the request of civil authorities, be it to provide assistance in the event of natural or man-made disasters or the ability to prevent terrorist attacks.

The terrorist threat was recognized and described. a. already about 20 years earlier in the Austrian National Defense Plan (1985), as well as the networking of terror with the “denationalization” of conflicts: “… Political power goals are not only pursued through the use of military and economic means, but also through subversion and terror. In the case of the last two means of power, however, it is not always easy to distinguish between political and criminal motives. ”In this national defense plan, etc. a. "Guard companies" of the armed forces "to strengthen the executive" v. a. in the course of property protection.

In 1996, Stix wrote “... the military use at the interface to international terrorism will increase; regardless of whether it is guarding the Paris subway against bombers or, for example, when searching for war criminals in Bosnia by IFOR troops. "

The fact that the constraining of armed forces in German-speaking countries is not necessary to guarantee internal security because the executive is able to guarantee this may well be true of the present. However, this can change suddenly due to an unpredictable escalation of the situation. (Keywords: the youth riots in Paris in 2006 with hundreds of burning cars per night as well as the cartoon controversy in 2006 with radicalized demonstrations paired with attacks against Western embassies. Once the police's “security card” has been “played out” in the course of such events, there is no longer any other, simultaneous threat manageable.)

The fight against organized crime

In military operations against organized crime , e.g. In the areas of drug production and transport, human smuggling, piracy and illegal arms trade / proliferation (armaments) , for example , it is not primarily about fighting the leaders (fighting the white-collar men is still a matter for the police), but rather those who carry them out. The latter (unlike earlier robber or gangster gangs) are often better equipped than the local security forces (transport helicopters for drugs, guided weapons and camouflage means to protect the cultivation areas, high-tech electronics for tugs, armed high-speed offshore boats for pirate attacks ). Due to the increased mobility, the criminal actors act across borders and often in areas in which local forces are beneficiaries (e.g. in the case of illegal arms trade / proliferation ), “record” (e.g. financially), “look the other way” (e.g. because otherwise they would have to take action against groups of people close to them) or are unable to take adequate countermeasures. In addition, there are - especially in the area of ​​drug production and drug wholesale distribution - networks in the area of ​​international terror and the “denationalization” of war. It is therefore quite possible that a local "warlord" and master of a private army is also a "drug lord" (among other things to finance this).

Military operations against organized crime are carried out as support for the police at home (e.g. against people smugglers) or under national command as a kind of substitute undertaking abroad because local forces are overwhelmed or unwilling to do so (this was, among other things, the Israeli reason for combating terrorism on the Palestinian basis Area by regular Israeli armed forces), but also as part of an international task force such as the maritime security / fight against pirates by the German Navy in the Horn of Africa. A good knowledge of police-like measures is also essential.

Development trend of constabulation

According to Cesare Marchetti , the developments in the factors of constabulation can also be visualized as growth curves. If their current course is represented over a common time axis, the curves of the factors urban warfare and the “denationalization” of wars, asymmetrical warfare and the fight against terrorism run almost parallel and are currently in an increase phase.

The individual factors additively influence the course of constraining. Because not a single curve points downwards, but several upwards, further progress in stabilization can be expected in the near future. In terms of size, however, this progress only has an impact within the “armed forces system” . Because even if the degree of constancy of the armed forces is 100 percent, the number always remains within the armed forces system. If the development of the armed forces is also represented as a growth curve, it is currently pointing downwards (in almost all of Europe). The armed forces are constantly being reduced and the military budgets (measured in terms of real value or purchasing power) are also falling. Many soldiers from former army units (territorial militia, guard companies ...) who can be deployed for "police-like measures" (property protection etc.) after mobilization are therefore no longer available. Based on the presence stand, z. B. in Austria the usage phase of the recruits is also reduced. This reduced the number of soldiers available at any given point in time. Despite the higher degree of constancy, this means fewer people available for police-like measures (no matter where) than before. Another deployment of soldiers in the previous number for police-like measures (no matter where) is therefore at the expense of other capabilities of the armed forces .

If there was no constability or if it were too small, states would not be able to resort to armed forces capable of police-like measures, or only to a limited extent. This would have to be done by someone else, e.g. B. a private security and military company ( Private Military Company , "mercenary company", ...). Ultimately, however, this would be synonymous with giving up the state monopoly on the use of force.

The main danger in constabulation

The main risk is not to pursue constabulization as an extension of military possibilities, but rather as a replacement or as a general replacement for previous military tasks and procedures. Here is an example from another area: In the area of ​​the fire brigade , technical operations (e.g. freeing injured persons from car wrecks) have significantly overtaken extinguishing operations in terms of numbers. The seemingly logical conclusion from this is to redesign the fire brigade in general in the direction of technical operations based on economic considerations and to leave it only a residual extinguishing capacity. But that is a fallacy! Because how often it burns - whether ten times a month or only once in ten months - does not change anything in terms of the training courses, team strengths and equipment required for fire fighting. These are - apart from synergy effects - independent of other fire service tasks. The fire brigade must be able to cope with several tasks - regardless of their frequency and their current probability.

Applied to the armed forces, this means: If, due to the changed threat profile, (more) security police tasks - at home and abroad - are required, this must be done. However, the forces “constrained” in this way must remain able to continue to fulfill their other core tasks, even if these become less likely. At the very least, their ability to grow - including their know-how - must be retained. The soldiers must therefore be able to handle plexiglass shields and handcuffs as well as anti-aircraft weapons and armored combat vehicles. They too must be able to cope with several tasks - regardless of their frequency and their current probability. It is therefore not a matter of exchanging “anti-aircraft weapons for Plexiglas shields” - even if some strive for this for financial or ideological reasons or to satisfy current political needs - but rather their optional use. As early as 2001, Hessel feared - because combat missions were taking a back seat - correspondingly "the political attitude according to which cheap armed forces appear sufficient as auxiliary and protection forces because" the enemy has apparently been lost "".

If you start from target cost management and ask the key question “What may the product cost”, it is quite possible that the “customer taxpayer” is not prepared to raise the necessary funds for foreign assignments. Because of this price pressure there is a risk that z. For example, funds for foreign assignments are deducted from other core tasks or a “waiver plan” is carried out: Only what is trained, purchased and carried out is what is, as it were, “daily needs” and what is directly required by politics. What is necessary in the long term is avoided - regardless of the consequences. Even within the armed forces, there is a risk that uncomfortable but long-term indispensable core tasks (keywords: defense, security, disaster relief) will be pushed aside or neglected (e.g. in training).

Reduced to a catchphrase, the main risk is therefore “constabulization instead of combat suitability” or “constabulized is what remains ” (freely based on the statement of the victorious powers of the First World War : “Austria is what remains!”) - de facto one Police rest of the army.

Chances of constability

Constabilization can enable the armed forces to continue to provide reliable protection and help in the future where others can no longer do so, if one sees constabilization as a necessary response to “new situations”, such as B. Stix predicted as early as 1996 for Austria “... everything Austrian soldiers had to be able to do up to now, they must also be able to do in the future! The soldier's classic skills such as security, attack, defense, reconnaissance, etc. must be retained in full (regardless of the adaptation to new devices and procedures). In addition, new situations - such as international deployments, ambiguous legal situations, multilingualism, border security, new dimensions of terrorism, etc. - require additional training and dissemination - ideally and materially ... ”From a self-image point of view, the armed forces are (still) - according to Hessel -“ the last tool to deal with crises of all kinds - internally as well as externally ”. According to Micewski, it is about "an expansion of previous traditional 'primary functions' ..." and the "... assumption of so-called 'secondary functions' which generally means all areas of activity that have nothing to do with direct defense or military alliance obligations ...".

If the ability of the armed forces to be able to carry out police-like measures in general (goal of constability) is added to the conventional capabilities such as attack capability, defense capability, the ability to secure areas, etc., this expands the capabilities of the armed forces considerably. The ability to carry out police-like measures makes the armed forces more versatile, more efficient, more independent, more interoperable and more flexible because their training now also covers trends and developments in the threat image that were previously neglected or not necessary. In this case, the armed forces would improve the security of the country and - in the course of foreign missions - also the security of Europe.

The objection that reinforced police units could also do that is ineffective. Because already during use (no matter where) against

  • Subcultures prepared and capable of violence in several places at the same time,
  • dissatisfied, agitated religious and ethnic minorities (local majorities!) in the order of magnitude of a multiple of the police force available,
  • thousands of trained suicide bombers - including those supported by states,
  • "Spontaneous demonstrations", arson (against churches, synagogues, mosques, courts, town halls, company headquarters, cars, ...) or "lynch mobs", which - organized by agitators (using mobile phones) - are constantly taking effect in different places,
  • self-protection organizations that suddenly emerge as a result of any incidents (even if they are just "Molotov cocktail or baseball bat militias")

The limits of the police possibilities soon become apparent - already numerically. If the police fail to pacify even a single trouble spot, this spurs other "warriors" on. The politicians know that, but so do the agitators. The latter only need to threaten with such measures, and the state has to give in or it faces chaotic conditions. War, massive foreign interests or foreign interests (not the subject of this entry) are not even rudimentarily mentioned. A preventive inflation of the police units to the required size (all professional police!) Would cost just as much as a real army, but could not take on their other tasks (defense, protective tasks, foreign tasks). The same applies after the armed forces have been police-controlled.

But if there are forces in sufficient numbers and these can also be used for police similar tasks (no matter where), then begin their possibilities to enforce the law and protect the democracy about where the police can end . The potential civil warrior / agitator knows that his "troops" will lose quickly against organized, relatively strong military units that can handle police-like tasks (avoidance of violence against bystanders, house searches, squads, ...). That is why he may refrain from violent acts - if only out of self-interest. This means that sufficiently strong, constrained armed forces have a high deterrent effect . However, unlike in the past, they do not only keep state armed forces away from a territory , but also non-state actors from acts of violence in a territory .

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ after Armed Forces and International Security - Global Trends and Issues and after Heinrich Schneider's lecture on the occasion of the presentation of this book on March 4, 2004 at the National Defense Academy in Vienna.
  2. ↑ Friedrich Hessel: The phenomenon of "war" in today's time . In: Troop service issue 2/2001, p. 109.
  3. ↑ MEYER's encyclopaedic lexicon in 25 volumes, Volume 5: Bud – Con. Bibliographisches Institut, Mannheim 1981, p. 865.
  4. ^ Peter Blume: Tube artillery of the US ARMY in Germany 1945-2005 . Unitec Medienvertrieb, Stengelheim 2005, p. 1 f.
  5. ↑ Jörg Rodewald, Christian Wolf: Border surveillance in the high mountains of southern Kosovo . In: Truppendienst , 1/2002, page 57ff and Michael Lasser: Dienst im “Bootleg”. Operational experience in alpine terrain . In: Truppendienst , 3/2003 page 254ff but also Volkmar Ertl: At Ferne Grenzen. Spittaler Gebirgsjäger in Kosovo's mountains . In: Truppendienst , 2/2006 p. 156 ff.
  6. ↑ quoted from Michael Pesendorfer: IFOR - SFOR - EUFOR . In: Troop service , issue 2/2005, p. 152.
  7. ^ Günther Hauser: Austria's security policy between neutrality and sovereignty (II). In: Troop service , issue 3/2005, p. 213.
  8. ^ Christian Platzer: Tactics in Kosovo . In: Truppendienst , issue 2/2005, p. 156 ff.
  9. ↑ Markus Öttl: House search, "Lessons Learned" from the deployment in Kosovo, Parts I and II. In: Truppendienst , issue 3/2002, page 255 ff and issue 4/2002, page 340 ff.
  10. ↑ Gerd Schrimpf: UN Peacekeeping - The new challenges . In: Truppendienst , issue 4/2005, p. 346 ff.
  11. ↑ Kurt Radner: "Artemis" - the EU mission in the Congo . In: Troop service , issue 1/2004, p. 20 ff.
  12. ↑ Günter Rudderstaller: The Austrian Armed Forces in Afghanistan . In: Truppendienst , issue 4/2005, p. 354 ff.
  13. ↑ Brigadier Klemens Hofmeister, at that time head of the department for overall military planning in the Ministry of Defense on the occasion of an expert conference "Rethinking Internal Security - Consequences of September 11" in Vienna on September 15, 2003; quoted in Public Safety - The Interior Ministry Magazine , No. 3–4 / 2004.
  14. ↑ a b Rüdiger Stix: You don't have to be a prophet… . In: Troop Service Special 1/1996, p. 12.
  15. ↑ Horst Malat: Peace Enforcement - peace enforcement . In: Truppendienst , issue 4/2002, p. 321 ff.
  16. ↑ globalsecurity.org as of March 28, 2006; mout stands for Military Operations on Urban Terrain.
  17. ^ A b Michael Pesendorfer: The battlefield of tomorrow . In: Troop service , issue 3/2002, p. 219 f.
  18. ↑ on this area of ​​tension cf. also Alexander Spannbauer: Local battle in Bonnland - An Austrian hunter train is practicing in Germany . In: Troop service , issue 6/2005, page 522 ff. a. about the use of weapons in buildings in view of the risk that civilians will be harmed by the protecting power. Bonnland is a German local combat facility.
  19. ^ Christian Platzer: Tactics in Kosovo . In: Truppendienst , issue 2/2005, p. 156 ff.
  20. ↑ Klausjürgen Gantzl: New Wars? New fighters? Working paper No. 2/2002 of the University of Hamburg, IPW, Research Center for War, Armaments and Development and other publications of the Working Group on Research into the Causes of War (AKUF). The definition of war is based on violent mass conflicts in which regular forces / armed forces are deployed on at least one side, a minimum degree of organization of the belligerents is available, a planned strategy is recognizable and it is more than occasional banter. The number of armed conflicts for which at least one of these criteria did not apply was, however, much higher.
  21. ↑ Horst Pleiner: Possible conflicts. Consequences for the Austrian Armed Forces . In: Troop service , issue 2/1998, p. 105 f.
  22. ↑ Martin van Creveld: The future of war . Munich 1988, in several places.
  23. ↑ Klausjürgen Gantzl: New Wars? New fighters? Working paper No. 2/2002.
  24. ↑ Herrmann Jung: Change of the image of war - consequences for the armed forces . In: Troop service , issue 3/2004, p. 226 f.
  25. ↑ Hubert Michael Mader: Cruelty without feeling guilty. The “psychopathic civil warrior” as an antipole to the “knightly soldier” . In: Troop service , issue 6/2002, p. 541.
  26. ^ Carlos Marighella: Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrila . Self-published, Cuba 1969. This is similar to a training regulation, but is de facto a guide for urban guerrillas and is considered the first terrorist training manual.
  27. ^ David Eshel: Profile and training of the Islamist suicide bombers . In: Truppendienst , issue 2/2002, p. 118 ff.
  28. ↑ cf. to -Pe-; Hey Mister Taliban, What's Your Legal Status? In: Truppendienst , issue 3/2002, p. 235 ff.
  29. ↑ Jörg Schönbohm was then Minister of the Interior of Brandenburg, quoted from GLOECKNER, Eduard; Defensive fight against terrorism. In: European Security 3/2006, p. 74 f.
  30. ^ Helmut Zilk on the occasion of the presentation of the report of the reform commission in Vienna on June 14, 2004 to the Federal Minister for National Defense and the Armed Forces 2010; Report of the Federal Army Reform Commission p. 9.
  31. ↑ National Defense Plan . Federal Chancellery, Vienna 1985, p. 25.
  32. ↑ National Defense Plan . Federal Chancellery, Vienna 1985, p. 118.
  33. ^ Dieter Stockfisch: Threats at Sea. Terrorism and piracy . In: Truppendienst , issue 2/2003, p. 136 ff.
  34. ↑ Cesare Marchetti: Is History Automatic and Are Wars al la Carte? IIASA, Laxenburg o. J. and Renewable Energies in a Historical Context. IIASA, Laxenburg 1985 and A Simple Mathematical Model of War Events. Histoire & Mesure, 1992, p. 297 ff., U. a.
  35. ↑ Friedrich Hessel: The phenomenon of "war" in today's time . In: Troop service , issue 2/2001, p. 109.
  36. ^ Frank Heines: Target Costing . Online sheet 1/2006 of the Malik Management Center, St. Gallen, p. 1 ff.
  37. ↑ Rüdiger Stix: You don't have to be a prophet ... In: Truppendienst -Spezial 1/1996, p. 12.
  38. ↑ Friedrich Hessel: The phenomenon of "war" in today's time . In: Troop service , issue 2/2001, p. 109.
  39. ↑ Edwin Micewski: security policy and military development . In: Troop Service , Issue 2/1996, p. 105.
  40. ↑ according to “Zeit im Bild 1” (ORF) of April 16, 2006 and ORF Teletext from April 16 and 17, 2006, citing US sources in Iran, “40,000 trained suicide bombers” are available; Similarly, on April 18, 2006, the “Kronen Zeitung” reported on page 1 and “Today” on p. 2.