Koreagate

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Koreagate was an American political scandal in 1976 in which South Korean politicians sought to influence members of Congress . An immediate target of the influence was to reverse President Richard Nixon's decision to withdraw troops from South Korea. The scandal involved the South Korean secret service KCIA (now NIS ), which allegedly paid bribes and favors through South Korean businessman Tongsun Park in order to gain advantage and influence on decisions of Congress on South Korean goals. 115 members of Congress were reportedly involved. There has also been much speculation about the involvement of Sun Myung Moon , former KCIA director Kim Hyung Wook, and former Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon .

People involved

Tongsun Park and Richard T. Hanna were the two main actors in the Koreagate scandal. Allegedly there was an agreement to use commissions on the sale of American rice to South Korea to make decisions favorable to Seoul in Congress.

Hanna was also responsible for teaching Chung Il-kwon and Park effective lobbying techniques. Park was responsible for providing special financial incentives for Hanna and the members of Congress. These financial incentives were believed to have ranged between US $ 100,000 and $ 200,000.

aims

The Korean leadership was angry at President Nixon's decision to withdraw troops from South Korea and tried to maintain the US military presence. The government was also interested in the United States helping Korea modernize the army . The influence was also intended to suppress criticism of the government's human rights violations.

Consequences

The State Department recognized the illegal aspects of Park's actions and in 1970 informed the Korean embassy in Washington that such activities would strain relations. Former United States Ambassador to Seoul, William J. Porter , tried unsuccessfully to persuade President Park and Chung Il-kwon that Tongsun Park should return to Korea. Porter later called the US reaction too cautious because it did not want to denounce South Korea because of its support in the Vietnam War . His successor, Philip Habib, followed Tongsum Park more forcefully. Habib also tried unsuccessfully to convince Park to register as a lobbyist for South Korea. In response to his unsuccessful efforts, he ordered all embassy staff to cut ties with Park and warned various congressmen of their illegal behavior. Former Attorney General William B. Saxbe , however, warned Park of these actions and the prosecution that might result from them. Shortly thereafter, Habib accepted a job offer and the Park matter was initially not pursued.

Diplomatic relations

Political relations between the United States and South Korea were shaken by the scandal. The resentments were deepened by disagreement about how to proceed.

The United States created a legal basis and expected South Korea to cooperate in the ongoing investigations. On the South Korean side, the opinion was expressed that the whole story would only be promoted through American media. Anti-park conspiracies were also suspected.

Political experts came to the conclusion that the scandal was being used to offset Nixon's misconduct in the Watergate affair with the missteps of Democratic Congressmen in the Koreagate scandal.

Result

Tongsum Park was eventually invited to a hearing and testified publicly in 1978. During the hearing, Park admitted distributing funds to 30 members of Congress. Eventually ten members were identified as the main responsible, most of whom resigned immediately. Park was guaranteed full immunity. Congressmen Edward R. Roybal , Charles H. Wilson, and John J. McFall were publicly reprimanded. Edward J. Patten was found not guilty and Otto E. Passman was not prosecuted for health concerns. Richard Hanna was sentenced to 30 months in prison. Many experts believed that coming to terms with the scandal was too weak and indulgent. This analysis was confirmed when Park became embroiled in the oil-for-food program scandal in 2005 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Boettcher, Robert B. (1980). Gifts of Deceit
  2. Chae.J. Lee dynamics of adjustment p. 95
  3. Lee Koreagate Investigations p. 95
  4. ^ Koreagate on Capitol Hill Time, p. 2
  5. R. Boettcher Gifts of Deceit
  6. C. Lee political notions of scandal, p. 96
  7. C. Lee financial notions of scandal, p. 96
  8. C. Lee Social Notions of Scandal Pg 96
  9. Lee A Troubled Peace reactions to actions p. 97
  10. Lee Porter's concern on ethics p. 98
  11. Purdum Government bias to withhold punishment p.2
  12. Unethical behavior description of Time Pg 3
  13. Lee A Troubled Peace p. 99
  14. Lee Consequences on hold Pg 99
  15. Lee Dynamics of Structural Adjustment p. 99
  16. Lee Koreagate Investigations p. 99
  17. Lee Diplomatic Sparring p. 99
  18. Lee Diplomatic Sparring p. 99
  19. Lee Diplomatic Sparring p. 100
  20. ^ Dobbs on Koreagate p. 1
  21. ^ Dobbs on Koreagate p. 1
  22. ^ Dobbs on Koreagate p. 1
  23. ^ Dobbs Congressional Bad Boys p. 1
  24. ^ Dobbs on Koreagate p. 1
  25. ^ Dobbs on Koreagate p. 1
  26. ^ Dobbs Congressional Bad Boys p. 1

bibliography

  • Robert B. Boettcher: Gifts of Deceit  : Sun Myung Moon, Tongsun Park , and the Korean Scandal . Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York 1980, ISBN 0030445760 .
  • Michael Dobbs: The Washington Post: Koreagate Figure Tied To Oil-For-Food Scandal April 15, 2005.
  • Chae. Jin-Lee: A Trouble Peace: US Policy And The Two Koreas . Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2006, ISBN 0-8018-8330-X .
  • Todd S. Purdum: The New York Times: Accusation Against Lobbyist Echo Charges in 70's Scandal . The New York Times Company, New York April 15, 2005.
  • Time Magazine: Koreagate on Capitol Hill? . Time in Partnership with CNN, New York November 29, 1976.