Metro accident at Couronnes train station
The metro accident at Couronnes station was a serious railway accident on Paris Métrolinie 2 (then Métrolinie 2 Nord). It happened on August 10, 1903 and killed 84 people. The high number of deaths was primarily caused by insufficient accident prevention .
Realities
The first section of Métrolinie 2 Nord was opened on October 13, 1900. Extensions followed on October 7, 1902 and January 31, 1903. The line had both tunnel and elevated railway sections. The elevated railway ran between the stations of Boulevard Barbès (since 1907: Barbès - Rochechouart ) and Rue d'Allemagne (since 1914: Jaurès ).
Since the temporary eastern end stations Anvers (from October 1902) and Bagnolet (since 1970: Alexandre Dumas ; from January 1903) neither endloops still had Umsetzmöglichkeiten, the track is frequented since the first extension of trains of six sidecar and a motor coach to passed every end of the train.
In the area of the elevated railway line , the line was not equipped with storage or overtaking tracks . The traction current was fed into a conductor rail from various substations , which, however, did not form isolated circuits . The electricity was drawn using pantographs , with only the leading railcar receiving the power in this way. The railcar at the end of the train received its power from the leading railcar via a 600 V cable that ran along the sidecar. For this reason, the wagons of such a train could not simply be uncoupled.
After the commissioning of the last section of the line to the Nation terminus , which is located within a turning loop , on April 2, 1903, it was again possible to use trains with only one railcar at the Zugspitze. On August 10, 1903, therefore, short trains consisting of one railcar and three sidecars and long trains consisting of six sidecars ran on Line 2 North between two railcars. All vehicles of the 100 and 200 series were two-axle, the bodies were made of wood.
the accident
The first train: No. 43
The events began at 6:53 p.m. when a short circuit caused a smoldering fire in the drive bogie of the leading vehicle M 202 of eight-car train 43, which was traveling eastwards, on the slope in front of the Boulevard Barbès underground station . which resulted in heavy smoke development. The train was evacuated in the station and the pantographs were lifted off the conductor rail. This stopped the development of smoke, but the platform was full of angry passengers. In order to be able to offer them an opportunity to continue their journey as quickly as possible, the railway staff decided to drive the train out of the station. Since there was no rescue train available, this was done on its own at 7:05 p.m., which immediately reactivated the short circuit and caused the fire to swell again. The danger of the situation was initially hidden from the driver , so that he pulled the train into the tunnel and only stopped at the Combat tunnel station (since 1945: Colonel Fabien ). As soon as the pantographs were lifted, the fire subsided. The driver decided against trying on his own and asked for a vehicle to push train 43 on.
The second move: No. 52
The passengers, who had to get off train no.43 at the Boulevard Barbès station, boarded the next train no.52, a four-car train, and had come to Rue d'Allemagne when they asked to get on Push vehicle of the driver of train 43 arrived. It was decided to use train 52 as a push vehicle. All travelers had to leave train no. 52 so that it could go empty to the damaged train 43 and push it away. The maneuver succeeded and at 19:32 the twelve-car unit 43/52 thus formed drove on. In the meantime, however, the wooden lifting devices for the pantographs of train 43 were so damaged that they were no longer functional: The pantographs were now on the conductor rail and the voltage continuously fueled the fire. The train passed Belleville underground station , but did not use the parking space available there and also passed the Couronnes station on fire . The station master was alarmed by this, but did nothing.
The third move: No. 48
The next train, no. 48, again a four-car train, had meanwhile arrived at the Rue d'Allemagne station and had also taken in all the passengers that trains 43 and 52 had left behind. His guide was so worried about the completely smoke-filled tunnel in front of him that he did not take his train to the front end of the platform as usual, but stopped in the middle of the platform to discuss the situation with the station master . Both were aware of the threatening situation and decided to take the travelers to the streets. The passengers, who the third cancellation of services now had experienced in succession in part, reacted angrily and pressed the station staff for a fare refund to leave the station instead quickly.
The catastrophe
The 43/52 train had just reached the nearest Ménilmontant underground station when the fire got out of hand. Another short circuit in the damaged M 202 multiple unit caused it to immediately burst into flames. The electricity that fed the fire could not be turned off. Although the next substation, Pére-Lachaise, was shut down, the line was not divided into sections that were electrically isolated from each other, and the Barbès and Étoile substations continued to supply electricity. In the Ménilmontant station, seven passengers suffocated in the thick black smoke, and the broken train with wooden superstructures that had stopped in the station was completely burned down to the chassis.
At around 8 p.m., the fire damaged the electrical wiring that also supplied the lighting at Couronnes station. This failed at the exact moment when the smoke oozed from the tunnel leading to the Ménilmontant station. Confused by the darkness and the smoke, the passengers on the platform panicked . Many lost their bearings, fled from the penetrating smoke in the opposite direction and suffocated at the north-western end of the station. About 50 bodies lying on top of each other were found where the Couronnes underground station has no exit. But people who had not made it outside in time also died from suffocation in the counter hall above the tunnel.
consequences
84 people died: 75 in Couronnes, 7 in Ménilmontant and 2 who tried to escape this way, in the tunnel.
Just one week after this accident, the supervisory authorities ordered a series of measures to prevent such accidents in the future:
Immediately
- For each section of the route, a person responsible can be named who could initiate the rescue measures in the event of operational incidents,
- every driver is enabled to isolate motors with short circuits from further power supply,
- every exit is provided with illuminated signs as an emergency exit,
- Provision of temporary fire extinguishing stations until hydrants are installed,
- every exit of the train station must be cleared of all fixtures that interfere with the escape route.
Were within two weeks
- to completely isolate all electrical components in the vehicles,
- to couple the two railcars one behind the other at the Zugspitze instead of the two ends of the train in order to avoid routing the 600 V cable along the sidecar,
- to reduce train lengths to a maximum of seven vehicles (two multiple units and five sidecars),
- to largely remove combustible materials in the vehicles, especially in the driver's cabs ,
- Establish replacement power lines for the station lighting, which nonetheless ensured the lighting if the original supply failed.
By November 1903
- the route was to be divided into electrically independent sections,
- the exits of the stations had to be structurally enlarged.
See also
- Railway accident at Liverpool-Dingle station , a similar accident on the underground section of the Liverpool Overhead Railway about two years earlier
- List of fire disasters in Île-de-France
literature
- Jean Tricoire: Un siècle de métro en 14 lignes. De Bienvenüe à Météor . 2nd Edition. La Vie du Rail, Paris 2000, ISBN 2-902808-87-9 , p. 18th f .
- Jean Robert: Notre Métro . La Musée des Transports Urbains (AMTUIR), 1967
- Brian Hardy: Paris Metro Handbook . 3. Edition. Capital Transport Publishing, Harrow Weald 1999, ISBN 1-85414-212-7 , pp. 60 .
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b Jean Tricoire: Un siècle de métro en 14 lignes. De Bienvenüe à Météor . 2nd Edition. La Vie du Rail, Paris 2000, ISBN 2-902808-87-9 , p. 18 .
Coordinates: 48 ° 52 '9.4 " N , 2 ° 22" 48.6 " E