Operation Matador (Malaya)
The operation Matador was a defense plan for British Malaya , the massive troop movements on the Malay Peninsula as far as Thailand into foresaw to a Japanese counteract invasion. The first prognoses were made in 1937 by the then commanding officer in Malaysia, Major General William Dobbie , on which the plan drawn up by Air Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham in August 1941 was based.
Major General Dobbie inspected the British defenses on the Malay Peninsula in 1937 and concluded that during the monsoon season between October and March, enemy troops could land on the coast and penetrate as far as Thailand. He considered the beaches at Singora and Pattani in Thailand and Kota Bharu in Malaysia to be particularly at risk . He proposed appropriate countermeasures by deploying troops and reinforcing them. His views were later found to be correct, but they were ignored.
It was not until August 1941 that the then Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command, Air Marshal Brooke-Popham, developed another plan with the code name Matador and sent it to London for approval (PRO record FO 371/28163). The plan was based on the assumption that the Japanese would land on the east coast of Thailand at Singora and Pattani, then advance south to Jitra and on to Kroh. Brooke-Popham thought two units were sufficient to hold back the Japanese until the main force would arrive and intervene. But there were some problems with this plan. Additional units requested at the beginning of 1941 could not be dispatched and the British ambassador to Thailand, Sir Josiah Cosby , had already signed a non-aggression pact the year before with the Thai Prime Minister Plaek Pibulsonggram . In addition, the British wanted the full support of the USA for the implementation, which they were denied for the time being.
On December 5th, when the outbreak of war became more and more likely, the British changed the plan to be able to face the Japanese with the existing troops. It should come into effect immediately before an invasion. The plan included the advance of British units into southern Thailand in the event that enemy units should land at Singora and Pattani. The Indian 11th Infantry Division under Major General Murray-Lyon was available for execution, but it also had the task of defending Jitra, which would stretch its lines far apart. On the same day, London accepted the plan and left the Far East High Command to decide to trigger it. The most important strategic decision involved advancing troops into Thailand before the Japanese had even landed. After another quick revision, the troops were ready on December 6th to move into the operational rooms. At an afternoon meeting between Brooke-Popham, General Arthur Percival and Governor Shenton Thomas , however, the decision was made to suspend the operation for the time being and to make a new decision the next morning, although a Japanese convoy had already been sighted in the South China Sea . In retrospect, this turned out to be wrong: shortly after midnight on December 8, the Japanese invasion of the Malay Peninsula began .
The Japanese army had developed a counter-plan in the event that Matador was triggered. Landings at Bangkok airport and airfields in southern Thailand were intended to establish an air superiority that would make it easier for the ground troops who landed on the Isthmus of Kra to advance south.
Another plan, called Matador , had been worked out by the Royal Navy to defend Singapore.
literature
- Ong, Chit Chung:
- Operation Matador: World War II: Britain's Attempt to Foil the Japanese Invasion of Malaya and Singapore , Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2003, ISBN 981-210-266-3
- Operation Matador: Britain's War Plans against the Japanese, 1918-1941 , Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1997, ISBN 981-210-095-4
- Richard J. Aldrich: Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service , Cambridge University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-521-64186-1