Coup in Thailand 1957

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Relief for the 1957 coup on the monument to Sarit Thanarat in Khon Kaen .

The coup in Thailand in 1957 took place on September 16, when sections of the Thai army under the command of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat successfully overthrew the government of Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram (Phibun for short).

After the coup of 1947 and Phibun's seizure of power, a power struggle had developed between individual groups within the military. These were in competition with one another for military, political and economic power. After the government had rigged the elections in February 1957, public criticism broke out of Phibun, which Field Marshal Sarit's group joined for tactical reasons. They submitted their resignation and subsequently disempowered the government. After the coup, the coup plotters first set up a civilian-run government and held elections in December. Since it subsequently came to unrest and instability, the coup leaders Sarit created a year after the coup took place, the Constitution , and established a direct military dictatorship.

situation

Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram, Prime Minister until the 1957 coup

The coup was preceded by ten years of military rule under Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram. During that time, there were considerable conflicts and power struggles between different circles within the military. In 1949 and 1951, two overthrow attempts by supporters of the former liberal Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong , who were also members of the armed forces, were unsuccessful. There was competition between the various military cliques not only for military and political power, but also for economic influence. In 1955, Phibun allowed the formation of political parties. One of them, the Seri Manangkhasila Party , was dominated by the most influential military and formed the government. In addition to Phibun himself, the Supreme Commander of the Army, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, and the Director General of the Police, General Phao Siyanon , had formed internal wings to secure their respective power bases.

The elections in February 1957 had been massively manipulated by the government through vote-buying and there was considerable public criticism of Prime Minister Phibun and Police Chief Phao. Sections of the military around Field Marshal Sarit joined her to get rid of the rivals on this occasion. They publicly attacked the fraudulent elections and uncovered other corruption affairs. In protest against Phibun's appointment of a new cabinet, 48 army officers, including Sarit and his deputy, General Thanom Kittikachorn , announced their resignation.

There were public demonstrations against the government and King Bhumibol Adulyadej also supported Phibun's replacement. Phibun had an anti-aristocratic attitude and had always tried to limit the role of the monarchy to a constitutional minimum. King Bhumibol had never made a secret of his dislike of this prime minister. Phibun recently assumed religious functions that traditionally belonged to the monarch. It was the field marshal and not the king who led the festivities for the 2500th anniversary of Buddhism in 1956/57, but this did not increase its popularity among the rural population as hoped.

Actor

Sarit Thanarat in his uniform as field marshal and commander in chief of the army.
General Thanom Kittikachorn.

The coup was carried out by the clique of the Army Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. In addition to Sarit, the most important representatives of this group were General Thanom Kittikachorn, who was second man in the land forces as commander of the First Army, and his deputy Lieutenant General Praphas Charusathien , who commanded the First Division. These officers were also heavily involved in the economic life of Thailand, which earned them the nickname "soldiers of profit". Other key contributors to the coup were the air defense division commander, Major General Praesert Ruchirawong, and Brigadier General Krit Sivara . In addition to the military, the network also included technocrats and intellectuals.

After the army under Sarit's command had taken all strategically important points in the capital in a flash, Phibun and Phao fled the country.

King Bhumibol Adulyadej's biographer , Paul Handley, believes it is possible that Bhumibol was also an accomplice of the putschists. This is supported by the speed with which the monarch gave his blessing to the new rulers. He proclaimed martial law , appointed Sarit "Defender of Bangkok" and granted him the right to countersign orders on behalf of the king . He later explained to the coup plotters: “His Majesty the King has benevolently stated that the goal of the Revolutionary Party to protect the people, ensure the well-being of the nation and promote the prosperity of the country is a noble one. (…) You will have His Majesty's full blessings if you put all of this into practice. ”Political scientist Thak Chaloemtiarana, on the other hand, assumes that the king probably had no choice but to submit to Sarit's coup. Immediately after the coup, members of the Privy Council contacted the embassies of western countries to assure them that Sarit was a reliable royalist and anti-communist and enjoyed the full support of the palace.

motivation

To explain the coup one must look at the rivalry between the various cliques within the military government. In particular, the groups of Army Commander Sarit and Police Chief Phao were in competition with one another for power. Economic interests also played a role, because the influential officers had been heavily involved in business during the 1950s and in some cases were in charge of important corporate groups that also competed with one another.

As with other military coups, the putschists may have acted out of a situation of “humiliation” for the army, because after Prime Minister Phibun's manipulation of the election became apparent, the armed forces were exposed and discredited. Sarit and his allies, who saw themselves as extremely professional soldiers, probably mainly disturbed the obviously "unprofessional" approach.

Putsch leader Sarit claimed to have ousted the electoral fraudsters because of the public desire for free and equal elections. So he thought that he had intervened in the “national interest”. He can be credited with the fact that after the coup he initially entrusted the government with a recognized technocrat and actually had elections held in December. The imminent transition to direct (and long-term) military rule, with Sarit himself as head of government and considerable economic corruption, is in contrast to this.

Result and consequences

Pote Sarasin, briefly Prime Minister immediately after the 1957 coup

As a result of the coup, the military rule of the leaders of the coup was secured for the next 15 years. From then on they dominated the military and politics. After a short interlude under the civilian Pote Sarasin , Sarit and, after his death in 1963, his henchman Thanom led the government. The group's economic influence was also confirmed and strengthened. The military patronage system could be expanded into the economic and political spheres. The Unionist Party , which the coup leaders had founded, became the dominant force and the opposition could almost be eliminated. Phibun and Phaos careers came to an end and their allies were ousted from power in the military and the state.

After the coup, Pote Sarasin was first installed as Prime Minister, a diplomat who was actually the designated Secretary General of SEATO . Pote stood for a close alliance with the USA. Sarit took over the leadership of the police, which he cleared of supporters of the previous director-general Phao. He implemented measures that minimized the importance of the police as a political influence. Rivals in the navy and the air force were also sidelined. Only the First Army Division then had the military clout that could also lend political power. Pote's party won the December election so narrowly that he was unwilling to remain in charge of the government.

As a result, Thanom Kittikachorn took over the office of Prime Minister. Sarit had to have his liver cirrhosis treated abroad. The situation was initially unstable. The ruling party suffered losses against the opposition Democrats in by-elections in March 1958 . Thanom has faced conflicts within the government, opposition opposition to the budget, strikes, demonstrations and negative pressures. During his stay in England, Sarit therefore decided on an authoritarian "revolution".

Upon his return to Thailand in October 1958, he suspended the constitution and declared martial law. The press was henceforth censored and opponents of the regime arrested. Sarit and his " Revolutionary Council " ruled by ordinance. The field marshal promoted cleanliness and order, combated crime, prostitution and drug trafficking. Political opponents were generally persecuted as communists and often imprisoned without a trial. The ardent royalist Sarit restored great public recognition to the monarchy, which was limited in importance after the revolution of 1932. The administration of royal property, for which the Ministry of Finance was responsible after the end of the absolute monarchy, was again subordinated directly to the king in the form of the Crown Property Bureau . In return, he was able to gain legitimacy for his rule through the benevolence of the monarch.

After a visit to a World Bank mission between 1957 and 1958 to analyze and disclose the weaknesses of the Thai national economy, the Sarit government turned away from the strategy of industrialization through state-owned enterprises and towards the market economy with free enterprise. The authoritarian-paternalistic Sarit-Thanom era was at the same time a phase of rapid economic growth and accelerated development, including in the rural regions that were back then. The coup did nothing to change the country's good relations with the United States, whose closest ally was in the Thailand region, especially during the Second Indochina War .

See also

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Kiener, p. 36f.
  2. ↑ a b Grabowsky, p. 171
  3. ↑ Kiener, p. 37
  4. ↑ Kiener, p. 37f.
  5. ↑ Grabowsky, pp. 171f.
  6. ^ A b Paul M. Handley: The King Never Smiles. A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej. Yale University Press, New Haven (CT) 2006, p. 138.
  7. ↑ Thak Chaloemtiarana: Thailand. The Politics of Despotic Paternalism. Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Ithaca (NY) 2007, ISBN 978-0-8772-7742-2 , p. 82.
  8. ↑ a b c Kiener, p. 39
  9. ↑ Kiener, p. 40f.
  10. ↑ Peitz, p. 230
  11. ↑ Peitz, p. 230f.
  12. ↑ Peitz, p. 231f.
  13. ↑ Peitz, 221f.
  14. ↑ Peitz, pp. 232-234
    Grabowsky, pp. 172-174
  15. ↑ Peitz, p. 233
    Grabowsky, p. 175f.