Battle of the Pichincha

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Battle of Pichincha
date May 24, 1822
place Pichincha volcanoes near Quito , Ecuador
output decisive victory of the patriots
Peace treaty Surrender of the colonial forces in Ecuador on May 25, 1822
Parties to the conflict

Flag of The First Republic of Venezuela.svg Patriots

Flag of Spain (1785–1873, 1875–1931) .svg Royalists

Commander

Antonio José de Sucre

Melchior Aymerich

Troop strength
2971 1894
losses

about 200 killed, 140 wounded

fallen over 400

The Battle of Pichincha was a crucial nation-building struggle in the history of Ecuador between Spain's forces under the President of the Royal Court of Justice Melchior Aymerich and the separatists of Quitos (judicial district) / Guayaquils, Greater Colombia, Peru and Argentina under Antonio José de Sucre . With the Spanish defeat, the colonial rule of Spain over the area of ​​today's Ecuador ended.

prehistory

After the end of the first independence from Ecuador in 1812, it required the victory of Simón Bolívar in the Battle of Boyacá in 1819 in what is now Colombia and the presence of the Chilean-Argentine expeditionary army under José de San Martín , northern Peru under his control with the help of Peruvian patriots in 1820 had brought, and thereby isolated the Spanish colonial power in today's Ecuador. Above all, the fact that San Martín kept the Peruvian viceroy busy was what moved the patriots in Guayaquil , the most important port city in the south of the province of Quito , to the uprising on October 9, 1820, which led to the overthrow of the Spaniards. First own attempts to bring independence to the Andes highlands failed in the same year because of the Spanish military power with support from the South Columbian monarchist stronghold of Pasto (first battle of Huachi on November 22, 1820).

The Guayaquils separatists turned to San Martín and Bolívar for support for the liberation of the Royal Judicial District (Real Audiencia) of Quito. The first visible reaction came from San Martín, who sent troops and officers whose ventures also failed (Battle of Tanizagua on January 3, 1821). Bolívar, who intended to join Ecuador to Greater Colombia from the outset , had sent its most capable officer, the trained pioneer José Antonio Sucre, who had been promoted to Brigadier General after the Battle of Boyacá, to the Antilles in early 1820 to procure weapons for the Ecuador campaign . Sucre had also taken on the planning of the campaign, but did not arrive in Guayaquil until the beginning of May 1821 with around 650 soldiers, the Santander Battalion and the Albion Battalion, as well as extensive military equipment , also because of the royalist resistance in southern Colombia . José Mires had already come to Guayaquil in January with 1,000 rifles, ammunition and other military equipment on the orders of Bolívar.

Despite initial successes (Battle of Yaguachi (also Cone) on August 19, 1821) against the attacking colonial power, Sucre also suffered a devastating defeat on an advance into the highlands in September (second Battle of Huachi on September 12, 1821). This overturned his schedule, deprived him of most of his army, and he was forced to write many letters to ask for further support from Greater Colombia and Peru. He procured the time for this with a cleverly negotiated armistice on November 19 in Babahoyo, which lasted 90 days. San Martín sent 1,275 soldiers under Andrés de Santa Cruz . Bolívar intended to lead further forces to Quito by land, but failed because of the Royalists of Pasto in the Battle of Bomboná on April 7th. He prevented the intervention of the new-renadine royalists, but could not support Sucre himself.

At the end of 1821, the new president of the court, Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon, arrived from Spain, who posed a threat to the Sucre campaign because he brought the liberal attitude of the Spanish government into the judicial district, applied the constitution of 1812 and fought corruption. With his measures he gained influence among the population and threatened to deprive Sucre of the moral ground for his campaign. With his death on April 8, 1822 and the return of Melchior Aymerich as president of the court, this danger was averted, because Aymerich had already proven his reputation as a loyal conservative ten years earlier in the destruction of the patriots.

The Pichincha campaign

Peruvian claims to Guayaquil that arose during the colonial period, also in connection with San Martín's personal ambition, led to tensions between Peru and Greater Colombia, although both countries were only half liberated. So there was a further delay, as San Martín wanted to withdraw his troops again. By this time, February 1822, the combined army, which consisted of a Peruvian-Argentine and a Greater Colombian division, had already taken Cuenca on the southern Cordillera without a fight because the Spaniards had retreated from the overwhelming forces of the separatists. After San Martín failed with his request before the Peruvian parliament to declare war on Greater Colombia, the military chief in Peru, Juan Antonio Álvarez de Arenales, lifted the withdrawal order for the Santa Cruz division.

In mid-March 1822 the campaign could be continued. Sucres soldiers marched north in the highlands towards the capital Quito. In the battle of Riobamba (Hacienda San Miguel de Tapi) on April 21, part of the Reiter Sucres defeated the Spanish cavalry under Carlos Tolrá. Bolívar exploited the victory politically to appease the Argentines after the dispute. For the Spaniards, the defeat had a moral impact that kept them focused on defending Quito. Melchior Aymerich, the last president of the Royal Court of Justice, initially had the central passes south of Quito occupied by the troops of Tolrá in order to relocate Sucre to the capital.

On May 2, 1822, Sucres' troops gathered in Latacunga , 90 km south of Quito. Here they were reorganized by the commanding officer and reinforced with additional volunteers from the area. Sucre received reinforcements from the Alto Magdalena battalion from northern Colombia under José María Córdova and information about the positions of the army loyal to the king.

It was clear to Sucre that an attack on the passes south of the capital could only be successful with great losses, if at all. He therefore decided to turn northeast from May 13th in order to get along the flanks of the Cotopaxi volcano into the Valle de los Chillos south of Quito and thus behind the enemy outposts. The troops loyal to the king then withdrew to Quito on May 16. Aymerich had the access roads to the city, which at that time still mainly consisted of the old city center, occupied with guns in order to make a breakthrough impossible for the advancing patriots. Sucres troops stayed in the valley from May 17th to 19th.

From the 21st, Sucre presented his army east of Cerro Panecillo, which rises about two hundred meters from what is now the city, in order to move the Spaniards to attack. Sucre had not only explored well, but had also used an agent to lure the monarchists into the colonial army, who urged them to desert until Aymerich had the saboteur locked up. Aymerich did not allow himself to be carried away to attack Sucres divisions for the next two days either.

Sucre now decided to bypass again in order to provoke a battle outside the city. To do this, he marched off at 9 p.m. on the night of May 23rd to 24th. He bypassed the positions of the Spaniards to the south, then turned north-west to climb the flank of the double volcano Pichincha in the pouring rain. The steep path forbade taking the cavalry with you, which remained at the foot of the ascent. The most experienced battalion Alto Magdalena took over the marching point, followed by the majority of the two divisions, and finally the Albion battalion, covering the supply line at the end of the army, which was working its way up the narrow, flooded paths to an altitude of over 3,500 meters.

Course of the battle

Led by Indians, the liberation army reached the Walstatt at today's Cima de la Libertad early in the morning, where Sucre let rest. After initial hesitation, Aymerich sent the two officers Carlos Tolrá and Nicolás López, who had already been successful for the Spaniards in New Granada, Venezuela and later also in the first attempts of the separatists in Ecuador in the past two years, with the three infantry battalions of the Spanish division towards the patriots.

Sucre, whose armed forces awaited the royalists on a relatively small battlefield bordered by ravines and steep slopes, dispatched a reconnaissance company, which the Spaniards reached around ten o'clock and immediately fired at. These patriots were forced to withdraw, but received reinforcements from Colombians and Peruvians. The firefight turned out to be more ammunition-intensive than planned. Sucre was therefore forced to rotate his battalions so that they could be equipped with powder, bullets and flints. The small size of the battlefield was beneficial to the position of the Spanish troops, as they had better training and, above all, greater combat experience than most of the patriotic troops. So they were able to oust the two Peruvian battalions from the battlefield. At that moment, the Greater Colombian division commander, José Mires, with a hundred men prevented the collapse of the separatists' fighting line, which could now be stabilized by freshly supplied battalions.

When the patriots' ammunition threatened to run out again, Sucre ordered that the combat-experienced great Columbians of Alto Magdalena should carry out a bayonet attack into the center of the Spanish colonial troops. Lopéz saw that he was falling behind and sent his best battalion, 1st Aragon, to bypass Sucres' left flank and thus stab the Patriots in the back. To do this, it had to overcome a ridge on which the Albion battalion suddenly took up position, apparently no longer taking care of the entourage. It is unclear whether there was really an order from Sucres. The Europeans on the side of Sucres, although numerically far inferior, held the Aragon battalion on a lasting basis and thus thwarted the circumvention plan. That was the starting signal for all other battalions of Sucres, especially the new renadins of Córdova, to join the ranks of the Spaniards with the bayonet and to finally break their order of battle. At noon, the colonial troops fled in complete dissolution downhill to Quito, seven hundred meters below, leaving four hundred dead on the slopes of the Pichincha. In Sucres' army report, there are two hundred dead and one hundred and forty wounded patriots.

Follow-up

The cavalry of the royalists disbanded in the face of the defeat and offered no resistance, those of the patriots followed them along the foot of the mountains and also pursued the defeated infantry. The defeated fled into the streets of the city, but Sucre probably broke off the pursuit here. The next day the Spaniards signed the deed of surrender. Sucre captured another 1,260 soldiers; Aymerich was allowed to leave the country. A few Spaniards were unwilling to accept the defeat and fled to southern New Granada and Venezuela to continue their fight.

Ecuador was liberated and the war was over. After his arrival in Quito, Bolívar, who had been held up by the royalists near Pasto, declared the former royal judicial district of Quito the new department of his Greater Colombia on July 13th, which was complete as he had planned five years earlier. As early as May 29, the parish council, together with church representatives and dignitaries in Quito, decided to join Greater Colombia. In contrast to other liberated countries, there were no uprisings against the republic in later Ecuador. There was only one campaign by the Royalists from Pasto the following year, which Bolívar ended in his only battle in the former judicial district of Quito in Ibarra on July 17, 1823.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Jorge Núñez Sánchez, 2002, p. 15 .
  2. ↑ Rudolfo Pérez Pimentel: Tomo II , Mitos, historias, recuerdos, anécdotas y tradiciones del país, 4 vols., Ed. de la UG, 1987-8.
  3. ↑ Vicente Lecuna: Crónica Razonada de las Guerras de Bolívar. Caracas, 1950, chap. XXII, Sucre en Guayaquil.
  4. ↑ Vicente Lecuna: Crónica Razonada de las Guerras de Bolívar. Caracas, 1950, chap. XXII, Combate de Yaguachi.
  5. ↑ Vicente Lecuna: Bolívar y el Arte Militar. Colonial Press, New York 1955, chap. XI, rtf download , Derrota de Huachi
  6. ^ Letter from the Chief of Staff Luis Urdaneta of January 6, 1822 from Piura, in: LECUNA, 1955, Apendíce 121
  7. ↑ Rudolfo Pérez Pimentel: La batalla de Pichincha , Mitos, historias, recuerdos, anécdotas y tradiciones del país, 4 vols., Ed. de la UG, 1987-8.
  8. ↑ PAREDES, 2003, I. 2. Acción conjunta de los ejércitos libertadores del norte y del sur.
  9. ↑ Vicente Lecuna: Bolívar y el Arte Militar. Colonial Press, New York 1955, chap. XI, rtf download , Combate de Riobamba.
  10. ↑ Vicente Lecuna: Crónica Razonada de las Guerras de Bolívar. Caracas, 1950, chap. XXII, Prosigue la Campaña.
  11. ↑ Vicente Lecuna: Bolívar y el Arte Militar. Colonial Press, New York 1955, chap. XI, rtf download , En el Cotopaxi.
  12. ↑ Luis Pacheco Manya: servicio de inteligencia de la Campaña de Pichincha  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . 2007@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / foroplus.net  
  13. ^ René Pozo Astudillo: Abdón Calderón. Cuadernos de divulgación cívica , pp. 35-36.
  14. ↑ Sucre Army Report. (Parte de guerra de la batalla de Pichincha)
  15. ↑ Pichincha, Batalla del AVILÉS PINO
  16. ↑ Sucre Army Report. (Parte de guerra de la batalla de Pichincha)
  17. ↑ Vicente Lecuna: Crónica Razonada de las Guerras de Bolívar. Caracas, 1950, chap. XXII, Batalla de Pichincha.
  18. ↑ Quoted from the Historia Diplomática del Ecuador by Jorge Villacrés Moscoso
  19. ↑ Armando Martínez Garnica e Inés Quintero Montiel: Actas de formación de juntas y declaraciones de independencia (1809-1822), II. UIS, 2007, [1]

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