Battle of Toba Fushimi
The Battle of Toba-Fushimi ( Japanese 鳥羽 ・ 伏 見 の 戦 い , Toba-Fushimi no tatakai ) from January 27 to January 31, 1868 was a military conflict during the Boshin War south of the access points to what was then Kyoto, the Toba-guchi (鳥羽 口) and the Fushimi-guchi (伏 見 口). Here troops met the Tokugawa - shogunate under the nominal command of the Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu to troops of the alliance of the Han of Satsuma , Chōshū and Tosa under the command of Emperor Meiji . The battle ended after four days of fighting in the complete defeat of the shogunate troops.
prehistory
After centuries of rule, the Tokugawa dynasty saw its decline during the Bakumatsu period . Which, among other things, was triggered by the forced opening of Japan by foreign powers in 1852 after two centuries of isolation . The shogunate had been forced to sign a number of unequal treaties , undermining its domestic reputation for deriving its legitimacy from ensuring peace and security. In addition, the arrival of foreigners raised many unresolved domestic and foreign policy issues.
In 1867 the power of the shogunate had waned to such an extent that it was forced to make extensive concessions. On October 29, 1867, a representative of Tosas presented a proposal for the future distribution of political power in Japan to Rōjū Itakura Katsukiyo . This included the return of authority to the emperor and the formation of a government made up of daimyos , their vassals and kuges , under imperial supervision . On November 7, 1867, Tokugawa Yoshinobu accepted Tosa’s proposal, thereby ending the unrestricted rule of his family that had existed for 264 years. The proposal had no effect on the autonomy of the Han and was very similar to the policy of the Kōbugattai , which had already been operated by the shogunate, and which provided for a joint vote between the imperial family and the shogunate.
The reasons for the acceptance were varied, so Satsuma developed a more far-reaching plan at the same time. This envisaged removing the Tokugawas from their power of government and using military force to force their direct areas of control to surrender in order to deprive them of the basis of their power. So Tosa's suggestion appeared to be the lesser evil. In October 1867 there were troop movements of Satsumas and Chōshūs, which looked threatening in connection with the Satsumas plan that had become known. The daimyo of Hiroshima also turned to the Shogun on November 1, 1867 and spoke out in favor of handing over power to the emperor. Three days later, on November 4, Tokugawa Yoshinobu received reports of a coup planned for November 10 or 11 by Satsuma and Chōshū and Rōnin , Tosa and Nakatsugawa and Shishi .
The shogunate troops were still being reorganized and trained by French military advisers, an arms factory was under construction and arms deliveries and British naval advisors on their way to Japan, and the financial situation was poor. Shogun Tokugawa and his advisors saw Tosa's proposal as a lesser evil, the acceptance of a plan which, as previous experience has shown, was doomed to failure, could mean a gain in time that also offered an opportunity for the keiō reforms that had been initiated the year before to develop their effect. In addition, Tokugawa Yoshinobu was not attached to his office, he had already signaled his rejection in previous years and was only reluctant to succeed Tokugawa Iemochi .
On November 9th, the shogun officially handed over his authority to the imperial court, which in return informed him that state affairs should be handled as before until the establishment of the new daimyo assembly. The result was that the shogunate had to continue to make and answer for all unpopular decisions without being able to fall back on the desired broader consensus. This unsatisfactory situation led to Tokugawa Yoshinobu's abdication on November 22nd, which, however, had no consequences for the time being. Tosa's proposal had thus fizzled out.
The renunciation of supremacy led to unrest and resistance among the Tokugawa vassals and the gathering of daimyōs was thwarted by these, Fudai and Tozama alike, as the vast majority of them did not obey orders to appear at court on pretexts and so on Tosa proposal failed. Satsuma increased his efforts to prepare for an armed revolt and troops from all parties gathered in Kyoto. A military solution to the conflict was on the horizon, as indicated by the sharp rise in imports of obsolete and modern firearms.
On December 26, Chōshū troops landed not far from Osaka on the coast of Settsu and advanced on Kyoto. The shogunate decided to avoid a direct military confrontation, instructed its nearby vassals to reinforce their border guards and secured the backing of the court by obtaining an imperial order that diverted the Chōshū to Osaka.
Since Osaka was to be opened to foreign ships on January 1, 1868, the presence of so many daimyo troops, especially the xenophobic Chōshū, in the city led to additional pressure from the British envoy Harry Parkes on the Bakufu.
On December 31, the court informed the Bakufu of a request to amnesty radical courtiers and to allow Chōshū samurai to enter Kyoto again. The shogunate responded the next day that both Parke's request and the question of amnesty should be discussed at a meeting of the daimyo present. The court then called a meeting of the daimyo present for January 2, which Tokugawa Yoshinobu and his advisors boycotted. Presumably believing their absence would prevent a decision. This was not the case, on the contrary, after all-day negotiations it was decided to grant the application for amnesty and re-entry. Tokugawa Yoshinobu, informed of this, did not raise any objection. The session dragged on, and by now also consisted of planners and supporters of the far-reaching Satsuma proposal. Without the presence of representatives of the Shogunate, they managed to obtain the imperial approval of their plan to remove the Bakufu and his allies from Kyoto and replace them with troops from their own Han. In addition, court posts filled with Bakufu sympathizers were to be abolished. Belated attempts by Bakufu to avert this decision were unsuccessful. Fierce enemies of the Tokugawa now had power over the imperial seat of Kyoto.
On January 4, Tokugawa Yoshinobu was informed that the court had decided that he should appear in Kyoto and surrender land worth two million koku and abdicate as a shogun, whereupon he agreed to resign, but responded evasively to the surrender of land. Deliberations had been held in which proponents of an immediate military retaliation against Satsuma were defeated by proponents of a retreat on Osaka. Troops should be gathered there and the shogun wrote a letter to the court, which the court did not receive, in which he once again affirmed his adherence to the Tosa proposal and condemned the actions of the opposing Han.
Meanwhile, Edo had seen many shishi activities, unexplained fires, and shootings. In addition to the Shogun's letter, these had heated up the mood and so on January 19 the Satsumas and Sadoharas were overrun and reinforcements were sent to Osaka. There, these incidents led to a reassessment of the situation.
Course of the battle
On the New Year of 1868 the Shogun had written a letter to the court listing Satsuma's misconduct point by point. However, the messenger was intercepted by Satsuma guards and so the letter did not reach its recipient until January 29th. In the days before that, also in light of the recent events in Edo, the decision had been made to give up the political tricks and seek a violent solution. As early as December, the Shogun had been requested to appear at court and this request was now to be met in the company of an army.
The individual regiments of the shogunate troops were composed of different types of troops, which reduced their fighting strength. For example, the soldiers were armed with a mixture of edged weapons and firearms.
On paper, the shogunate had 13,000 men at its disposal, 1,000 more from Tsu were bound by security guards in and around Osaka. 5,500 soldiers were to advance on Kyoto, the rest to take positions along the road to Osaka. 8,500 men should then actually take part in combat operations in the following days. On paper this number was impressive, but unreliable and non-existent units were also listed. Troops from Hikone were supposed to guard the ammunition transports, but had already changed sides, men from Kii were scheduled to patrol Osaka, but had already withdrawn homeward and units from Ogaki were to be deployed northwards, but their leaders spoke out against an armed conflict out. This was done consciously to allow this Han to change sides again without losing face on both sides. In theory, at least, these numbers were impressive and led to a false sense of superiority at the middle and lower command levels.
The advance of the shogunate army began on January 25, 1868. Their individual regiments moved apart and divided northwards towards Kyoto. For example, the vanguard units lagged behind in the midfield. As a result, when Toba and Fushimi were reached, the troops were not ready to fight.
Course of the battle on January 27th
On the afternoon of January 27, the army reached the southern edges of Toba and Fushimi. Takikawa Tomoshige was refused entry at a roadblock in Satsuma, who withdrew to discuss how to proceed. At this point, 400 city guards (Mimawari) were in the vanguard, further back along the road taken was followed by two infantry - battalions with uncharged guns. Eight companies from Kumawara were not on site as planned. This total of about 2,000 to 2,500 men faced about 900 satsumas with four guns. While the Bakufu was still discussing how to proceed, the Satsuma units went into combat formation and attacked at dusk. The surprised city guards and infantry battalions became confused and withdrew. In doing so, they set buildings on fire to cover their retreat, but were illuminated by them and offered a good target. In the course of the next few hours the situation stabilized, as the Satsuma troops assumed a large numerical inferiority, which was not given due to the absence of the contingent from Kumawara. This appeared, but reacted very late to the order to advance and by the time it arrived at midnight the fighting had already ended.
At Fushimi you could hear the noise of battle and some Aizu troops moved through Fushimi towards Toba. This also led to an attack by the Satsumas here. The shogunate had 3,000 men, including four guns and 150 Shinsengumi , cavalry units and other artillery were not on the spot as ordered. They faced 1,400 men from Satsuma, Tosa and Chōshū. An advance by the Aizu was repulsed and their artillery overrun. Bakufu infantry then intervened in the fight, which then succeeded in pushing back the enemy until Chōshū, east of Fushimi, attacked them head-on with firearms, artillery and incendiary arrows. The shogunate troops withdrew in a disorderly manner over the Bungo Bridge spanning the Uji, but held a bridgehead and thus secured their retreat. A few Aizu managed to break through to Toba to the west. After this severe defeat, troops began to withdraw to Yodo Castle . At daybreak, the leaders Takenaka, Okubo, Okochi Takikawa, gathered at the castle, reported to Osaka and Edo that the fighting had been a draw and that the enemy would soon be defeated. They suggested an immediate advance to retake Fushimi, but this was rejected by the officers of the units concerned, citing the exhaustion of their men. The advance had been halted at both theaters of the battle. At Toba the losses of soldiers, material and land were small, at Fushimi the vassals from Aizu suffered heavy losses and were pushed back across the river.
Course of the battle on January 28th
On January 28, the shogunate again attacked on both fronts. The road to Toba was quickly retaken by units from Kuwanu. In the meantime, Satsuma's forces had been reinforced by troops from Kyoto and Fushimi, and the arrival of Prince Yoshiaki signaled support from the court. The Satsumas succeeded in pushing the Kuwanu back. Aizu replaced them, but got caught in heavy gun and gun fire and suffered heavy losses. The ammunition was running low and they were pushed back over the Uji Bridge. This advance threatened the Yodo Castle and led to the use of more aizu with pikes and the support of Kuwanu artillery, which intervened in close combat at 5 p.m. They fought back the satsumas, which in turn suffered heavy losses. As night fell, the fighting broke out.
At Fushimi, Aizu and infantry units of the shogunate advanced along the Uji. However, some Aizu were redirected to support the oppressed troops near Toba. The remaining forces were pushed back by Choshu and Tosa and took up a line of defense northeast of the castle. Here again men were withdrawn to support the fight at the small Uji Bridge and there was no further fighting.
During the day the Bakufu had deployed approximately 5,000 men, including 3,500 shogunate infantry. Kyoto's forces were fewer in number, but had been reinforced since the previous day. Nevertheless, they managed to get the upper hand only with difficulty and with the use of almost all reserves at Toba, and so they could no longer use any more reserves in the afternoon and were only saved by the nightfall and the restrictions of the shogunate.
Course of the battle on January 29th
At dawn, Kyoto went back to attack. The fighting at Toba raged back and forth until the Aizu and Bakufu troops had been defeated and were driven back over the small bridge to Yodo Castle by the afternoon. Here they took up defensive positions and received reinforcements from French trained and Western uniformed units.
At Fushimi, four Tosa companies had been removed from the battle and replaced by two guns and soldiers from Satsuma and Choshu. With these fresh troops, the insurgents went on the attack here too and met Aizu and Bakufu units moving north from the castle. A firefight ensued in which the shogunate units were pushed back 300 meters and two guns were lost. Aizu hid in the sedge on either side of the road and surprised the carelessly advancing Choshu. At the same time, Aizu guns opened fire and the shogunate infantry launched a frontal attack . The Choshu were repulsed and fled to Fushimi. However, the Bakufu forces failed to pursue them because some units refused to give orders to advance.
Subsequent attempts by the Aizu to throw back the enemy, who had now been reinforced with reserves, failed. After heavy fighting, the shogunate troops withdrew to Yodo. Now that the enemy had also been pushed back in the east, the defenders of Tobas and Fushimis joined forces in the early afternoon and took their artillery under fire at the castle.
The shogunate had now been pushed back as far as the castle and the area north of the river in the hands of the enemy. Beyond that, heavy losses were recorded, which further undermined morale. The previously strong units from Aizu were exhausted and were replaced by weaker ones. In addition, rumors circulated that supplies were running out and that material was already being destroyed in some places so that it would not fall into the hands of the enemy. When soldiers of the shogunate tried to enter the castle, the vassals from Yodo refused entry under threat of violence. This of her own accord, since and although her daimyo was in charge of Bakufu in Edo.
This led to the fact that the shogunate troops were now exposed to the enemy fire without protection, were potentially threatened by the castle and rumors circulated that the Yodo would burn the great bridge over the Kizu and break through to the south in order to deny the shogunate troops any possibility of retreat. So the decision was made to retreat to prepared positions between the villages of Yamasaki and Yahata. In a report to Osaka, the commanders asked for any man they could need for reinforcement.
Course of the battle on January 30th
January 30th was a clear and cold day. Kyoto's troops that day numbered about 3,500 men. They faced between 3,050 and 4,300 demoralized shogunate troops, who were poorly coordinated and therefore could no longer deploy powerful troops like the Aizu. At Yodo, Satsuma and Choshu units crossed the Kizu in boats and advanced on the eastern flank of the shogunate at Yahata, while others advanced along the eastern bank of the Yodo to threaten the western flank of Hashimoto. In the center, insurgents were moving head-on down the street towards the line between Yahata and Hashimoto. At 10 o'clock the fighting began in the center and on the eastern flank around Yahata, where the attackers succeeded in pushing their opponent back with little effort. The shogunate's artillery was concentrated on the western flank and was intended to crossfire the enemies advancing along the yodo. The Tsu artillery remained silent and when they finally opened fire at 12 o'clock, they did this completely surprisingly on the shogunate troops that had just been allied. When reports of this reached the eastern flank, it caused a panic, as the units there feared they would be cut off from the retreat and withdrew on Hiakata. This also threatened the rear of the western flank and also retreated. By late afternoon, the retreat was general and the victorious insurgents prepared for the advance of the next day.
This should not happen, because Itakura ordered the retreat on Osaka at night.
analysis
The hesitant, passive behavior of the Bakufu resulted in a lack of guidance and trust and encouraged the apostasy of the allied Han. When the decision to fight was finally made, it was hasty and without sustainable planning.
The lineup at the start of the battle fell due to political considerations and led to the insurgents taking the initiative. The fact that only 6,000 men were close enough to the enemy to be able to intervene in the first 40 hours was probably due to the poor reliability of a large number of these units. The leaders of Bakufu feared the influence of the Shishi on the troops of the great Han. The presence of British warships in Osaka may also have had an impact. In any case, most of the troops stayed near Osaka.
The leadership was poor. Tokugawa Yoshinobu was in bed with an alleged cold. The formal commander, Okochi, was in Yodo, Takenaka, the next in the chain of command, was initially in Fushimi. Their influence on the course of the battle was limited - on the one hand because of the sudden outbreak of fighting, on the other hand because of the lack of obedience of the subordinate officers. For example, when the Kuwara advanced belatedly at the beginning of the fighting for Toba and on the morning of January 28, Bakufu and Aizu unit leaders at Fushimi refused to swiftly counterattack.
There was also the problem that the battle was fought at two different stages and a defeat at one of the two could become a threat behind the other. The setbacks at the start of the fighting caused morale to drop rapidly. The open support of the rebels by the imperial court also induced some Han to cooperate. Since loss rates had dropped sharply on the last day of the battle, morale seems to have waned by then. Many combat reports speak of defeatism among soldiers and unit leaders for the last day . This also happened with the modern units trained by the French.
The existing artillery was not adequately supplied and only partially positioned within range of the fighting.
While the troops of Satsumas and Choshus were uniformly equipped with modern rifles and only their smaller contingents were poorly equipped, the troops of the shogunate had a very mixed armament.
While the best units - such as the French-trained infantry - had modern weapons, the Mimawari, for example, who were the first to come into contact with the enemy, and the Shinsengumi were equipped with pikes. Even the Aizu, who proved to be strong in combat, were only armed with swords and pikes.
literature
- Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862–1868 . Honolulu 1980, ISBN 0-8248-0614-X .
Individual evidence
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. pp. 459-461.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. p. 381.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. pp. 383, 385.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. pp. 382-383.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. pp. 382-383.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. pp. 387-388.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. pp. 394-396.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. pp. 398-400.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. pp. 408-414.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. pp. 416-417.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. pp. 419-420.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. p. 420.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. p. 423.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. p. 424.
- ^ Conrad Totman: The Collapse of Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu 1980. pp. 424-425.