Battle of Savo Island

The burning HMAS Canberra

date	August 9, 1942
place	Off Savo Island , Solomon Islands
output	Japanese victory

Parties to the conflict
United States United States Australia Australia	Japan Japan
Commander
United States Richmond Kelly Turner Frederick L. Riefkohl Victor Crutchley United States Australia	Japan Mikawa Gunichi
Troop strength
6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 6 destroyers	5 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer
losses
1024 dead 4 cruisers sunk, 1 cruiser damaged, 2 destroyers damaged	69 dead, 34 of them on Kako 2 Kreuzer damaged 1 Kreuzer sunk on march back

Overview - Pacific War

In the battle of Savo Island on the night of August 8th to 9th, 1942, Japanese forces attacked the US landing fleet , which had been unloading troops on the Solomon Islands Guadalcanal since August 7th ( see also Battle of Guadalcanal ). Savo is the name of a small island about five nautical miles from the northern tip of Guadalcanal, Cape Esperance.

The Japanese attack

After the US landing became known, there were several Japanese air strikes on the Allied invasion fleet on August 7th and 8th, damaging a transport ship and a destroyer. In the air battles it turned out that the Allies had air cover from American aircraft carriers .

The Japanese Commander: Vice Admiral Mikawa

On the evening of August 7th, the Japanese fleet set off a formation of five heavy and two light cruisers as well as a destroyer under Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi from their naval base in Rabaul . These were all available combat ships in this sea area. The unit was to take action against the Allied landing fleet on the night of August 9, causing as much damage as possible and marching back before daybreak in order not to be exposed to air attacks by American carrier planes .

Meanwhile, the commander of the American carrier fleet, Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher , decided to withdraw his carriers towards the evening of August 8th because of the high losses of aircraft. Turner, who thus lost his air cover, wanted to continue unloading the supplies until the morning of the 9th and then also withdraw with the invasion fleet - accepting that a large part of the supplies would remain on the ships and those landed on Guadalcanal Troops had to get by with inadequate equipment.

Battle formation

The American transport ships were in Sealark Sound , later known as Ironbottom Sound , the body of water between Florida Island in the north and Guadalcanal in the south. The Sealark Sound could be entered from the east through the Sealark Channel or from the west, either north or south of the island of Savo, which lies between Guadalcanal and Florida Island.

To protect the transports, Admiral Crutchley divided his forces into three groups. Two of them, each consisting of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers, were to patrol the passages north and south of the island of Savo. An attack from the east was considered unlikely, since the Japanese coming from Rabaul would have had to take the long way around Guadalcanal or Florida Island first; In order not to take any risk, a third group of two light cruisers and two destroyers secured the landing zone to the east. This eastern group was too far away to intervene in the ensuing battle. In addition, a destroyer was on an outpost patrol in front of the two western access routes. Five other destroyers were with the transports.

Late that evening, Admiral Turner ordered Admiral Crutchley and General Alexander A. Vandegrift , the commander of the 1st Marine Division , which had landed on Guadalcanal , to board his flagship, the troop carrier USS McCawley , to discuss the planned withdrawal of the transporters for the next morning. Admiral Crutchley drove to the meeting with his flagship, the heavy cruiser HMAS Australia , thereby withdrawing this cruiser from the southern cover group. The command of the group took over as senior officer the commandant of the USS Chicago , Captain Bode. The Chicago was in the unfavorable position for the formation management at the end of the cruiser column and Captain Bode did not put his ship at the head.

Course of the battle

Around midnight (August 8th / 9th) the Japanese association reached the passage between Savo and Guadalcanal. The US destroyer Blue used to guard this passage did not discover the Japanese ships that passed it about an hour after midnight on August 9th. Mikawa detached his destroyer companion Yunagi to shadow the Blue . It was only at 1:43 a.m. that the destroyer Patterson discovered the Japanese cruiser association near the island of Savo. Seconds later, the Japanese were able to demonstrate their high level of training in the night battle: their aircraft, which they had previously launched, threw light bombs at 1:43 a.m. , which bathed the allied ships of the southern cruiser group in a bright light, while the Japanese cruisers barely in front of the dark silhouette of Savo were recognizable (the use of radar was still in its infancy). The allied formation - two heavy cruisers and two destroyers - was completely taken by surprise.

Bow of the Chicago after the torpedo hit

Before the Allied units could fire a shot, the heavy cruisers Chicago and Canberra were hit by torpedoes and shells and badly damaged. The Canberra swerved out of line, began to burn in the fierce Japanese shell fire and was incapable of fighting and maneuvering within a few minutes. The damaged Chicago sighted the destroyer Yunagi in the west and headed for it, but ultimately unsuccessfully.

Burning Quincy in the headlights of Japanese cruisers

The still completely undamaged Japanese association now split up. The two groups turned north and ran around Savo to attack the second Allied cruiser group guarding the northern passage between Savo and the island of Florida. Since none of the allied ships attacked so far had sent a radio message, the surprise also succeeded here when the Japanese opened fire around 1:50 a.m. With their headlights on and firing non-stop, three cruisers passed in front of and four behind the northern guard group. The heavy cruisers USS Astoria , USS Vincennes and USS Quincy were shot down in minutes. Vincennes and Quincy sank within an hour; Astoria later on August 9th. During this northern battle, the Japanese cruisers Chōkai and Kinugasa also received hits that caused minor damage. Hits by the Quincy on the Japanese flagship Chōkai destroyed the command center and killed 34 men. The two US destroyers USS Ralph Talbot and USS Patterson were also damaged.

Allied forces

Commander	Ships	fate
V. Crutchley ( Royal Australian Navy ) Southern Group	Heavy cruisers HMAS Australia , HMAS Canberra ( Australian Navy ) , USS Chicago ; Destroyers USS Bagley , USS Patterson and USS Blue (on outpost patrol)	Canberra sunk; Chicago , Patterson damaged
F. Called cabbage northern group	Heavy cruisers USS Astoria , USS Quincy , USS Vincennes ; Destroyers USS Helm , USS Wilson and USS Ralph Talbot (on outpost patrol)	Astoria , Quincy , Vincennes down; Ralph Talbot damaged
N. Scott Eastern Group	Light cruiser USS San Juan , HMAS Hobart ( Australian Navy ) ; Destroyers USS Buchanan and USS Monssen	not involved in the battle
with the vans	Destroyers USS Selfridge , USS Mugford , USS Dewey , USS Henley and USS Ellet	not involved in the battle

Japanese armed forces

Commander	Ships	fate
G. Mikawa	Heavy cruisers Chōkai , Aoba , Furutaka ; Kako , Kinugasa ; Light cruisers Tenryū , Yūbari ; Destroyer Yunagi	Chōkai , Kinugasa damaged; Kako sunk by submarine on the way back

Termination of the battle

At around 2:16 a.m., Mikawa ceased firing and gathered his ships, as his unit had lost its tactical cohesion. Although he was already close to the enemy transport ships, he decided to break off the operation and return to Rabaul, as he feared that if he remained in these waters for a long time he would be attacked by aircraft of the US carriers at daybreak. The Japanese naval command did not know that these had been withdrawn the day before and were no longer within range - the actual objectives of the operation, the Allied transport ships, therefore remained unscathed.

The Chicago , which was looking for enemy ships west of Savo, did not return to the battlefield until 4:00 and accidentally shot at the Canberra and the destroyer Patterson lying alongside , but without getting hit. At that time, the crews of the Astoria and Canberra were still trying to save their ships. When Turner ordered the fleet to retreat around 6:30 am, the Canberra was sunk. The work continued on the burning Astoria until around noon on August 9th, several explosions occurred inside the ship and the cruiser finally sank.

The Japanese cruiser Kako torpedoed on its march back .

The Australian Navy criticized the decision to abandon the Canberra , which it felt was premature. In fact, it took over 250 shells and several torpedoes from the destroyers Ellet and Selfridge to bring the ship down. As a diplomatic gesture, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt asked the US Navy to baptize its own cruiser in the name of Canberra . This was launched in April 1943.

Mikawa's unit also suffered a loss when the heavy cruiser Kako was sunk by four torpedoes from the American submarine S-44 on August 10 off New Ireland on the march back to Rabaul .

consequences

Admiral Turner (left) with the commander of the invading forces, Major General Vandegrift.

The battle off Savo Island was tactically a heavy defeat for the Allies. Strategically, the victory of the Japanese army only had the advantage that Turner's retreat left the 19,000 US troops who had landed with only a few supplies such as ammunition and food, which made an immediate major offensive against the much smaller Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal impossible. Ultimately, however, the Japanese could not use this advantage: Since the Allies had already succeeded in conquering the airfield under construction on August 8th, only 12 days later it was put into operation as " Henderson Field " and thus gained control of the air, In the following months the Japanese occupation forces could only be insufficiently supplied. Finally, despite numerous nightly supply trips ( Tokyo Express ) , the island could not be held and was conquered by the Allies in February 1943.

The Japanese commander in front of Savo, Admiral Mikawa, was sharply criticized for not taking action against the transporters after the main Allied combat groups had been suppressed. But he remained in command of the Eighth Fleet. Crutchley also came under fire because he was held responsible for the high losses as the local commander. An investigation into the events off Savo, which began in December, exonerated the senior officers: Crutchley, like Turner, retained his rank and post.

The lower ranks fared differently: Captain Riefkohl, commander of the Vincennes and commander of the northern group, received no further command on a ship. Captain Bode of the Chicago was accused of leaving the combat area with his ship instead of walking to the Australia and the transports and protecting them; and also not to have issued a warning to the other ships after the start of the battle. Before a judgment was pronounced, Bode shot himself in April 1943.

literature

Bennett, Geoffrey: Naval battles in World War II, Augsburg 1989
Richard F. Newcomb, The Battle of Savo Island , Owl Books, 2002, ISBN 0-8050-7072-9
Elmar B. Potter, Chester W. Nimitz - Jürgen Rohwer: Seemacht , Manfred Pawlak Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Herrsching 1986, ISBN 3-88199-082-8