Security ethics

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The Security Ethics is a young field of applied ethics , which has established itself in the context of the new interdisciplinary safety research. In view of the increasing relevance of security in different political, economic and social discourses, considerations of security ethics address the question of the ethical implications of creating security in different areas of society. The use of security technologies is a particular focus.

object

safety

The concept of security is complex and the subject of different attributions. The security ethic takes up an understanding of security that primarily understands it as something produced or manufactured. Security, like uncertainty, is always a question of perception. What seems highly certain to the first may appear very uncertain to the second. So security is not an absolute category. For example, security on an airplane prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was certainly viewed as high. But this changed fundamentally afterwards. Before the terrorist attacks, it was not considered necessary to thoroughly check people before entering the aircraft, which is now considered unsafe and seems absurd. Security is not a fixed state to be achieved. Complete security - neither for some people nor for all - is neither efficient nor feasible. In addition, the desire for it appears dubious: because a community that would aim at the unlimited increase in security would dissolve itself in this attempt.

Rather, security can be understood as a resource. Security ethics ask for the right level. It examines the mechanisms and technologies of their production and problematizes their fair distribution as well as questions of weighing up other goods such as money, privacy or freedom. Because the pursuit of the goal of security is always associated with restrictions in other areas.

Security paradox

In the face of increasingly globalized, technologized and decentralized social structures, there is a growing feeling of fundamental insecurity at different levels of society. Advancing globalization, secularization and individualization make actions and their consequences increasingly unmanageable. Questions of accountability are becoming more and more complex. Last but not least, economic and ecological challenges have promoted the need for increased security in recent years.

In many respects, the German population lives more securely than it has been for a long time, if not more securely than ever. The security situation in Germany could therefore objectively be classified as relatively safe. Despite the subjective perception of security, one could assume that many people therefore do not feel a particularly great need for security. Here, however, what Ammicht Quinn calls the security paradox comes into play: “The more security I have, the more I need”. Uncertainty is therefore a prerequisite for the development of societies. In the course of the reduction of uncertainties, these can be tolerated less and less, so that the demand for coping and insurance strategies increases.

Basic questions

One of the most important basic problems of security ethics is the question of what kind of security is necessary for society and how it is to be achieved. It is important here, for example, to weigh up between public security and personal freedom, which is endangered by surveillance that ensures security . Not only privacy and personal freedom play a role here, but also how much money, work and other resources should be invested in security. The emergence of security ethics as an important part of ethics was promoted, among other things, by the ever-increasing fear of terror and the resulting surveillance.

The question of fairness in security activities also arises. The use of automatic facial recognition software can be cited as an example of a security ethical problem. Such software used by the American FBI could be proven not to be able to correctly identify people with dark skin color. It showed a 5–10% higher error rate in identifying dark-skinned people compared to identifying whites. The associated risk of being falsely accused of an offense committed by another person as a dark-skinned person is correspondingly higher. In addition to its intended effects, security software can also have unintended consequences - such as this continuation and reinforcement of discriminatory relationships. The second example of justice is the question of the distribution of security. For example, poorer people are often less secure than richer people, because law enforcement officers often do less of their work in poorer areas or in relation to poorer people. However, it also happens that poorer areas in particular are seen as a crime hotspot and are therefore more closely monitored. However, this can also be seen as a kind of "negative security", since those affected could be stigmatized by the heavy police presence at their place of residence. A rule of thumb in security ethics is therefore: “Security technology is fair if those who enjoy its advantages are also those who bear the (not only monetary) costs - including the costs of an incision in privacy or freedom of action - and when these costs are distributed almost equally ”.

Fields of application

Probably the biggest discourse in security ethics is about surveillance (see above). The security ethics is now applied in that it finds the right measure in which security takes precedence over the rights of the individual. The so-called panopticon of the western liberal world must be critically questioned here. So it is possible for the state to monitor every citizen, but conversely it is impossible for the citizen to keep an eye on the state. The lack of transparency here must also be criticized in the context of the security of individual citizens. If the whole thing is exaggerated, it is impossible to live safely in a Big Brother system , as any wrongdoing, be it morally and ethically right, can have consequences.

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Regina Ammicht Quinn: Security Ethics . An introduction . In: Security Ethics . Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden 2014, ISBN 978-3-658-03202-9 , p. 15–47 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-658-03203-6_1 ( springer.com [accessed June 3, 2020]).
  2. ↑ Regina Ammicht Quinn: Security Ethics . An introduction . In: Security Ethics . Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden 2014, ISBN 978-3-658-03202-9 , p. 15–47 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-658-03203-6_1 ( springer.com [accessed June 3, 2020]).
  3. ↑ Regina Ammicht Quinn: Security Ethics . An introduction . In: Security Ethics . Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden 2014, ISBN 978-3-658-03202-9 , p. 15–47 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-658-03203-6_1 ( springer.com [accessed June 3, 2020]).
  4. ↑ Bernhard Frevel: What about security? In: Security . Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden 2016, ISBN 978-3-658-12457-1 , p. 12 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-658-12458-8_3 ( springer.com [accessed June 3, 2020]).
  5. ↑ Regina Ammicht Quinn: Security Ethics . An introduction . In: Security Ethics . Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden 2014, ISBN 978-3-658-03202-9 , p. 19 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-658-03203-6_1 ( springer.com [accessed June 3, 2020]).
  6. ↑ Regina Ammicht Quinn: Security Ethics . An introduction . In: Security Ethics . Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden 2014, ISBN 978-3-658-03202-9 , p. 18 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-658-03203-6_1 ( springer.com [accessed June 3, 2020]).
  7. ↑ International Center for Ethics in Science at the University of Tübingen from March 26, 2020.
  8. ↑ Monitored: Seven billion in sight. Retrieved June 3, 2020 .
  9. ↑ Regina Ammicht Quinn: Security Ethics . An introduction . In: Security Ethics . Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden 2014, ISBN 978-3-658-03202-9 , p. 37 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-658-03203-6_1 ( springer.com [accessed June 3, 2020]).
  10. ↑ Regina Ammicht Quinn (ed.): Sicherheitsethik Springer VS , Wiesbaden 2013, ISBN 978-3658032029