Social sense
The work of social sense. Critique of Theoretical Reason is a work by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, first published in 1980 . He developed and deepened numerous of his theoretical concepts such as habitus , the logic of practice and the theory of types of capital .
With this book, the ethnologist Bourdieu turns increasingly to sociology. Social sense was originally conceived as an introductory theoretical part of The Subtle Differences , but in fact it only appeared a year later as an independent monograph. Social sense, like The Subtle Differences, is one of Bourdieu's main works.
Structure, creation and context
The original French title Le sens pratique was published in Paris in 1980. The German translation of the monograph first appeared in 1987 in two books by Suhrkamp Verlag.
In the first book, Critique of Theoretical Reason , Bourdieu develops his theoretical concepts such as habitus, the logic of practice and the theory of types of capital. In the second book, Practical Forms of Logic , the theoretical explanations are explained using ethnological material. In terms of structure, it is a reversal of the earlier work Draft A Theory of Practice . The empirical material comes predominantly from the ethnological field research already published in Draft A Theory of Practice , which Bourdieu carried out from 1958 to 1960 in Kabylia in northern Algeria.
content
Science criticism (criticism of the social sciences)
In the chapters of the first book 1. Objectifying Objectification and 2. The Imaginary Anthropology of Subjectivism , Bourdieu distinguishes himself from the modern sociological theories of his time. He deals with the question of the relationship between theory and practice and the conditions of the possibilities of scientific knowledge. By practice, Bourdieu means acting in a concrete situation.
According to Bourdieu, the social sciences distinguish between the two modes of knowledge subjectivism and objectivism . Bourdieu's primary concern now is to overcome this contradiction and still preserve the achievements of both:
"Of all the opposites that artificially divide the social sciences, the most fundamental and most pernicious is that between subjectivism and objectivism."
"In the social sciences, progress in knowledge presupposes progress in recognizing the conditions of knowledge."
Bourdieu deals with the underlying conditions of the knowledge of subjectivism and objectivism. He analyzes them in these introductory chapters. He notes that subjectivism and objectivism are both excluded from their own theories.
Bourdieu sees the structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Ferdinand de Saussure as a purely objectivist way of knowing. He opposes this mode of knowledge because the conditions of the possibility of objective knowledge are not questioned. He also expresses his criticism with the intentionally somewhat cumbersome chapter heading “Objectifying Objectification”.
On the other hand, Bourdieu breaks with the purely subjectivist approach. It presupposes an objectification. This is the case because sociology “does not want to be just a projection of a state of mind”. Because "because the agents never know exactly what they are doing, what they do has more meaning than they know themselves".
In his criticism, Bourdieu delimits himself against the free-floating spirit of any kind of intellectualism . He means z. B. Sartre's subjectivism or Saussure's objectivist linguistics .
“Intellectualism is [...] intellectualocentrism [...]. The transfer of a non-objectified theoretical relationship to practice, which one wants to objectify, is the cause of a whole series of scientific errors that are all interrelated. "
With Sartre, the illusion of "an" inertial consciousness "without a past and externality" prevails as an "imaginary world of exchangeable possibilities". This imaginary world is "experienced by a pure, bondless and rootless subject". Sartre's exclusively imaginary world does not stand up to comparison with the actual and not just thought-through and thought-out reality. With Saussure's constructed understanding of language, on the other hand, Bourdieu criticizes the fact that language is made the “object of analysis” and no longer fulfills its practical meaning.
Against this background, Bourdieu introduces the praxeological method of knowledge . This should avoid the complementary one-sidedness of subjectivism and objectivism.
In order to overcome the opposition between subjectivism and objectivism, one must break with both modes of knowledge. He introduces the concepts of theoretical (knowledge) practice and practical (knowledge) practice . Central is the insight that there is a fundamental difference between theoretical and practical (knowledge) practice. Every social practice is subject to a specific practical logic. For a more precise understanding of this social practice, Bourdieu developed the concept of habitus.
Habitus
In the third chapter “Structures, habitus forms, practices” Bourdieu introduces the habitus concept. First of all, he again clearly distinguishes himself from objectivism and structuralism. Instead, he suggests the terms opus operatum and modus operandi , which should be understood as a kind of cycle. While the modus operandi generates forms of practice and can be understood as a way of acting that is not consciously controlled, the opus operatum is seen as empirically analyzable patterns of perception, thought and evaluation generated by the modus operandi. This process creates the habitus forms or governs the structure over the habitus. Bourdieu himself explained the habitus very clearly at another point: It is a system of boundaries and if you know a person's habitus, you would know pretty well which actions or behavior would be unthinkable for the person. Furthermore, the habitus is incorporated, so you know instinctively what you can or should not do. This means that the action practices can also be reflected in movements, eating habits and language use. They run regularly and are collectively coordinated. Therefore it is possible to distinguish people from other classes based on their social position. It also helps people to recognize one another. People with a similar habitus identify with one another through common codes (which can be a similar taste) and can thus coordinate their practices. One can also speak of a class or group habitus. The groups or classes also have a greater chance of having the same experiences in their lives, which, according to Bourdieu, is due to the effectiveness of the ruling structures.
"Since it is an acquired system of generating schemes, all thoughts, perceptions and actions, and only these, can be freely brought about with the habitus which lie within the limits of the particular conditions of its own generation."
With this statement he emphasizes that the actors are also imposed a negative freedom through their habitus, which definitely limits their scope of action. If a person tries to exceed their limits, then all possible offenses are reprimanded without “violence, cunning or argument”, but one instinctively knows that a certain behavior is not proper.
Social field
Bourdieu does not devote a separate chapter to the concept of the social field in the social sense, nor does he explain the concept in detail. His remarks on the social field can be found mainly in Chapter 4 - Faith and Body. They represent an important cornerstone of his theory of social space . In a social sense, the ideas for the theory of social space are already fundamentally prepared with Bourdieu's remarks on the social field.
Bourdieu describes the social field as independent sub-areas of overall human practice that function according to certain rules and are subject to a certain logic . Examples are art , science and politics . These rules and logics differ depending on the social field. Social fields are not self-created areas. They are social constructions . Bourdieu characterizes these social fields in terms of social constructions on the one hand by their independence in analogy to "play". On the other hand, Bourdieu also characterizes social fields as "arbitrary" and "artificial".
Bourdieu assumes that the actors of a social field develop an idea of the functioning of the social fields. Bourdieu describes this notion of functioning as “the sense of the game”. Two of his main concepts, habitus and social field, come together at the point of the notion of the functioning of social fields:
“As a particularly exemplary form of the practical sense as an anticipated adaptation to the requirements of a field, what is referred to in the language of sport as the“ sense of the game ”[...] gives a very precise idea of the almost miraculous coincidence of habitus and Field, of incorporated and objectified history, which enables the almost perfect anticipation of the future in all concrete game situations. "
Bourdieu compares this idea of the “game” with real games and uses sports as a comparison in particular. While in a real game all participants know the clearly defined and explicitly formulated rules, this is not the case with social fields. According to Bourdieu, social fields function differently:
“On the other hand, in social fields, which as a result of a lengthy and slow process of independence, are games in and of themselves, so to speak, and no longer games for themselves, one does not consciously decide to participate, but is born into the game, born with the game, and is that The relationship between faith, illusion and commitment, the more total and unconditional the less it is recognized as such. "
Accordingly, one is born into certain social fields. In this way, the actors learn the rules of the game. They are "given the habitus necessary for the proper functioning of these fields". The actors are also not necessarily unconscious of belonging to certain fields. Bourdieu is of the opinion, however, that the actors “the less aware of this affiliation”, “the more imperceptibly and earlier you get involved in the game and the learning processes connected with it, whereby in the extreme you are naturally born into the game, born with it ".
According to Bourdieu, social fields function on the basis of the actors' belief in the game. Bourdieu also calls this belief Illusio . This "practical belief" is Bourdieu's view of "the entrance fee that all fields tacitly demand [...]". Bourdieu describes the rules, functional mechanisms and forms of knowledge and action that are then taken for granted in the field as Doxa .
The concept of the social field acquires extensive explanatory power and the possibility of gaining knowledge, especially in connection with Bourdieu's theory of capital . Bourdieu suggests that the functioning of the social fields is comparable to a “collective enterprise of the formation of symbolic capital, which can only succeed if it remains unrecognized how the logic of the field works”. Individual fields therefore function according to different “economies”. In these economies, different aspects of human activity, different cultural practices or objects etc. are evaluated differently. In this way, various aspects can be given more respect in a certain field than in other fields.
Logic of practice
The theories of social sciences are developed to understand and explain human behavior. These theoretical models aim to reveal mechanisms of action and predict behavior. Bourdieu criticizes the assumption that practical action is based on theoretical models. After all, the models are only designed to explain this very practice. This criticism is particularly directed against rational choice approaches that were prominent at the time , which theoretically model a rationally weighing self-interest actor. With this theory of action, some useful predictions could be made. But just because the prediction models work does not mean that the actors actually act according to the logic of the model in practice, i.e. that they actually (always) carry out complex cost / benefit considerations. The transfer of scientific theory back to the actor constructs an image of man (in this case Homo oeconomicus ). As a theorist, it takes a great deal of effort to pretend to explain rational behavior with mathematical models, while “introducing this rational being, an obligation to which an agent becomes whose entire practical action is to be based on reason”. By definition, the “economic subject without preconditions” excludes any question of the economic and social conditions, how this subject and its behavior come about.
By practice, Bourdieu means acting in a concrete situation. Practice is subject to a situation logic - the conditions of limited resources, temporality and urgency. This includes the irreversibility of action. The practice follows exclusively pragmatic considerations. The practical sense only differentiates between what is relevant and what is irrelevant in the respective situation.
“Exactly with this practical sense , which is neither burdened with rules nor with principles (except in the case of failure or failure), and even less with calculation or conclusions, which are excluded anyway by the time pressure of action, which“ tolerates no delay ” the meaning of the situation can be assessed on the spot, at a glance and in the heat of the moment, and the right answer can be found immediately. Only this kind of acquired mastery, which functions with the automatic certainty of an instinct, allows one to react instantly to possible uncertain situations and ambiguities in practice: [...] "
This is where practical logic differs from scientific logic . The scientist is relieved of the urgency and the pressure to act that the actors are usually subject to. Science is strongly delimited. Theoretical practice means observing and reflecting on practice. The scientific analysis - the grouping, the sorting, the synopsis - takes place in retrospect and overcomes the limitation of practice and thus excludes the complete recording and the complete understanding of the practical meaning. The scientific observer easily escapes the essentials of a practice, because the scientific recording changes the character of the practical logic. Scientific practice cannot claim any direct practical relevance.
The effect of time
In the chapter The Effect of Time , Bourdieu devotes himself to what he believes to be a gross mistake in the objectivism previously used in social science research: the investigation of practices without taking time into account. Since practice is constructed in time and only receives its meaning through this, the de-timed, objective consideration of a situation obscures the true knowledge that can only be gained through the recognition of a relationship between practice and time. When examining social practices, regularities can often be identified as a characteristic. However, this leads to practices being viewed as mechanical chains of action, which could also be reversed at will and in which people function like automatons. Based on this assumption, the practice in science is interspersed with determinants and models, and practices are degraded to predictable sequences of actions. However, Bourdieu sharply criticizes the assumption of a mechanical situation character by pointing to improvisation, intuition and the permanent uncertainty of the outcome of the situation, which significantly shape the logic of practice.
"Reintroducing the uncertainty means the reintroduction of time with its rhythm, its directionality, its irreversibility, whereby the mechanics of the model are replaced by the dialectics of strategies [...]"
Bourdieu thus justifies the demand for the consideration of the time aspect with the associated development of strategies that can change practice itself. For a really objective analysis it is important to recognize that a chain of action is not mechanically linked and can be reversed at will, but “must be created continuously and can be interrupted at any moment”. Bourdieu uses his ethnological investigations of exchange processes among the Kabyle as an empirical basis for his research . Using the exchange of gifts as a basic example of social practice, it becomes clear what real relevance the aspect of time has. In the case of exchange relationships, the choice of point in time enables the actors to achieve different effects through the same action, which in turn serve certain strategies - primarily the accumulation of symbolic capital. At the same time, the form of the relationship between the exchangers is constituted. Time becomes a "strategic resource" that must be taken into account. Reacting too quickly to a gift can have a negative impact on you, explains Bourdieu, using the Kabyle gift exchange:
"Anyone who shows how urgently he is in no longer to be obliged [...] to owe nothing, denounces the original gift as guided by the desire to oblige."
Strategic considerations become even more relevant in other Kabyle “exchanges” that Bourdieu has examined. Delaying an answer when a daughter's hand has been asked can induce reverence. Postponing an act of revenge can become an instrument of power that could be useful in the event of recurring conflicts. Here time has a new strategic function:
"[...] delaying the counter-gift can be a method of letting uncertainty about one's own intentions persist [...]"
These examples make it clear that social practices cannot be explained by models and determinants. The compulsive search for rules is therefore a major obstacle for Bourdieu to understanding the logic of practice. Instead of rules, practices are determined by a practical meaning that is directly derived from the situation. The acquisition of the meaning of the behavior and the knowledge of one's own symbolic value and that of the opponent are prerequisites for an appropriate reaction and thus credible situational action. This action is not based on conscious mental decision-making, but on an immediate understanding of the situation, a feeling for the meaning of the practice.
Classification in Bourdieu's biography
Due to his varied biography, Bourdieu is predestined to attempt the balancing act between practice and theory and the two sociological modes of knowledge. He comes from a simple background in rural France. He first studied philosophy and later conducted ethnological field studies in Algeria - which also play an important role in the second part of this book (see content). The work Social Sense marks his increased turn to sociology.
"The social world as a place of such" bastard "compromises between thing and sense [...] is a real challenge for everyone who can only breathe in the pure world of consciousness or" practice ""
literature
- Pierre Bourdieu : Draft of a theory of practice on the ethnological basis of Kabyle society. 2nd edition, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 2009 (first in French 1972).
- Pierre Bourdieu: Social Sense. Critique of Theoretical Reason. Frankfurt am Main, 1987, Suhrkamp. ISBN 3-518-57828-6 (French original: Le sens pratique, Les Éditions de Minuit, 1980. Collección «Le sens Commun».)
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1992. The hidden mechanisms of power. Hamburg: VSA.
- Secondary literature
- Gerhard Fröhlich and Boike Rehbein: Bourdieu manual. Life, work, effect. Stuttgart 2009, JB Metzler. ISBN 3476022358
- Markus Schwingel: Pierre Bourdieu - introduction , 3rd edition July 2000, Junius Verlag, 1995, ISBN 3-88506-321-2
- Nicole Burzan : Classes and Lifestyles in One Model: Bourdieu's Social Space. In: Nicole Burzan (ed.): Social inequality. An introduction to the central theories. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 3-531-14145-7 , pp. 138–152.
Individual evidence
- ^ A b Christian Schneickert and Alexander Lenger: Social sense . In: Fröhlich / Rehbein (ed.): Bourdieu-Handbuch, p. 280.
- ↑ a b Schwingel: Pierre Bourdieu - introduction , p. 47
- ↑ Bourdieu: Social Sense , p. 26
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , p. 127
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , p. 79
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , pp. 85–86
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , pp. 82/83
- ^ Schwingel: Pierre Bourdieu - introduction , p. 49
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , p. 98
- ↑ a b Bourdieu: Social sense , p. 102
- ↑ Bourdieu: The Hidden Mechanisms of Power , p. 33
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , p. 99
- ↑ Burzan: Classes and Lifestyles in a Model: The Social Space in Bourdieu , p. 130
- ↑ Bourdieu: Social Sense , p. 111
- ↑ Bourdieu: Social Sense , p. 112
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , p. 104
- ↑ cf. Bourdieu: Social Sense, p. 96 (footnote)
- ↑ a b cf. Bourdieu: Social Sense, p. 123
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn, p. 122 (see also p. 150)
- ↑ a b c d Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn, p. 124
- ↑ cf. Bourdieu: Social Sense, p. 122
- ↑ a b c Bourdieu: Social sense , p. 125
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , p. 148
- ↑ a b Bourdieu: Social sense , p. 88
- ↑ a b Bourdieu: Social sense , p. 149
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , p. 163
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , p. 164
- ^ Schwingel: Pierre Bourdieu - introduction , p. 50
- ↑ Bourdieu: Social sense , p. 180ff.
- ↑ a b c cf. Schneickert / Lenger: Social sense . In: Fröhlich / Rehbein (ed.): Bourdieu-Handbuch, p. 194
- ↑ Bourdieu: Social sense , p. 180f.
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , p. 183
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , p. 192
- ^ Schneickert / Lenger: Social sense . In: Fröhlich / Rehbein (Ed.): Bourdieu-Handbuch, p. 226.
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , p. 195
- ↑ Bourdieu: Social sense , pp. 189f.
- ↑ Bourdieu: Sozialer Sinn , pp. 190f.