Summation thesis (Aristotle)
The so-called summation thesis (also known as the theory ) is a political theoretical thesis that Aristotle puts forward in his main work on political philosophy . According to her, the decision of a larger group of people may be better than that of fewer individuals or experts. The thesis has at times been seen as an Aristotelian argument for the democratic form of government - also because it weighs out efficiency ( areté ) by sheer number.
The summation thesis can be understood as an early formulation of the basic idea of “ collective intelligence ”.
Source point
“But that the decision should lie more with the number than with the smaller number of the best [the aristoi ], that seems to exist and to be defended, perhaps even to be true. For the multitude, of which the individual is not an able man, seems to be able to be better overall than those best ; not each individual for himself, but the whole, just as the meals, to which many have contributed, can be better than those organized by an individual. For there are many, and each has a part in virtue and insight . As they come together, the crowd becomes like a single person who has many feet, hands, and organs of perception, and so does that of character and intellect. This is how the crowd judges the works of music and poets better; one judges this side, the other that side, and so everyone judges the whole. "
classification
| Number of rulers |
correct forms |
missed forms |
| One | monarchy | Tyranny |
| Some | aristocracy | oligarchy |
| All | Politics | democracy |
Apparently contrary to the general tenor of the third book of politics , the 11th chapter introduces a “quantitative” criterion into the discussion of the question of what “the decisive factor” should be in the state: “the crowd, the rich, the decent, the one, who would be the best of all, or the tyrant? ”From the normative point of view of Aristotle, it is primarily true that only a high degree of individual efficiency ( Greek: areté ) can be the reason that someone in the state community has special rights, with which he at the same time rejects wealth or the mere citizen status as a reason for political participation. In this sense, both oligarchy , as the rule of the rich, and democracy , as the rule of the many or the free-born poor, represent failed forms of government for him, also because they only pay attention to the well-being of the respective rulers.
Following on from the well-known typology of state forms (Chapters 6–8) and the investigation of the oligarchical and democratic concept of justice with regard to the nature of the state (as a community for the purpose of perfect life, Chapter 9), the short chapter 10 contains various problematizations of the assumptions made so far: “If the majority of the poor divide up the wealth of the rich, is this not unjust? Yet it did seem fair to the crucial part. [...] So should the minority and the rich rule fairly? If those do the same thing, robbing and stealing property from the crowd, is that fair? Then it would also be the first. ”Against this background, Aristotle begins with Chapter 11 Reflections on the correct distribution of competencies among the parts of the state with a view to the just constitution.
interpretation
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The participation of “the crowd”, the free people or the demos in the government of the state finds, in a different form, a thoroughly positive assessment within the framework of the Aristotelian constitutional typology, namely in the “good” popular rule, the politics , in which poor and rich, the two essential parts of the state that manage public affairs for the common good. Accordingly, the claims of the mass of the population to have a share in the administration of state affairs cannot be wholly unjustified, which Aristotle certainly admits in various (if not central) positions in politics . For example, the judgment of the people should be taken into account where it produces the better - perhaps less partisan - results or, for the sake of preserving the state, must be included.
Among the arguments for the participation of the “common people” in the government, the simple, but still prominent “summation thesis”, from the third book of Scripture, stands out in particular. The name goes back to an article by Egon Braun from 1959. The special significance of the thesis that the mass of people can judge better than a single person or a few must be seen against the background of the expertocratic attitude that is attributed to Plato and his students - including Aristotle. (As an example of this one repeatedly invokes the so-called “ philosopher king's sentence ” in Plato's Politeia .) In contrast to this thinking, the summation thesis also expressly attests to the “ordinary citizen” a certain political competence.
In Henning Ottmann states: "The political judgment of the amount should be better, or at least no worse 'than that of the experts be [Arist. Pole. III, 11, 1282 a17]. It is true that the individual was inferior to the expert [...]. But if many came together, then there would arise a composition or summation of skills and insight that is superior to the ability and insight of an individual. The parts of efficiency and insight that each individual possesses would be combined into a single great person with many feet and hands, with many senses and intellect ”.
The connection that Plato had established between politics and professional knowledge, that political rule (comparable to the art of a doctor) must also be tied to a higher qualification, is overcome by Aristotle's summation thesis, although Aristotle certainly also excludes Aristotle criteria for political participation, such as about a lack of virtue, quite knows. Ottmann also gives critical consideration to this: The thesis “stands and falls with the assumption that what is added can in itself, as an individual opinion, claim a certain correctness. A lot of wrong opinions could not be turned into a correct overall opinion by adding them up. Not the consensus as such, but rather the process of discussion and deliberation behind summation theory can explain how different opinions, when discussed and turned back and forth, improve and complement each other, so that in the end deliberation a better judgment and a better decision stand. ”Viewed in this way, the passage of politics at the center could even be interpreted as an isolated plea for the direct, advisory mode of government of the people gathered in the Ekklesie of Attic democracy .
Olof Gigon assesses the passage in his notes on III. Book of Politics as follows: “On the whole, Aristotle's thesis proves to be the somewhat breakneck attempt to unite two demands on the perfect state: 1. The goal of the perfect state must be the realization of virtue through the government of the most ethically qualified be; 2. Every state, even the perfect one, only lasts if all citizens are interested in its existence; they will only be if they can all participate in government. The only way then is through the acceptance of a collective reason and collective virtue that is still superior to the reason and virtue of even the most perfect individual. ”Gigon rightly sees Aristotle on this point in clear opposition to the Socratic tradition , as it was demonstrated by Xenophon and above all Plato (for example in Gorgias ) is represented.
criticism
On the one hand, the assessment of the “crowd”, the common people, which Aristotle in the 11th chapter of III. Politics book shows, with Ottmann as "strangely optimistic". The passage does not reflect the recognition of their susceptibility to demagoguery , as addressed by Thucydides and Plato. It also remains unclear why it should not be assumed that negative properties are added up. Ottmann said: “In masses, individuals lose their individuality and their sense of responsibility. They become emotionalized and pushed into actions that they would not allow themselves to be carried away as individuals. Aristotle, however, has less of the masses of modern mass psychology in mind than a citizenry articulating itself in popular and judicial assemblies and articulating in a disciplined manner. "
On the other hand, Aristotle seems to relativize his judgment in part by conceding in the text in the section following the passage of the “summation theory” that it is unclear whether “this difference exists between the many and the few noble in every people and every multitude ". Rather, it would be clear that the statement made by the theory cannot apply to many peoples.
Conclusion in the text
Against the background of the summation thesis apparently also problematic for Aristotle, he comes to the following conclusion in view of the now fundamentally justified claims of the "crowd" to political participation: that the many free people in the state hold the highest offices (the archonate, for example) are dangerous, "because because of their injustice and folly they will commit injustice here, there will commit mistakes." But to exclude them completely from rule is even more dangerous, according to Aristotle: "Because if the number of the dishonorable [ie those without political participation ] and the poor are very large, this state will inevitably be full of enemies. All that remains is to let them take part in advising and making decisions. ”At this point, at the latest, it becomes clear that the summation thesis is based on an idea of collective reason that arises when many decide together, but is completely absent when individuals from the "Common people" are entrusted with government powers. In view of this, it seems to Aristotle advisable to allow the crowd to participate only in the political deliberation and decision-making process (for example in the popular assembly) and the election of officials, while the “passive right to vote” must be withheld from them, since the individual poor usually have the personal qualification to rule.
See also
- Democracy theory
- Collective intelligence
- Second theory of the form of the state , for Aristotle's theory of democracy in particular.
Individual evidence
- ↑ quoted from translation by Gigon (see below), p. 119. It is not emphasized in the original.
- ↑ Arist. Pole. 1281 a11 ff.
- ↑ Arist. Pole. 1281 a14 ff., 1281 a23 ff.
- ↑ See Braun 1959
- ↑ Ottmann 2001, p. 194.
- ↑ Ottmann 2001, pp. 194f.
- ↑ Gigon in the notes on his politics translation (see below), p. 308f.
- ↑ See Ottmann 2001, p. 194.
- ↑ Ottmann 2001, ibid.
- ↑ Arist. Pole. 1281 b14 f.
- ↑ Arist. Pole. 1281 b26 ff.
- ↑ Arist. Pole. 1281 b29 ff.
literature
source
- Aristotle: politics . Translated and edited by Olof Gigon . 10th edition, Munich, 2006.
Secondary literature
- E. Braun: The summation theory of Aristotle , in: Annual Issues of the Austrian Archaeological Institute in Vienna 44 (1959), pp. 157-184.
- Henning Ottmann : History of Political Thought. The Greeks. From Plato to Hellenism , Vol. 1/2, Stuttgart / Weimar 2001.