Surprise (military)

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Instructions from the Swiss Army to soldiers who were not mobilized during World War II

Surprise or the element of surprise is an important condition for success or failure in warfare. Classic writers of strategy such as Sunzi and Liddell Hart base their considerations almost entirely on the surprise of the opponent as a possibility of achieving decisive victories. Battles and campaigns in which one party managed to surprise its opponent are particularly common in lists of major battles and victories.

Induction of surprise

The preparation of a troop for the fight, which not only has a mental effect, but also shows in the formation, is based in most cases on certain expectations. An approach of forces that does not meet the expectations of the opponent comes as a surprise. Due to the low level of readiness (preparation for this fight), which is the result of a surprise, the fighting strength and the combat value of the opponent are reduced.

Since only the unexpected surprises, in order to achieve the surprise you need to have expectations of the opponent

and or

be disappointed. If this succeeds, his willingness for this fight is initially low and he enters the battle with reduced fighting strength.

Expectations are always based on information. In addition to news about the location, type, strength and intent of an opponent, this also includes what was imparted in the training and what experience was gained. An important prerequisite for surprise is therefore to withhold relevant information from the opponent (e.g. through secrecy). Information can be withheld by withdrawing your own forces from the enemy reconnaissance (Japanese aircraft carrier association on the approach to Pearl Harbor ). False information can be given in a targeted manner ( Rommel had trucks drive around on his right wing in order to use the engine noise to give the enemy the impression that he was pulling forces there for the attack, which was planned on the left wing). Nowadays there is also the possibility of flooding the opponent with information so that he is no longer able to differentiate between important and unimportant things and cannot process and evaluate the information in time. One of the most effective methods of giving the enemy an inaccurate picture of the situation is based on the enemy's prejudices (example: the Ardennes are unsuitable for tank divisions (which was refuted in the western campaign in 1940)).

Success by surprise

Sustainable effectiveness is a prerequisite for the success of a surprise. If the opponent recovers too quickly from the surprise, or if he can prevent the surprise from resounding success through new arrangements, it cannot develop its effect.

  • It was surprising for the soldiers of the Wehrmacht to be attacked by Soviet cavalry, but they still repulsed the attack with their machine guns .
  • After the first encounter with war elephants, the Roman legionaries let them push through the gaps in the first meeting and made them down behind the front, where they no longer had any protection from their own infantry.
  • The Spartans were at Leuktra after the battle had started, no longer able to change their battle formation and adapt to the new conditions.
  • After the Austrians had initially watched Frederick the Great's flank march at Leuthen , which was misunderstood as a departure, after the Prussian army again turned left, they were no longer able to bring enough forces to the threatened wing in time.

Surprise at various management levels

Surprise is effective at all management levels. The higher the management level at which the surprise acts, the greater the expected effect. While tactical surprises only have a limited effect in terms of time and place and can be quickly contained, surprises at the operational and strategic level usually have a much more lasting effect. Surprises on one of the levels are not necessarily accompanied by surprises on the other levels.

  • While the German troops in Normandy were only slightly surprised by the invasion (as they were deployed there to repel an invasion), the surprise affected the operational management, who expected further invasions elsewhere and therefore only delayed further defense troops released.
  • The attack on Pearl Harbor surprised the soldiers stationed there so much that no effective defense could be established. Great Britain was surprised by the conquest of Norway by the Wehrmacht and could not bring in sufficient forces for defense in the short time.
  • The Allies were strategically and operationally prepared for an attack by the Wehrmacht through Holland and Belgium, but were tactically surprised by the rapid capture of Fort Eben-Emael and both operationally and strategically by the rapid tank advance through the Ardennes.
  • The crews of the Allied bombers and their escort fighters were not prepared for attacks from below ( weird music ) and initially had nothing to counteract them; the air combat tactical surprise, however, did not affect their air dominance because of the limited effectiveness .

Unpredictability as a military-political problem

The prevention of a world war during the Cold War was based heavily on the predictability of the potential opponents NATO and the Warsaw Pact . On the one hand, each of the two alliances had to reckon with the willingness of the other side to use nuclear weapons at the price of its own destruction. On the other hand, this balance of horror and predictability also made disarmament negotiations such as START possible .

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Egon Bahr , New Approach to Common Security in: Die Neue Gesellschaft, Volume 29 (1982), pp. 659 ff.