Battle of Leuktra
| date | August 5, 371 BC Chr. |
|---|---|
| place | Leuktra |
| output | Victory Thebes |
| consequences | End of Spartan domination |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
|
Thebes |
Sparta |
| Commander | |
|
Epaminondas |
Cleombrotos I. † |
| Troop strength | |
| 7,000 men (including 1,000 cavalry) |
11,000 men (including 1,000 cavalry) |
| losses | |
|
about 400 |
approx. 1,000 |
With the Battle of Leuktra the Theban War began between Sparta and its allies and Thebes and its allies in 371 BC. In it the Theban general Epaminondas defeated the Spartan army, which had been considered invincible until then, by applying the leaning order of battle for the first time . The armies met at Leuktra, a small Boeotian town near Thespiai and about 10 km from Thebes. The decisive Theban victory broke the dominance of the Spartans over Greece , which had existed since the Peloponnesian War . However, Thebes' subsequent power position was also short-lived. Under Philip II , Macedonia took the lead in the Greek states with a victory in the battle of Chaironeia over an allied army of Athens and Thebes.
prehistory
Between 395 and 387 BC During the Corinthian War , Sparta fought for supremacy in Greece against an alliance of Thebes, Athens, Corinth and Argos, which was financially supported by Persia. Thebes was able to win the first skirmish of this war against a Spartan reaction force at Haliartus before the Spartan civil army arrived. In the further battles Sparta defeated the armies of the allies and was thus able to maintain its supremacy in the peace of Antalkidas (= peace of the king ). The following period was overshadowed by constant tensions between Thebes, which claimed supremacy in Boeotia, and Sparta, which would not tolerate this competitor. In 382 the Spartan troop leader Phoibidas occupied the Kadmeia , the citadel of Thebes, without instructions , and put a garrison into it. This resulted in a strengthening of patriotism in Thebes. Three years later, in 379, the garrison was driven out again by the Thebans. When a group of Boeotian cities asked Sparta to free them from political control of Thebes, and Sparta then demanded the withdrawal of the Theban garrisons from these Boeotian cities, war broke out again.
Starting position
One of the two Spartan kings, Cleombrotus I , was with an army in Phocis near Delphi at the beginning of the war . Instead of taking the usual pass route to Boeotia, Cleombrotos decided to march through the mountains over Thisbe, about 50 km away , and to take the fortified port of Kreusis der Thebans, 7 km from Thisbe, including 12 Theban ships. He carried out these movements so quickly that the Thebans only learned of his presence when he captured Kreusi. On the correct assumption that Cleombrotos would now march directly against Thebes, Epaminondas gathered the troops of Thebes and his allies near the small town of Leuktra, about 9 km southwest of Thebes, on the road to Thisbe. After a march of 25 km, Cleombrotos also arrived there.
Course of the battle
After the armies at Leuktra had developed and acted against each other, the Spartan Peltasts and skirmishers opened the battle. Subsequently, a skirmish developed between the Spartan cavalry, which Cleombrotos had put in front of his front, perhaps to shield a flank march, and the Boeotian horsemen. As was to be expected, the Spartan cavalry was chased from the field, but in their evasive movement through the narrow lanes between the Spartan detachments, disordered the phalanx and the flanking movement that had begun could not be completed. The Theban phalanx proceeded according to plan, thus holding back the right wing in a staggered manner, while the deep column on the left inevitably encountered the right wing of the Spartans and defeated it. In the clash, two Spartan detachments with a total of 1,000 men were almost completely destroyed, and King Cleombrotos, his deputies and four hundred Spartans were killed. When the rest of the Spartan army saw that the right wing was defeated, they left the field to the Thebans. Epaminondas refused to pursue the defeated enemy.
Importance of the battle
The brilliant victory of the Thebans took the aura of invincibility from Sparta. Epaminondas took advantage of the victory, attacked Sparta in the Peloponnese and weakened it so decisively that it lost its supremacy in Greece.
Tactical importance
- The Battle of Leuktra is the first battle for which the use of the Leaning Order of Battle has been proven. The crooked order of battle is still considered a high art of tactics.
- Epaminondas was the first European general who, by consciously weakening it elsewhere, formed a focus at the point where he wanted to seek success. He is therefore considered to be the creator of the tactical principle of concentration.
- Due to the organic connection of the cavalry with the hoplites on both wings, Epaminondas is also considered to be the founder of the tactical principle of combined arms combat in Europe.
Evaluation and state of research
With Hans Delbrück in the 1880s a dispute began about the strength of the armies that met in Leuktra, the tactical concept (idea of the battle) on which Epaminondas based the battle, the tactical principles that came to light in this battle, and the peculiarity or ordinariness of the course and success of this battle. Delbrück doubted the traditional figures. He saw no reason to assume that the Spartans had appeared on the battlefield with ten to eleven thousand hoplites, while Epaminondas had only six to seven thousand at their disposal. Rather, he assumed that both armies had about the same number of hoplites, but that the Boeotians had a numerically superior cavalry. The decisive factor for him was, among other things, the consideration that the Theban victory against an equal number is to be assessed as an outstanding tactical achievement, the victory against one and a half times superiority could not increase Epaminondas' fame. The dispute continues to this day. Today's representatives of the opposition to Delbrück's view are Victor Davis Hanson and Donald Kagan , who assume that the crooked order of battle did not correspond to a plan, but rather arose by chance during the battle and was not an expression of a will to win, but a delaying tactic. Both rely on the numerical superiority of the Spartans. Both see the introduction of combined arms combat under Alexander the Great in the Macedonian army. The use of the cavalry, the subdivision and the possibility of using the elite on the left do not count towards Epaminondas, as this had already existed in some battles before, but not in this combination. But they accept Epaminondas as the founder of the principle of concentration.
Aside
- The Holy Company also fought on the victorious left wing of Thebes .
- A memorial was erected on the battlefield, which, restored, is still there today and can be viewed.
See also
literature
- Little Pauly
- Peter Connolly: Greece and Rome at War
- Victor Davis Hanson: The War in Ancient Greece
- Hans Delbrück: History of the Art of War , Volume 1 The antiquity
- Bernard Law Montgomery: World History of Battles and Campaigns , Volume 1
- I. Ch. Bagramjan (ed.): History of the art of war
swell
- Xenophon , Hellenica , vi. 4. 3-15
- Diodorus , xv.50–56 (gives a completely different and in comparison to Xenophon improbable description)
- Plutarch , Pelopidas 20-23
- Pausanias ix. 13. 210
Web links
- Andreas Fischer: Leuktra. (PDF) University of Munich, accessed on June 5, 2011 .
Individual evidence
- ^ Eduard Meyer : Geschichte des Altertums, 5th volume, book 4, 403
- ^ A b Hermann Bengtson: Greek History from the Beginnings to the Roman Empire , Issue 5, Publisher: C. H. Beck, 1977, ISBN 3-406-06660-7 , page 277.
- ↑ a b Sergeant Arthur Majoor: The Battle of Leuktra ( Memento of the original from June 13, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 181 kB), The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin (Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall / Winter 2003, page 52).
