Aʿyān thābita

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The term Aʿyān thābita ( Arabic أعيان ثابتة, DMG aʿyān ṯābita  'fixed entities') is an ontological term from the philosophy of the Andalusian mystic Muhyī d-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240) and his school. It denotes the beings contained in God's primordial knowledge, which underlie the contingent things existing in the external world . The attribute “fixed” ( ṯābit ) is used for these beings because they are contained in God's knowledge regardless of their external existence . In his work Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam , Ibn ʿArabī relates the fixed beings to the words of God, which cannot be changed, from Sura 10:64 .

Statements in Ibn ʿArabi

Ibn ʿArabī deals with the Aʿyān thābita in his works al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya and Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam as well as in a separate treatise.

al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya

In al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya , Ibn ʿArabi confesses that he borrowed the term from Muʿtazilite theology and refers to a hadeeth qudsī according to which God said: “I was a hidden treasure that was not known. But I wanted to be recognized. That is why I created the creatures and made myself known to them. And they recognized me. ”The hidden treasure in this hadith, in his view, proves the existence of the Aʿyān thābita. According to Ibn ʿArabī, the Aʿyān thābita are specifically the fixed beings of the possible, i.e. H. contingent things ( mumkināt ); the appearance of the multitude of forms in existence indicates their regularities.

In the 312nd chapter of al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya , which deals with the type of inspiration among friends of God and their protection from the inspiration of the Satans , Ibn ʿArabī explains that there are only three types of knowledge:

  1. the absolute existence ( al-wuǧūd al-muṭlaq ) which is not bound; this is the existence of God, that which necessarily exists through itself;
  2. the absolute non-existence ( al-ʿadam al-muṭlaq ), which by itself is non-existence. It never enters into a bond, is unthinkable ( muḥāl ) and is opposed to absolute existence.
  3. There is a barrier ( fāṣil ) between these two opposites . This is the highest Barzach ( barzaḫ al-barāziḫ ). One side of him opens to existence, the other to nonexistence. Here are all the contingent things that are absolute like existence and non-existence.

Ibn ʿArabī explains that the Aʿyān thābita are fixed beings who are peculiar to the contingent things in the Supreme Barzach. You are on the side of the Barzach that is facing absolute existence. The existing contingent things that God creates were to the Aʿyān thābita as shadows were to their bodies. There is no existing form ( ṣūra mauǧūda ) without a fixed entity that is identical with it and for whom existence is like a dress ( ṯaub ). Ibn ʿArabī expresses his amazement at the Ashʿarites , who reject the notion that non-being in its non-being is a thing, has a fixed being and then existence is added to it. He explains that absolute nonbeing is related to absolute being like a mirror in which being can see its form. This form is the essence of the contingent, and therefore the contingent in the state of its non-being has a fixed essence.

In another passage from al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya , Ibn ʿArabī explains that there are fixed beings who are endowed with existence, just as one knows that if one dips a sewing needle into the sea, something of that on the The needle sticks. The proportion of the water that sticks to the needle to the sea does not correspond in its extent to what the fixed beings have clad in the garment of existence, because the ocean is limited, but the fixed beings are unlimited. Nevertheless, this parable is undoubtedly correct.

Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam

In a passage from his Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam , which deals with the problem of the absolute immutability of the causal relationship in this world, Ibn ʿArabī makes it clear that the fixed beings have an intermediate status between eternity and temporality through their connection with existing things. Here he writes:

“It is not possible to override the instrumental causes ( asbāb ) because the fixed entities require them. And in existence everything only appears in the form in which it exists in the fixed state, because the words of God cannot be changed (see Sura 10:64 ). The words of God are nothing else than the beings of existent things. On the one hand, with regard to their fixed state, they are assigned initial eternity ( qidam ) and, on the other hand, with regard to their existence, originated in time ( ḥudūṯ ). "

The treatise on the Aʿyān thābita

Ibn ʿArabī's separate treatise on the Aʿyān thābita is conceived as a commentary on the hadith on the hidden treasure. Here he explains that things generally have two existences, a knowledge existence ( wuǧūd ʿilmī ) and an external existence ( wuǧūd ḫāriǧī ). Knowledge existence is what is called the Aʿyān thābita. They are beginningless ( qadīm ) and primeval ( azalī ), while the external existence is brought about in time. The concealment of God applies in relation to the Aʿyān thābita in the beginningless eternity. Because these, he explains, exist with God, but they have no knowledge of him, so that God is hidden with regard to them. When God intended that the Aʿyān thābita should know him, he led them out of the knowledge-like existence into the outer existence so that he might be known. Because God is only known through external existence.

Statements made by later thinkers

The theologian al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurdschānī (d. 1413) defined the Aʿyān thābita as follows:

“They are the realities of the contingent things in the knowledge of God and the forms of the realities of the divine names in the sphere of knowledge ( ḥaḍra ʿilmīya ). They follow it in terms of essence, but not in time, for they are initially eternal ( azalīya ) and end-eternal ( abadīya ). Relativity ( iḍāfa ) only means posteriority in terms of essence, nothing else. "

The Persian mystical thinker Jāmī (d. 1492) identified the Aʿyān thābita with the quiddities ( māhīyāt ) of Aristotelian philosophy. In his work Naqd an-nuṣūṣ he explains:

“The Aʿyān thābita are the named individualized forms in the knowledge-based presence. And these forms emanate from the divine being through the most holy emanation ( al-faiḍ al-aqdas ) and the primary manifestation by means of essential love and the pursuit of the keys of concealment, which only He knows, for appearance and perfection. The divine manifestation is divided into the most holy emanation and the holy emanation ( al-faiḍ al-muqaddas ). Through the former, the beings and their basic dispositions adjust to knowledge, through the latter those beings in the external with their necessary appearances and consequences. "

Jami then explains that the Aʿyān thābita, which the philosophers call quiddities, are not created ( ġair maǧʿūl ).

The concept of Aʿyān thābita became particularly important in the Islamic mysticism of Southeast Asia. Hamza Fansūrī , who lived at the court of the Sultan of Aceh in the early 17th century , provided twelve theological derivations for these beings in his work Asrār al-ʿārifīn . The concept also plays an important role in the Javanese adaptation of the Arabic Sufi work at-Tuḥfa al-mursala ilā rūḥ an-nabī .

ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazā'irī explains in his Mawāqif : “If God reveals to one of the elite of his servants something of his foreknowledge about him and of what his established being requires, then it is permissible for this servant to say: 'I did what I did at his request and willful command. "

Inner Islamic criticism of the concept

One of the most articulate critics of the aʿyān-thābita theory was the Hanbali scholar Ibn Taimiya (d. 1328). He said that Ibn ¡Arab∆ ascribed the aʿyān thābita an existence of their own and thus violated the Islamic dogma of Tawheed . He also argued that accepting such pre-existent beings would unduly restrict God's omnipotence .

Similar objections to the aʿyān-thābita theory were later put forward by Nūr ad-Dīn ar-Rānīrī , who was the leading court scholar in the Sultanate of Aceh in the time of Iskandar II. Thani Ala (r. 1636–1641). He had the books of Hamza Fansūrī and his student Samatrānī burned in public and their students executed.

Modern interpretations

Toshihiko Izutsu translated the term Aʿyān thābita in English with "permanent archetypes". However, William Chittick has criticized this translation as inadequate, arguing that there is a great difference between the Platonic archetypes and the Aʿyān thābita, because the former form the model for many individuals , while for the latter, each "fixed entity" ( ʿain ṯābita ) is one “Existing entity” ( ʿain mauǧūda ) faces.

Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila sees a similarity between the concept of Aʿyān thābita and the space-time worm of four-dimensionalism : the birth of a person and their life to death is a fixed sequence in a four-dimensional world that undergoes no change; only when you look at the situation from a conventional three-dimensional perspective do you experience the sequence as a change. It is the same with the fixed entity: it is unchangeable, although its manifestations seem to change in time. The original, the fixed entity, however, is immutable and eternal in God's knowledge. One thing ( šaiʾ ) is only a three-dimensional cross-section from a four-dimensional entity, namely the ʿain thābita . The difference between the spacetime worms and the fixed entities, however, is that the former belong to the physical world and have no spiritual meaning, while the latter exist in the spiritual world and do not belong to the physical world in which they manifest themselves.

Another metaphor that Hämeen-Anttila uses to illustrate the concept of Aʿyān thābita is that of the videotape : when you watch the film it contains, you see people moving and changing; the video cassette itself, however, does not experience any change. The same applies to the change of things in this world: it is built into the Aʿyān thābita, which, however, are not themselves subject to change; the change only takes place in our perception.

literature

Arabic sources
  • Muḥyī d-Dīn Ibn-ʿArabī: al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya . 4 vols. Dār al-Kutub al-ʿArabīya al-Kubrā, Cairo, 1911. Digitized
  • ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān ibn Aḥmad Ǧāmī: Naqd an-nuṣūṣ fī šarḥ naqš al-fuṣūṣ . Intišārāt-i Anǧuman-i Šāhanšāhī-i Falsafa-i Īrān, Tehran, 2577 (= 1977 AD).
Secondary literature
  • William Chittick : The Sufi path of knowledge. Ibn al-Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination. Albany 1989. pp. 83-86.
  • Geneviève Gobillot: “Une Solution Au Problème De La Prédestination En Islam: Les Essences Prédisposées D'Ibn 'Arabî” in Revue Philosophique De Louvain 105/3 (August 2007) 333–360; 105/4 (November 2007) 555-589.
  • Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila : “The Immutable Entities and Time” in Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society 39 (2006) 15–32. On-line
  • Toshihiko Izutsu : Sufism and Taoism: a comparative study of key philosophical concepts . University of California Press, Berkeley et al. a., 1983. pp. 159-196.
  • AH Johns : The Gift addressed to the spirit of the prophet . Canberra 1965.
  • Todd Lawson: "The Mythic Substrate of Ibn al-ʿArabī's Immutable Entities - al-aʿyān al-thābita" in Journal of the American Oriental Society 136.4 (2016) 817f.
  • Egbert Meyer: “A short treatise by Ibn ʿArabī on the -aʿyān aṯ-ṯābita” in Oriens 27/28 (1981) 226-265.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Ibn-ʿArabī: al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya . 1911, Vol. II, p. 232, lines 11f. - Engl. Transl. At Chittick: The Sufi path of knowledge. 1989, p. 204.
  2. ↑ Ibn-ʿArabī: al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya . 1911, Vol. II, p. 473, line 34.
  3. ↑ Ibn-ʿArabī: al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya . 1911, Vol. III, p. 46. - Engl. Transl. By Chittick: The Sufi path of knowledge. 1989, p. 204a.
  4. ↑ Ibn-ʿArabī: al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya . 1911, Vol. III, p. 47, line 6. - Engl. Transl. By Chittick: The Sufi path of knowledge. 1989, p. 204b.
  5. ↑ Ibn-ʿArabī: al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya . 1911, Vol. III, p. 47, line 19. - English translation by Chittick: The Sufi path of knowledge. 1989, pp. 204b-205a.
  6. ↑ Ibn-ʿArabī: al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya . 1911, vol. III, p. 47. line 31. - Engl. Transl. At Chittick: The Sufi path of knowledge. 1989, p. 205a.
  7. ↑ Ibn-ʿArabī: al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya . 1911, Vol. III, p. 47. Lines 33f. - Engl. Transl. At Chittick: The Sufi path of knowledge. 1989, p. 205a.
  8. ↑ Ibn-ʿArabī: al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya . 1911, Vol. IV, p. 320. Lines 18-21. - Engl. Transl. At Chittick: The Sufi path of knowledge. 1989, p. 85b.
  9. ↑ See Izutsu: Sufism and Taoism . 1983, p. 163.
  10. ↑ Muḥyī d-Dīn Ibn-ʿArabī: Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam . Ed. Abū l-ʿAlā ʿAfīfī. Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 1966. p. 211. Digitized
  11. ↑ Meyer: “A short treatise by Ibn ʿArabi”. 1981, pp. 233, 236.
  12. ↑ Cf. as-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurdschānī: Kitāb at-Taʿrīfāt . Ed. Gustav wing. Leipzig 1845. p. 30. Digitized
  13. ↑ Ǧāmī: Naqd an-nuṣūṣ fī šarḥ naqš al-fuṣūṣ . 1977, p. 42.
  14. ↑ Ǧāmī: Naqd an-nuṣūṣ fī šarḥ naqš al-fuṣūṣ . 1977, p. 43.
  15. ↑ See SMN al-Attas : The Mysticism of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī . Kuala Lumpur 1970. pp. 81-86.
  16. ↑ See Johns 14f.
  17. ↑ ʿAbd al-Qādir Ibn-Muḥī-d-Dīn al-Ǧazāʾirī: al-Mawāqif ar-rūḥīya wa-l-fuyūḍāt as-subūḥīya . Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, Beirut, 2004. p. 423. Digitized
  18. ↑ Cf. Alexander Knysh : Ibn 'Arabī in the Later Islamic tradition. The Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam. Albany 1999. pp. 101f.
  19. ↑ See Johns 113f.
  20. ↑ Amirul Hadi: Islam and State in Sumatra. A Study of Seventeenth Century Aceh . Leiden 2004, p. 155.
  21. ↑ Izutsu: Sufism and Taoism: a comparative study . 1983, pp. 159-196.
  22. ↑ See Chittick: The Sufi path of knowledge. 1989, p. 83f.
  23. ↑ Hämeen-Anttila: “The Immutable Entities and Time” 2006.
  24. ↑ Hämeen-Anttila: “The Immutable Entities and Time” 2006.