Air Transport International Flight 782

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Air Transport International Flight 782
McDonnell Douglas DC-8-61 (F), Air Transport International - ATI AN0236600.jpg

A similar Douglas DC-8 from Air Transport International
Accident summary
Accident type Stall when taking off with three engines
place at Kansas City International Airport , Missouri , United StatesUnited StatesUnited States 
date February 16, 1995
Fatalities 3
Survivors 0
Aircraft
Aircraft type United StatesUnited States Douglas DC-8-63F
operator United StatesUnited States Air Transport International
Mark United StatesUnited States N782AL
Departure airport Kansas City International Airport , Missouri , United StatesUnited StatesUnited States 
Destination airport Springfield-Westover Metro Airport , Massachusetts United States
United StatesUnited States 
Passengers 0
crew 3
Lists of aviation accidents

The Air Transport International flight 782 (flight number IATA : 8C782 , ICAO : ATN782 , call sign AIR TRANSPORT 782 ) was a ferry flight on 16 February 1995. On this flight should be a Douglas DC-8-63 of the Air Transport International with a defective engine from Kansas City International Airport in the US state of Missouri to Springfield-Westover Metro Airport in Massachusetts . During takeoff, the machine stalled and then crashed, killing all three people on board.

plane

The machine that crashed was a Douglas DC-8-63F, which was finally assembled at the Douglas plant in Long Beach , California . The machine had the serial number 45929, it was the 367th Douglas DC-8 from ongoing production. The rollout of the machine took place on May 7, 1968, the machine was given the test number N19B for test flights . On June 16, 1968 the machine was delivered to the Canadian Pacific Air Lines , it went into operation with this with the aircraft registration CF-CPS , the fleet number 804 and the name Empress of Hong Kong . From June 19, 1968, the machine was leased to the Flying Tiger Line , where it was operated with the aircraft registration N624FT . On July 1, 1969, the machine returned to its owner, now trading as CP Air , where it retained its old fleet number and aircraft registration number, but was renamed the Empress of Madrid . On January 1, 1974, the machine received the new designation C-FCPS and the new name Empress of Sydney . On March 1, 1983, Worldways Canada took over the machine along with its registration number and fleet number. From August 1985 she leased the plane to Icelandair , which in turn operated it for Air Algérie . In September 1985 the machine returned to Worldways Canada. In December 1990 the aircraft was bought by the Aerolease Financial Group and converted into a cargo aircraft. The machine was then leased to Burlington Air Express , on whose behalf Air Transport International operated the DC-8 from October 15, 1991. The machine received its last registration number N782AL . From January 10, 1994 Air Transport International became the lessee of the machine, the lessor remained the Aerolease Financial Group . By the time of the accident, the machine had completed a total of 77,096 operating hours, which accounted for 22,404 take-offs and landings.

crew

There was a three-person crew on board the machine, consisting of a flight captain, a first officer and a flight engineer.

Flight captain

The 48-year-old flight captain (born October 18, 1946) had flown from March 1983 to June 1988 at the Trans Air Link cargo aircraft of the Douglas DC-6 and Douglas DC-7 types with the rank of flight engineer and first officer. In October 1988 he qualified as captain on board these two types of aircraft. He stayed with this airline until his leave of absence in October 1991. Until November 1989 he flew as first officer in aircraft of the type Douglas DC-8, after which he was used as the captain of this type of aircraft. A certificate of a successfully completed flight proficiency test from August 1991 was available when the accident report was drawn up. In February 1992, the captain began an employment relationship with Fine Air , where he was used as the captain of the Douglas DC-8. From November 1992 he was hired by American International Airways as first officer of the Douglas DC-8. He left the company in January 1994 and was subsequently hired by Air Transport International as captain of the Douglas DC-8. The captain had 9,711 hours of flight experience, of which he had completed 3,129 hours as a captain on board the Douglas DC-8 and a further 1,354 hours as first mate of machines of this type.

What is striking is the almost two-year demotion of the captain to the rank of first officer without renewed promotion. During his time at American International Airways, there were contradicting judgments by test captains about the pilot's flying skills. For example, someone wrote the following note on a line check in an examination book on October 5, 1993:

  • Excellent ride. [This individual] would make a good captain. (Excellent flight. [This person] would make a good captain.)

In contrast, another test captain on October 20, 1993, with whom the pilot completed a simulator test for first officers:

  • [This individual], at this time, does not exhibit the confidence and command authority necessary to function as a pilot in command. I do not recommend he be considered to for upgrade at this time. ([This person] does not have the trustworthiness and leadership authority required to be the pilot in command. I do not currently recommend that a promotion be considered.)

After completing a second first officer simulator exam, another examiner noted in the comments column:

  • Good instrument scan and aircraft control. Weak on procedures. All proficiency training maneuvers completed satisfactorily. (Good instrument overview and control of the machine. Weak in carrying out procedures. All maneuvers of the proficiency test were completed in a satisfactory manner.)

In April 1994 the master carried out a flight with a test master present in the cockpit. The aim was to check the suitability for use on international flights. The examining captain found that the captain was not suitable for use in international air traffic and that he should initially only be used on domestic flights until he became more experienced. At the time of the accident it was being used on international flights, so two days before the accident it was observed on a flight to Germany by a captain who commented positively on the captain's performance.

Although the master's training records indicated that he had completed simulator training for three-engine take-offs, there was nothing to indicate that he had ever operated as a pilot in Command under such conditions.

First Officer

The 38-year-old first officer (born August 15, 1956) acquired his private pilot's license on March 22, 1981 and qualified as a commercial pilot on October 12, 1989. Previously, on March 20, 1989 , an auditor for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pronounced a disapproval for failing to check the instruments. The disapproval concerned procedures for holding patterns , traffic patterns and VOR -Anflüge. On April 15, 1989, the first officer was tested again on these points and this time passed the test. On July 13, 1992, an FAA examiner again disapproved, this time due to a failed oral and flight proficiency test with a Piper PA-31-350 . Two weeks later, the first officer was again successfully examined here. The first officer also had a type rating for the Boeing 737 , which he had acquired on August 20, 1993. Ten days earlier, the pilot had received another disapproval from an FAA examiner, this time for a failed simulator test. The first officer was employed by Sunwest Aviation from November 1990 to January 1994 . At the company he was used as the captain of the small feeder aircraft Beech 99 and the Piper PA-31 . From February 1993 to August 1994 he also flew for the Ameriflight , where he was used on the same types of aircraft. The first officer was hired by Air Transport International on August 22, 1994. At the time of the accident, the first officer had 4,261 hours of flight experience. At Air Transport International he was still in his one-year probationary period. He had only been flying Douglas DC-8s for four months and had 171 hours of flight experience with this type of aircraft.

Flight engineer

The 48-year-old flight engineer (born July 20, 1946) retired in October 1989 after 23 years of service with the United States Air Force . By then, he had more than 4,000 hours of flight experience with the Lockheed C-141 . At the time of the accident, the flight engineer was on probation with Air Transport International and had been in this position on board the Douglas DC-8 for five months. It was his first experience as a crew member in commercial aviation. The flight engineer had 4,460 hours of flight experience, of which he had completed 218 hours in the cockpit of the Douglas DC-8.

the accident

The wreck of the machine

The plane landed at Kansas City Airport on February 16, 1995 after a scheduled cargo flight from Denver, Colorado. The aircraft was loaded with new cargo and prepared for departure to Toledo, Ohio. During the preparations for take-off, the flight crew was unable to start engine no. 1. The local maintenance staff examined the engine and found that the gear ratio of engine # 1 had failed. On-site repair was found not to be feasible. The airline's management decided that the three-engine machine would fly to Westover Metropolitan Airport (CEF) in Chicopee, Massachusetts for repairs. The cargo was then transferred from the aircraft to another ATI DC-8-63F with registration number N788AL , which was flown in from Dover , Delaware . The crews of the two DC-8s changed. The crew flown in from Dover, who had previously completed a cargo flight from Germany to the USA and had a subsequent break, was supposed to carry out the transfer flight.

At 20:21 local time, the crew prepared to take off from runway 01L at Kansas City International Airport for a flight to Westover Metropolitan Airport. During the take-off run, the pilots could not keep the machine on track, whereupon they aborted the take-off.

At 20:27 the pilots tried to take off the machine a second time. After a take-off run of 980 meters, the DC-8 began to break out to the left. After 1,160 meters , the machine rotated with a tailstrike , with the stern scrubbing a further 250 meters over the runway. After 1,600 meters, the DC-8 finally took off and climbed to 30 meters before falling to the ground with a left roll angle. The wreck came to a halt after 2,300 meters, and the three flight crew members were fatally injured.

root cause

The cause of the accident was determined to be the loss of control over the straight-line stability of the machines by the responsible pilot during the take-off run, as well as his decision to continue the take-off under these conditions. He had initiated a rotation below the calculated take-off speed, which led to premature take-off, further loss of control and a collision with the site. Significant here was the flight crew's lack of understanding of take-off procedures with three engines and the pilots' decision to deviate from these procedures. The airline has identified a failure to ensure that a flight crew is deployed that has sufficient experience, training and calm to carry out the non-routine flight. The inadequate supervision by the Federal Aviation Administration of the flight and duty time regulations of Air Transport International contributed to the accident, especially since the regulations allowed significantly shorter rest periods for flight crews when performing positioning flights.

swell