Hitler's address to the commanders-in-chief on November 23, 1939

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The Hitler's speech to the commanders on 23 November 1939 was a speech of Adolf Hitler before about 180 to 200 generals and officers of the armed forces , in which he announced his intention to Western campaign to begin. A recording of the speech was used as a key document in the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals (Document PS-789).

prehistory

On September 3, 1939, France and Great Britain declared war on Germany as a result of the German invasion of Poland . This led to the so-called seat war , in which neither side carried out major military actions. On the day of Poland's surrender , Hitler called the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the armed forces to the Reich Chancellery and informed them that he wanted to take the offensive in the west this year. He justified this with the fact that the time was working for the enemy, the glory had to be exploited by the attack on Poland, which would otherwise fade, as well as with the current armaments advantage and the threat to the Ruhr area . On October 22nd, Hitler had set the date for the attack in the West on November 12th, 1939. Due to the weather, the attack was postponed a total of 29 times until it finally took place on May 10, 1940. On October 9, 1939, Hitler wrote a 58-page memorandum on the question of the campaign in the west and stated in it about the war goal:

“As already emphasized, the goal of this struggle lies on the opponent's side in the dissolution or in the destruction of the German Reich. The German war goal, on the other hand, has to be the final military settlement of the West, that is, the annihilation of the strength and ability of the Western powers to once again oppose the state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe. "

procedure

Probably on November 21, 1939, the order was issued to the generals to appear in the New Reich Chancellery for a meeting on Thursday, November 23 at noon . Hitler's address lasted an hour and a half and took place in the conference room.

In attendance were the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the armed forces, the army groups and armies, the chiefs of the air fleets and the commanding generals, the chiefs of the general staffs up to the army corps, the corresponding ranks of the navy and air force as well as several officers of the OKW and OKH .

At 2:30 p.m. Hitler gave a second address only to the commanders-in-chief of the army groups, armies and corps.

On the evening after the speech, Hitler told his adjutant Nicolaus von Below that he wanted to have the troops free for an attack on the Soviet Union by spring .

content

Hitler began by saying that he wanted to give those present an insight into his world of ideas and share his decisions. He told those present that he was not afraid to make “brutal decisions”. He emphasized the importance of ideological education of the people for war. Hitler confessed that he had long been in the dark about whether to open war in the West or in the East. In the justification for the decision to go to war, he referred to the National Socialist concept of living space :

“The increasing population required larger living space. My goal was to achieve a reasonable relationship between population and population area. This is where the fight must begin. No people can avoid solving this problem or they have to give up and gradually perish. History teaches us that. First mass migration to the southeast, then adjustment of the population to the small area through emigration. In recent years, the population has been adjusted to the insufficient space by reducing the number of births. This would lead to death, to bleeding. If a people goes this way, all weaknesses are mobilized. One renounces violence towards the outside and uses violence against oneself by killing the child. That means the greatest cowardice, decimation of the number and devaluation. I decided to take the other way: adapting the living space to the population. One thing is important: the state only makes sense if it serves to preserve its people. We are 82 million people. That means the greatest commitment. He who does not accept this obligation is not worthy of belonging to the national body. This gave me the strength to fight. It is an eternal problem to put the number of Germans in relation to the ground. Securing the necessary space. No clever cleverness helps here, solution only with the sword. A people who do not have the strength to fight must resign. The fights have become different than 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a race war. Today we are fighting for oil fields, rubber, earth resources etc. "

In addition, an Anglo-French offensive against the Ruhr area must be "anticipated", and a better starting position is needed for the submarine and mine warfare against England. He announced his decision to attack France and England with the words:

“My decision is irreversible. I will attack France and England at the cheapest and fastest time. "

The choice is between "victory or annihilation". The war cannot be ended victoriously without an attack. He invoked the superiority of the Wehrmacht and the German armaments industry:

"Today we have a superiority that we have never had [...] Today we are superior to our opponents, also numerically in the West. Behind the army is the strongest arms industry in the world. "

And he ended with the words:

"No surrender externally, no revolution internally."

reaction

The evening after the speech, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Walther von Brauchitsch, offered Hitler his resignation, but Hitler refused. Helmuth Groscurth noted the speech in his diary:

"On November 23 I am in the Reich Chancellery at the two-hour address by the Führer to the commanders. Shocking impression of a mad criminal "

General Fedor von Bock noted in his diary:

“Through all of the explanations there is a certain dissatisfaction with the leaders of the army. The navy and air force are portrayed as role models for action. The reason is clear: The Fiihrer knows that the bulk of the generals do not believe that the attack would be decisive for the war at this point in time. "

General Hermann von Witzleben reported:

“It was observed shortly after the speech that the division of the officer corps into two camps was clearly evident. There was just as much outrage as there was almost enthusiastic approval "

Lore of Speech

Document PS-789 was captured by the Allies from the OKW files in Flensburg and brought in as evidence in the Nuremberg trial on November 26, 1945. The document consists of loose sheets, without date, signature, header and secret note, as is usual with documents.

There are also three other postscripts, on the one hand a note in key words from the commander of the X Army Corps General Hansen (Nuremberg Document NOKW-482) from December 4, 1939, the notes from General Hermann Hoth (Nuremberg Document NOKW-2717) and a postscript presumably by Helmuth Groscurth , which is in the Freiburg military archive. All four documents are essentially the same in their thought processes, so the text of document PS-789 is considered safe.

In General Ritter von Leeb's diary there is a short sketch of the first speech and also the second, given that afternoon.

There is also a diary entry from November 26, 1939, by the General Staff Officer Hans Meier-Welcker , who was not present , and who briefly outlined the speech. There it says about Hitler's motives:

“He described the Wehrmacht as a force as good. The navy in particular received kudos for their commitment. He described the armed forces of our western opponents as less good and in armor behind us. He described this fact and the danger from Russia in the event of the death of Stalin as the decisive factor in the decision to attack in the West. "

See also

literature

  • Hans-Adolf Jacobsen : Yellow case. The struggle for the German operational plan for the western offensive in 1940 (= publications of the Institute for European History, Mainz. Vol. 16, ISSN  0170-365X ). Steiner, Wiesbaden 1957, p. 59 ff. (Source review)
  • Hans-Adolf Jacobsen : 1939–1945. The Second World War in chronicles and documents. 6th edition. Wehr und Wissen Verlags-Gesellschaft, Darmstadt 1961, pp. 133 ff. (Complete print of document PS-789).

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Reprint of document PS-789 in: Internationaler Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg (Ed.): The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (November 14, 1945 to October 1, 1946) . Nuremberg 1947, volume 26, p. 327 ff.
  2. ^ Franz Halder : War diary. Daily records of the Chief of the Army General Staff 1939–1942 . Stuttgart 1962, Volume 1, p. 86 ff.
  3. ^ Hitler's memorandum for Brauchitsch , Raeder , Göring , Keitel of October 9, 1939. Nuremberg Document 52-L. Printed in: Internationaler Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg (Hrsg.): The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (November 14, 1945 to October 1, 1946) . Nuremberg 1947, Volume 37, p. 468.
  4. ↑ General Fedor von Bock noted in his diary on November 21st: "In the evening the surprising order comes that the Führer wants to speak to all commanders-in-chief and commanding generals in Berlin on the 23rd." Fedor von Bock : Between Duty and Refusal, The War Diary . Munich / Berlin 1995, p. 202.
  5. ^ Letter from Walther Nehring to Jacobsen dated December 14, 1954.
  6. ^ Franz Halder : War diary. Daily records of the Chief of the Army General Staff 1939–1942 . Stuttgart 1962, Volume 1, p. 131.
  7. ^ Nicolaus von Below : As Hitler's adjutant. 1937-1945. Pour le Mérite, Selent 1999, ISBN 3-932381-07-6 , p. 217.
  8. ↑ Hans-Adolf Jacobsen : 1939–1945. The Second World War in chronicles and documents . Darmstadt 1961, p. 134 f .; In Hoth's note (NOKW-2717) the entry reads: “Why not peace? Natural law. Self-preservation. Battle for habitat. Either adapt the living space of the population or vice versa. The former leads to war, the latter to birth control or emigration. Dangers in the moral field. ” Quoted after: Erich Kosthorst: The German opposition to Hitler . Bonn 1957, p. 38.
  9. ↑ Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, p. 64. Source there Nuremberg Document PS-3798. See also the testimony of Franz Halder printed in: Library of Congress of the US: Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals . Volume 10, p. 858. online (PDF; 57.3 MB)
  10. ↑ Helmuth Groscurth : Diaries of an Abwehr officer. 1938-1940. With further documents on the military opposition to Hitler (= sources and representations on contemporary history. Vol. 19, ISSN  0481-3545 ). Edited by Helmut Krausnick and Harold C. Deutsch. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1970, p. 234.
  11. ↑ Fedor von Bock : Between Duty and Refusal, The War Diary . Munich / Berlin 1995, p. 79.
  12. ↑ European publication (ed.): The power of conscience . Munich 1956, Volume 1, p. 414 f.
  13. ^ The Nuremberg Trial, Main Negotiations, Fifth Day. Monday, November 26, 1945, morning session at Zeno.org .
  14. ^ Hans-Günther Seraphim : Post-war processes and contemporary historical research . In: Man and State in Law and History, Festschrift for Herbert Kraus . Kitzingen / Main 1954, p. 454.
  15. ↑ This is printed by: Helmuth Groscurth : Diaries of an Abwehr Officer. 1938-1940. With further documents on the military opposition to Hitler (= sources and representations on contemporary history. Vol. 19, ISSN  0481-3545 ). Ed .: Helmut Krausnick and Harold C. Deutsch. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1970, p. 414 ff.
  16. ↑ Georg Meyer (Ed.): Generalfeldmarschall Ritter von Leeb, diary entries and assessments of the situation from two world wars . Stuttgart 1976, p. 202 f. online ( Memento from November 29, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
  17. ↑ Military History Research Office (Ed.): Notes of a General Staff Officer 1939–1942 . Freiburg 1982, p. 36 f.
  18. ↑ Meier-Welcker, p. 36.