Liebmann record

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The so-called Liebmann recording is the bullet-point summary of a two and a half hour speech that Adolf Hitler gave on February 3, 1933 to the highest representatives of the Reichswehr . The same speech also summarizes the Mellenthin dictation , which was created independently of the Liebmann recording, and the transcript of the communist intelligence service .

The name of the recording goes back to Lieutenant General Curt Liebmann , who made notes on numerous commander meetings "during the meetings themselves or immediately afterwards". The recording of February 3, 1933, similar to the case of the Hoßbach transcript from 1937, passed on statements by Hitler that "revealed in an astonishingly unvarnished manner [...] his broad, ideologically justified, politically outrageous and at the same time criminal goals" . For the first time in his function as Chancellor of the Reich , Hitler announced his expansion program on February 3, 1933 to gain so-called living space in the east .

The content of Hitler's speech was not public until the Liebmann recording was published in 1954. Since then, Liebmann's notes have been widely discussed in contemporary historical research. In doing so, “the interest of the reaction and the calculation of the generals involved was directed; or it was about the authenticity, the motivational structure of Hitler and the evaluation of the speech in the context of his politics ”. While the latter question is still controversial today, there is broad agreement on the importance of the speech as the basis of the alliance between Hitler and the Reichswehr leadership around the newly appointed Reichswehr Minister Werner von Blomberg and the head of the ministerial office Walter von Reichenau .

Framework

Background and interests

After Hitler was appointed Chancellor on January 30, 1933, Hitler surprisingly visited some barracks in Berlin the following morning and spoke to the soldiers “about the spirit of the new Germany” without the knowledge of the generals. Since the Reichswehr leadership was concerned about this, Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord , the head of the Army Command , invited Hitler to dinner on February 3rd in his private apartment, which probably took place on the occasion of the 60th birthday of Reich Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath , and to the the senior generals who were in Berlin for a commanders' meeting on the same day were also invited.

During the commanders' meeting in the Reichswehr Ministry , the Reichswehr Minister Werner von Blomberg, newly appointed with the Hitler cabinet , presented himself and his views. He had emphasized the continuity of the policy of his predecessor (and short-term Chancellor) Kurt von Schleicher , which he intended to continue. He stated that he wanted to keep the Reichswehr as a non-partisan means of power. At the same time, it should press for the "military detention" of the people, and ultimately be made a powerful instrument of security policy.

The meeting of the new Reich Chancellor with the military commanders that followed in the evening gave Hitler the opportunity to define the position and tasks of the Reichswehr within the state in order to anticipate possible discussions within the armed forces. He was also able to win over the Reichswehr leadership by accommodating their wishes and dispelling their fears. The speech can therefore be interpreted as a step towards consolidating power, which should prevent military opposition.

Evening event and lore

Dinner took place in General Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord's apartment . In addition to the army commanders of the groups and military districts , to which Liebmann belonged for the Stuttgart military district V, the commanders of the navy around the chief of naval command , Admiral Erich Raeder , were also present. In addition to Hitler and Konstantin von Neurath, the head of the Reich Chancellery, the Reich government was represented by the head of the Reich Chancellery, Hans Heinrich Lammers, and Blomberg and Reichenau from the Reichswehr Ministry. In addition to the 26 officials, "von Blomberg's daughter, Mrs. von Hammerstein" and possibly their two daughters, who were not present during Hitler's speech, took part in the dinner.

Hammerstein's adjutant Horst von Mellenthin remembered the evening in 1954: “At that time, Hammerstein introduced the“ Herr Reich Chancellor ”from above a little 'benevolently', the general sphalanx acknowledged politely coolly, Hitler made modest awkward bows everywhere and remained embarrassed until he followed the meal got the opportunity to give a longer speech at the table ”. During the two-and-a-half-hour speech, Mellenthin and Adjutant Raeders Martin Baltzer made notes "sitting behind a curtain", from which independent parallel traditions of the Liebmann recording arose:

The Mellenthin dictation arose the next day on the basis of key words, but neglected Hitler's "living space" program, which Mellenthin possibly misinterpreted as an intention to regain " colonies ". Therefore, the research focused primarily on the Liebmann record, the Mellenthin dictation was not published until 1999, although it has been known for a long time.

On the other hand, a tradition newly discovered around the turn of the millennium on Hitler's speech to the generals is considered reliable, "most likely the very next tradition of the Hitler speech". It can be assumed that Hammerstein's daughter Helga von Hammerstein-Equord , who had been a member of the KPD since 1930 and worked for the communist intelligence service under the code name "Grete" until 1937, made a copy of Baltzer's notes in the days after February 3 and passed them on. A copy of Hitler's speech was sent to Moscow on February 6, 1933, where it arrived on February 14 and was kept in the Comintern's Moscow archive until it could be edited and published in 2001. This copy of the communist intelligence service essentially confirmed the contents of the Liebmann recording, but was about twice as extensive as Liebmann's bullet points. In this way, Hitler's statements were also received in the Soviet Union ; under Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov , the classification of Hitler's ideology of expansion as a danger initially led to efforts to rapprochement with France. Even Josef Stalin is said to have received from the speech note.

Contents of Hitler's speech

Liebmann divided Hitler's statements into four categories, which he headed "Inside", "Outside", "Economy" and "Building the Wehrmacht". Hitler outlined his medium and long-term goals. He named the "elimination of the cancer damage of democracy" and "the eradication of Marxism stump and stick" as the cornerstones. This serves the goal of building a strong armed forces, which is a necessary prerequisite for the "regaining of political power". Hitler also addressed the purpose for which this power should serve:

"How should pol. Power, when it is won, be needed? Not yet to say. Perhaps fighting for new export opportunities, perhaps - and probably better - conquering new living space in the east and the like. its ruthless Germanization . "

In the copy of the communist intelligence service , the corresponding passage to Hitler's habitat program reads:

“Then the army will be able to conduct an active foreign policy, and the goal of expanding the living space of the German people will also be achieved with an armed hand - the goal would probably be the East. But a Germanization of the population of the annexed resp. conquered land is not possible. You can only Germanize soil. Like Poland and France, you have to ruthlessly expel a few million people after the war. "

Furthermore, Hitler promised to "strengthen the will to defend by all means," which the NSDAP organizations would take care of. To this end, he is also considering the reintroduction of conscription. He assured the officers that he did not want to use the Reichswehr inside the state. In doing so, he reassured the Reichswehr leadership, which feared competition from the SA . The entire armament of the Wehrmacht had to be done in secret, otherwise there would be the danger that France or its Eastern European allies (Poland and Czechoslovakia) would prevent the German Reich from rearming or even attacking it.

rating

According to Liebmann's recollections, the generals did not take the new Chancellor too seriously: following a line by Friedrich Schiller , one of those present commented on Hitler's speech with "Always the speech was bolder than the deed" when he had already left for Munich. In a conversation after the Second World War , the President of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht , stated that one of his officer friends would never have found it necessary to inform him of Hitler's speech.

This downplaying of the importance of the address is countered by the almost unanimous view of post-war history scholarship that the Reichswehr has been accepting Hitler's plans since his address in return for the assurance of its "non-partisanship", the armament and the limitation of SA activities to internal opponents of the Regime. This decision on February 3, 1933 aroused astonishment in research because the speech did not provoke any contradictions, although Hitler openly announced his "adventurous, war-consciously calculating" living space "visions" threw off a peaceful veil and showed his true colors among the generals.

The historian Michael Salewski assessed the meeting of February 3, 1933 in 1978 as follows:

“What was decisive, however, was that with his address of February 3, 1933, Hitler had already broken the principle of“ non-partisanship ”claimed by Blomberg. Since the top of the Wehrmacht raised no fundamental objections, it could be assumed from now on that they approved Hitler's program in principle. Three days were enough to lead the Reichswehr out of the “apologetic” area and into an alliance with Hitler's system. The question remained whether this rapprochement would lead to complicity. "

However, the extent to which Hitler's later plans were already developed in this address and documented by the Liebmann recording is still controversial. The functionalist interpretation says that it is merely a promotional speech to ensure Hitler's support by the Reichswehr. Accordingly, some researchers, including Ian Kershaw, see in the "Lebensraum" passage only an indistinct allusion to future expansion policy. The intentionalist interpretation, on the other hand, regards the Liebmann recording as a programmatic sketch, even as an “overall draft” of Hitler's policy. Even Joachim Fest argued "Hitler innerster, central idea" the conquest of " living space " have urged, "to find all Selbstverheimlichungsbedürfnissen defiance of [the commanders] accomplice" this.

See also

swell

literature

  • Klaus-Jürgen Müller: The Army and Hitler - Army and National Socialist Regime. Stuttgart 1969.
  • Michael Salewski : The armed power in the Third Reich 1933-1939. In: Wehrmacht and National Socialism 1933–1933 . Published by the Military History Research Office , Munich 1983 ( German Military History , Vol. 4).
  • Carl Dirks / Karl-Heinz Janßen : The war of the generals. Hitler as a tool of the Wehrmacht. Berlin 1999, ISBN 3-549-05590-0 .
  • Reinhard Müller: Hitler's speech to the Reichswehr leadership in 1933. A new Moscow tradition . In: Mittelweg 36 10, 2001, issue 1, pp. 73-90 (also uses the copy of the communist intelligence service edited by Wirsching ).

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d Thilo Vogelsang : New documents on the history of the Reichswehr 1930–1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2, 1954, issue 4, pp. 397–436 ( PDF , 1.77 MB), here p. 434.
  2. ↑ a b Andreas Wirsching : “You can only Germanize soil”. A new source on Hitler's speech to the leaders of the Reichswehr on February 3, 1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49, 2001, issue 3, pp. 517–550 (PDF, 1.45 MB), here p. 520.
  3. ↑ a b c Andreas Wirsching: “You can only Germanize soil”. A new source on Hitler's speech to the leaders of the Reichswehr on February 3, 1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49, 2001, issue 3, pp. 517–550 (PDF, 1.45 MB), here p. 517.
  4. ↑ a b c Andreas Wirsching: “You can only Germanize soil”. A new source on Hitler's speech to the leaders of the Reichswehr on February 3, 1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49, 2001, issue 3, pp. 517–550 (PDF, 1.45 MB), here p. 523.
  5. ^ Thilo Vogelsang: New documents on the history of the Reichswehr 1930–1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2, 1954, issue 4, p. 397–436 (PDF, 1.77 MB), here p. 432–434 (Document No. 7: 1933 February 3, Berlin. Comments by the Reichswehr Minister von Blomberg the group and military district commanders in the Reichswehr Ministry. Handwriting records of Gen. Lt. Liebmann as a basis for later commander meetings. Munich, Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, No. 167/51, fol. 37-38. ).
  6. ↑ a b c d e Michael Salewski: The armed power in the Third Reich 1933–1939. In: Wehrmacht and National Socialism 1933–1933 . Ed. By the Military History Research Office, Munich 1983, pp. 21–24.
  7. ^ In: Carl Dirks / Karl-Heinz Janßen : The war of the generals. Hitler as a tool of the Wehrmacht . Berlin 1999, pp. 232-236.
  8. ↑ a b Andreas Wirsching: “You can only Germanize soil”. A new source on Hitler's speech to the leaders of the Reichswehr on February 3, 1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49, 2001, issue 3, pp. 517–550 (PDF, 1.45 MB), here p. 522.
  9. ↑ Reinhard Müller: Hitler's speech to the Reichswehr leadership in 1933. A new Moscow tradition . In: Mittelweg 36 10, 2001, issue 1, pp. 73–90.
  10. ^ A copy of this file is in the Federal Archives, Departments Berlin, Foundation Archive of Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR ( SAPMO ) under the signature RY 5 I 6/10/88, Bl. 20-22.
  11. ↑ a b Copy of the communist intelligence service . In: Andreas Wirsching: “You can only Germanize soil”. A new source on Hitler's speech to the leaders of the Reichswehr on February 3, 1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49, 2001, issue 3, pp. 517–550 (PDF, 1.45 MB), here pp. 545–548.
  12. ↑ Andreas Wirsching: “You can only Germanize soil”. A new source on Hitler's speech to the leaders of the Reichswehr on February 3, 1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49, 2001, issue 3, pp. 517–550 (PDF, 1.45 MB), here p. 524.
  13. ^ Ralf Reuth: Hitler - A political biography. Munich 2003, p. 309.
  14. ^ Thilo Vogelsang: New documents on the history of the Reichswehr 1930–1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2, 1954, issue 4, p. 397–436 (PDF, 1.77 MB), here p. 434 f.
  15. ↑ Wolfgang Michalka: German History 1933-1945. Documents on domestic and foreign policy. Frankfurt am Main 1999, ISBN 3-596-50234-9 , pp. 17f. Cf. Thilo Vogelsang: New documents on the history of the Reichswehr 1930–1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2, 1954, issue 4, pp. 397–436 (PDF, 1.77 MB), here p. 435.
  16. ↑ Wirsching suspects in his comment on the text a reference to the option regulations negotiated between Poland and Germany for the German resident population in the ceded areas after the First World War , which Hitler reproduced “in his characteristically distorted, propagandistic perception”.
  17. ^ Thilo Vogelsang: New documents on the history of the Reichswehr 1930–1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2, 1954, issue 4, pp. 397–436 (PDF, 1.77 MB), here p. 435.
  18. ^ Thilo Vogelsang: New documents on the history of the Reichswehr 1930–1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2, 1954, issue 4, pp. 397–436 (PDF, 1.77 MB), here p. 436.
  19. ^ Carl Dirks / Karl-Heinz Janßen: The war of the generals. Hitler as a tool of the Wehrmacht. Berlin 1999, p. 50.
  20. ↑ a b c Andreas Wirsching: “You can only Germanize soil”. A new source on Hitler's speech to the leaders of the Reichswehr on February 3, 1933 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49, 2001, issue 3, pp. 517–550 (PDF, 1.45 MB), here p. 518.
  21. ↑ Hans-Ulrich Thamer: Seduction and violence. Germany 1933–1945 . Berlin 1986, p. 313.
  22. ↑ Joachim Fest: Hitler. A biography . Berlin 1973, p. 535.