Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord

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Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord 1930
In front, first row from left to right: Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord, Prince Eitel Friedrich von Preußen , Otto Hasse , Erich Raeder at the unveiling of a memorial in front of the main entrance to the New Cemetery in Potsdam for the members of the medical corps who died in the First World War , October 1929

Kurt (Curt) Gebhard Adolf Philipp Freiherr von Hammerstein-Equord (born September 26, 1878 in Hinrichshagen , Mecklenburg-Strelitz , † April 24, 1943 in Berlin ) was a German army officer (from 1934 Colonel General ), from 1930 to 1933 chief of the army command and was part of the military resistance against Adolf Hitler .

Origin and military career

Empire and First World War

Hammerstein-Equord came from the noble family of those von Hammerstein , who had already produced some well-known officers. His parents were the Grand Ducal Mecklenburg-Strelitzische Oberforster Heino von Hammerstein and his wife Ida, née von Gustedt . After his school education, Hammerstein-Equord joined the cadet corps in Plön in 1888 at the age of ten and came to the 3rd Guard Regiment on foot via the Hauptkadettenanstalt Lichterfelde (entry in 1893) , where he was promoted to second lieutenant on March 15, 1898 .

Awards

The later Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher (1882–1934) also served in this unit at the time , and the two men soon became very friendly. Hammerstein was deployed in Kassel from 1905 to 1907 . From 1907 to 1910 he attended the Prussian War Academy and in 1911 was employed in the deployment department of the Great General Staff . In 1909 he was promoted to first lieutenant . In 1913 he served as a captain in the general staff .

During the First World War he served first as adjutant to the Quartermaster General and then as General Staff Officer in various units (1915 First General Staff Officer of the VIII Reserve Corps , 1916 in the General Staff, 1918 Ia in the General Staff of the General Command). In 1914 he wrote the first army reports from the Great Headquarters . In the meantime he led a company in Flanders in 1914 and was awarded the Iron Cross in this capacity . In 1917 he was promoted to major .

Weimar Republic

In the Weimar Republic, Hammerstein was accepted into the Reichswehr . In 1919 he served under his father-in-law General Walther von Lüttwitz in the general staff of the Lüttwitz corps . In 1920 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. In the same year he refused to take part in the Kapp Putsch , which was supported by Lüttwitz , and moved as chief to the headquarters of Group Command II in Kassel. In 1922 he took a position as battalion commander in the Munich area . In 1924 he was transferred to the staff of Wehrkreis III ( Berlin ). After a brief assignment in Group Command I (1929), he was appointed Major General on October 1, 1929, Chief of the Troop Office, the successor organization to the Great General Staff, which was banned by the Allies in the Treaty of Versailles . There he replaced General Werner von Blomberg . He had come into conflict with the Reich government because he judged the German chances of a two-front war with France and Poland to be favorable. In contrast, Reichswehr Minister Wilhelm Groener and Reich Chancellor Heinrich Brüning valued Hammerstein's aversion to political extremism and military risks. Hammerstein first worked out tactical concepts for the Reichswehr in the troop office, which provided for a defensive defense in the event of an attack until the League of Nations intervened. In 1930, however, under his leadership, the first mobilization plan since 1923 was drawn up, which envisaged a tripling of the seven infantry divisions to 21. When in 1930 the chief of the Army Command , Colonel General Wilhelm Heye , stepped down from office at Schleicher's instigation, Schleicher (now Reichswehr Minister), with the support of Brüning, succeeded Hammerstein. On November 1, 1930 he took up the post while being promoted to General of the Infantry . There he created an armament program for the Reichswehr, which envisaged the formation of at least 42 divisions .

Third Reich

Memorial plaque on the house at Breisacher Strasse 19, in Berlin-Dahlem

Hammerstein ensured that the Army Service Regulations H.DV. issued by Hans von Seeckt in 1921 and 1923. 487 "Leadership and Combat of Combined Arms" (FuG) through the Army Service Regulations H.Dv. 300/1 "Troop Leadership" (TF 1933, also: "Beck regulation"), which had been developed since 1931 by General Beck with the assistance of Colonel von Stülpnagel , in that he had the TF 1933 on October 17, 1933 with a "Entry Decree" provided in force.

According to this rule, resistance in the case of inferiority was only required as long as it was considered reasonable. In contrast to the previous situation, in certain cases the "delaying battle" and the "retreat" were allowed as possible solutions in principle. In addition to holding, there was also evasion - conceptually the final breakthrough from positional warfare to war of movement . Also in October 1933, Hammerstein submitted his resignation to President Paul von Hindenburg . He informed him on December 23, 1933 that his departure was approved on January 31, 1934, combined with the final appointment as colonel general and the "authorization to wear the uniform of the general staff with general badge".

As part of the general mobilization at the beginning of the Second World War , Hammerstein was reactivated. At first he was stationed for about two weeks in Breslau near the then Polish border as Deputy Commander of Military District VIII ( Silesia ). Subsequently, from September 9, 1939, he was deployed for two weeks near the German western border in Cologne as Commander-in-Chief of Army Division A. In the end he was transferred to Wroclaw again for a few days. There he was finally put into retirement on September 24, 1939 on Hitler's personal instructions "because of his negative attitude towards National Socialism" without any combat duty.

Political thinking and acting

The reports of those involved and contemporary witnesses and other documents from that time are contradictory. On the one hand, this is due to the confused situation at the time; on the other hand, it reflects the different interests of the authors, but also the changeable balancing and actions of those involved. In addition, the contradicting reports from that time are inevitably shaped by the different interests and preferences of the reporters.

Weimar Republic

On the occasion of the Nazi coup attempt in 1923, Hammerstein, then battalion commander at the Munich Infantry School , had remarked in front of his soldiers: "In Munich, a private Hitler went crazy" and telegraphed one of his lieutenants to a request for rules of conduct: "Obey Prussian superiors!" however wrong to draw the conclusion from this that Hammerstein was republican in his ideas of the state. It is true that he had reservations about the National Socialists. Like the majority of the Reichswehr, however, he advocated a conservative, moderate policy and repeatedly made this public:

So on September 12, 1931, at the request of Hitler, the chairman of the then growing NSDAP, Hammerstein came to a speech by Hitler and a subsequent discussion in the house of the secretary of the Association of Former Officers of the 3rd Guards Regiment on Foot, Major a. D. von Eberhardt. Hammerstein said in conclusion: “We want it slower. Otherwise we are actually of the same opinion. "

On February 27, 1932, during a commanders meeting, Hammerstein described the general political attitude within the Reichswehr, but also made it clear who, in his opinion, was responsible for the chaotic political situation in Germany at that time:

“ Hugenberg sabotaged the thing for the second time. From this the current heap of internal political rubble. Crime and stupidity to treat the question of the Reich President in this way in this foreign policy situation! Condemn leaders! We are all right-wing, but we have to be clear about whose fault the rubble was created. These are the leaders of the right-wing parties. "

Hammerstein was also not afraid to tell Hitler in 1932 that he would use direct force against him under certain circumstances: “Mr. Hitler, if you come to power legally, it should be fine with me. Otherwise I would shoot. "

The then Austrian General Edmund Glaise-Horstenau said that in 1937 Hitler told him that Hammerstein had told him during his time as Chief of the Army Command that “he was sorry if he had to shoot the National Socialists; but in an extreme emergency he would do it ”.

Hitler is quoted as follows in one of his monologues on May 21, 1942: Some generals such as Schleicher tried to contradict themselves in every respect. "The closest colleague of Schleicher and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General von Hammerstein, did not even deceive himself to call him and tell him that the Reichswehr could under no circumstances approve of his chancellorship."

When the NSDAP missed an absolute majority in the Reichstag elections in July 1932 , but Hitler rejected a coalition government with moderate right-wing forces, but instead unsuccessfully demanded that Hindenburg "lead a government and state leadership to the full" without von Papen and Schleicher, this strengthened the position of the officers in the Reichswehr who were critical of the National Socialists, to whom Hammerstein belonged like most of the older ones. Hammerstein is said to have said in August 1932:

“That he could only now sleep peacefully again, since he now knew that he might be able to order the troops again to shoot at the Nazis. In the army there is now [...] an extraordinary anger against the Nazis. In this respect, the current government policy was still good. "

These reports make it clear that even before 1933 Hammerstein reserved the right to resort to violence without an order from the Reich President and the Reichstag in order to counter a breach of the constitution by others (here: Hitler). Hammerstein was thus in accordance with the previous democratically illegitimate tradition and the special legal position of the Weimar Reichswehr as a state within a state .

Due to the great wins of the National Socialists in the elections at the national and regional level from mid-1932, however, the conviction gradually gained acceptance that serious unrest and even civil war could result if this political direction were excluded by the Reich government:

The Reichstag election of November 1932 made the NSDAP the strongest parliamentary group for the second time in a row, but now the right-wing parties no longer had the majority, but the extreme right and left, for whom a coalition was out of the question. Throughout Germany, the clashes between right and left on the street and in parliaments became more intense. While the SPD and KPD also fought each other as representatives of the left, the National Socialists represented a comparatively closed power. The idea of ​​averting a civil war by integrating the National Socialists into a coalition government under the supervision of other parties and thus being "tamed" gained them could, with the Reich President, the moderate right-wing parties and in the Reichswehr more and more approval.

So if Hammerstein, Schleicher and others admitted in the near future that Hitler's chancellorship might not be avoidable, they declared that this was "the lesser evil" and tried to present the dangers of this solution as manageable. When, for example, the head of the Army Personnel Office von dem Bussche expressed his worries about a possible Hitler government in a conversation with his superior Schleicher, Schleicher is said to have initially replied: “You can be very calm; the Wehrmacht does not tolerate that ”, but then asked Hammerstein. This has confirmed:

“You can be absolutely sure. The Reichswehr and myself will never allow ourselves to be ordered by a fool. If he comes and insists on giving us orders, we will have him arrested. "

However, in the near future, governments in which the National Socialists as junior partners could have been controlled by moderate parties did not come about because at least one of the participants always refused:

Up until November 1932, for example, Hitler had refused Hindenburg twice to join a coalition government that was not led by him. On December 1, 1932, Schleicher submitted another such offer to Hitler through the head of the Wehrmacht Department in the Reichswehr Ministry, Eugen Ott , in this case, to join a Schleicher cabinet as Vice Chancellor . Hitler refused. Franz von Papen , Schleicher's opponent and his predecessor as Reich Chancellor, tried at the end of 1932 to persuade Hindenburg to appoint a Papen-Hitler government led by him. This time Hindenburg refused.

It is undisputed that between January 26 and 27, 1933, Hammerstein and Hindenburg also held discussions about Hitler's chancellorship. Different authors claim different times, participants and content for this. To explain the discrepancies, an author assumes, after detailed presentation of the established facts and controversial reports, that in truth there were two visits by Hammerstein during this time, accompanied by different people at Hindenburg.

Hammerstein asserted in his notes that he had asked Hindenburg not to appoint Hitler as Chancellor, and the Reich President had dismissed him with the confirmation that he “did not even think about making the Austrian corporal as Defense Minister or Reich Chancellor”. The comparison of the known facts and reports allows the author to come to a different conclusion: In a (possibly first) conversation with Hindenburg on January 26, 1933, Hammerstein could have been of the opinion that Hitler should become Chancellor because of the otherwise existing danger of civil war, just as he announced this two days later, on January 28, 1933, according to the diary entries of his confidante Ferdinand von Bredow . The possibly second meeting of Hammerstein with Hindenburg would have taken place on January 27, 1933, accompanied by von dem Bussche. The latter is said to have pleaded against Hammerstein (again) for Hitler's chancellorship.

Others believed that the unstable political situation could only be calmed down by a presidential dictatorship - achieved through political channels or a coup d'état , especially a military coup.

At the beginning of 1933, it was assumed: " Walter von Reichenau is considering putsch plans because he fears that Hindenburg would not appoint Hitler."

There are contradicting and ambiguous contemporary information about the point in time at which Hammerstein rejected Hitler's entry into a Reich government or - if it was legally accepted - advocated it. Some authors argue that his view of Hitler's chancellorship was always negative, others that it was always in favor. From contradicting information, some conclude that only one of the representations could be "correct".

On the other hand, authors who cite contradicting sources and then argue critically of the source come to the conclusion that Hammerstein, like Schleicher, was torn back and forth on this issue and so at different times, even with Hammerstein, contradicting views, statements and actions, if not proven , so are to be assumed as likely. They also consider it plausible that, in the course of a meeting, some participants changed their minds under the influence of the arguments and power relations.

With regard to Hammerstein's attitude towards a Chancellor Hitler is one extreme, Schleicher (i.e. not just Hammerstein and others) intended on the morning of January 29, 1933 in the Hammerstein office in the Bendlerblock, in cooperation with Hammerstein, to meet Hindenburg, his confidante and head of the President Otto Meissner , the son of Hindenburg and Hitler arrested on the grounds of a breach of the constitution.

Others report that in the meeting of January 29, 1933 with Hammerstein, Reichswehr Minister Schleicher, the head of the Ministerial Office of the Reichswehr Ferdinand von Bredow, Eugen Ott, the State Secretary in the Reichswehr Ministry Erwin Planck and von dem Bussche, it was Hammerstein who initially demanded To declare Hindenburg insane and to declare a state of emergency due to this presidential crisis, arrest Hitler and alarm the Potsdam garrison. Schleicher, on the other hand, objected that such an approach could trigger unrest across the Reich, including civil war, and rejected the plan. As the new chancellor, Hitler is the lesser evil compared to a civil war . Hammerstein finally agreed with this view and withdrew his proposal. What is certain is that Schleicher visited Reich President Hindenburg after this interview, declared his government to resign and recommended Hitler's appointment as Chancellor.

According to Henry Picker’s notes , Hitler made very specific statements about this meeting on the day before he took office in one of his monologues on May 21, 1942: “In the late afternoon of January 29, 1933, one was surprised by the news of a downright great plan by the Schleicher clique been: General von Hammerstein had alerted the Potsdam garrison and given an order to shoot. In addition, the intention was to deport President Hindenburg to East Prussia and thereby prevent his intervention against the thwarting of the NSDAP's takeover by mobilizing the Reichswehr. ”And in agreement with this, Hermann Göring stated before the Nuremberg court :“ At that time, what was little known, threatened a putsch by Schleicher-Hammerstein with the Potsdam garrison. ”However, statements neither by Hitler nor by Göring can always be considered reliable historical sources. See how others turn against the adoption of coup preparations end of January 1933, there were neither in the Federal Archives-Military Archive Freiburg still at Military History Research Institute in Potsdam have any knowledge about an alarm stationed in Potsdam infantry regiment or the local cavalry squadron . Any orders or reminders should have been received if orders had been given.

Other authors emphasize Hammerstein's key role at the time and admit that a putsch by Hammerstein could actually have prevented Hitler from becoming chancellor. You agree with the opinion at the time, however, that this would have triggered a civil war: “The only man with a political alternative on January 30th was von Hammerstein. It was the alternative of Hitler or civil war. "

What is certain is that in the weeks leading up to January 30, 1933, Hammerstein and others' concerns about civil war gradually gained the upper hand over concerns about Hitler's chancellorship. Hammerstein summed it up in his 1935 notes:

“We agreed that only Hitler would be possible as future Chancellor. Any other choice would lead to a general strike, if not to civil war, and thus to an extremely undesirable deployment of the army inside against two sides, against the National Socialists and the left. "

And the later Reich Finance Minister Schwerin von Krosigk also foresaw in his diary that a "Papen cabinet without Nazis [...] would lead to a general strike in the shortest possible time".

As a consequence of the morning's meeting, Hammerstein, in agreement with Schleicher, asked Hitler for an interview. This took place a few hours later in the early afternoon of January 29, 1933 in the house of the piano manufacturer Edwin Bechstein , who was well known on both sides . Hitler untruthfully assured Hammerstein that he would hold on to Schleicher as Minister of Defense. Hammerstein noted: “I explained my worries to him and asked whether he believed that the takeover of government would be negotiated with him seriously or only in appearance. If the latter were the case, I wanted to try to influence things in order to prevent serious misfortune for the fatherland. "

On the eve of Hitler's accession to power, Hammerstein had evidently no longer considered the political situation to be particularly explosive, and in particular no longer planned a military coup: Immediately after the conversation with Hitler, he attended a horse show and then between 9 and 10 in the evening Schleicher.

A few hours before Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor, Hindenburg appointed General von Blomberg to succeed Schleicher as Reich Defense Minister. In accordance with the Weimar Constitution, as a representative of the Reich President, he was given political authority over Hammerstein.

Third Reich

Cold position

On the day after the seizure of power , Hammerstein declared: "We have made a dive into fascism", "98 percent of the German people are just drunk".

Admittedly, Hitler came to power legally on January 30, 1933, as Hammerstein had made a condition of tolerance by the Reichswehr since 1932. Subsequently, however, the NSDAP, as a majority faction, abolished the democratic principle of majority decision-making in favor of the Führer principle ; In addition to legal means, Hitler increasingly used illegal means to set up a totalitarian state in which the Reichswehr also had to submit to the regime.

Even before the seizure of power, the Reichswehr was no longer the monolithic block as it was under Seeckt. Although the leadership was largely hostile to the National Socialists (and in a few cases, like Fritsch, even tended to monarchist goals), they no longer had the officer corps behind them, since especially among the younger officers, National Socialist goals initially met with approval or enthusiasm for example with Claus von Stauffenberg and Henning von Tresckow , who later committed their lives for the resistance.

Hammerstein, as a representative of the rather negative head of the Reichswehr, has been cut off step by step from his previous functions since the seizure of power. Hitler had already created one of the prerequisites for this before his appointment as Chancellor by replacing Reichswehr Minister Schleicher with Blomberg. The relationship between the two generals was already strained by the history of 1929. In contrast to Hammerstein, Blomberg also proved to be open to Hitler's efforts to bring the Reichswehr, contrary to its previous tradition, under strict political control, and had the troops systematically indoctrinated with Nazi propaganda .

Hammerstein invited Hitler to a dinner in his private apartment on February 3, 1933, which probably took place on the occasion of the 60th birthday of Reich Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath , and to which the senior generals were also invited who were in for a commanders' meeting on the same day Berlin stayed. During the commanders' meeting in the morning at the Reichswehr Ministry in the Bendler Block , the Reichswehr Minister Werner von Blomberg, newly appointed with the Hitler cabinet , presented himself and his views. In doing so, he emphasized the continuity of the policies of his predecessor (and brief Reich Chancellor) Kurt von Schleicher , which he intended to continue. He stated that he would keep the Reichswehr as a non-partisan means of power. At the same time it was supposed to push for the people to be “made into military custody” and ultimately be made into a powerful instrument of security policy.

At dinner in Hammerstein's apartment, Hitler then tried to win over the generals . The shorthand protocols and reports that became known about this event differ significantly from each other, even the information about the guests contradict each other. It is undisputed that Hammerstein presented his guest quite coolly as "the Chancellor of the Reich Hitler" and that Hitler then presented his foreign, military, domestic and economic policy plans in a two and a half hour speech. It is the "building of the Wehrmacht the most important prerequisite" for the "regaining of political power", that is, the restoration of sovereignty by abolishing the Versailles Treaty . After that, it is necessary to conquer “new living space in the East ” and “ruthlessly Germanize it” and “in the worst case to enforce this through offensively waged wars”. It is controversial what response Hitler's speech found among the audience at the time. Contemporary descriptions speak more of agreement, those after 1945 of reluctance. According to Liebmann's recollections , the generals did not take the new Chancellor too seriously: following a line by Friedrich Schiller , one of those present commented on Hitler's speech with "Always the speech was bolder than the deed" when he had already left for Munich. Hitler himself later said that at the time he had the feeling that he was talking against a wall.

At the end of April 1933, Hitler also appointed Blomberg commander-in-chief of the Reichswehr. With this, Blomberg also became Hammerstein's military superior, and in addition to the political “command” he now had military “command” over him. Hammerstein nonetheless showed "obstinacy" and continued to express himself critical of the new rulers in public.

His brother-in-law, General Smilo von Lüttwitz , reported that Hammerstein had "always very clearly expressed his rejection of the Nazi movement [...]", after the autumn maneuvers of 1933 he had repeated in front of people who were not close to him and foreign officers " of the criminal gang and the pig hedgehogs ”. The latter term alluded to reports of homosexual practices in the SA.

Hammerstein's influence on the Reichswehr was steadily declining because of his new superiors.

Some authors accuse him that this was at least also due to convenience and a lack of interest in organizational activity, said Schwerin von Krosigk : "Hammerstein let the reins drag too much and thereby weakened the position of the head of the army command in relation to the new Reichswehr Minister Blomberg." General Hermann Foertsch criticized: Hammerstein had submitted his departure on the one hand because of "political (r) reasons, opponents of the National Socialists from a correct recognition of the excessiveness of the movement. Then there was the fact that Hammerstein was a man who shied away from normal work. He was brilliant, clever, easy-going in appearance, very critical, slightly pessimistic (stinky lazy), so that the upcoming tasks with regard to the army required a different personality. "

In October 1933, Hammerstein submitted his resignation to Hindenburg.

After Hammerstein's resignation, Blomberg imposed a social boycott on him on January 31, 1934 : The department heads of the Reichswehr Ministry were made clear that they would face professional disadvantages if it became known that they would visit him.

The Röhm massacre

As of 30 June 1934, Hitler sat under the pretext of an imminent coup by SA boss Röhm continued intimidation and elimination of suspected and known opponent with a large-scale arrests and murders. The action was met with approval within the Reichswehr insofar as it eliminated the now numerically significantly larger SA as a competitor, so the Reichswehr became the sole "weapon bearer of the nation" again, and it was not only discussed with General Reichenau and other parts of the Reichswehr , but some arrests and murders also took place by the Reichswehr, in coordination with them or at least with their equipment.

Some prominent opponents such as Hammerstein and Papen were not affected by this act of violence, which some authors attribute to the fact that Hindenburg demanded it. According to a report by communist agents, on the other hand, Hammerstein “was the focus of the Berlin officers' circles these days; Comrades from the ministry had protected him, since they feared he would be arrested at any moment ”.

However, the murdered included Generals Schleicher and Bredow. This led the Reichswehr to a number of attempts at clarification and legal punishment - all without consequences, even if the acts were retroactively exempt from punishment by a "State Emergency Defense Act" passed unconstitutionally by Hitler on July 3, 1934, and Reichswehr Minister Blomberg Hitler for the successful conclusion of the action had congratulated.

General von Witzleben, however, together with Generals von Leeb and von Rundstedt, demanded that General Fritsch, now Chief of the Army Command, initiate a court martial into the murder of Schleicher and Bredow. Major Hans Oster was among those who protested against the murder of their comrades .

Hammerstein and Field Marshal August von Mackensen tried to contact Hindenburg personally because of the massacre. When they did not succeed in doing this, they sent him a memorandum which, according to a report, was given to him in a blue folder on July 18, 1934 and was therefore also called the "blue book" August 1934 has not reached.

In any case, the text, which was only a few pages long, was copied after Hindenburg's death and distributed to all senior officers. The sections are headed “Deplorable division”, “England not an ally of Germany”, “Poland - a second Austria-Hungary”, “France and the Soviet Union” and above all: “A Directory for War Preparation”. The authors recommended replacing the Hitler government with a directory led by Hindenburg , in which Hammerstein was designated as Reichswehr Minister. Given the well-known frailty of the very old Hindenburg, however, this proposal was not very promising. A few months later the memorandum appeared in public, but this time illegally published by the exile KPD under the camouflage title “English Grammar” with the fictitious publisher's name Leipzig. This edition largely corresponded to a “ brown book ” that had previously been published in Paris by Willi Munzenberg . In 1935 the Blue Book was published again in Moscow as part of a “ White Book ”.

Parallel to this written petition to Hindenburg, Hammerstein and Mackensen urged Generals Blomberg and Fritsch to work for the posthumous rehabilitation of their unjustly accused comrades.

On July 13, 1934, Hitler tried to justify the acts of violence in a speech in the Reichstag. The speech was broadcast on the radio to answer questions from the general public. Hitler specifically accused Schleicher and Bredow of subversive cooperation with Röhm and the conspiracy with foreign countries for the purpose of a “national-Bolshevik overthrow”. As a result, military district commanders and commanders came to Blomberg and complained that Blomberg was not doing anything against this defamation. Blomberg defended Hitler's claim and promised documentation. Apparently, however, the outrage within the Reichswehr was so clear that Hitler finally gave in: In a closed meeting of the heads of government, party and Reichswehr on a different topic, at the end of his speech he announced that "investigations" had shown that the generals were from Schleicher and von Bredow were "mistakenly" shot. In order to give satisfaction to the memory of the two innocently shot dead, they should be placed on the plaques of their regiments. However, this declaration was not allowed to be published and no officer was allowed to attend the funeral - something Hammerstein did not adhere to: he was the only general to attend Schleicher's funeral.

As soon as Hindenburg died on August 2, 1934, Reichenau had the armed forces' oath of pledge changed so that recruits immediately had to obey "Adolf Hitler, Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht ".

Hammerstein, who belonged to the armed forces reserve, initially no longer posed an acute danger to the regime, especially since he was further isolated as far as possible and held back politically in public. But because of the activities of his children and because of his private contacts with people who were not loyal to the line, he remained in the focus of state surveillance. In search of the leak through which Hitler's speech of February 3, 1933 to the head of the Reichswehr could reach Moscow within a few days , the Gestapo came across Werner Scholem's acquaintance, Hammerstein's daughter Marie Luise , who thereupon was interrogated in August 1935. Fortunately, that was the end of the matter.

The summons of his daughter by the Gestapo may have been a warning for Hammerstein that his personal safety and the inviolability of his apartment were now less secure than they were before Hindenburg's death. In any case, in 1935 he had his notes put in a safe in Great Britain. After the war, his son Kunrat took possession of it and evaluated it.

1938: September conspiracy

When Hitler's foreign policy demands threatened war in September 1938 as part of the Sudeten crisis , Hammerstein was included in plans from the Wehrmacht High Command in the Bendler Block, which were developed by General Oster with the support of General Adam , Witzleben, Halder and (retired) Beck were. A possible war was to be ended by a coup against Hitler and Hammerstein was to be reactivated as commander in chief of Army Command 4. This “ September conspiracy ”, however, was deprived of its foundation by the Munich Agreement . However, after Brüning's memories, Hammerstein said in the spring of 1939 that he would continue to support: "Just give me one troop and I won't be missing." When Groener died in May 1939, Hammerstein appeared in full, as in 1934 at Schleicher's funeral, despite the corresponding ban Uniform for the funeral of his former superior.

1939: Siegfried Line conspiracy

After its reactivation, Hammerstein was Commander-in-Chief of Army Division A on the western border from September 9, 1939 . A few contemporary reports state that from there he recommended Hitler several times to pay his army in the West a visit - ostensibly to demonstrate the strength of the Western Front, in fact to arrest him. Hammerstein even announced to familiar opposition members like Beck that if Hitler visits his unit, there would be a "fatal incident" and that he would "render Hitler harmless once and for all". Hitler, however, did not accept Hammerstein's invitations, he never went to the Siegfried Line during the attack on Poland . In September 1939 Hammerstein was transferred to Silesia and permanently retired on September 24, 1939.

1939: Zossen conspiracy

Around this time, however, the “Zossen conspiracy” occurred, in which Hammerstein was also involved: On September 27, 1939, Hitler had announced his decision to the head of the Wehrmacht to attack the Western powers immediately after the end of the attack on Poland. Thereupon the Commander-in-Chief of the Army von Brauchitsch , his Chief of Staff Halder, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris , Generals Thomas , von Leeb , von Reichenau, Colonel Groscurth and other officers as well as reservists like Hammerstein and Beck and civilians like von Dohnanyi , Gisevius , von Hassell and Goerdeler initially determined to prevent the German attack on France because a military defeat of Germany seemed certain to them. The plans included warning foreigners and preventing the German attack by reacting to foreign forces, but also arresting Hitler. The attack on France was postponed several times, however, which gave the German forces time to better prepare. The pessimism of the senior generals gradually gave way to increasing confidence, and in February 1940 the plans were abandoned.

The red general and his contacts to the German resistance

During the Weimar Republic, the Reichswehr had extensive contacts, albeit camouflaged as far as possible towards the contracting states of the Versailles treaties. a. with the secret flying school and testing facility of the Reichswehr as well as the Kama tank school for the Soviet army . Hammerstein knew numerous high officers of the Soviet Army such as Tukhachevsky and Voroshilov from this time and also maintained personal contacts with some of them. The fact that Hammerstein was sometimes referred to as "the red general" during the Weimar Republic is said to be based on these contacts with the Soviet Army. Other authors also claim that Hammerstein had "moderate social" views and personal relationships with some union representatives from the point of view of the time.

That Hammerstein had daughters whose left-wing ideas and contacts he obviously did not suppress was not unknown at the time. Fortunately for him, a private acquaintance remained undiscovered: from 1930 to 1937, the Austrian Ruth von Mayenburg was one of his close friends. Even when she was only able to stay in Germany with false papers, she was repeatedly a guest in his house, for example on his birthday in 1936. With her, under the alias Lena and Ruth Wieden, as courier and agent of the Comintern and the espionage of the Soviet Army worked, Hammerstein had numerous conversations, and about them he exchanged conspiratorial messages, for example with the then Defense Minister Voroshilov.

In addition, after his departure, Hammerstein had members of the civil and military resistance to visit his house, many of whom were from the right-wing conservative to monarchical spectrum. Beck, Canaris, Geßler , Goerdeler, von Halem , Martin Niemöller , Pechel and Witzleben were among the best-known interlocutors . The National Socialist authorities found out about this. After his arrest on April 8, 1942, during interrogation at the Reich Security Main Office , Pechel admitted that at the end of 1941 he had received an order from Hammerstein to see General von Witzleben. Apparently Hammerstein tried to give an innocuous reason for these visits. Goerdeler's first visit took place in January 1942 on the pretext that Hammerstein wanted him to advise him on economic matters. The authorities probably only realized the full extent of Hammerstein's contacts after his death: According to a report by the Chief of the Security Police and the SD Ernst Kaltenbrunner to Reichsleiter Martin Bormann on July 29, 1944 , Werner von Alvensleben revealed during his interrogation that he knew about it a gentlemen's evening that took place at Hammerstein's in February 1942, attended by Beck, Goerdeler, Geßler and Pechel.

Image of man and leadership style

Most of his contemporaries described Hammerstein as a clever and talented general staff member who, however, appeared skeptical, mocking, cool and superior in his professional dealings. He made no secret of the fact that he was not interested in military and craftsmanship because he took it for granted. Accordingly, the former Field Marshal Erich von Manstein attributed the saying: "Rules of engagement are for the stupid".

As regards the differentiation and suitability of officers , Hammerstein said:

“I distinguish four types. There are clever, hardworking, stupid and lazy officers. Usually two properties come together. Some are clever and hardworking, they have to join the general staff . The next ones are stupid and lazy; they make up 90% of any army and are suitable for routine tasks. Those who are smart and lazy at the same time qualify for the highest management tasks, because they bring along the mental clarity and the strong nerves for difficult decisions. One must beware of those who are both stupid and hardworking; you shouldn't give him any responsibility, because he will always cause harm. "

He described the management style he recommended as follows:

“Free yourself from detailed work. To do this, keep a few smart people. But give yourself plenty of time to think about it and to become very clear to yourself. Make sure your thoughts are carried out. This is the only way you can lead properly. "

Marriage and offspring

Kurt (Curt) Gebhard Adolf Philipp Freiherr von Hammerstein ("Hako", "Papus"), Protestant, married Maria (Luise) Freiin von Lüttwitz ("Ama", "Mietze") in Karlsruhe in 1907 , * March 11, 1886 in Schweidnitz ; † March 9, 1970 in Mutlangen , Catholic, daughter of General Walther von Lüttwitz and sister of the later General Smilo von Lüttwitz . This mixed denominational marriage had seven children:

Illness, death, liability to kin

Hammerstein had a tumor below his left ear that had been increasing in size for years, to which he paid no attention until Ferdinand Sauerbruch finally declared it inoperable. He's been in a lot of pain for the past few weeks. Hammerstein died on April 24, 1943 in his house in Berlin-Dahlem. The burial took place in the family cemetery in Steinhorst , Lower Saxony . The family refused to be buried in the Berlin Invalidenfriedhof because the coffin would have had to be covered with the Reich war flag and the swastika . Hitler had a wreath with a bow sent, but this was "forgotten" by the relatives in the subway.

Three weeks after the assassination attempt on July 20, 1944, the Gestapo searched the Hammerstein's house in Berlin and interrogated Maria von Hammerstein in the Prinz-Albrecht-Palais , and the search for Kunrat and Ludwig began. Franz was arrested in the Ruhr area, questioned in vain about his brothers and transferred to Moabit prison in Berlin . Helga was also interrogated without any results, but was released after two weeks in prison; Marie Luise remained unmolested on her husband's estate, Maria Therese was out of reach in Japan.

Mother Hammerstein and daughter Hildur were arrested on December 1, 1944, also in the hope of finding out about Kunrat and Ludwig. On March 1, 1945, Mother Maria, Franz and Hildur were initially transported from Berlin to the Buchenwald concentration camp as part of their kin liability . General Smilo von Lüttwitz , Maria's brother, tried unsuccessfully by submitting a petition to General Field Marshal Keitel to get his sister and the children released from family liability. Gradually a group of over 100 prisoners found themselves in Buchenwald. On April 3, 1945, they were transported to the Dachau concentration camp , then on April 17, 1945 to Innsbruck . Franz stayed there, Mother Maria and Hildur were transported in a trek by 141 prisoners to the Dolomites in South Tyrol .

On April 30, 1945 they were rescued from the murder by the officer Wichard von Alvensleben from the violence of the SS in Niederdorf during the liberation of the SS hostages in South Tyrol - after he had been alerted by Colonel Bogislaw von Bonin , who was also in this group found. On May 4, 1945, this group was taken over by US troops from German hands and housed on Capri until the end of June 1945 .

Others

Hammerstein-Equord was a knight of honor of the Brandenburg Provincial Cooperative of the Order of St. John .

On May 7, 2017, the ordered Inspector General of the Bundeswehr Volker Wieker investigating all army barracks for so-called Wehrmacht - devotional on. The aim was to check the existing pictures and exhibits for compliance with the valid decrees, in particular the so-called traditional decree of the Bundeswehr, to identify possible violations and to rectify defects. As a result, a picture of Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord was removed from an officers' mess. At this point in time, however, it remained unclear whether there was any breach of the statutory order.

literature

Web links

Commons : Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

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Colonel-General and Admiral General of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS
Colonel General of the Army

Adam | by Arnim | Beck | Blaskowitz | Dietl | Dollmann | by Falkenhorst | Frießner | by Fritsch | Pious | Guderian | Haase | Halder | by Hammerstein-Equord | Harpe | Heinrici | Heitz | Hilpert | Hoepner | Hollidt | Hoth | Hube | Jaenecke | Jodl | Lindemann | by Mackensen | Out | Reinhardt | Rendulic | Ruoff | by Salmuth | Schmidt | by Schobert | Bouquet | by Viettinghoff | White | Zeitzler

Colonel General of the Air Force

Deßloch | Grauert | Jeschonnek | Basement | Korten | Loerzer | Löhr | Rüdel | Student | Blunt | Udet | wise

General Admirals of the Navy

Albrecht | Boehm | Carls | from Friedeburg | Kummetz | Marshal | Hall guard | Schniewind | Schultze | Warzecha | Witzell

SS Colonel Group Leader and Colonel General of the Waffen SS

Dietrich | Hausser

personal data
SURNAME Hammerstein-Equord, Kurt von
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Hammerstein-Equord, Kurt Gebhard Adolf Philipp Freiherr von
BRIEF DESCRIPTION German colonel general and part of the military resistance against Adolf Hitler
DATE OF BIRTH September 26, 1878
PLACE OF BIRTH Hinrichshagen , Mecklenburg-Strelitz
DATE OF DEATH April 24, 1943
Place of death Berlin