Eugen Ritter von Schobert

Eugen von Schobert (photo 1941)

Eugen Siegfried Erich Ritter von Schobert (born March 13, 1883 in Würzburg , † September 12, 1941 with Nikolajew ) was a German army officer (since July 1940 Colonel General ). Schobert served as an officer in the Bavarian Army during the First World War and received the Military Max Joseph Order , which raised him to the personal nobility . After that he was briefly a member of the Epp Freikorps and then made a career in the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht . In the Wehrmacht he benefited from his early acquaintance with Adolf Hitler and his positive attitude towards National Socialism . During the Second World War , Schobert commanded the VII Army Corps and from autumn 1940 the 11th Army , which he led from Romania on the south wing of the German attack on the Soviet Union from July 1941 . He extended the so-called commissioner order to shoot the captured political commissioners to include the civilian commissioners. He was at the Holocaust involved and worked on a collaboration with Einsatzgruppe D out. In September 1941, Schobert had a fatal accident when his plane landed in a minefield. He was the first German army leader to fall on the front lines during World War II.

Life

Eugen Schobert was born on March 13, 1883 as the son of the royal Bavarian major Karl Schobert and his wife Anna (née Michaely) in Würzburg . He attended the Wilhelmsgymnasium in Munich from 1893 to 1896 and then belonged to the Royal Bavarian Cadet Corps until 1902 , where he finally passed the Abitur . The latter was only the case with a few officer candidates at the time; only 34 of the 246 cadets of the final year 1902 had this level of education.

On July 14, 1902, Schobert joined the 1st Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment "König" as an ensign . On March 9, 1904, he received the officer license to lieutenant . From April 1910 he was used as an adjutant of his battalion . Since one tried at that time to train the officers as versatile as possible in order to prepare them for possible employment in the general staff, there was the possibility to be trained in another branch of service. Schobert therefore belonged to the airship department from June to December 1911 , where he was trained as a pilot at the Oberwiesenfeld airfield . He is said to have caused a crash landing and sustained a head injury. He remained connected to aviation later, for example when he promoted the local balloon club in Augsburg in 1925 .

First World War

In August 1914, Schobert led a company of his regiment as a first lieutenant in the First World War . In the next few years he was continuously used as a troop officer on the Western Front. Although he had an above-average level of education, Schobert did not get into the general staff service during the World War. Like Ernst Busch , he stood out clearly from the other later military commanders in the first years of the war. In fact, it was later reported in a propaganda publication that Schobert had voluntarily given up a career in the general staff service. At the end of 1915 Schobert is said to have received a corresponding offer to which he replied: "I would much rather stay with my people." However, this version was questioned by the historian Johannes Hürter.

In the spring of 1915 there were disciplinary proceedings against Schobert and one of his platoon leaders because, with their knowledge, on March 31, 1915, in the no man's land on the western front between the lines, their soldiers had fraternized with French soldiers. Schobert is said to have also made photographs. The accused were temporarily released from their command, but the regimental commander dropped the proceedings on April 13th. This episode didn't hurt Schobert any further, because he was promoted to captain on August 9th . After a brief assignment as a regimental adjutant, he became battalion commander in October 1917.

During the German offensive "Michael" on the Somme , on March 23, 1918, Schobert and his battalion forced the crossing over the Crozat Canal . In an eyewitness report by Lieutenant Endl it says:

“Everything jumped over the bridge after our commander into the village […] the troops stormed the approximately 1200 meter long village street […] The sudden great losses had a paralyzing effect. Then Captain Schobert saved the situation by shouting 'Hurray' with all his might. Everything came together and charged forward. The machine-gun nest was taken, the English captain was killed by Captain Schobert in a duel. "

For this he received the Knight's Cross of the Military Max Joseph Order , through which he was raised to the personal nobility and was now called Eugen Ritter von Schobert . Previously, on September 14, 1914 and November 11, 1915, he had already received the Iron Cross II and I Class and the Bavarian Military Merit Order . On May 6, 1918, he was also awarded the Knight's Cross of the Royal House Order of Hohenzollern with Swords. In July 1918, Schobert suffered a severe head and arm wound. He therefore experienced the Armistice of Compiègne of November 11, 1918 in the hospital in Aschau am Chiemsee.

Reichswehr

Schobert joined the Freikorps Epp after the end of his stay in the hospital . This association, about 700 men , had been set up for the East Border Guard on the instructions of the Reichswehr Minister Gustav Noske . In April 1919, this paramilitary unit and the military crushed the Munich Soviet Republic . Then the Freikorps was incorporated into the Reichswehr and Schobert was assigned as the leader of the 8th ( MG ) company of the 42nd Rifle Regiment. During this time he apparently met Adolf Hitler . At least General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau wrote in his diary in 1941 about a conversation with Schobert: "He has had personal relationships with the Fuehrer since 1919 and a loyalty that cannot be compromised." Supposedly, the two of them met when Hitler was giving one of his lectures in the company Schoberts held. Schobert was then involved in the suppression of the Ruhr uprising in March and April 1920 in the Oberhausen area .

Schobert married Alice Rieder-Gollwitzer in 1921. In the following years they had two sons and a daughter. In the same year Schobert then was one of the only about 4,000 in the new Reichswehr acquired officers . From January 1, 1921, he served in the 19th Infantry Regiment in Lindau and is said to have been involved in the training and secret armament of the " Black Reichswehr ". In 1923, Schobert apparently openly sympathized with the Hitler-Ludendorff putsch . He is said to have sent part of his battalion to Munich to support Hitler. This did not harm his career, however, because on February 22, 1924 he was promoted to major and in October of that year he was battalion commander in the 19th Infantry Regiment in Kempten . From January 1926 to February 1927 Schobert was used for the first time in a general staff. This was the staff of the 7th Division in Munich, where the later Colonel General Friedrich Dollmann also served at the time. There he was particularly involved in the drafting of service regulations and textbooks. Then Schobert moved to the Reichswehr Ministry, where he was busy inspecting the infantry (In2). After two years he returned to the 19th Infantry Regiment in February 1929 as commander of the 2nd Battalion stationed in Augsburg . There he became a lieutenant colonel on April 1, 1929 . In November 1932 he moved to the staff of Group Command 2 in Kassel , where he was promoted to colonel on April 1, 1932 .

Wehrmacht

SS troops at the 1935 Reich Party Rally, which Schobert helped organize

In 1933, Schobert was a colonel at the head of the Reichswehr, although he did not emerge from the General Staff . The seizure of power by the National Socialists improved his career opportunities considerably over the next few years. As early as April 1933 he became Chief of the Staff of the Infantry Inspection in the Reichswehr Ministry, and in August 1934 he was transferred back to Munich as Infantry Leader VII. There he received his promotion to major general on October 1st . Schobert "made a name for himself as a loyal political officer, as many National Socialists wanted him to be." In June 1935, for example, he dismissed a soldier who had made negative comments about the SA , justifying this by stating that, as an instructor, he had more sensitivity for cooperation with the party should have shown. In 1934 and 1935, Schobert organized the “Day of the Wehrmacht” at the NSDAP party congresses in Nuremberg .

On October 15, 1935, Schobert took over as commander of the newly established 17th Infantry Division in Nuremberg and then in March 1936 the 33rd Infantry Division in Mannheim . He kept this command for two years and during this period he was promoted to Lieutenant General (January 1, 1937) and General of the Infantry (February 1, 1938). In March 1938, Schobert took over command of Military District VII ; In the event of war, he was also the Commanding General of the VII Army Corps , a position previously held by Lieutenant General Walter von Reichenau . On March 12, 1938, Schobert participated as commander of the VII Army Corps in the 8th Army (Colonel General Fedor von Bock ) in the operations for the " Anschluss " of Austria . He had previously been informed by Hitler at the same time as Goering and before all the other military officers on the night of March 9-10. Schobert had convinced Hitler that an invasion of Austria had to be planned and directed centrally, whereupon the dictator first commissioned the chief of staff, Colonel General Ludwig Beck, with the improvised planning of the company. Shortly thereafter, the VII. Army Corps was on 1st / 2nd Mobilized again in October 1938 and used to occupy the Sudetenland . Shortly afterwards, the General Staff of the Army Corps brought out a propaganda publication about this mission. During this time as the commanding general, Schobert also worked towards the National Socialist training of his soldiers. In a training order dated November 4, 1938, he wrote:

“Our supreme law is: 'Everything for the Führer, for Germany!' Under this slogan, the troops must internally become firm and absolutely hard on themselves. Under her she takes the clear path of duty, unconcerned about less beautiful everyday appearances. You don't care. He doesn't stir up dirt, isn't a complainer. But successes in the life of our people, achieved through genuine German manliness, inspire him all the more. "

- Eugen von Schobert (November 4, 1938)

Second World War

War against Poland 1939

On August 26, 1939, shortly before the start of the Second World War , the command of Military District VII was mobilized again and subordinated to Army Group South (Colonel General Gerd von Rundstedt ) as the VII Army Corps . It comprised the 68th and 27th Infantry Divisions and served the Army Group as a reserve in the first days of the September campaign against Poland . The corps marched through Tarnowitz , Kielce and Jędrzejów before it was placed under the 14th Army (Colonel General Wilhelm List ). As part of this army, Schobert's army corps crossed the Vistula at Baranów and Tarnobrzeg and took part in the battle at Tomaszów Lubelski (September 16-20, 1939), during which around 60,000 Polish soldiers were captured. On September 21 and 26, 1939, the VII Army Corps fended off strong Polish counter-attacks near Zamosc . It then withdrew fighting to Annopol on the Vistula, because it had already been on the territory that had been assigned to the Soviet Union according to the secret additional protocol of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939 . Schobert's General Staff also published a propaganda pamphlet about these battles.

In Poland, Schobert was one of the troop leaders who warned their troops of a possible free- riot war even before the invasion of Poland , but at the same time warned them against “ghost-seeing”. On September 5, 1939, his command post ordered that non-military Polish resistance organizations be uncovered and destroyed with the help of the ethnic German minority. On the same day, Schobert issued a special order in which he criticized the loosening of discipline among the troops (there had been looting) and denounced the rampant nervousness because of alleged Polish irregulars, because of which there had been "senseless shooting". Since this apparently did not have the desired effect, Schobert issued another corps order on September 7th, which stated: “It has happened that, without sufficient evidence, civilians were shot dead on the orders of unauthorized officers. […] We don't need to fear a split enemy! There is no reason to be nervous and its consequences. The shooting of civilians who do not die in combat can only be ordered by court lords. ”Later, on September 21, he threatened the death penalty for particularly serious crimes against the civilian population, such as robbery .

Use in the West in 1940

Parts of the armored factory 505 today

General Command VII was moved to the German western border shortly after the fighting in Poland had ended. Initially there was no major fighting (→ seated war ). At the same time, however, Schobert experienced a certain setback when in October 1939 General of the Infantry Ernst Busch, the commanding general of the VIII Army Corps , was appointed to head the newly formed 16th Army . Both officers had served as troop officers in the First World War, both were considered open to National Socialism and both had commanded an army corps in the fighting in the Tomaszow area. And although Schobert was the senior officer, it was not him but Busch who was appointed commander of the army, to which Schobert and his VII Army Corps were subordinated.

In the western campaign from May 10, 1940, Schobert's corps belonged as part of the 16th Army to Army Group A under Colonel General Gerd von Rundstedt . The army's task was initially to secure the flanks for the German tank advance of the mass of Army Group A across the Meuse further north. In order to tie up the French forces along the opposite Maginot Line , the VII Army Corps was tasked with an attack against Panzerwerk 505 near Verdun , which it carried out successfully from May 16-19, 1940. In view of the general operational situation in the north, the attack was of little importance, but “the battle for La Ferté was ultimately stylized as highly as if the battle of Verdun was to be fought a second time at this point […] at this point In the fierce battle for Panzerwerk 505 it was about something completely different, namely the myth of the »invincibility of the Maginot Line«. "This achievement was particularly emphasized in the propaganda and the" superior leadership and the exemplary and rousing commitment of the commanding general “Attributed. For this Schobert was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross on June 29, 1940 .

In the second phase of the western campaign, the "Fall Rot", the VII Army Corps forced the passage over the Aisne as part of the 16th Army from June 9, 1940 . Shortly thereafter, the army was subordinated to Army Group C (Colonel General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb ). Schobert's corps had a share in the enclosure of the 200,000 strong Allied Army Group 3 (French 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 8th Army), which had to surrender by June 22, 1940. On June 25, 1940, the Compiègne armistice came into effect, temporarily ending the war in the West. As part of a large wave of promotion within the Wehrmacht leadership, Schobert was raised to the rank of Colonel General on July 19, 1940 in recognition of his military achievements .

In the course of the planned Sea Lion , the invasion of Great Britain, the VII Army Corps was planned as part of the landing forces. The command of the corps had a new march composed for its troops, the title of which was England to collapse . Only after the landing operation had been postponed indefinitely did Schobert become Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed Army High Command 11, which initially disguised as the "Leipzig Command Staff" and stayed in Munich from April 1941. In the following months, Schobert devoted himself to training and equipping various subordinate associations with a view to the impending war against the Soviet Union .

War against the Soviet Union in 1941

Colonel General von Schobert (right) in conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Hans von Ahlfen during the crossing over the Pruth (1941)

Originally it was planned that the Army High Command 12 under General Field Marshal Wilhelm List should take over the leadership of the German action from Romania against the Soviet Union. However, since he was appointed Wehrmacht Commander Southeast (Greece and Yugoslavia) after the Balkan campaign in spring 1941 , Army High Command 11 was sent to Romania instead. Schobert received all of the German troops already present there or still being brought in to the extent of seven infantry divisions (22nd, 50th, 72nd, 76th, 170th, 198th and 239th), three general commands (XI., XXX. and LIV.) as well as the German Air Force Mission with around 60 fighters . On May 24, 1941, Schobert took up his position as "Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in Romania". Until the start of the planned attack, it was the task of these troops to protect the economically important Romanian oil fields near Ploieşti in the event that the Red Army noticed the German deployment and would disrupt it with its own advance. From May 28, the last preparations for the offensive against the USSR were made, the first target of which was to be the city of Vinnitsa (Operation "Munich"). The participating armies ( 3rd and 4th) of the Romanian ally, which was only inaugurated very late, should also be subordinate to Army High Command 11, but for political reasons the Romanian marshal and actual head of state Ion Antonescu should be the nominal commander in chief of all German and Romanian units operating from Romania act. Thus the situation arose that the German Army High Command 11 drew up all operational plans and all necessary orders, but had to have these confirmed by Antonescu, if they concerned Romanian troops. Schobert's high command functioned as a kind of staff for the nominal commander-in-chief Antonescu.

The German attack on the Soviet Union began on June 22, 1941. On June 24, the Romanian declaration of war followed and on the following day Schobert's Army High Command 11 ordered the preparation of an offensive over the Prut . On July 2, 1941, the attack, for which the Romanian 3rd Army was subordinated to the German 11th Army, was to be carried out. Schobert received the order not to advance on Vinnitsa, but first on Proskurow , where he should gain connection with the other formations of Army Group South . The Soviet resistance of the southern front deployed here (Lieutenant General IW Tjulenew ) slowed the advance of the German-Romanian units considerably. It was therefore not possible to enclose parts of the Red Army between the German 11th and 17th Armies and Panzer Group 1 as planned. When the heads of the 11th Army were in the Soroki area , their southern flank was hit on July 9 by a Soviet counterattack, which made it necessary to turn off a corps to take Kishinev . For this reason, and because of ongoing supply problems, Schobert was unable to attack again before July 17th. The units of the 11th Army were therefore no longer able to intervene in the kettle battle near Uman that was developing from mid-July . However, after three Soviet armies (6th, 12th and parts of the 18th Army) had been crushed in this battle, the German-Romanian units in the Ukraine gained greater freedom of movement.

On August 12, Schobert received a new instruction instructing him to operate against the Dnieper and to erect bridgeheads there in order to advance to the Crimea in a further step . There were only local skirmishes with Soviet rear guards, so that the Dnepr near Berislav could soon be reached. However, since Stalin had ordered the Dnepr line to be kept absolutely, fierce fighting developed in this area from August 30 to September 5, 1941, in the course of which Schobert's troops (XXX Army Corps, Infantry General Hans von Salmuth ) broke out Could form a bridgehead on the other side of the Dnieper. Schobert now set the LIV. Army Corps ( General of the Cavalry Erik Hansen ) in the direction of the Crimea and left the Red Army units from XXX. Army Corps and XXXXIX. (Geb.) Army Corps ( General of the Mountain Troop Ludwig Kübler ) pursue. On September 12, 1941, when the LIV. Army Corps reached the Isthmus of Perekop , Colonel General von Schobert died when his reconnaissance plane crashed. In his place, General of the Infantry Erich von Manstein took command of the 11th Army, which arrived on September 17th.

During the 10 weeks of his command, Schobert had the criminal commissioner order carried out. He had expanded this to include civilian Soviet commissars for his area, which was not provided for in the order itself. At a briefing on the issue of orders already held on June 18 under his leadership, at which all division commanders of the 11th Army were present in addition to the Romanian head of state Antonescu , the essential provisions of the martial law decree and the commissioner's order were recorded as follows:

"Irregulars, saboteurs, political commissars of the troops and properly established political commissars of the Civil Administration are summarily to shoot."

Chief of Staff Otto Wöhler wanted to restrict the order insofar as he only wanted to have the Soviet commissioners shot who had been guilty of a crime carrying the death penalty. But Schobert refused on the grounds that an order could not simply be put on file. When he heard that the commander of the 50th Infantry Division , Lieutenant General Karl-Adolf Hollidt , considered the commissar's order to be inconsistent with his conscience, he dismissed it with the remark that Hollidt was a soldier whose job it was to carry out orders .

Participation in the Holocaust

Action of Einsatzgruppe D in the 11th Army's area of ​​operations

In the war against the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht was involved in the mass murder of the Jews from the start. While Einsatzgruppen A, B and C were assigned to Army Group Commands North, Central and South, each with their several armies, Einsatzgruppe D, which was somewhat smaller compared to Einsatzgruppen A, B and C, was assigned to Schobert's Armeekommando 11 alone. On July 12, 1941, the colonel general met for the first time for a personal discussion with the chief of Einsatzgruppe D, SS-Obergruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf . After that, according to Ohlendorf, the two met "once or twice in the casino " of the army staff. In a conversation on July 12th, Schobert assured the SS units “free hand” and “flexible use”. Schobert was thus in line with the practice that had been agreed between Army Group Command Center (Field Marshal Fedor von Bock ) and Einsatzgruppe B at the same time .

In practice, the agreement between Ohlendorf and Schobert was undermined by his chief of staff, Otto Wöhler , who wanted to use the task force as an auxiliary force mainly for security tasks at the disposal of the army. The actions of the task force were severely restricted in this way, against which Ohlendorf protested to his superiors. Wöhler's intention was not to prevent the killings of the task force, but rather to use them to support the 11th Army police. From August 7, 1941, the approach of Einsatzgruppe D became more flexible. She was instructed by Schobert to take over the security of the rear combat area. He stated that numerous Soviet soldiers had left their bunkers and dressed in peasant clothes. As a result, there is a risk that partisan groups will form. He ordered “all people who cannot identify themselves properly to be arrested and, if necessary, shot. It is better to arrest too many than too few people. ”In the weeks that followed, the number of Jews murdered by Einsatzgruppe D skyrocketed. 4,425 people were murdered in the first two months of the war. By the end of September that number rose to 35,782.

Schobert himself worked towards cooperation with Einsatzgruppe D. One example of this is the "Romanenko case". This man was accused of being a commissioner who threatened some volunteers and called them to stop working. On Schobert's direct order, Romanenko was handed over to Sonderkommando 11a, which was supposed to punish him by way of example, for example by publicly hanging him. It was later found that the man was innocent. Nonetheless, he was executed on September 9, 1941 for “hereditary reasons”, as he was assessed as “mentally weak” who, according to his own statement, had stayed in sanatoriums several times.

Another aspect was the actions of the Romanian troops against the Jewish population, to which more people fell victim in the initial phase of the war in Ukraine than the German task forces. The public pogroms and shootings found no approval in Schobert's army command. At the end of July 1941, the Romanian authorities began to expel tens of thousands of Jews from Bessarabia, which was claimed by Romania, and to deport them across the border river Dnestr to the rear of the 11th Army. Schobert vigorously opposed this practice because he saw it as a threat to security in his area of ​​command. He had the Jews driven back by Einsatzgruppe D and sent a letter of complaint to his superiors on July 31 and August 15. Thereupon an agreement was reached in Tighina on August 30, 1941 that the Romanians would waive further deportations in exchange for the preservation of full sovereignty in Transnistria .

Death and Contemporary Judgment

Cover of the memorial book published in 1942 by the central publishing house of the NSDAP

On September 12, 1941, Schobert boarded a Fieseler "Storch" of Kurierstaffel 7 together with the pilot, Captain Wilhelm Suwelack , to fly to an advanced division command post. For reasons unknown, but probably because of Soviet machine gun fire, they had to make an early landing. However, the aircraft got into a Soviet minefield and exploded shortly after touching down. Both inmates were killed. Schobert was the first German army leader to fall in World War II. His death was officially announced in the Wehrmacht report on September 14, 1941. On September 15, Schobert was buried near the Bug Liman . The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch , gave the funeral speech. Marshal Antonescu also attended and posthumously awarded the Order of Michael the Brave . On September 23rd, a state act ordered by Hitler was committed in the German Reich, the central celebration of which took place in Munich. Here Colonel General Friedrich Fromm gave a memorial speech for Schobert. The NSDAP played a key role in the celebrations, which in view of the tensions between the party and the military could not be taken for granted. Hitler himself wrote in his letter of condolence to Schobert's widow: "With him I am losing a comrade whom I could rely on at any time." Less than a year later, the central publishing house of the NSDAP published two books on the VII Army Corps. the propaganda publication Generaloberst Eugen Ritter von Schobert - Life picture of a German army leader from the propaganda company member Leo Leixner. This typeface with little informational value is the only monographic treatment of Schobert's biography to this day.

As early as 1938, General Erwin von Witzleben judged Schobert to be a man with “a strongly National Socialist personality.” After the general's death, this was confirmed by Reich Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels , who described Schobert as “fundamentally Nazi-minded <sic!>”. During the Nuremberg Trials , Colonel General von Salmuth testified that Schobert admired Hitler and blindly followed his orders. He later said that Schobert was not a National Socialist, but a sincere and honest person. "He was an idealist of the purest water, and if he followed Hitler's ideas, it was because he believed in them like the amen in the church." Otto Wöhler testified that Schobert believed in Hitler and his "historical mission" believed. “But I don't think that Schobert was what one should understand by a Nazi driver in the sense of party politics.” The former Lieutenant General Hans Speidel , who saw Schobert as a “dedicated National Socialist”, saw it differently .

attachment

literature

• Horst Boog , Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär : The attack on the Soviet Union (= The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 4). DVA Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 978-3-421-06098-3 .
• Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Heerführer - The German Supreme Commanders in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 (= sources and representations on contemporary history . Volume 66). 2nd Edition. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-486-58341-0 (Habilitation thesis Universität Meinz 2006, 719 pages).
• Marcel Stein: Field Marshal Von Manstein, a portrait: the Janus head . Trowbridge 2007, ISBN 978-1-906033-02-6 .

Web links

Commons : Eugen von Schobert  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commander-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 662.
2. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 45.
3. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 54.
4. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, pp. 54 and 662.
5. ^ Leo Leixner: Colonel General Eugen Ritter von Schobert . Munich 1942, p. 26.
6. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 71.
7. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, pp. 58 and 73.
8. ^ Leo Leixner: Colonel General Eugen Ritter von Schobert . Munich 1942, p. 20.
9. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 72 fn. 8.
10. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 82.
11. ↑ Quoted from: Leo Leixner: Colonel General Eugen Ritter von Schobert . Munich 1942, p. 29.
12. ↑ R. v. Kramer: Virtuti Pro Patria - The Royal Bavarian Military Max Joseph Order . Munich 1966, pp. 217 and 404 f .; Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Supreme Commanders in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 77 fn. 31.
13. ↑ Reichswehr Ministry (Ed.): Ranking list of the German Reichsheeres . Mittler & Sohn Verlag, Berlin, p. 117.
14. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 77.
15. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 86 fn. 64; Leo Leixner: Colonel General Eugen Ritter von Schobert . Munich 1942, p. 42.
16. ↑ Quoted from: Peter Broucek (Ed.): A General in the Twilight - The Memories of Edmund Glaises von Horstenau . Vol. 2, Vienna 1983, p. 631.
17. ^ Leo Leixner: Colonel General Eugen Ritter von Schobert . Munich 1942, p. 42.
18. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 93.
19. ^ Leo Leixner: Colonel General Eugen Ritter von Schobert . Munich 1942, p. 43 f.
20. ↑ For example: Eugen Ritter von Schobert: Instructions for training in shooting with s. MG with examples - On the basis of the shooting regulations for s. MG Verlag Ernst & Sohn, Berlin 1926.
21. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 103.
22. ↑ ^{a b} Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 663.
23. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 126.
24. ↑ Manfred Messerschmidt: The Wehrmacht in the Nazi State - Time of Indoctrination . Hamburg 1969, p. 103.
25. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 126 fn. 18.
26. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 149.
27. ^ Klaus-Jürgen Müller: Colonel General Ludwig Beck . P. 302.
28. ↑ With the VII. Corps in the Sudetenland . Central publishing house of the NSDAP, Munich 1938.
29. ↑ Quoted from: Jürgen Förster: Geistige Kriegführung in Deutschland 1919–1945 . In: Ralf Blank u. a. (Ed.): The German War Society 1939 to 1945 - First half volume: Politicization, Destruction, Survival . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 2004, p. 493 (= The German Reich and the Second World War . Vol. 9/1).
30. ^ Nikolaus von Vormann: The campaign in Poland in 1939 . Weissenburg 1958, pp. 86, 97, 145 and 169 f.
31. ↑ We moved against Poland . Central publishing house of the NSDAP, Munich 1940.
32. ^ Jochen Böhler: Prelude to the War of Extermination - The Wehrmacht in Poland 1939 . Frankfurt / Main 2006, p. 109 f.
33. ↑ Quoted from: Jochen Böhler: Prelude to the War of Extermination - The Wehrmacht in Poland 1939 . Frankfurt / Main 2006, p. 113.
34. ^ Jochen Böhler: Prelude to the War of Extermination - The Wehrmacht in Poland 1939 . Frankfurt / Main 2006, p. 182.
35. ^ Karl-Heinz Frieser : Blitzkrieg Legend - The Western Campaign 1940 . Munich 1996, p. 310 and 314.
36. ↑ Quotation from the reason for the award of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, cf. Leo Leixner: Colonel General Eugen Ritter von Schobert . Munich 1942, p. 28.
37. ↑ Veit Scherzer : Knight's Cross bearers 1939-1945. The holders of the Iron Cross of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm and armed forces allied with Germany according to the documents of the Federal Archives. 2nd Edition. Scherzers Militaer-Verlag, Ranis / Jena 2007, ISBN 978-3-938845-17-2 , p. 678.
38. ^ Kurt von Tippelskirch: The Second World War . Bonn 1956, pp. 90-93.
39. ↑ Richard Brett-Smith: Hitler's Generals . London 1976, p. 30. This personal "battle cry" Schobert is also confirmed in Leixner's propaganda pamphlet, cf. Leo Leixner: Colonel General Eugen Ritter von Schobert . Munich 1942, p. 10.
40. ↑ Jürgen Förster: The acquisition of allies in Southeast Europe . In: Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann u. a .: The attack on the Soviet Union . Stuttgart 1983, pp. 342-345.
41. ↑ Jürgen Förster: The acquisition of allies in Southeast Europe . In: Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann u. a .: The attack on the Soviet Union . Stuttgart 1983, p. 346.
42. ↑ Ernst Klink: The operation management . In: Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann u. a .: The attack on the Soviet Union . Stuttgart 1983, pp. 473 and 479-484.
43. ↑ Erich von Manstein: Lost victories . Munich 1976, p. 215.
44. ↑ Felix Römer : The commissioner order. Wehrmacht and Nazi crimes on the Eastern Front 1941/42 . Schöningh, Paderborn 2008, ISBN 978-3-506-76595-6 (Zugl .: Kiel, Univ., Diss., 2007), p. 194 f.
45. ^ Entry in the war diary of the 239th Infantry Division for discussion at the AOK 11 v. June 18, 1941; BA-MA, RH 26-239 / 17. Quoted from Felix Römer: The Commissar Order. Wehrmacht and Nazi crimes on the Eastern Front 1941/42 . Schöningh, Paderborn 2008, p. 195.
46. ↑ Marcel Stein: Field Marshal Von Manstein, a portrait: the Janus head . Trowbridge 2007, p. 253.
47. ↑ So Otto Ohlendorf in the Einsatzgruppen process , see Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 4: United States of America vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et al. (PDF; 54.24 MB) . United States Government Printing Office , District of Columbia 1950, p. 291 (Volume 4 of the "Green Series"). The date of the first meeting there is June 12, 1941, meaning July 12, 1941. On June 12, 1941, Einsatzgruppe D was not yet in Romania.
48. ↑ Helmut Krausnick: Hitler's Einsatzgruppen - The Troops of the Weltanschauung War 1938–1942 . P. 170.
49. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 526.
50. ↑ Helmut Krausnick: Hitler's Einsatzgruppen - The Troops of the Weltanschauung War 1938–1942 . Pp. 171-188.
51. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 526 f.
52. ↑ Helmut Krausnick: Hitler's Einsatzgruppen - The Troops of the Weltanschauung War 1938–1942 . P. 189.
53. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 527.
54. ↑ Helmut Krausnick: Hitler's Einsatzgruppen - The Troops of the Weltanschauung War 1938–1942 . P. 197.
55. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 589.
56. ↑ Erich von Manstein: Lost victories . Munich 1976, p. 208; Leo Leixner: Colonel General Eugen Ritter von Schobert . Munich 1942, p. 13 f.
57. ^ The reports of the Wehrmacht High Command, 1939–1945 . Vol. 2, Munich 1983, p. 242.
58. ^ Leo Leixner: Colonel General Eugen Ritter von Schobert . Munich 1942, pp. 14-16 and 59.
59. ↑ Quoted from: Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Heerführer - The German Supreme Commanders in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 126 fn. 17.
60. ↑ Elke Fröhlich (ed.): The diaries of Joseph Goebbels . Part II, Vol. 1, Munich 1996, p. 418 (entry from September 14, 1941).
61. ↑ Helmut Krausnick: Hitler's Einsatzgruppen - Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges 1938–1942 , Frankfurt / Main 1985, p. 334 f.
62. ↑ Marcel Stein: Field Marshal Von Manstein, a portrait: the Janus head . Trowbridge 2007, p. 252 f.
63. ↑ Hans Speidel: From our time - memories . Berlin 1977, p. 77.

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