Rudolf Schmidt (General)

Rudolf Schmidt after his promotion to Colonel General (1942)

Rudolf Schmidt (born May 12, 1886 in Berlin , †  April 7, 1957 in Krefeld ) was a German officer and most recently Colonel General . Schmidt served in the Prussian army during the First World War and then made a career in the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht . Although he originally emerged from the intelligence service , he was one of the leading experts in the armored force during the Nazi era . During the Second World War he rose from division commander to army commander in chief . During the surrender negotiations he led, Rotterdam was bombed in May 1940 . In the 1941 tank battles in the Soviet Union , Schmidt was one of the most important tank commanders. In contrast to large parts of the political and military leadership, he took a cooperative course towards the Russian population, placing a large area under self-administration in the Lokot area. Schmidt was fired in 1943 after his brother got involved in an espionage and high treason affair. After the war he was imprisoned by the Soviets and did not return to Germany until 1955.

Life

Origin and youth

Rudolf Schmidt was born on May 12, 1886 as the son of the Royal Prussian Privy Councilor and Gymnasium director Rudolf Schmidt (Sen.) and his wife Johanna Elisabeth Friederike Udine (born von Könitz ; 1857-1928) in Berlin-Schöneberg. He had a younger brother Hans-Thilo (1888-1943) who was known as a spy. The Protestant student attended a humanistic grammar school and successfully passed the Abitur in 1906 .

Shortly after he entered on September 25, 1906 as a cadet in the 83 Infantry Regiment "Wittich" (3 Kurhessisches) No. In Kassel one. There, Schmidt completed his training as an officer in the following years and, after completing the same, was promoted to lieutenant on January 27, 1908 . Since Schmidt apparently had a keen interest in technology, he was assigned to Telegraph Battalion 4 from November 1911 to September 1912. This was a common practice at the time to broaden the horizons of young officers beyond their own branch of service. This experience soon proved to be formative for Schmidt. In the course of the general expansion of the army, the intelligence force also grew and generated an increased need for officers in this branch of arms. In April 1913 Schmidt was finally transferred to Telegraph Battalion 5 in Berlin. From May 1914 he was entrusted with the management of the telephone department of the 1st Reserve Corps .

In the first World War

Schmidt's original branch of service: intelligence force with army field wagon (1914)

At the beginning of the First World War, Schmidt's telephone department was initially used on the Eastern Front . In 1914 he took part in the fighting in East Prussia as part of the 1st Reserve Corps and was then transferred to the 1st Landwehr Division in April 1915 as head of the telephone department . This fought in the summer months on the Bobr . Then in October 1915 Schmidt was transferred to Army High Command 12 as adjutant of the telegraph force. After this first assignment in a general staff, Schmidt came to the Western Front in April 1916 as head of the telephone department for the Guard Corps . In this position, which also made him commander of the Guard Telephone Troop, he remained for a year.

This was followed by an improvised general staff training typical of the wartime period . Originally, Schmidt had already qualified to attend the War Academy before the war through above-average performance and successfully passing entrance exams . The three-year course, which should have started in October 1914, would have made Schmidt a general staff officer and thus the elite of the army. When the war broke out, however, all courses were canceled and candidates and teachers were sent to the front. However, as the need for general staff officers grew as the war progressed, a provisional procedure was developed. Suitable officers were used on a trial basis in various staffs and made familiar with the practical work there. Then they attended an intensive course lasting several weeks (see General Staff Course Sedan ) and were accepted into the General Staff if they passed the final exam. Schmidt served as part of this program between April 1917 and August 1918 in the staff of the Chief of Field Telegraphs at the headquarters (April to June 1917), in the staff of the 28th Reserve Division (June 1917 to January 1918) and in the general staff of the XIV. and VII Reserve Corps (January to September 1918). Only in September 1917 did Schmidt briefly command the 2nd Battalion of the Reserve Grenadier Regiment 110 . This was not unusual in that brief front-line commands were common for staff officers so as not to lose contact with the troops. In September 1918 Schmidt finally took part successfully in the course for staff officers in Sedan and was immediately transferred to the General Staff of the 4th Army .

Reichswehr and Wehrmacht

Career in the Reichswehr

Promotions

• September 25, 1906 Flagjunker
• May 18, 1907 Ensign
• January 27, 1908 Lieutenant
• November 28, 1914 First Lieutenant
• December 18, 1915 Captain
• February 1, 1927 Major
• April 1, 1931 Lieutenant Colonel
• October 1, 1933 Colonel
• October 1, 1936 Major General
• June 1, 1938 Lieutenant General
• June 1, 1940 General of the Panzer Force
• 1st January 1942 Colonel General

After the war was ended by the Compiègne armistice , the Army High Command sent 4 Schmidt with a “special battalion” to revolutionary Hamburg . But in December Schmidt , who had meanwhile advanced to captain , returned to the Guard News Replacement Department in Berlin. A few months later he served in the Prussian War Ministry from March to October 1919 and then moved to the Reich War Ministry . After the signing of the Versailles Treaty , the German land forces were only allowed to count 100,000 soldiers. Schmidt was one of those officers who were accepted into the new Reichswehr. The departments changed for him several times. From October 1923 on, he led the 1st Company of Intelligence Department 3 in Potsdam for two years, before returning to the Reichswehr Ministry in October 1925. Here he belonged to the inspection of the intelligence forces (In 7).

Only after almost three years was there another transfer in October 1928, this time as a course leader and tactics teacher in the staff of the 6th Division in Münster . A year later he took up the same position on the staff of the 3rd Division in Berlin. In June 1931 he finally returned to the Reichswehr Ministry as "Chief of Staff for the Inspection of the Intelligence Forces". Only one year later, in July 1932, he took up the post of "Commander of the Berlin Officers Training Courses". As such, he was responsible for the organization of the military district examinations and the subsequent training of the best candidates to become “Fuehrer assistants”, i.e. general staff officers. Building on this, the War Academy in Berlin was later reopened. Schmidt thus belonged to the military upper class even before the National Socialists ' seizure of power .

Promotion in the Wehrmacht

It was still customary to temporarily entrust the officers of the General Staff with troop commands so as not to alienate them from the front lines. Schmidt, meanwhile promoted to colonel , therefore took over the leadership of the 13th (Württemberg) infantry regiment in Ludwigsburg in October 1934 . In November 1935, however, he was transferred to the General Staff of the Army High Command (OKH) as Quartermaster III . In this function he was not only one of the deputies of the chief of staff, but also responsible for the central questions of transport and supplies. Long before the armament of the German armed forces, Schmidt belonged to the group of German officers who had dealt in depth with the issues of mechanization and motorization of the army. It is noticeable that, like other protagonists of the later German armored troops (e.g. Guderian and Hoth ), he had already belonged to a technical service class during the First World War. As chief quartermaster, he was able to play a decisive role in the modernization of the armed forces during the armament phase.

Deployment of Schmidt's 1st Panzer Division in Karlsbad on October 4, 1938

In October 1937, Schmidt took command of the 1st Panzer Division in Weimar as major general . An impression of Schmidt's attitude towards the Nazi regime at the time gives a speech that he gave as commander on the occasion of the swearing-in of recruits on November 9, 1937, which among other things said:

“We have once again become a powerful, respected people who play a decisive role in the world. This tremendous turnaround […] took place without major disruptions thanks to the genius of our Führer, a phenomenon unprecedented in history. As a strong haven of peace, for the security of the German people, behind the Führer is the German Wehrmacht, 100,000 men once and now an army of millions. "

It was later pointed out that this speech had been given before the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis , i.e. before Adolf Hitler put himself at the head of the army and got involved directly in military affairs. In any case, Schmidt showed himself to be energetic towards the National Socialist organizations. According to the memories of the resistance fighter Fabian von Schlabrendorff , because of the constant friction between soldiers and the SS , he set up officer patrols in his area of ​​command before the war , which, if necessary, were to use armed force against the SS.

The only case of mobilization for Schmidt's armored division before the outbreak of World War II took place during the Sudeten crisis . As part of the XVI. Army corps (motorized) under Lieutenant General Heinz Guderian, the 1st Panzer Division marched from Cham and Eibenstock across the border and occupied Karlsbad on October 4, 1938 .

In World War II

Poland, Holland, and France 1939–1940

When the Second World War began on September 1, 1939, Schmidts' division again belonged to XVI. Army corps (mot.), Which was now commanded by General of the Cavalry Erich Hoepner . This corps was to act as the “spearhead” of the German troops during the attack on Poland and, after overcoming the first Polish resistance, advance quickly to Warsaw . Indeed, the troops of the XVI. Army Corps at Tomaszów Mazowiecki a breakthrough and on September 8, 1939, parts of the unit temporarily invaded the suburbs of the Polish capital. Schmidt's 1st Panzer Division was given the task of covering the right flank south of Warsaw and at the same time forming bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Vistula . In those days these German units were far ahead and had to hold their own against Polish counter-attacks from almost all directions for a while until the main forces of the army came up. After this crisis was overcome, Schmidt's division was also used in the Battle of the Bzura between September 16 and 20, 1939 .

Rotterdam, May 14, 1940: Although the Dutch city commandant started negotiations with Schmidt, ...

... Schmidt's order to cancel the bombing attack no longer reached the pilots. Around 900 people died in Rotterdam

After the successful campaign, the bulk of the German army was moved to the western border and prepared for the planned offensive against the Western Allies. In the course of the expansion and reorganization of the command structure, Schmidt received a new post on February 1, 1940, as the commanding general of the newly established XXXIX. Army Corps . However, the corps staff was initially kept in reserve and only two days after the start of the western campaign on May 10, 1940, Schmidt's staff was deployed in the area of ​​the 18th Army under Artillery General Georg von Küchler . On May 12th, command of the 9th Panzer Division , 254th Infantry Division and Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler" was placed under the command of the Army Corps . With these forces Schmidt was supposed to take action against the fortress Holland with a focus on Rotterdam and prevent a permanent defense of the Dutch troops there. For this purpose, the 7th Flieger Division was subordinated to him, whose soldiers had jumped in the enemy hinterland and had established themselves there. German soldiers landed with twelve He 59 seaplanes on the Wilhelmsbrücke over the Maas in Rotterdam and formed a bridgehead exposed to severe Dutch counter-attacks. A German air strike was ordered as early as May 13th to relieve the burden. Schmidt commanded the relief for the bridgehead and in this role also led surrender negotiations. Schmidt received the order from his superior, Küchler, to “break the resistance in Rotterdam with all possible means, if necessary threaten and carry out the destruction of the city.” In order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, Schmidt demanded the Dutch occupation of the city on May 14, 1940 to surrender. The day before, however, the order had already been given to the air force to bomb the city at 3 p.m. the following day. When the Dutch entered into the negotiations, Schmidt radioed the air force command at 2:15 p.m. “Attack postponed due to negotiations.” But this order no longer reached the approaching units: at 2:55 p.m. the surrender was signed; At around 3:05 p.m., aircraft from Kampfgeschwader 54 bombed the area in front of the bridgehead, i.e. the old town of Rotterdam. The bombing and the subsequent major fire killed around 900 people.

A few days after the events in Rotterdam, Schmidt and his corps staff were transferred to the Arras area, where British armored forces launched a counter-offensive on May 21, 1940 . The XXXIX. Army Corps took over the command of the German forces on site, but largely left the management of the defense against the attack to the commander of the 7th Panzer Division, Major General Erwin Rommel . Now the fronts came to a standstill for the time being and the fighting was concentrated in the Dunkirk pocket . Schmidt's corps was reorganized and placed under the armored group Guderian . In the association of this grouping, Schmidt's troops crossed the Aisne on June 9, 1940 during the continuation of the German offensive (see case Rot ) and advanced within a few days to the Swiss border. Here she met divisions of General Dollmann's German 7th Army , which were coming towards them from southern Germany. Allied Army Group 3 (French 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 8th Army) was thus included. This soon had to surrender on June 22, 1940.

For Schmidt, the fighting in France had brought another leap forward in his career. On June 1, 1940, he was promoted to General of the Armored Force and two days later he was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross .

During the occupation that followed in France, Schmidt instructed his soldiers to

"That as long as you remain as an occupying force in the areas of France occupied by the German Wehrmacht, you will show an attitude worthy of a German soldier. Any looting, including the removal of objects of any kind without payment, is prohibited and is severely punished. Violence against residents is not only unworthy of a German soldier, but also results in the strictest punishment. "

While the German war efforts were now directed against Great Britain , the Wehrmacht leadership drew up a plan to conquer Gibraltar (see company Felix ). Of the two general commands designated for this difficult operation, one was the XXXIX. Schmidt's Army Corps. However, since General Francisco Franco refused to allow German troops to march through Spain at the last minute , the undertaking was never carried out. At times, Schmidt was also considered as commander of the Africa Corps , before the decision was made for Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel. Schmidt and his XXXIX. Army corps, however, were relocated to Allenstein in East Prussia in the spring of 1941 .

Russia 1941-1943

Awards

• Iron Cross (1914) 2nd and 1st class
• Knight's Cross II. Class of the Order of the Zähringer Lion with Swords and Oak Leaves
• Order of Henry the Lion IV class
• Austrian Military Merit Cross III. Class with the war decoration
• Iron crescent
• Officer's Cross of the Bulgarian Order of Military Merit
• Wehrmacht service award IV. To I. class
• Clasp for the Iron Cross, 2nd and 1st class
• Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with oak leaves
  • Knight's Cross on June 3, 1940.
  • Oak leaves on July 10, 1941 (19th award)

The German attack on the Soviet Union began on June 22, 1941 . Schmidts XXXIX. Army corps (mot.) Belonged to Panzer Group 3 under Colonel General Hermann Hoth in the area of Army Group Center . Schmidt's divisions advanced from the Suwałki area via Olita and Wilna and reached Vitebsk on July 10, 1941 . The rapid advance of the corps was reason enough for the Wehrmacht leadership to award Schmidt the Knight's Cross as the first soldier in the war against the Soviet Union at this early stage. Meanwhile, the troops of the XXXIX formed. Army corps (mot.) The northern part of a ring around several Soviet armies in the Smolensk area until they surrendered in mid-August (see Kesselschlacht bei Smolensk ). On July 29, 1941, Schmidt stated in a letter to Lieutenant General Friedrich Paulus , Lieutenant General Friedrich Paulus , that the losses of his troops were considerable and that the material was "on the dog". In the same letter he also criticized the conduct of the war by the High Command of the Army and Army Group Center:

“The intermediate points only inhibit u. do not use. Make tank armies out of the Pz. Groups and the case is over. The Army Group can very well deploy these formations appropriately. She just mustn't shy away from giving orders instead of 'leaving' and 'making wishes'. That means a lot. "

But regardless of the condition of the troops, Schmidt's corps was detached from the front on August 16, 1941 and relocated to the area of Army Group North for reinforcement . Here it was supposed to contribute to the capture of Leningrad . However, the advance was delayed by the tough Soviet resistance. It was not until September 8, 1941, that Shlisselburg on Lake Ladoga was taken and the city was robbed of its connections to the rear. Although the local generals assumed that they would now attack the metropolis, Hitler had already decided at this point to starve Leningrad. The bulk of the armored units of Army Group North were moved south again to take part in the attack on Moscow . Schmidts XXXIX. Army corps (motorized) remained at the Volkhov and formed the core of an attack group that made an advance towards Tikhvin on October 16, 1941 (see Battle of Tikhvin ). Despite icy weather and sustained resistance by the Red Army , Schmidt succeeded in taking the city on November 8, 1941. With that, however, the strength of the German troops was at an end.

Schmidt again complained massively to his superiors about the fragmentation of the few available forces and about the lack of winter clothing and equipment. He wrote to the Army High Command that the reports from Army High Command 16 , which was subordinate to Schmidt's Corps, were positively colored and did not do justice to the actual critical situation at the front. His battalions had only 60 instead of 500 men and suffered from the cold of −24 ° C without winter clothing: “But once the forces of the troops will stop and even the toughest orders will be of no use. And that's where we are now. ”It was only with difficulty that they managed to hold the city against the Soviet counter-attacks until the beginning of December, but then they had to retreat to their original positions. At this point, however, Schmidt was no longer in command of the units deployed here. On November 11, 1941, shortly after the fall of Tichwin, he was appointed representative of Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs , Colonel General of the Second Army , who was sick . On the one hand, the success was a reason for the new assignment at a higher management level. On the other hand, it was a burden for Schmidt to leave his staff and long-term employees in the difficult situation in Tikhvin.

The Russian winter posed unimagined problems for soldiers, leadership and material. Schmidt pushed through the withdrawal of his troops against Hitler's orders.

On November 26, 1941, Schmidt took over command of the 2nd Army on the south wing of Army Group Center, which was still advancing slowly on Moscow. After the first analysis of the situation, Schmidt came to the conclusion: "The situation in the army sector is such that even the damage that we can still inflict on the Russian combat force is no longer worth the effort [...] Now only fights are justifiable. which serve to create a favorable winter safety line. ”One of these measures was the short-term capture of the city of Jelez , which was abandoned after the destruction of important military installations.

On December 5, 1941, however, the Red Army's counter-offensive began in the Battle of Moscow . By December 9th, it had made a deep break in the lines of the weakened 2nd Army. All attempts to push back the Soviet troops by counter-attacks failed. In the days that followed, the situation became critical. When Schmidt learned that some of his soldiers were taking panic wagons and deserting, he ordered “individual people who were making defeatist speeches to be singled out and exemplarily killed.” On the other hand, he had the soldiers spread the news that Stalin had ordered no more prisoners to be admitted do. He impressed on them that giving up the fight would mean death for them. Schmidt considered Hitler's unconditional “halt order” of December 16, 1941, which categorically forbade withdrawal even in hopeless situations, to be a big mistake. In a statement, he informed the Army High Command that this would expose his army to annihilation and asked to be able to interpret the order flexibly. Just three days later, on December 24, 1941, he decided to give up the town of Livny and later to withdraw the entire army front. When the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Günther von Kluge , protested by referring to the Fuehrer's order, Schmidt pointed out that he was under pressure from the situation and continued the withdrawal movement. In contrast to other commanders-in-chief, who had also disregarded orders such as Colonel-General Guderian or Colonel-General Erich Hoepner, Schmidt did not suffer any disadvantages from his arbitrariness. The historian Johannes Hürter suspects that this was due to the fact that General Field Marshal Kluge, in contrast to the other two cases, did not press for Schmidt's replacement in the Army High Command and with Hitler. On the contrary: When Colonel General Guderian was released from his command on December 26, 1941, it was Schmidt who was appointed his successor in the High Command of the 2nd Panzer Army .

Schmidt, who was promoted to Colonel General on January 1, 1942, led the 2nd Panzer Army and the 2nd Army at the same time. The uniform command had a positive effect on the operational management of the German troops in this region. Colonel-General von Weichs did not return until January 15, so that Schmidt only had to command the 2nd Panzer Army. For the next few months Schmidt's headquarters were in Oryol . In the summer of 1942, the Wehrmacht shifted the focus of its operations to the southern part of the Eastern Front. The area of ​​Army Group Center was now a secondary theater of war, but the Red Army undertook several offensives in the course of the year. However, the 2nd Panzer Army was not affected. Their units attacked to relieve the neighboring armies only from 11 to 22 August 1942 as part of " Enterprise Whirlwind " with little success in the direction of Sukhinichi . Only in the course of the Soviet winter offensives did the 2nd Panzer Army become more critical again. On February 22, 1943, a Soviet advance against Bryansk began and further south at the interface with the 2nd Army, enemy attacks led to the risk of a breakthrough. However, since several divisions could be freed in other areas of Army Group Center through an extensive retreat, Schmidt's army was able to be strengthened enough to repel all Soviet attacks.

Schmidt proposed to Kluge on March 10, 1943, an all-out attack on the Soviet troops in the Kursk area. On March 13, 1943, Schmidt was able to present his idea to Hitler at a briefing at the headquarters of Army Group Center in Smolensk. Schmidt's proposal was later implemented at the Citadel company .

Against the background of the catastrophic setbacks on the Eastern Front, Schmidt increasingly criticized Hitler and the military leadership. In October 1942 he had already spoken quite openly with Major General Fridolin von Senger and Etterlin about their mutual disgust for the National Socialist regime. At the briefing at the headquarters of Army Group Center on March 13, 1943, Schmidt is said to have responded to Hitler's derogatory remarks about the generals and the accusation that he did not have enough war experience because they did not spend the First World War in the trenches as he did: " Your war experience will be carried away by a sparrow on its tail! ”Research recently questioned whether this statement was actually made and whether it led Hitler to become suspicious of Schmidt. Apart from Schlabrendorff's assertion, there is no further evidence for the sentence. Nevertheless, only a few weeks later there was an occasion to remove the Colonel General.

Schmidt and the occupation regime

BW Kaminski, who established a Russian self-government in the Lokot area under Schmidt's protection, in conversation with officers (photo from 1944)

In the fight against Soviet partisans (here during an attack on a village), Schmidt did not just rely on hardship

Schmidt was one of those officers who viewed the actions of the German occupation forces in the Soviet Union critically. In his opinion, the ideological coercive measures and the treatment of the civilian population and prisoners of war were detrimental to German interests. Even before the beginning of the war, he had protested against the " Commissar Order " to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch . Although he was unable to get the order lifted, he openly sabotaged it in the months that followed. Even after that, he did not leave it to personal views, but tried to convince the military command posts of a cooperative concept towards the Russian population. In September 1941 appeared on the staff of his XXXIX. Army Corps (mot.) Published a "memorandum on the possibility of a shock to the Bolshevik resistance from within." This was supposedly written by an unspecified sergeant Hertel, but it can be assumed that it came from Schmidt's own pen. This was sent to the Army High Command and Hitler on September 17, 1941. It said that the commissioners urged the Soviet troops to fanatical resistance because they knew that they would be shot themselves if they were imprisoned or overflowed: "As an immediate measure, the shooting order for political commissioners must be issued." The population, however, has no perspective and must be won for the German cause through one's own advantages: "In the long term, however, it is even more important to show the Russian people a positive future." The formation of Russian governments was also encouraged. However, the proposals in the memorandum were in diametrical opposition to the idea of ​​a war of exploitation and extermination with which Hitler had opened the war against the Soviet Union. So they had no effect.

The order that Schmidt issued in relation to the prisoners of war is also instructive. Shortly after he had taken over the command of the 2nd Army, he instructed the commanders under him on December 5, 1941, "with all emphasis" to ensure that the prisoners of war are adequately taken care of. He mainly referred to the need to keep the prisoners as labor, but concluded with the words: “Quite apart from this, [the] bad treatment of defenseless prisoners of war by a German soldier is unworthy, damages German propaganda measures and worsens the lot of the unfortunate German soldiers who have become prisoners of war in Russia. ”He therefore ordered that our own supplies should be used to ensure that the prisoners were supplied. It is difficult to understand to what extent these orders were implemented. In the weeks that followed the Soviet counter-offensive, conditions were chaotic and the German troops struggled for their own survival, so that the question of prisoners of war fell out of focus. It was only in March 1942 that Schmidt reminded people that they should be dealt with in accordance with international law.

But now, as Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army in his " Rear Army Area ", he was confronted with the emergence of a larger partisan movement . In the Bryansk area in particular, the partisans soon controlled around 400 towns. In June / July 1942 a large-scale operation (see Vogelsang company ) was carried out in this area. 1,582 partisans were reported as killed and 519 as captured. 3,249 men were also arrested and 12,531 people evacuated from the area. The German losses amounted to 58 dead and 130 wounded. The resulting discrepancy between the German and Soviet losses must also have struck Schmidt. When he heard of arbitrary shootings during the operation, he clarified in an order:

“The fight against the partisans requires ruthless toughness where it is appropriate. But I expect the troops to understand how to distinguish between the partisans and the population in the partisan area, some of which live under severe terror. It depends on getting them on our side. […] Every other course of action drives the population into the hands of the partisans. Apart from these effects, I would like to point out the serious damage to the discipline that the arbitrary actions of individual units must result in. [...] Even in partisan warfare, we remain soldiers and do not fight women and children. "

In the summer of 1942, too, he tried to persuade the subordinate departments to take a friendly course towards the civilian population, because arbitrariness was still the order of the day. In June 1942 he also communicated his concept to employees of the Central Economic Inspectorate and the East Economic Staff , which included winning over the population for the German cause. According to the historian Joachim Hoffmann , Schmidt thus represented a “remarkable exception”, at least in the more northerly areas of the German occupied territory. In implementing his ideas, Schmidt went so far as to set up a Russian self-government under BW Kaminski in the city of Lokot . This area (see Republic of Lokot ) finally comprised 1.7 million inhabitants and the local administration soon had its own troops to fight Soviet partisans. In a certain sense, Schmidt also used the principles already formulated in September 1941 in the "Memorandum on the Possibility of Shaking the Bolshevik Resistance from within".

Espionage affair and dismissal

Schmidt had already come into conflict with Hitler because of his critical views on the conduct of the war in the Soviet Union and the treatment of the population there. Against this background, the events that developed around the Colonel General in the spring of 1943 were bound to have particularly detrimental effects on him. On April 1, 1943, his younger brother Hans-Thilo Schmidt was arrested by the Gestapo . Like his older brother, Hans-Thilo Schmidt had also chosen the profession of officer and worked in the cipher department of the Reichswehr Ministry until 1938 . From October 1931 he had forwarded classified material to the French secret service, which later helped the Allied agencies to break into the "Enigma" encryption system. A former liaison officer had betrayed the spy on March 23, 1943. Hans-Thilo Schmidt finally committed suicide while in custody on September 19, 1943.

Schmidt may have perceived this development as a personal stroke of fate, but difficulties arose for himself too, as he was targeted in the course of the investigation against his brother. The few surviving files on the case indicate that critical letters from the Colonel General to his brother appeared in the first half of the year and were available at the OKW. A little later, Reich Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary on May 10, 1943:

“For example, a whole series of letters from the Colonel General himself have now been found on the brother of Colonel General Schmidt, who had to be arrested for treason, which were directed very sharply against the Führer. This is now one of the Colonel-Generals on whom the Fiihrer had put a lot of money. So he has once again experienced a serious disappointment. "

- Joseph Goebbels

In the course of the espionage affair, Schmidt was released from his command on April 14, 1943. With the leadership of the 2nd Panzer Army, General of the Infantry Erich-Heinrich Clößner , Commanding General of the LIII. Army Corps , commissioned. The activity report of the Army Personnel Office said: “When the correspondence was confiscated, letters came to light […] which are so politically stressful for him that it is impossible to remain in his position [as commander-in-chief of an army]. Among other things, he criticized the supreme leadership and accuses them of mistakes that are said to have led to the serious setbacks of recent times. ”However, the incriminating letters have been lost, so that their exact content is no longer known today.

In an interrogation during his later imprisonment in the USSR, Schmidt reported: “I was arrested by the general judge of the Fuehrer's headquarters, Lieutenant General Sack , in Oryol and taken by plane to Rastenburg to see Hitler's headquarters. I remained in custody until July 10, 1943. During that time, I was interrogated at least twice a week. Major General Lotter , who was then general judge, questioned me. Then I was released, but until the second half of September 1943 I was regularly called to the Wehrmacht Investigation Staff to interrogate Major General Hoffmann . "

In fact, the exact circumstances of the arrest and subsequent detention were more complex. Shortly after his brother's arrest, Schmidt had contacted his legal advisor, Dr. Weinheimer skillfully. This in turn sought contact with the Chief of Army Justice General Staff Judge Karl Sack . Sack went to the Gestapo, but was unable to achieve anything for Schmidt. However, in cooperation with Chief Staff Judge Rudolf Lehmann from the Wehrmacht Legal Department and Lieutenant General Rudolf Schmundt , head of the Army Personnel Office and Hitler's chief adjutant, he was able to avert a trial before the Reich Court Martial. Instead Schmidt von Sack was placed in a psychiatric institution until an expert opinion later determined that at the time the letters were written he was “outside of his free will.” On July 10, Schmidt was transferred to the Führerreserve . On September 30, 1943, the Colonel General was finally released from the Wehrmacht.

Schmidt attributed it to the influence of Rudolf Schmundt that he had been released from prison. However, in the next few years he tried to recycle it. He therefore turned to Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler and asked him to stand up for him. Himmler advised him to “prove his trust in the Führer.” However, Himmler later tried, as chief of the replacement army, on September 2 and 13, 1944, through the chief of the Army Personnel Office, Lieutenant General Wilhelm Burgdorf to get Schmidt to be re-employed by Hitler . However, Hitler categorically refused. A few weeks earlier, in July 1944, Lieutenant General Rudolf Schmundt, Burgdorf's predecessor and Hitler's chief adjutant, had unsuccessfully campaigned for Schmidt to be appointed Chief of the Army General Staff as the successor to Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler .

Civil life and arrest

Butyrka prison near Moscow, built in 1890, where Schmidt was temporarily held

In December 1943, Schmidt, now a civilian, began working as an employee in a chemical company in Berlin before moving to a construction company in Offenburg in July 1944 . In November 1944 he founded his own company there under the name "Rhein-Beton", which also had a branch in Berlin. However, he soon had to evacuate this company to Wertheim before the approaching Allied troops . Schmidt experienced the end of the war in April 1945 in Weimar , where he had gone in February 1945.

In June 1945 the city was handed over to the Red Army, and Schmidt had to vacate his apartment because of the billeting of Soviet soldiers (as he had already had to do with US soldiers in April). He avoided registering with the new local command as a former senior officer and moved to (West) Berlin in August 1945 in the Friedenau district . Over the next few months he devoted himself to rebuilding his company until he sold it in July 1946 and moved to Northeim in the British zone of occupation . There he worked again as an employee of a chemical company.

After more than four years as a civilian, Schmidt finally traveled to the Soviet occupation zone with a permit on December 16, 1947 , where he apparently wanted to get some items from his former apartment in Weimar. On his return journey on December 24, 1947, he was arrested by Soviet soldiers near Nordheim after a pistol was found in his luggage. He was transferred to a prison in Mühlhausen and, after the first interrogation, was brought to Moscow in January 1948. The Soviet interrogation officers were primarily interested in Schmidt's role as Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army and its operations against partisans in the Oryol area. The then commandant of the rear army area (Korück 532), Lieutenant General Friedrich-Gustav Bernhard , had already been convicted and executed in Bryansk at the end of 1945 for these actions. Schmidt admitted in the interrogations not only that there had been convictions by court courts, the burning of villages and “numerous atrocities against the civilian population”, but also that Bernhard had acted on the basis of his (Schmidt's) orders and plans I managed these operations on my own responsibility. Other issues were the deportation of civilians to Germany for forced labor and the mistreatment of Soviet prisoners of war and civilians in prison camps within the command area of ​​the 2nd Panzer Army.

On February 4, 1952, Schmidt was finally sentenced as a war criminal to 25 years in a camp. Two days later he turned to Joseph Stalin in a vain request for pardon :

“I have always been on friendly terms with the Russians […] As far as dealing with the partisans from the beginning of 1942, I gave my commanders the order to act in accordance with the Hague Convention. Hitler's brutal order on how to deal with the partisans, which contradicted my instructions, led to a great deal of uncertainty among the troops as to how to behave. My verbal orders that I had given the commanders of the corps and the contradicting orders of Hitler did not always reach the lower units because of the partial exchange of troops. In doing so, my troops committed these crimes that I did not know about at the time. I knew the case of two farmers who had been murdered by two German soldiers. But I requested an investigation into this matter. The soldiers were, in my opinion, sentenced to death. In February I upheld four death sentences for Soviet citizens carried out by the Oryol Commandant's Court. I pardoned other people who had been convicted in this connection. […] I also gave orders to take hostages, but I never gave orders to shoot these hostages. I gave the order to transport workers to Germany. But this was about people who had agreed to do so. […] In this regard, I issued a written order that the principle of voluntariness in the mobilization of workers should be observed. […] But during the investigation I found out that I had been betrayed and that the reports from the organs were not true. I am guilty for not personally checking that my instructions were followed correctly. [...] I did everything I could to help the prisoners of war. […] I should plead guilty to all other violations and crimes committed against the civilian population and prisoners of war, because I failed to control and intervene vigorously, as well as because I was responsible for everything that happened in happened to my area of ​​responsibility by my troops. […] Great Generalissimo Stalin! […] Because I was responsible for the actions of my subordinates, I ended up in the position of a criminal. I deserve a conviction, but I ask that my sentence be reduced by a pardon so that I can see the light of freedom again. "

- Rudolf Schmidt

After he was held in the Vladimirovka camp and the Butyrka prison, among other places , he was tried in a military tribunal in Moscow in 1952. Sentenced to 25 years of labor in the camp, Schmidt was released from prison on September 30, 1955 as one of the last German prisoners of war. In poor health he returned to the Federal Republic. Here he died after a serious illness on April 7, 1957 in Krefeld.

literature

• Dermot Bradley , Richard Schulze-Kossens (ed.): Activity report of the chief of the Army Personnel Office General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt. Biblio-Verlag, Osnabrück 1984, ISBN 3-7648-1292-3 .
• Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg. Weltbild Verlag, Augsburg 1989, ISBN 3-89350-023-5 .
• Johannes Hürter : Hitler's Army Leader - The German Supreme Commanders in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42. Verlag R. Oldenbourg, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-486-57982-6 .
• Klaus Reinhardt : The turning point before Moscow - The failure of Hitler's strategy in the winter of 1941/42. (= Contributions to military and war history. Volume 13). Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1972, ISBN 3-421-01606-2 .
• Friedrich-Christian Stahl: Colonel General Rudolf Schmidt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. Volume 2. Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 1998, ISBN 3-534-12678-5 , pp. 218-225.

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b} Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42. Munich 2007, p. 660.
2. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, pp. 56, 58, 73, 660f.
3. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 660f.
4. ↑ ^{a b} Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 661.
5. ↑ See Hansgeorg Model: The German General Staff Officer - His selection and training in the Reichswehr, Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr. Frankfurt am Main 1968, p. 34.
6. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 104.
7. ^ Friedrich-Christian Stahl: Colonel-General Rudolf Schmidt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. Volume 2, Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 1998, p. 218.
8. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, pp. 80, 144.
9. ^ Full print of the speech in the "Thüringische Landeszeitung Deutschland" (November 10, 1937)
10. ^ Friedrich-Christian Stahl: Colonel-General Rudolf Schmidt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. Volume 2, Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 1998, pp. 218f.
11. ^ ^{A b} Fabian von Schlabrendorff : Encounters in five decades . Wunderlich, Tübingen 1979, ISBN 3-8052-0323-3 .
12. ↑ Heinz Guderian: memories of a soldier. Heidelberg 1951, p. 50.
13. ↑ On these struggles in detail, cf. Walter Chales de Beaulieu : Colonel General Erich Hoepner - Military portrait of a tank leader. Neckargemünd 1969, pp. 11-57.
14. ↑ Len Deighton: Blitzkrieg. Weltbild Verlag GmbH., Augsburg 1989, p. 247.
15. ^ Quote from: Hans-Adolf Jacobsen: The German air raid on Rotterdam May 14, 1940 - attempt to clarify. In: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau. Volume 8 (1958), p. 275.
16. ↑ Michael Schmidt-Klingenber: "We will erase them". In: Stephan Burgdorff / Christian Habbe (eds.): When fire fell from the sky - The bombing war in Germany. Bonn 2004, pp. 52-55.
17. ↑ See Karl-Heinz Frieser : Blitzkrieg-Legende - Der Westfeldzug 1940. Munich 1996, pp. 344–361.
18. ^ Kurt von Tippelskirch : The Second World War. Bonn 1956, pp. 90-93.
19. ↑ Quoted from: Friedrich-Christian Stahl: Colonel General Rudolf Schmidt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. Volume 2, Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 1998, p. 220.
20. ^ Gerhard Schreiber: The strategic dilemma in summer and autumn 1941 - alternative or interim strategy. In: ders., Bernd Stegemann, Detlef Vogel: The Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe - From the "non belligeranza" of Italy to the entry into the war of the United States ( The German Reich and the Second World War. Volume 3), Stuttgart 1984, p. 207.
21. ^ ^{A b} Friedrich-Christian Stahl: Colonel General Rudolf Schmidt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. Volume 2, Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 1998, p. 220.
22. ^ Ranking list of the German Reichsheeres , Mittler & Sohn Verlag, Berlin 1930, p. 121; Veit Scherzer : Knight's Cross bearer 1939–1945. The holders of the Iron Cross of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm and armed forces allied with Germany according to the documents of the Federal Archives. 2nd Edition. Scherzers Militaer-Verlag, Ranis / Jena 2007, ISBN 978-3-938845-17-2 , p. 671.
23. ↑ See the representation of the struggles in: David M. Glantz: The Initial Period of the War on the Eastern Front June 22 – August 1941. New York 1993, pp. 155–183.
24. ↑ See the representation of the struggles in: David M. Glantz: The Iniatial Period of the War on the Eastern Front 22 June-August 1941. New York 1993, pp. 345–454.
25. ↑ Quoted from: Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Heerführer - The German Supreme Commanders in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 286 fn. 28
26. ^ Friedrich-Christian Stahl: Colonel-General Rudolf Schmidt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. Volume 2, Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 1998, p. 220 f.
27. ^ David M. Glantz : The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944. Lawrence / Kansas 2002, p. 87118.
28. ↑ Quoted from: Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Heerführer - The German Supreme Commanders in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 308.
29. ↑ ^{a b c d} Friedrich-Christian Stahl: Colonel General Rudolf Schmidt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. Volume 2, Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 1998, p. 221.
30. ↑ Klaus Reinhardt: The turning point before Moscow - The failure of Hitler's strategy in the winter of 1941/42. Stuttgart 1972, p. 168 f.
31. ↑ Klaus Reinhardt: The turning point before Moscow - The failure of Hitler's strategy in the winter of 1941/42. Stuttgart 1972, p. 211 f.
32. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 374.
33. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, pp. 333, 354.
34. ↑ Bernd Wegner: The war against the Soviet Union 1942/43. In: Horst Boog, Werner Rahn , Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The global war - the expansion to the world war and the change of initiative 1941 to 1943 (= The German Reich and the Second World War, Volume 6), Stuttgart 1990, pp. 909f .
35. ↑ Bernd Wegner: The war against the Soviet Union 1942/43. In: Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The global war - the expansion to the world war and the change of the initiative 1941 to 1943 (= The German Reich and the Second World War, Volume 6), Stuttgart 1990, p. 1088 f.
36. ^ Roman Töppel: Kursk 1943. The greatest battle of the Second World War . 2nd Edition. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2017, ISBN 978-3-506-78187-1 , p. 21st f .
37. ↑ Frida von Senger and Etterlin: War in Europe. Cologne 1960, p. 71.
38. ^ Friedrich-Christian Stahl: Colonel-General Rudolf Schmidt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. Volume 2, Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 1998, p. 222.
39. ^ Roman Töppel: Kursk 1943. The greatest battle of the Second World War . 2nd Edition. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2017, ISBN 978-3-506-78187-1 , p. 23 f .
40. ↑ Manfred Messerschmidt: The Wehrmacht in the Nazi State - Time of Indoctrination. Hamburg 1969, p. 406 f.
41. ↑ The memorandum is printed in: Gerd R. Ueberschär / Wolfram Wette (eds.): The German attack on the Soviet Union - "Operation Barbarossa" 1941. Frankfurt am Main 1991, p. 340 f.
42. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 389.
43. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 391.
44. ^ Christian Hartmann : Operation Barbarossa. The German War in the East 1941–1945. Oldenbourg 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-58064-8 Introduction (p. 11 ff.)
45. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 436 f.
46. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 461 f.
47. ↑ Joachim Hoffmann: Deutsche und Kalmyken 1942 to 1945. Freiburg / Breisgau 1974, p. 74.
48. ^ Sven Steenberg : Wlassow - traitor or patriot? Cologne 1969, p. 83 ff.
49. ↑ Friedrich L. Bauer: Deciphered secrets - methods and maxims of cryptology (3rd edition), Berlin / New York 2000, p. 412.
50. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Wassili S. Christoforow / Wladimir G. Makarow / Matthias Uhl (eds.): Interrogated - The questioning of German generals and officers by the Soviet secret services 1945–1952 , Berlin 2015.
51. ↑ Joseph Goebbels: Diaries. Part II, Volume 8, p. 266 (May 10, 1943)
52. ^ John Zimmermann : Ulrich de Maizière - General der Bonner Republik 1912–2006 , Munich 2012, p. 81.
53. ↑ Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (ed.): Activity report of the chief of the Army Personnel Office General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt. Osnabrück 1984, p. 80 f.
54. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 602 fn. 6
55. ^ Hermann Bösch: Army judge Dr. Karl Sack in the resistance. Munich 1967, p. 69f.
56. ^ ^{A b} Friedrich-Christian Stahl: Colonel General Rudolf Schmidt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. Volume 2, Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 1998, p. 223.
57. ↑ Dermot Bradley, Richard Schulze-Kossens (ed.): Activity report of the chief of the Army Personnel Office General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt. Osnabrück 1984, pp. 89, 234, 248.
58. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader - The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 602 fn. 8

This article was added to the list of articles worth reading on April 4, 2011 in this version .