Soviet partisans

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Soviet partisans taking over a village

The Soviet partisans were members of the resistance movement against fascism and National Socialism , who fought against the German occupiers on Soviet territory between 1941 and 1944 during World War II . The resistance movement was often organized and supported by the Soviet government and army command.

Due to the increasingly brutal action taken by the Germans against real and “supposed” partisans , combined with the wiping out of entire villages, the number of partisans from the civilian population rose by leaps and bounds. In 1943 around 250,000 partisans were operating on the territory of the Soviet Union ; they ruled liberated territories in some rear areas . Their actions hindered the economic exploitation of the occupied territories and not only tied up German troops with their allies, but also restricted German warfare.

Beginning of the resistance movement

As far as the beginning of the partisan struggle is concerned, research has found that in the initial phase of the attack on the Soviet Union there was a very strong discrepancy between the political intentions of Hitler or Stalin and the behavior of their soldiers, but above all that of the Soviet civilian population. Contrary to their expectations and the announcements of the German propaganda, the advancing German troops in the Soviet Union mostly did not meet resistance from the civilian population, but found that, unless they even greeted the Germans in a friendly manner, they mostly behaved neutrally or at least indifferently. The situation was different with the many soldiers of the Red Army who, in the course of the German invasion from June 22, 1941, remained behind the front line, were trapped or dispersed. In this phase of the war, mostly little support from the local population, groups soon formed out of them and began to offer resistance to the German occupiers . Initially, however, it was little more than mere “survival groups”, and their “resistance” was mostly only determined by the desperate will to survive somehow. Militarily, these groups did not pose any serious threat to the Germans.

As early as 1933, the “Regulations for Partisan Warfare” appeared as a service book for the Red Army. According to its own information, however, the preparation for the partisan war was neglected, since "under the influence of Stalin the thesis [arose] that a future war would be waged with few casualties and on foreign territory." On June 29, 1941, the Soviet government and the Central Committee (ZK) of the CPSU issued a directive to form partisan groups in the border areas. In the period that followed, an increasing number of small troops made up of members of the NKVD were smuggled into German-occupied areas with the aim of recruiting partisans and carrying out attacks and acts of sabotage on German institutions and people. As early as July 29, 1941, the OKW's war diary noted that in the rear area of Panzer Group 4 the “planned activity of individual partisan groups in the interruption of road connections was noticeable”. General Gotthard Heinrici wrote on July 22, 1941:

“The hallmark of war are the Russian gangs appearing all over the woods. They attack everyone. Only they don't dare to approach the larger troop. "

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU passed a resolution on July 18, “On the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops”. These efforts also played into the hands of the German leadership, which had already pointed out in Directive No. 33a issued to their troops after mid-July 1941 that the protection of the conquered Russian territory could only be guaranteed by using "draconian means" . The military relied on the "Führer", who expressly approved these measures and had declared on July 16 that the partisan war also had advantages because it "gives us the opportunity to exterminate what is against us".

Further development

In the course of the second half of 1941, the Germans' actions against real and alleged partisans, which became increasingly brutal, caused their numbers to rise sharply. At the end of 1941 there were over 2,000 partisan groups with a strength of around 90,000 men. From September 1941 partisan schools were set up behind the front. In the winter of 1941/42 the Germans were already talking of "partisan areas" where German rule was significantly impeded. In mid-April 1942, the commander of the Rear Army Area Center determined that the combat strength of the partisan detachments was comparable to that of regular troops. The partisans' armament and level of organization were continuously expanded. In May 1942, a central staff of the Soviet partisan movement and corresponding staffs in the Soviet armies and on the fronts were established. The partisans had radio links and were supplied with airplanes. Almost all of the partisan commanders were members of the Communist Party. In the summer of 1942 a "Partisan Leader" appeared, a 430-page manual for partisans.

On August 18, 1942, Hitler issued “Instruction No. 46” with the title “Guidelines for intensifying the fight against gang violence in the East”, it began with the words:

“The gang mischief in the east has reached an unacceptable level in the last few months and threatens to pose a serious threat to supplies to the front and the economic exploitation of the country. By the beginning of winter, these gangs must essentially be exterminated and the east behind the front must be pacified in order to avoid decisive disadvantages for the Wehrmacht's warfare in winter. "

In 1943 their number had risen to 250,000, and they dominated the territory in some of the rearward areas. They hindered the economic exploitation of the occupied territories and not only tied up German troops, but also restricted German warfare. An analysis of the partisan war of the 2nd Panzer Army in July 1942 found that the partisans were fighting "to the point of self-destruction" and spoke of an "armed popular uprising". The French ambassador de Brinon explained to representatives of the press on July 6, 1943:

“As soon as you come to Russia, the essential fact that comes to mind is that two wars are taking place there, one on the actual front and one in the rear. In fact, not all villages and even all cities are not occupied, only the important rail and road junctions and their suburbs are protected against the activities of the partisans by a well-developed defense system. "

To combat the partisan movement, the Germans founded special anti- gang troops , including the von Gottberg combat group under SS leader Curt von Gottberg , who exterminated entire areas with heavy weapons in "anti-gang operations" lasting several weeks. Another strategy was to leave this "dirty work" to the armed forces of the "allies", such as the notorious brigade of Bronislaw Wladislawowitsch Kaminski , which was given its own "domain" around Lepel , which was largely free of partisans until June 1944 stopped by destroying villages that were even suspected of housing partisans, and often murdering the entire population. Kaminski's methods of combating partisans did not really surpass those of the SS and Wehrmacht in terms of their brutality, but Kaminski's troops also suffered from rape, torture and shameless enrichment at the expense of the Belarusian civilian population. A total of 5,295 villages were destroyed in Belarus and some of the residents were killed. In 628 all residents were killed. In addition to the Kaminski's brigade, there were the Belarusian Home Guard and the Belarusian auxiliary police , which were used in the fight against the partisans. In the spring of 1943, reports increased that entire Cossack units and protection teams, sometimes after killing their German support personnel, defected to the partisans. This forced the German side in the second half of 1943 to withdraw the Russian troop units from the Eastern war zone and deploy them in other European war zones.

On the night of August 2nd to 3rd, 1943, Operation Rail War struck the enemy rail network with a massive use of small explosive charges. From September 19 to November 1, 1943, the larger "Operation Concert" took place and in June 1944 an even larger such action in support of Operation Bagration .

From 1943 to 1944, the strengthened partisan movement succeeded in liberating entire areas. The Germans, on the retreat in 1943/1944, had no means of taking action against the increasing number of attacks and attacks by the partisans. General Gotthard Heinrici wrote in October 1943:

"Nowadays you can no longer speak to the Reich from Russia in the evening, because usually from 8:00 p.m. all lines to the Reich are disrupted by demolition or sabotage, only to get going again in the morning. Behind our backs there is no longer partisan activity, but essentially the whole country in turmoil. Somewhat peace only prevails in the area of ​​the front because there are too many soldiers. "

The cooperation between the Red Army and the partisans improved from 1944 onwards. The partisans now increasingly waged the "rail war" in which they attacked the connecting and supply lines of the German troops and thus sabotaged their operations on the front. During the fighting on the Volkhov Front in front of Leningrad and Novgorod, they destroyed the rails in 60,000 places, blew up 200 bridges and derailed 133 military trains. The war diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht recorded this on October 3, 1943:

“Report on the gang situation in the east from July to September 1943. The line demolitions on railway lines led for the first time to serious immediate operational disadvantages (cf. 6. 8./1 f.). In some places the gang activity begins to turn into a popular uprising. "

Partisan units, some of them regimental, made forays into the hinterland of the Eastern Front and in some cases crossed the Soviet borders. Of particular importance to the Red Army was not only sabotage warfare and armed combat, but also enemy intelligence. Partisans transmitted messages about German troop relocations, positions, aircraft, depots and traffic hubs. Children were often used as scouts, and they often carried out blasting orders.

The help of the partisans in overcoming natural obstacles for the Red Army was also very effective. It was largely thanks to the partisans that the Red Army was able to cross the river quickly through prepared crossings in the Battle of the Dnieper .

The special tactics of the partisans, the guerrilla war without a fixed front, surprise attacks and immediate retreat into impassable terrain, made them usually emerge victorious from this fight, so that in some cases even closed areas could be liberated by the insurgents. A feeling of powerlessness and forlornness spread among the occupation soldiers.

Because of the strength of the partisan units, the Wehrmacht soon took action against them with specially formed “anti-gang troops” and the heaviest weapons. Entire villages were wiped out and their inhabitants killed. The more brutal the German “defensive measures” became, the stronger the hatred and the will to resist against the Germans and their collaborators .

Areas in which partisans were active

Belarus

Partisans in the Belarusian SSR, in the Polatsk region, 1943

The Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic was completely conquered as early as the summer of 1941, at a time when the Wehrmacht was only making slow progress in Ukraine as the Red Army offered fierce resistance.

The Belarusians were surprised by the rapid advance of the German troops. Numerous cities in the country were bombed on June 22nd and many people were killed. In many cases, Belarusian refugees were brought back from the conquered areas and had to return to their partially destroyed villages and towns. Only around 20 percent of the Belarusians, around 1.8 million, managed to flee eastwards in the summer of 1941. Many fled with the Red Army.

At the end of June 1941, Mogilev had to look after around 200,000 refugees from the Minsk region in addition to his residents.

More than 25 percent of the population, Belarusians, Poles and Jews, perished in the three years of German occupation, hundreds of thousands were deported to Germany for forced labor and the Jewish community in Belarus was almost completely wiped out.

At the beginning of the war, many Belarusians welcomed the invasion of the Wehrmacht as a liberation from Stalinist terror.

As in other states occupied by the Wehrmacht, schools and universities were closed. The occupiers enforced the National Socialist ideology of “ master ” and “ sub-human ” by denying the population of the annexed countries, among other things, access to education.

As a result, the number of those who joined partisan units increased. At the end of 1941, for example, there were more than 50 different partisan groups in Minsk with more than 2,000 fighters.

In the western areas of Belarus, the partisans were unpopular and many partisans were even betrayed to the occupiers by the local population.

According to Soviet sources, in 1943 there were 375,000 partisans in Belarus alone, 65 percent of whom were Belarusians. The other 35 percent were made up of 45 different ethnic groups , such as 4,000 Poles , 400 Czechs and Slovaks , 300 Yugoslavs and others.

According to a memo from the Commander of the Rear Army Area of Army Group Center Max von Schenckendorff on September 6, 1942, the partisans reduced the transport performance of the railway to below 50% and the direct supply to the army to two thirds. Between August 24 and September 17, 1942, instead of the planned 672 trains, only 343 drove, whereby even ammunition trains with the highest priority were canceled.

The Commander in Chief of Army Group Center Günther von Kluge wrote to the Chief of Staff Franz Halder on February 24, 1942 :

"The constant reinforcement of the enemy groups behind the Army Group Front and the associated increase in the partisan movement in the entire rear area are assuming such a threatening scope that I must point out this danger with great seriousness."

now more and more closed partisan associations appeared

"Who, under the energetic leadership of Russian officers, well organized and armed with weapons, try to bring certain areas under their suzerainty and from these areas carry out combat missions even on a larger scale"

Ukraine

Public announcement in Kiev about the shooting of 100 hostages as reprisal

The German leadership was very interested in the conquest of Ukraine. In the beginning, here too (especially in western Ukraine, which belonged to Poland until 1939), the members of the Wehrmacht were welcomed as liberators from Stalinism , but after the first German measures and reprisals, the attitude of the population changed.

In the summer of 1941, around 5.8 million Ukrainians, Russians and Jews fled the country or were evacuated.

As in other conquered areas of the Soviet Union , thousands were brought to Germany for forced labor. Millions of Soviet prisoners of war starved to death in German prison camps. The Jewish population of Ukraine suffered in particular, with 800,000 victims.

In the period that followed, communist , Ukrainian- nationalist and anarchist partisan groups formed which fought against the Germans, but in some cases also against each other. But not only the Wehrmacht, but also the Ukrainian civilian population suffered from the attacks by the partisan groups.

The partisan war claimed around 5.5 million victims in Ukraine, only some of whom were partisans. Most of the victims were Polish and Ukrainian civilians.

During the siege of Kharkiv from 1941 to 1942, over 20,000 residents of the city, Russians and Ukrainians, died of starvation because the Germans prevented them from leaving the city or from getting food.

Because of the suspected support of partisans, the village of Kortelissy was burned down by German occupation forces and Ukrainian collaborators on September 23, 1942, and the population was murdered.

On March 1 and 2, 1943, about 6,700 residents of the northern Ukrainian town of Korjukiwka were massacred by SS troops and the Ukrainian auxiliary police after a group of partisans destroyed the city's garrison and freed 97 of the hostages sentenced to death. The Koryukivka massacre, in which people were shot, beaten and burned, is considered the largest massacre as a result of punitive action in Europe during World War II.

In the Polish village of Kopyschtsche , during a punitive action ( Operation Helga ) on July 13, 1943 , a massacre of the civilian population, later referred to as the Kopyschtsche tragedy , occurred , in which 2,887 residents, including 1,347 children, were locked up in houses, barns and churches and burned.

On August 15, 1943, the Ukrainian village of Jadlivka near Kiev, where around 800 Ukrainians lived, was burned down by the Germans, as Soviet partisans were suspected of having carried out attacks on German trains in the area the day before. About 200, mostly male residents of all ages, were burned in their homes or shot in the local market square. The rest, mostly women and children, were later days to forced labor in Germany deported .

Baltic States

There was little Soviet partisan activity in the Baltic States.

Russia

Interrogation of a Soviet partisan, Novgorod Oblast (Russia) 1942
Anti-Soviet Russian partisan fighters 1942

In Russia , large units of the Red Army were overrun and encircled by the rapid advance of the Wehrmacht. Because of the lack of ammunition and food and the general loss of morale in view of the superiority of the German troops, many hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner by Germany. At the end of 1944, on Himmler's instructions, the SS formed the Russian Liberation Army under the leadership of Vlasov from former Red Army soldiers who were anti-Soviet . This should be used primarily for "gang fight" .

However, some of the troops that had been worn out fled into the woods and steadily growing and well-organized partisan units were formed, some of which received supplies and instructions from the Soviet Army .

The German leadership intended to subjugate or destroy the Russian people. The General Plan East provided for the division of Russian territory and its economic exploitation .

The Jewish population was murdered, schools and universities were closed in many places, prisoners of war were starved to death and many Russians and prisoners of war were deported to Germany for forced labor and internment in concentration camps.

Finland and Karelia

At times, up to 5,000 partisans are said to have fought in this region, but never were less than 1,500 to 2,300 people. A special feature was that the partisan operations were not formed on the enemy territory, but that the groups were sent from the Soviet Union and mainly operated from the Soviet side of the front line.

The only major operation ended in defeat when the First Partisan Brigade was destroyed near Lake Seesjärvi in early August 1942 . The partisans distributed the propaganda papers “Truth” (in Finnish) and “Lenin's Flag” (in Russian). One of the leaders of the partisan movement in Finland and Karelia was Yuri Andropov .

In East Karelia, partisans attacked Finnish military supplies and infrastructure, but in Finland (within the 1940 border) nearly two-thirds of the attacks were against civilians, killing 200 people and wounding 50, including children and the elderly. Often all civilians were murdered by the partisans in order not to leave any witnesses of the atrocities alive. An example of this was the partisan attack on Lämsänkylä, Kuusamo , which took place on July 18, 1943. The partisans attacked a lonely house and murdered all seven civilians, including children, one 3 years old, the other half a year old.

Characteristics of partisan war

German reprisals against partisans

Execution of Partisans (September 1941)

For the German leadership, the war against the Soviet Union was basically “a different war , a war of worldviews ” and the Soviet soldiers were considered “barbarians” (quote from Hitler ). Therefore, the German leadership issued both the bullet decree and the commissar 's order, according to which captured political commissars of the Red Army should be shot immediately . Likewise, captured partisans were mostly killed. For example, a “leaflet on the use of troops against partisans” of December 15, 1941 of the 11th Army stipulated that partisans captured in combat were to be “shot (former Red Army soldiers) or hung up (non-soldiers)” after interrogation, and that partisans caught “always closed to hang ". Only deserters who were willing to fight the partisans could be treated as prisoners. In November 1941, General Gotthard Heinrici wrote to his family that the partisans “are firmly conspired with one another. They let themselves be shot without betraying their comrades. ”And in his diary he noted:“ The steadfastness of the partisans impresses everyone. Nobody reveals anything, everyone is silent and receives death. "

The German leadership viewed the partisans as " bandits " who, if captured, had no right to protection or care.

When the partisan units became stronger and stronger, the Germans took action against them with specially set up "anti-gang troops" and the heaviest weapons. In some cases, villages in which partisans were suspected were burned and the population wiped out.

Losses and "effectiveness"

According to Soviet sources, partisan attacks killed 600,000 enemy soldiers and another 50,000 were taken prisoner. 1,100 aircraft and 2,500 trains were destroyed. However, recent research has shown that information such as this does not stand up to critical examination based on the sources that are still available. In his study of the partisan war in Belarus, the Polish historian Bogdan Musial comes to the conclusion, after extensive reviews of sources, that only 6,000 to 7,000 German soldiers were killed by partisans there, although according to official Soviet information over 282,000 partisans were supposed to have been active there. Although the partisans represented a certain danger, especially for the German supply routes, their military results overall were far overestimated and mythicized by the Soviet post-war historiography. The main activity of the partisans was mostly not the fight against the German aggressors , but the procurement of food. Above all, however, the partisan war mainly fell victim to completely uninvolved civilians, and the partisans also committed acts of violence against real and alleged collaborators. All in all, according to Musial, the Belarusian partisans never succeeded in becoming a real decisive force in the war that would have been able to build a real “second front” behind the German troops. Therefore they never managed to jeopardize or block the supplies for the German troops fighting on the Eastern Front in such a way that their fighting ability would have been severely restricted.

Relationship with the Ukrainian National Resistance Movement

The Soviet partisans and the Ukrainian National Resistance Movement mostly fought independently of each other, and sometimes even against each other. The civilian inhabitants suffered from nightly attacks and the reprisals of the Ukrainian partisans (e.g. raids , rape , extortion ) just as they did under German rule. Some people got “caught between the fronts” and fled into the woods for fear of both warring parties and hid there.

In some cases, there were also “retaliatory measures” by the Ukrainian partisans in villages, of which it was suspected that the inhabitants were cooperating with the Germans.

Well-known Soviet partisans

Movies

literature

Focus on the partisan movement

  • Kenneth D. Slepyan: The People's Avengers: Soviet Partisans, Stalinistic Society and the Politics of Resistance 1941-1944 . Ann Arbor 1994.
  • Kenneth D. Slepyan: The Soviet Partisan Movement and the Holocaust . in: Holocaust and Genocide Studies 20, 2006.
  • Alexander Hill: The War Behind the Eastern Front. Soviet Partisans in North-West Russia, 1941–1944 . Cass Series on the Soviet Study of War, 18, London 2005.
  • Erich Hesse: The Soviet Russian partisan war 1941 to 1944 as reflected in German combat instructions and orders . 2nd edition Göttingen u. a. (Musterschmidt) 1993. ISBN 3-7881-1410-X .
  • Smilovitskii, Leonid: Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–1944: The Case of Belorussia . in: Holocaust and Genocide Studies 20, 2006.
  • John A. Armstrong (Ed.): Soviet Partisans in World War II . Madison 1964 (temporarily without access to Soviet partisan documents, nevertheless recommended)
  • Leonid Grenkevich: The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–1944. Critical Analysis of Historiography. 1999, ISBN 0-7146-4428-5 .
  • Bogdan Musial (Ed.): Soviet Partisans in Belarus - Interior Views from the Baranovici Area 1941–1944 , Munich 2004, ISBN 3-486-64588-9 .
  • Bernd Bonwetsch: Soviet Partisans 1941–1944 . in: Gerhard Schulz (Ed.): Partisans and People's War. Revolutionizing the War in the 20th Century , Göttingen 1985.
  • Jack Kagan, Dov Cohen: Surviving the Holocaust With the Russian Jewish Partisans . 1998, ISBN 0-85303-336-6 .
  • Bogdan Musial: Soviet Partisans 1941–1944. Myth and Reality . Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, Paderborn 2009, ISBN 978-3-506-76687-8 .
  • Yaacov Falkov: Forest Spies. The Intelligence Activity of the Soviet Partisans . Magnes Press and Yad Vashem Press, Jerusalem 2017, ISBN 978-965-7763-14-8 ( Online , pdf).
  • Yaacov Falkov, "Between the Nazi Hammer and the Soviet Anvil: The Untold Story of the Red Guerrillas in the Baltic Region, 1941-1945", in Chris Murray (ed.), Unknown Conflicts of the Second World War: Forgotten Fronts (London : Routledge, 2019), pp. 96-119, ISBN 978-1138612945 .

Focus on fighting partisans of the Wehrmacht

  • Jürg H. Schmid: The international legal position of the partisans in war . Zurich, 1956
  • Hans-Joachim Jentsch : The judgment of summary executions by international law. Marburg, Univ.-Diss., 1966
  • Central office of the state justice administrations (ed.): Hostage and partisan killings in World War II. Notes on legal assessment. Machine manuscript, Ludwigsburg 1968
  • Hans Umbreit: The unresolved problem. The partisan war in the rear of the Wehrmacht . in: Jürgen Förster (Ed.): Stalingrad. Event - Effect - Icon . Munich, Zurich 1993.
  • Jürgen Förster: Securing the living space in: Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann , Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller , Gerd R. Ueberschär : The attack on the Soviet Union (= Military History Research Office [ed.]: Das Deutsche Reich und der World War 2. Band 4 ). 2nd Edition. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1987, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 .
  • Timm C Richter: "Herrenmensch" and "Bandit" German warfare and occupation policy as the context of the Soviet partisan war (1941–44), Münster 1998, ISBN 3-8258-3680-0 .
  • Ruth Bettina Birn : Two Realities? Case study for fighting partisans in the east . in: Bernd Wegner (Ed.): Two ways to Moscow. From the Hitler-Stalin Pact to Operation Barbarossa . Munich, Zurich 1991, ISBN 3-492-11346-X .

Web links

Commons : Soviet Partisans  - Collection of Images

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Leonid D. Grenkevich: The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944: A Critical Analysis historiographical . Frank Cass, London 1999, ISBN 978-0-7146-4874-3 .
  2. ↑ a b Federal Archives (ed.): Europe under the swastika: The occupation policy of German fascism (1938–1945); Heidelberg 1996; Vol. 8, pp. 190 ff. ISBN 3-326-00411-7 .
  3. ↑ Lothar Rendulic : The partisan war . In: Balance of the Second World War . Oldenburg 1953, p. 108.
  4. ^ PN Pospelow (chairman of the ed.): History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union . Berlin 1964, Volume 3, p. 530.
  5. ↑ Hesse, Partisan War, p. 64.
  6. ↑ Johannes Hürter : Notes from the war of extermination . Darmstadt 2016, p. 51.
  7. ↑ See Christian Hartmann: Wehrmacht in the Eastern War. Front and Militaerisches Hinterland 1941/42 (= sources and representations on contemporary history, Volume 75) 2nd, improved edition, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70225-5 , pp. 718 ff.
  8. ^ Hesse, Partisan War, p. 143.
  9. ↑ Bonwetsch, Soviet Partisans, p. 109.
  10. ↑ Percy Ernst Schramm (ed.): War diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht . Bonn n.d. Volume 2, p. 79.
  11. ^ Christian Hartmann : The Wehrmacht in the Eastern War . Munich 2010, p. 756.
  12. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz : Citadel Company . Augsburg 1997, p. 125.
  13. ↑ http://www.khatyn.by/de/genocide/expeditions/
  14. ↑ Hesse, Partisanenkrieg, pp. 223 and 254.
  15. ^ Johannes Leeb, The Nuremberg Trials .
  16. ↑ Johannes Hürter : Notes from the war of extermination . Darmstadt 2016, p. 222.
  17. ↑ Percy Ernst Schramm (ed.): War diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht . Bonn n.d. Volume 6, p. 1167.
  18. ^ Federal Archives (ed.): Europe under the swastika: The occupation policy of German fascism (1938–1945); Heidelberg 1996; Vol. 8, p. 194.
  19. ↑ Hesse, Partisan War, p. 117 f.
  20. ↑ Erich Hesse: The Soviet Russian Partisan War in the mirror of German combat instructions and orders . Göttingen 1993, p. 254.
  21. ^ Hesse, Partisan War, p. 143.
  22. ↑ Booklets on political education (Der Nationalozialismus) , 1991; Johannes Leeb, The Nuremberg Trial , 1995.
  23. ^ Bogdan Musial: Soviet Partisans 1941–1944. Myth and Reality . Paderborn 2009, p. 142.
  24. ^ Jörn Hasenclever: Wehrmacht and occupation policy in the Soviet Union . Paderborn 2010, p. 399.
  25. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Army Leader, The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 432.
  26. ↑ Kopyschtsche - Zhytomyr Khatyn on politnavigator.net ; accessed on April 5, 2020 (Russian)
  27. ↑ a b Eino Viheriävaara, (1982). Partisaanien jäljet ​​1941–1944 , Oulun Kirjateollisuus Oy. ISBN 951-99396-6-0 .
  28. ↑ Veikko Erkkilä, (1999). Vaiettu sota , Arator Oy. ISBN 952-9619-18-9 .
  29. ↑ Lauri Hannikainen, (1992). Implementing Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Case of Finland , Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. ISBN 0-7923-1611-8 .
  30. ^ Tyyne Martikainen, (2002). Partisaanisodan siviiliuhrit , PS-Paino Värisuora Oy. ISBN 952-91-4327-3 .
  31. ↑ Johannes Hürter : Hitler's Army Leader, The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 426.
  32. ↑ Johannes Hürter : Notes from the war of extermination . Darmstadt 2016, p. 87 f.
  33. ↑ Johannes Leeb, The Nuremberg Trial , 1995; Booklets on political education (National Socialism) , 1991.
  34. ↑ http://vivovoco.astronet.ru/VV/PAPERS/HISTORY/PARTISAN.HTM
  35. ↑ Cf. Bogdan Musial: Soviet Partisans 1941–1944. Myth and Reality . Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, Paderborn 2009, pp. 222-225, 255, 288, 292 and 320-322 and 442-444.
  36. ↑ Hitler's War in the East .