Operation Rail War
The operation rail War ( Russian Операция Рельсовая война ) was an operation of the Soviet partisans in the German-Soviet war from August 3 to September 15 1943 specifically against the rail network in the hinterland of the German Wehrmacht (to support the counteroffensive at Kursk Operation Kutuzov and Belgorod Kharkov operation ).
Plan and implementation
The aim was to strike the enemy rail network . They wanted to blast as many tracks as possible at the same time by means of a new way of fighting, through the mass use of small mines , in order to prevent a quick repair. On July 9, 1943, the head of the Central Partisan Staff Panteleimon K. Ponomarenko wrote in a memorandum:
“One can imagine what an operational effect the destruction of 200-300 thousand pieces of rails would have. [...] As it turned out, 100 g and not 400 g of explosives are enough to tear apart a splint that weighs an average of 500 kg. So you need 1 t Trotyl to destroy 10,000 rails and 10 t Trotyl to destroy 1 million rails. The central staff has prepared everything for such an action. "
A derailed train normally causes a disruption of 7 to 14 hours, and a track blast only 3 to 6 hours. The plan was to destroy 126,400 tracks simultaneously on a total of 7,069 km. To this end, the partisans were to be supplied with a total of 161 tons of explosives , ammunition, medicines and propaganda material. In addition, liaison officers and demolition experts were sent to the partisans. Flanking this, heavy bombing raids were carried out on top and junction stations.
The operation began on the night of August 3rd.
German countermeasures
In response, the “Führer order No. 9” to Army Group Center stipulated that “all army forces deployed for non-vital tasks, all training units that are somehow available, dispensable air force personnel and alarm units called” are to be used for “route guarding”. The commander of the rear area of the 4th Army issued the order on August 5 to set up the civilian population as a trellis on the railway line, with a maximum distance of 200 m, arranged according to village community. If partisans still get through, “the toughest measures against this village community are necessary”. He also ordered that the base crews were no longer allowed to sleep at night. The transport chief of Army Group Center Hermann Teske reports that on the Shlobin - Gomel route a man was used to guard the route every 5 meters, but explosions were still carried out. In various cases, Eastern units deployed to guard the railway lines went over completely to the partisans. The war diary of the 3rd Panzer Army recorded on August 3, 1943, “Continuous nightly gang supply from the air” and noted: “Strengthening night hunting is absolutely necessary to prevent gang supply, otherwise similar large-scale explosions of the railway line as this morning are expected got to."
The Reichsbahn responded with diversions, driving on the wrong track on double-track lines and 'driving on sight'. For example, one track was restored on double-track lines and trains from both directions were combined in bundles, and then with 'drive on sight' they were alternately channeled over the single-track line.
effect
In large parts of the rear area, the rail connections were shut down for 48 hours. The war diary of the Wehrmacht High Command stated on August 6, 1943 that “all traffic in the rear area of H.Gr. Mitte ”was“ paralyzed ”by the blow. On October 3, 1943, the OKW's war diary recorded:
“Report on the gang situation in the east from July to September 1943. The line demolitions on railway lines led for the first time to serious immediate operational disadvantages (cf. 6. 8./1 f.). In some places the gang activity begins to turn into a popular uprising. "
In the 9th Army , the lack of urgently needed supplies in mid-August, due to the shutdown of numerous tanks and motor vehicles, resulted in large parts of the army becoming immobile. In addition to incorrect calculations of ammunition consumption, the explosions led to a "fatal ammunition shortage".
According to Teske, 20,505 blasting sites and 4,528 blasting prevented were found in August. The German-Polish historian Bogdan Musial contrasts these figures with the Soviet figures, which report 94,477 tracks destroyed by August 15 alone, and therefore considers them to be far exaggerated.
From September 19 to November 1, 1943, the larger "Operation Concert" took place and in June 1944 an even larger such action in support of Operation Bagration .
Individual evidence
- ↑ JP Petrow (chairman of the editor): History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union . Volume 3, p. 553. and Hermann Teske : The silver mirrors . Heidelberg 1952, p. 194.
- ^ Bogdan Musial : Soviet Partisans 1941–1944. Myth and Reality . Paderborn 2009, p. 223.
- ↑ Investigation report No. 95 of the Oreler staff of the partisan movement from September 2, 1943. Quote from Sebastian Stopper: “The street is German.” The Soviet partisan war and its military efficiency . In: VfZ Heft 3/2011, p. 410.
- ↑ Musial, p. 223.
- ↑ Teske, p. 194.
- ↑ Percy Ernst Schramm (ed.): War diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht . Bonn n.d. Volume 3 / II, p. 905.
- ^ Norbert Müller: German occupation policy in the USSR . Cologne 1980, 153 f.
- ↑ Teske, p. 197.
- ↑ Teske, p. 195.
- ↑ Kurt Mehner (Ed.): The secret daily reports of the German Wehrmacht leadership in the Second World War . Osnabrück 1988, Volume 7, p. 205.
- ↑ Hans Pottgiesser: The Deutsche Reichsbahn in the Eastern Campaign 1939-1944 . Neckargemünd 1975, p. 95 ff.
- ^ Alfred Philippi , Ferdinand Heim : The campaign against Soviet Russia 1941 to 1945. An operational overview . Stuttgart 1962, p. 213.
- ↑ War diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht . Volume 3 / II, p. 905.
- ↑ War diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht . Volume 3 / II, p. 1167.
- ↑ Daily and numerical reports from August 4 to 16, 1943 . KTB of AOK 9, Appendix Volume 4. Quoted from Stopper, p. 410
- ↑ Philippi, Heim, p. 214 f.
- ↑ Teske, p. 195.
- ↑ Musial, p. 223 f.