Belgorod-Kharkov operation

Operation Rumyantsev

Part of: Second World War

date	August 3-23, 1943
place	space Kharkov
output	Soviet victory

Parties to the conflict
Soviet Union	German Empire
Commander
Ivan Stepanowitsch Konew Nikolai Fyodorowitsch Watutin	Erich von Manstein Hermann Hoth Werner Kempf
Troop strength
1,144,000 soldiers, 2,418 tanks and assault guns, 1,311 aircraft, approx.12,866 guns	250,000 soldiers, 237 tanks and assault guns , 796 aircraft
losses
255,566 soldiers, 1,864 tanks and StuG 942 aircraft	≈30,000 soldiers ≈300 tanks and self-propelled guns 147 aircraft

The Belgorod-Kharkov Operation (also known as Operation Rumyantsev ; Russian Белгородско-Харьковская операция ) was a Red Army offensive in World War II that lasted from August 3 to 23, 1943 and, from the Soviet perspective, as part of the Battle of the Kursk Arch is seen. The operation was part of the long planned Soviet summer offensive, in the course of which almost all fronts of the Red Army went over to the attack on a broad front. During the operation, Belgorod was retaken from the German occupiers on August 5th and Kharkov on August 23rd .

The history

The course of the front in April 1943

At the beginning of July, the Wehrmacht opened its offensive against the Kursk arches , but it stalled against well-positioned Soviet defenders. The operation, the last major German offensive on the Eastern Front, was then canceled by Hitler . The Red Army began its long-planned summer offensive during the German attack. Operation Rumyantsev, which was planned as a direct counterattack against the advancing German units, was part of this comprehensive offensive. For this purpose, a whole Soviet front (comparable to a German army group ) was set up as a reserve. Since the German attack had caused the Soviet leadership to deploy this reserve early, Operation Rumyantsev could not begin on the scheduled date. In particular, the high losses of tanks made a refresh necessary. While the counter-offensive north of Kursk ( Operation Kutuzov ) was in full swing, things remained quiet around Belgorod . Together with the enormous tank losses of the Voronezh and steppe fronts in the southern part of the Kursk Arc, this led to the Wehrmacht's misjudgment that the Red Army would no longer be capable of a major attack here. On the German side, several tank divisions therefore withdrew . Many of them were sent north to support the troubled armies under Walter Model . The 9th Army and the 2nd Panzer Army found themselves exposed to heavy attacks from three Soviet fronts during the Oryol operation . Furthermore, for example, the SS Panzer Grenadier Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler was relocated to Italy in order to counter the expected defection of the Axis partner.

Soviet plans

Operation Rumyantsev was planned by the Stavka as the main thrust of the summer offensive. While Operation Kutuzov was mainly intended to support the defense in the Kursk Arc, Rumyantsev had far more ambitious targets. The operation aimed to crush the German armies, weakened during Operation Citadel . The 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Army Detachment were to be destroyed directly at the Kursk Bogen, and then swiveled south and encircled the 1st Panzer Army and the 6th Army on the Black Sea coast. This would then have been the destruction of the entire Army Group South under Erich von Manstein . Stalin wanted to start the attack on July 23, but Zhukov said the units needed time to be refreshed. The first goal of the advancing armies should be the direct capture of the important Bogoduchow hub . From there, the tank armies were to swing in and encircle Kharkov. In preparation for the operation, the southern and southwestern fronts began with attacks on Manstein's south wing in the Donets Basin ( Donets-Mius offensive ) on July 17 . These attacks failed with high losses, but at the same time led to a withdrawal of troops in the Belgorod-Kharkov sector. The operation, which was planned as Maskirowka , thus fulfilled its purpose of weakening the north wing of Manstein. Ten armies were ready for direct attack in the first phase, two of them tank armies. In addition, five independent corps were provided.

Troop strength

Two Soviet fronts, the Voronezh Front under Nikolai Watutin and the Steppe Front under Ivan Konev , had a troop strength of 1,144,000 soldiers, 12,886 guns, 2,418 tanks and 1,311 aircraft. The 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Army Division of the German Army Group South under Erich von Manstein had a total of 250,000 soldiers, 237 tanks and assault guns , as well as 796 aircraft. Reinforcements increased the number of German combat vehicles to 567 by August 10th. Successful Soviet diversionary attacks in the south and the critical situation in the north, which necessitated the relocation of German troops, resulted in an extremely favorable ratio for the Reds in the Belgorod / Charkow area Army.

Operation Rumjanzew: Strength information from Karl-Heinz Frieser and David M. Glantz

	soldiers			tank			artillery
	Soviet	German	relationship	Soviet	German	relationship	Soviet	German	relationship
Frieser	1,144,000	≈250,000	≈4: 1	2,418	237	10: 1	12,866	2.847	4.5: 1
Glantz	1,144,000	330,000	3.5: 1	2,439	530	4.9: 1
↑ Frieser uses food strength ↑ Frieser does not count the reserves added later ↑ Frieser increased to 567 through reinforcements ↑ The information for the citadel ↑ Glantz uses food strength ↑ Glantz assesses the strength and includes reinforcements ↑ Glantz includes reinforcements. Without reinforcement 250

course

Soviet advance directions

In support of the offensive, Operation Rail War began against the enemy rail network on the night of August 3 . At 5 a.m. on August 3, the operation began with a three-hour fire roller . After that, the artillery units' fire was directed at enemy targets in the hinterland, at the same time the Soviet ground troops began their advance. At 8:00 am, after three hours of artillery preparation and air strikes, Soviet troops attacked. The armed forces of the 6th and 5th Guards Army (Lieutenant General AS Schadow ) set up in the south of the Kursk front ledge (Lieutenant General AS Schadow ) had to force a breakthrough on Akhtyrka via Tomarowka and Borissowka . The 67th and 71st Guards Rifle Divisions (22nd Guards Rifle Corps) and the 51st and 52nd Guards Divisions (23rd Guards Rifle Corps) operated in the first meeting of the 6th Guards Army, followed by the 90th Guards in the second meeting. Guard and 309th Rifle Divisions. Almost three hours after the start of the attack, the strike groups of the 5th and 6th Guard Army (Lieutenant General IM Tschistjakow ) broke through the enemy defenses, and large tank formations stormed into the gap that was 15 kilometers wide. On the night of August 3, after dark, parts of the 6th Guards Army were replaced by the fresh 90th Guards and 309th Rifle Divisions. The introduction of the two Soviet tank armies overran the front German positions, which had already been weakened by artillery fire and air raids. There was a gap in the front between Belgorod and Tomarowka , through which Soviet armored shock wedges advanced up to 25 kilometers. The Soviet infantry penetrated the German positions up to eight kilometers. On the second day of the battle, the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army was followed by the 66th Guards Rifle Division, which had remained in the second season, in order to consolidate the previous gains in land between Pushkarnoje and Stepnoje. On the evening of the second day two German tank divisions built up a defensive position near Tomarowka and managed to temporarily stop the advance of the two tank armies. By August 5, the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army had overcome the defensive defense of the German 332nd Infantry Division . On the morning of the third day of the attack, the 66th Guards Rifle Division blocked the enemy defensive lines at Tomarowka. In cooperation with the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps, the German defense at Borissowka was bypassed and rolled up. Parts of five German divisions were partially enclosed in the Borisovka area and tried to slow the Soviet advance. The Soviet rifle divisions, which were supposed to follow the armored wedges, saw themselves forced to take action against the German pockets of resistance. That cost time and left the tank units partly without infantry support. Later, up to August 9th, these German units were horrified again by skillful counter-attacks by the 11th Panzer Division and the hastily brought up Greater Germany Division . By August 5th, the Soviet troops were able to retake Belgorod and the Red Army began the attack towards Kharkov . With their large mass of tanks, the Soviet units tore a hole in the front precisely at the interface between the two major German units. On August 7th, there was a gap of 50 kilometers through which Soviet units continued to advance. The Soviet 6th Panzer Corps (Major General AL Getman ) of the 1st Panzer Army succeeded in occupying Bogoduchow on the same day. This success is considered to be one of the first Soviet operational breakthroughs through German lines.

Fight at Bogoduchow

Panther of the SS division "Das Reich"

From August 10th, the Soviet 1st Panzer Army turned sharply south in the direction of Valki (37 km south of Bogoduchow) and threatened the Kharkov-Poltava railway line. Panic broke out in the German headquarters and armored units that had already been relocated were ordered back. By August 10, the German units were reinforced by ten more Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions , including the SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Das Reich" and SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Totenkopf" as well as the Greater Germany Division . The tracked tank divisions increased the number of German combat vehicles considerably and enabled the first counterattacks. Parts of the newly arrived SS Panzer Grenadier divisions “Das Reich” and “Totenkopf” launched a counterattack on August 12 against the Soviet 1st Panzer Army and 5th Guards Armored Army , which tried to gain further space south of Boguduchow. With their rapid advance, the Soviet units had overstretched their flanks and were accordingly vulnerable. In the heavy fighting that followed, the German units were able to encircle and wipe out large parts of the Soviet units. Here, too, the Soviet tank units failed to push back the German troops, despite their considerable material superiority. All attacks by the Red Army were repulsed. The German units inflicted considerable losses on the two Soviet armored armies, whereupon they stopped their attacks. By August 17, the two Soviet armies had been pushed back and practically lost their attack power. The two armored armies had only 200 of their original 1000 tanks and were initially unable to carry out operations.

Even if the attack by the two Soviet tank armies was stopped, the situation further west on the Psel section was still critical for the Wehrmacht. The 52nd Rifle Corps of the 40th Army liberated Lebedin on August 19 in cooperation with the 2nd mechanical corps (Major General AF Popov ). The 47th Rifle Corps (Major General SA Grjasnow) was already threatening the approaches to Gadatsch . The gap between the German 4th Panzer and 8th Armies (renamed Kempf Army Department) was still not closed. The German leadership therefore decided to attempt with a pincer attack to encircle and destroy the Soviet units that had advanced and at the same time restore the front. For this, the 4th Panzer Army provided the XXIV Panzer Corps , which attacked from the north. The SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Totenkopf" of the 8th Army attacked from the south. The attack started on August 18, and on August 20, units of the Totenkopf and Greater Germany divisions, under Hyazinth Graf Strachwitz , met in the rear of the Soviet wedges. In addition to two Soviet tank corps, large parts of the 6th Guard Army and 27th Army were included. The completely inadequate infantry forces of the Germans did not manage to completely seal off this cauldron, which is why large parts of the Soviet units were able to break out and withdraw. To support the outbreak of Soviet forces, other Red Army units attacked the positions of the German 57th Infantry Division . The heavy artillery bombardment that followed hit the division's positions so hard that it subsequently got into disarray and left its positions. This incident was an extremely rare occurrence for the Wehrmacht and led to German troops giving up the attack and withdrawing again. The leadership of the Red Army decided to concentrate on Kharkov for the time being, and did not take advantage of their superiority further west.

The capture of Kharkov

After the Soviet attack to the west was stopped for the time being, the further advance was now primarily directed towards Kharkov . The city and its surroundings were heavily fortified. For the defense of the city were mainly the XXXXII. and XI. Army Corps in charge. In contrast, up to five Soviet armies took part in the attack on Kharkov. Konew planned to encircle the city and on August 12th attacked the city's outer defensive ring. The 5th Guards Panzer Army under Pavel Rotmistrow served the Red Army as a shock wedge. General Kempf pointed out the danger of a possible enclosure of the German troops and called for the city to be abandoned, whereupon Hitler demanded that the city be kept “under all circumstances”. Due to the supply situation and the overwhelming power of the Soviet units, the German defenders saw themselves unable to defend the city against the armies attacking from several directions. The defenders were particularly troubled by the lack of ammunition in the artillery.

General Kempf, who on August 14th pleaded for the town to be evacuated, was relieved of his command by Hitler and replaced by General Otto Wöhler , who also voted for an evacuation. The fierce fighting resulted in heavy losses on both sides. The Soviet attacks were sometimes carried out very hastily and were therefore often halted with high losses. According to Frieser, Stalin reported prematurely to the Western powers about the capture of the city and therefore let it attack without considering losses in order not to have to deny it. The leadership of the 8th Army (previously Kempf Army Department) reported a lack of ammunition after the heavy fighting, so that finally Field Marshal Erich von Manstein ordered the withdrawal. Hitler had previously demanded the unconditional defense of the city, but was persuaded by the General Staff to give permission for the retreat. In order to lessen the political consequences, however, he ordered that the city should only be abandoned in an emergency and that the withdrawal be delayed as long as possible. According to Manstein, Hitler primarily feared negative effects on the attitude of neutral Turkey and its allied Bulgaria. The 5th Guards Panzer Army tried in vain on August 22nd to block the evacuation routes of the German units and could not prevent the relatively orderly withdrawal of the Wehrmacht. On August 23, Kharkov, which had largely been vacated, was finally liberated by Red Army troops. Kharkov, regarded by both sides as an object of prestige, changed hands several times during the war. This final battle for Kharkov is also known as the fourth battle for Kharkov .

consequences

Even if the Red Army failed to achieve its goal of destroying the two German armies, it won a victory. The Stawka was largely satisfied with their results after the battle and further attacks further north forced Manstein's troops to retreat again. The steadily developing Soviet army forced a decisive breakthrough in the initial phase of the attack. The new methods of the Soviet armored weapons and especially the artillery, which emerged after studies of the earlier defeats, showed their potential for the first time. Soviet tank units were deployed in a concentrated manner to break through the German lines and then to act in the operational depths. Georgi Zhukov later called these attacks "hammer blows", which characterizes the intensity of the attacks well. At the same time, however, it became evident once again that the Wehrmacht had not lost its tactical superiority. In this way she was ultimately able to prevent major losses on her side and withdraw in a relatively orderly manner towards the Dnieper . The tactical superiority of the Wehrmacht, especially with the tank units, led to relatively high losses on the part of the Red Army, which took little account of losses when it hit the hammer. In contrast to the Red Army, the Wehrmacht was unable to adequately compensate for its losses. The better strategic planning of the Stawka meant that with the start of Operation Rumyantsev, the Wehrmacht began to withdraw. The Soviet numerical superiority with now improved leadership ensured that the Wehrmacht was no longer able to take over the strategic initiative. The continuous Soviet attacks on a broad front meant that the Wehrmacht was no longer able to gather troops for large-scale operations. When Operation Rumyantsev was over, the battle of the Dnieper began immediately . In the course of this battle, Soviet units crossed the Dnieper and liberated large parts of eastern Ukraine.

losses

The Soviet losses were considerable. In literature, Colonel General Grigory Krivosheev's book is accepted as the standard work for Soviet losses. According to this, the Soviet units lost 255,566 men, 71,611 of whom were dead or missing. Regarding the information on personnel losses, it should be noted that the Soviet reporting system of the time was often incorrect. This is why some historians consider these official numbers as the lower bound. Individual historians give up to twice as high numbers. 1,864 tank losses were reported, which roughly corresponds to the losses of the Citadel company . Aircraft losses are difficult to determine because the Soviet archives are incomplete here. Based on the German gunshot reports, Frieser estimates that the Red Air Force has lost 942 aircraft.

The losses for the German side cannot be clearly determined either. Since loss reports are given for German operations and these differ in time from the Soviet ones, there are only relatively precise estimates. According to Frieser, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Army Detachment lost a total of 30,000 men, 10,000 of whom were either dead or missing. The tank losses are even more difficult to determine. Frieser gives a general tank loss rate of 8: 1 in favor of the Wehrmacht for the operations around Kursk. According to Frieser, this relationship also applies to Operation Rumyantsev. The German Air Force lost 147 aircraft. Above all, the Soviet post-war literature indicates far higher losses for the German side.

literature

• Г.Ф. Кривошеев (Ed.): Россия и СССР в войнах XX века. Потери вооруженных сил. Статистическое исследование ( Memento from March 30, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) (= Архив ). Олма-Пресс, Москва 2001, ISBN 5-224-01515-4 .
• David M. Glantz , Jonathan M. House: The Battle of Kursk. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS 2004, ISBN 0-7006-1335-8 .
• Karl-Heinz Frieser : The Eastern Front 1943/44. The war in the east and on the secondary fronts (= The German Reich and the Second World War . Vol. 8). Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2 .
• MK Barbier: The battle in the Kursk'er Bogen Tosa Verlag, Vienna 2002, p. 165 f. ISBN 3-85492-546-8 .

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b} Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. 191.
2. ↑ ^{a b} Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. 200. Quoted here: Grif sekretnoski snjat. P. 187f.
3. ↑ ^{a b} Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. 200.
4. ↑ ^{a b} Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. 199
5. ^ ^{A b} Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 241.
6. ^ Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 243.
7. ^ Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 245.
8. ^ Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. 191, is quoted Grif sekretnosti snjat by Krivoschejew .
9. ↑ ( page no longer available , search in web archives: Belgorod-Charkower Operation ); (Russian; accessed December 10, 2007).
10. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. 192
11. ^ Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. 100.
12. ^ Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 338.
13. ^ ^{A b} Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 345.
14. ^ ^{A b} Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 247.
15. ^ ^{A b} Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 248.
16. ↑ Article Kharkov Operation 1943 in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (BSE) , 3rd edition 1969–1978 (Russian)http: //vorlage_gse.test/1%3D118561~2a%3DCharkower%20Operation%201943~2b%3DCharkower%20Operation%201943
17. ^ Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. 193, quoted here as Chief Marshal of the Armored Troops Pavel Rotmistrow.
18. ^ Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 249.
19. ^ Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. ???
20. ^ Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 251.
21. ↑ ^{a b c} Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. 197.
22. ↑ ^{a b} Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. 198.
23. ^ Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, p. 199.
24. ^ Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 252.
25. ^ Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 254.
26. ^ Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 276.
27. ^ Glantz, House: The Battle of Kursk. 2004, p. 259.
28. ↑ ^{a b} Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44. 2007, pp. 198-200.

Web links

• GA Koltunow / BG Solowjow: Belgorod-Charkower Operation , Moscow Military Publishing House 1970 (Russian)
• Belgorod-Kharkov Operation in Velikaya Wojna ( Memento of March 12, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) (Russian)
• Use of the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps on http://militera.lib.ru/science/sb_proryv_oborony/04.html