Operation Mars

Operation Mars
(Second Rzhev - Sychovka Offensive)

Part of: Second World War

Front line around the time of Operation Mars

date	November 25 to December 21, 1942
place	Rzhev , Soviet Union
output	Defeat of the Soviet Union

Parties to the conflict
Soviet Union	German Empire
Commander
Georgi Schukow , Iwan Konew , Maxim Purkajew	Walter Model , Günther von Kluge
Troop strength
Kalininer Front 41st Army 22nd Army 39th Army 1st and 3rd Mechanized Corps Western front 30th Army 31st Army 20th Army 5th and 6th Panzer Corps 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps 29th Army 5th Army 33rd Army Total : 827,000 soldiers 2,352 tanks (directly involved in the attack)	Army Group Center 9th Army XXIII. Army Corps XXVII. Army Corps XXX. Army Corps XXXXI. Panzer Corps XXXIX. Panzer Corps
losses
100,000 dead and missing 235,000 wounded 1,600 tanks	40,000 dead and wounded 400 tanks

The Operation Mars was a major offensive of the Red Army against the German Wehrmacht from 25 November to 21 December 1942. The company was originally to accompany the Operation Uranus scheduled for October 1942, but then postponed to November 25 1942nd The operation of the Red Army, coordinated by Army General Georgi Konstantinowitsch Zhukov , did not achieve the objective set by headquarters, namely the removal of the Rzhev bridgehead, but its actions prevented the German high command from withdrawing considerable reinforcements from this section into the Stalingrad area.

Starting position

After the successes of the Wehrmacht in 1941, the Red Army tried in spring 1942 to win the strategic initiative. After the Battle of Moscow , the Red Army was able to push in the front at Rzhev during the winter offensive of 1941/42 ( Rzhev-Vyazma operation ) and thus create a bridgehead measuring around 150 square kilometers. The German 9th Army was in it under the command of Colonel General Walter Model . This army was still the head of Army Group Center , which protruded furthest in the direction of Moscow . Zhukov was of the opinion that the German Wehrmacht could be severely weakened here and then the Army Group Center could be destroyed. The Wehrmacht leadership recognized the threat behind the 9th Army and countered the encirclement attempts on July 2, 1942 with the Seydlitz company , which led to the encirclement and destruction of the 22nd, 29th and 39th Soviet armies by July 12, 1942. At the same time, the German troops went back on the offensive in the south of the front and advanced as far as the Caucasus and the Volga.

With the consent of Stalin , the implementation of two large counter-offensives was ordered on September 26th, each of which was divided into two phases: General Zhukov was to encircle and destroy the 9th Army in the Rzhev bridgehead in the area in front of Moscow (code name: Mars ). Subsequently, the two Soviet fronts involved ( Kalininer Front and Western Front ) were supposed to destroy the remaining units of Army Group Center in the Smolensk area in a great pincer movement (code name: Jupiter ). In the Stalingrad area , three Soviet fronts under the command of General Wassilewski were supposed to encircle and destroy the German 6th Army in Stalingrad (code name: Uranus ) in order to subsequently recapture Rostov-on-Don and include all German formations of Army Group A (code name: Saturn ).

The General Command VI. AK ., Which had hitherto been the focus of the fighting for Rshew, was pulled out, the remaining units went to the area of ​​the XXVII. Army Corps under the command of General of the Infantry Walter Weiß . Since the Wehrmacht knew roughly the place and time of the attack from intelligence sources, the 9th Army was able to take effective defense measures. Fortifications were expanded and forests that could have served as cover in the attack areas were cleared.

Soviet attack planning

Planning sketch for the operations Mars and Jupiter

The Kalininer Front (General Purkajew ) and the Western Front (General Konew ), reinforced by the Moscow Military District, had a total of 1.9 million soldiers, over 24,000 artillery pieces, 3,300 tanks and 1,100 aircraft. Of these, the Stawka deployed around 830,000 soldiers and 2,300 tanks for Operation Mars .

In the first phase, the 41st Army (Major General Tarasov ) of the Kalinin Front in the west of the Rshever front arc had to lead the main strike south of Belyj . It comprised five rifle divisions, the 1st Mechanized Corps, the 47th and 48th Mechanized Brigade and the 6th Rifle Corps (Major General Powetkin ) - together around 106,000 men and 350 tanks. According to Konev's plans, the 41st Army was to break through the German defense, extend the breakthrough to the west and north and establish a union with the 20th Army on the western front, which had entered the Sychevka area . The German XXIII. and XXVII. Army Corps ( 6th , 72nd , 78th , 95th , 129th and 251st Infantry Divisions ) in the Rzhev front arc. The 1st Mechanized Corps (Major General Solomatin ) supported the 41st Army in the attack against the German XXXXI. Panzer Corps (General Harpe with the 205th , parts 330th and 328th Infantry Divisions ).

At the same time, to the north of it, the 22nd Army (Lieutenant General Juschkewitsch ) attacked the left wing ( 86th and 110th Infantry Division ) of the German XXIII. Army Corps (General Hilpert ) on the western front arc. The 22nd Army was supported in the attack against the Luchessa sector by the 3rd Mechanized Corps (Major General Katukov ). The 39th Army (Lieutenant General Zygin ) on the left wing of the Kalinin Front had to cross the Molodoi Tud river in the north and fight with the German XXIII. Army Corps ( 206th , 253rd, 110th, 86th, 87th Infantry Division ) to take the village of Urdoma and advance against the eastern apron of Rzhev under cover of the 30th Army (Lieutenant General Kolpaktschi ), who remained defensive on the left . To the south near Subzow along the rivers Wazusa and Osuga, the 31st and 20th Army (Major General Polenow and Kirjuchin ) attacked by the 6th Panzer Corps (Colonel Getman ) supported by the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (Major General Krjukow ) against the front of the German XXXIX. Panzer Corps (General of the Armored Force von Arnim with the 102nd , 205th , 330th and 328th Infantry Divisions ).

On the right wing of the Kalinin Front, the 3rd Shock Army had an offensive from November 24th against the small front of the LIX. Army Corps (General von der Chevallerie ) initiated towards Velikiye Luki and Novosokolniki ( Battle of Velikiye Luki ). The order of the Soviet General Staff read: "The units of the right wing of the Western Front and the left wing of the Kalinin Front have to encircle the enemy forces in the bridgehead of Rzhev, to take Rzhev and to regain control of the railway connection Moscow-Velikiye Luki."

A second phase was planned from the east in the Gschatsk area, in addition to the German XXXXVI. Panzer Corps (General of the Panzer Troops von Esebeck ) break through on Vyazma. The troops of the 5th and 33rd Armies of the Western Front, reinforced by the 9th and 10th Panzer Corps, were supposed to attack the German defenses east of Vyazma (Operation Jupiter). After the break-in, the 3rd Panzer Guard Army (12th and 15th Panzer Corps) was supposed to be introduced, take Vyazma, force the connection with the Kalinin Front and, if the conditions were favorable, continue the attack on Smolensk . However, these attacks were not carried out due to the failure of Operation Mars.

course

First phase

The attack, which began in the early hours of the morning of November 25, took place in four sections simultaneously: north of Sychevka, west of Rzhev, north of Belyi in the Luchessa valley and south of Belyi. The temperatures in this winter battle were between 0 and −25 degrees. In the east it was initially unfavorable: fog and blowing snow prevented the planned air support and significantly reduced the effectiveness of the Soviet artillery, as the ground targets were difficult to pinpoint. The 41st Army made a major breakthrough on the western front arc with the 1st Mechanical Corps south of Belyi. The attack by the 31st Army was able to break through the German defense on the eastern front arc, but got stuck after a few kilometers of terrain gain. The 88th, 336th and 239th Rifle Divisions attacking from the area west of Subzow, supported by the 332nd and 145th Panzer Brigades, achieved only limited success. On the Osuga, there was a deep break- in between the 102nd Infantry Division (General Frießner ) and its right-hand neighbor, the 5th Panzer Division (General Metz). The Soviet 247th Rifle Division, supported by the 80th and 140th Panzer Brigade, was able to bridge the Wazusa section and, after the introduction of the 331st Rifle Division (Colonel PE Berestow), form a bridgehead on the western bank. To the south of it, the Soviet 20th Army with the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps was also able to break through. North of Belyi, the Soviet 22nd Army (about 80,000 men with 270 tanks) with the 3rd mechanical corps reached another dangerous break in with the German 86th and 110th Infantry Divisions and advanced on both sides of the Lutschessa Valley. The bulk of the German reserves of the German 9th Army were in the Olenino area: the 9th Panzer Division , the 14th Motorized Division and the Greater Germany Division (Major General Hörnlein ) could be brought in quickly and contain the Soviet territorial gains.

On November 26, the Soviet 41st Army's incursion spread to about 20 kilometers wide and almost 30 kilometers deep. The 47th Mechanized Brigade (Colonel Dremow ) tried to encompass the town of Belyj, which was occupied by the German 246th Infantry Division , in the northeast. General Harpe decided to hold the city and received the combat group Wietersheim from the 1st Panzer Division and the combat group Kassnitz from the Greater Germany division as reinforcements. The troops of the 20th Army had been detained at the Wasuza section, the attack of the 31st Army was completely paralyzed south of it and the attack of the 29th Army was not yet planned.

Konjew ordered the introduction of the 5th Panzer Corps (Major General Semenshenko ) with almost 200 tanks in the area of ​​the 20th Army on November 27th in order to force the planned union with the 41st and 22nd Armies. The 20th Army finally managed to break into the 78th Infantry Division (General Völckers ), which was almost wiped out. Soviet tanks threatened the railway line between Sychevka and Rzhev. Although further breaches of the front were achieved, especially in the western section, the offensive overall fell far short of expectations. After just a few days, the Wehrmacht had stabilized the situation. The few land gains that the mechanized units of the Red Army achieved also required great losses on the Soviet side. By tactically moving units to the respective focal points, further attack efforts by the Red Army could be repulsed at an early stage, while increasing losses of people and material as well as supply problems made the Soviet side increasingly incapable of action.

Second phase

The German 9th Army was the XXX. Army Corps (General Fretter-Pico ) from the section of Army Group North. German counter-attacks, which began on December 7th in the eastern and western sections of the front, threw the Red Army back to its starting position, sometimes leaving behind heavy material. In the Belyi area, the 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions (Major General von Lüttwitz ) and the SS Cavalry Division (SS General Bittrich ) were deployed to counterattack from the north, while parts of the 1st Panzer Division (Major General Krüger ) and attacked the fusilier regiment "Großdeutschland". The broken-in Soviet 6th Rifle Corps (General Powetkin) and the Panzer Corps under General Solomatin were cut off in the area southeast of Belyi and had to fight their way back to their original position by December 15, with heavy losses. At the end of the operation on December 21, the Red Army was only able to record permanent gain of space of 10 to 20 kilometers in the north of the bridgehead in the area of ​​the 39th Army (Kalinin Front).

Result

Operation Mars cost the Red Army nearly half a million men in losses. According to the Soviet historian Isajew, there were 70,373 dead and 145,301 wounded. According to the American military historian Glantz, around 100,000 dead and missing and 235,000 wounded, plus around 1,600 tanks, 279 artillery pieces and 353 anti-tank guns were destroyed. The losses of the German 9th Army from October to December 1942 amounted to 53,500 men, of which about 80% (40 - 45,000 men) in Operation Mars. For example, the 1st Armored Division alone lost 1,793 men and the 5th Armored Division 1,640 men, while the losses in the infantry divisions (78th, 246th, 86th, 110th and 206th) along the main Soviet lines of attack suffered even greater losses.

The company, which was run parallel to Operation Uranus , did not result in the encirclement of the 9th Army despite a very large amount of resources deployed and high losses on the part of the attackers. Glantz sees the main reasons for this, on the one hand, in the poor planning of the operation and, on the other hand, in the effectiveness of the defending troops. In contrast to Stalingrad, only Wehrmacht units were deployed at Rshew, which turned out to be a decisive difference: the German troops, which were faced with a large majority, were tactically better guided and consisted mainly of experienced fighters. They therefore acted appropriately and inflicted heavy losses on the attackers, who often attacked frontally, through tenacious resistance, which in many places led to the attacks being discontinued early on. Furthermore, points of little importance were not kept pointless, but cleared and - if possible - later recaptured. After the armies of the Soviets got bogged down, local counter-attacks were carried out, some of which led to the encirclement of large Soviet units. Parts of the Greater Germany Infantry Division did particularly well here.

rating

With their donations, Soviet kolkhoz farmers hand over built KV-1S tanks to their crews (Soviet propaganda image)

According to the latest Russian military-historical research, "Operation Mars" was partially successful. It was not possible to encircle the German 9th Army, but forces were tied up that the Wehrmacht could not use elsewhere. "Operation Mars" thus indirectly helped in the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad . These statements are questioned by historians like Glantz:

"In the unlikely event that Zhukov was correct and Mars was really a diversion, there has never been one so ambitious, so large, so clumsily executed, or so costly."

"In the unlikely event that Zhukov is right and Mars was really just a diversionary action, there has never been such a large and clumsy one, and none that is so costly."

- David Glantz

Marshal Georgi Konstantinowitsch Zhukov's assessment of Operation Mars : “The operation of our troops did not achieve the objective set by headquarters, the removal of the Rzhev bridgehead, but its actions prevented the German high command from making considerable reinforcements into the area from this section To withdraw Stalingrad. On the contrary: in order to hold the Rzhev-Vyazma deployment area, the Hitler command had to deploy four tank divisions and one motorized division in this area ”.

The battle for Rzhev in art

By Alexander Twardowski one of the most poignant poems about the war comes. It is not for nothing that it has the title: “I fell at Rzhev”.

"If the front burns incessantly like a knife its glow,

I'm dead and I don't know, will Rzhev still be ours? "

Web links

• Military historical account by David M. Glantz (English)
• Counter-notification by Col. Alexander Semenovich Orlov (English translation from Russian)
• Алексей Валерьевич Исаев (AW Isajew): Operation Mars (Russian)
• Valeri Abaturow: Операция Марс (Russian)

literature

• David M. Glantz : Zhukov's Greatest Defeat. The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (1999 Kansas City).
• П.Судоплатов: Разведка и Кремль. М., 1966. С. 187-188.
• Орлов Александр Семёнович: ОПЕРАЦИЯ "МАРС": РАЗЛИЧНЫЕ ТРАКТОВКИ
• Vladimir Karpov: Маршал Жуков, его соратники и противники в годы войны и мира
• Georgi K. Zhukov: Memories and Thoughts. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH., Stuttgart 1969, p. 405.

Individual evidence

1. ↑ David Glantz: Zhukov's greatest defeat p. 24.
2. ^ David Glantz: Zhukov's greatest defeat p. 308.
3. ^ Percy E. Schramm (ed.): War diary of the OKW. 8 halves. Weltbild, Augsburg 2005. ISBN 3-8289-0525-0 .