Battle of Rzhev

Battle of Rzhev

Part of: Eastern Front , World War II

The Rzhev promontory

date	January 1942 to March 1943
place	Space Rzhev , Soviet Union
output	Rzhev front arch is held until March 1943
consequences	Withdrawal of the 9th Army as part of the company's buffalo movement

Parties to the conflict
Soviet Union	German Empire
Commander
Georgi Zhukov Andrei Jerjomenko Ivan Konev	Günther von Kluge Adolf Strauss Walter Model
Troop strength
Kalininer Front Western Front	Army Group Center 9th Army 4th Army
losses
Soviet figures: 362,554–433,000 dead, 768,233 wounded.	Soviet figures: 330,000 dead, 450,000 wounded. According to the Wehrmacht: 162,713 dead, 469,747 wounded, 35,650 missing.

The battles around Rzhev ( Russian Ржевская битва Rschewskaja bitwa ; as Ржевская мясорубка Rschewskaja mjassorubka "meat grinder of Rzhev" known), between January 1942 and March 1943 took place, were among the bloodiest battles in the German-Soviet war during the Second World War . After the troops of the Armed Forces , represented by the 9th Army of Army Group Center , the end of 1941 before Moscow were beaten back, tried the Red Army in a series of operations, the north and east of Rzhev to break through standing German defenses and the divisions of the 9th Cut off and destroy army in this projecting front arch.

overview

German Panzerkampfwagen IV near Vyasma, March 1942

Rzhev, often referred to on the German side as the “cornerstone” and “breakwater” of the Eastern Front, was the scene of a series of material battles and position battles from winter 1941 to spring 1943. The Wehrmacht units, which were inferior in terms of personnel and material, had the disadvantage compared to the Red Army that they were less prepared for extreme weather changes (temperature drops from thaw to minus degrees of 40 ° C) and difficult terrain (muddy soil after rainfall and thaw). The Central Army Group got into numerous critical situations, mainly because of the supply situation, which it survived thanks to Colonel General Model's improvisational skills. The Soviet Army Command also made several serious mistakes that the German Army Group Command was able to use tactically.

The battle lasted a total of 15 months and consisted of three major offensives by the Red Army:

• Rzhev-Vyazma operation from January 8 to April 20, 1942 ( Сычевско-Вяземская наступательная операция Sychevsko-Vjasemskaja nastupatelnja operazija ) following the battle for Moscow
• First Rzhev Sychovka operation from July 30 to October 1, 1942
• Second Rzhev Sychovka operation ( Operation Mars ) from November 25 to December 21, 1942

The following sub-operations can be assigned to the Rzhev-Vyazma operation :

• Moshaisk-Vyazma attack operation from January 10 to February 28, 1942 ( Можайско-Вяземская наступательная операция Moshaisko-Vjasemskaja nastupatelnja operazija )
• Toropez-Kholmer attack operation from January 9 to February 6, 1942 ( Торопецко-Холмская наступательная операция Toropetsko-Kolmskaja nastupatelnja operazija )
• Airborne operation of Vyazma ( Вяземская воздушно-десантная операция Wjasemskaja bosduschno-desantnaja operazija ) and German company Hannover from 18 January to 28 February 1942 against Soviet partisans and paratroopers troops
• Rzhev attack operation from March 3 to April 20, 1942 ( Ржевская наступательная операция Rschewskaja nastupatelnja operazija )

There are four major winter and summer battles in the Rzhev, Sychovka and Vyazma areas.

It was not until the end of July 1942 that the Seydlitz company to fight partisans was able to bring about a temporary relaxation of the situation in the rear of the 9th Army. Although maintaining the 530 kilometers long exposed frontal promontory of Rzhev cost a lot of strength and tied up an enormous number of people and material, Hitler could not make up his mind to give up this position for a long time. In his opinion, it was of great psychological importance to maintain the threat to the capital Moscow for as long as possible. It was not until the defeat of the 6th Army at Stalingrad and the associated loss of 250,000 soldiers that any possibility of resuming the offensive on Moscow dwindled because there were no more military resources available for this. In March 1943, Hitler therefore ordered the German withdrawal enterprise buffalo movement . The front arch of Rzhev was finally straightened and the German front shortened by 230 kilometers.

The battle claimed immense casualties on both sides: probably around 500,000 men died on the Red Army side, and around 1,000,000 Soviet soldiers were wounded. On the German side, 80,000 dead and two and a half to three and a half times as many wounded were expected. Presumably, the numbers are much higher, and this relatively unknown battle would be even more costly than the Battle of Stalingrad .

Location

Rzhev is a district capital of Tver Oblast in northern Russia, 180 kilometers west of Moscow , with a population of 54,000 . Rzhev is an important traffic junction from Moscow to Smolensk , Novgorod and Vyazma . Due to its strategically favorable location on the upper reaches of the Volga, Rzhev was the focus of military-hegemonic conflicts during the Tsarist era. The area around the city is criss-crossed by large, damp mixed forest areas (alder, aspen, birch and spruce) and numerous swamps.

Military historical representation

German soldiers marching on muddy roads, March 1942

The aspects of the battles for Rzhev have been little explored by military historians of the Soviet Union . Some documents only became accessible after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Exact data on the course of the battle, participants, results, significance and losses are not fully available to this day. A poem from 1945/1946 by Alexander Trifonowitsch Twardowski recalls the bloody battles with the sentence “I was killed near Rzhev” ( Я убит подо Ржевом Ja ubit podo Rzhevom ), otherwise there is very little from the Soviet side handed down.

One of the main reasons for the inadequate documentation of the fighting around Rzhev is, at least according to the Russian historian Igor Bunitsch, the concealment of a large number of bad military decisions and the senseless and brutal sacrifice of large numbers of Russian soldiers for questionable targets. The Russian expression мясорубка mjassorubka (literally translated into German "meat grinder") means the "merciless slaughter of masses of soldiers" on the orders of Soviet officers. The ten times superior Red Army failed to take the city of Rzhev within 14 months. According to Colonel General and historian Dmitri Volkogonov , the battles for Rzhev from October 1941 to March 1943 were among the greatest catastrophes of World War II.

“During the entire war I have seen nothing more terrible: huge bomb craters filled to the brim with water, wrecked vehicles and cars along the way, dead horses and all around corpses. And the groans of the wounded from the forest. "

- Eyewitness of the 17th Guards Rifle Division in the summer of 1942

The portrayal of the company Büffelbewegung , i.e. the German withdrawal, was marked by polemics in military historiography in the post-war period. While the division commander of the 6th Infantry Division , General Großmann and the war diaries of the 78th Sturm Division and 98th Infantry Division reported unanimously about the success of the company, Soviet historians presented the company as a catastrophic failure of the Wehrmacht:

“The Kalininer Front and the Western Front prevented the detachment movement from proceeding according to plan by energetic pushing. The German troops abandoned some of their equipment and suffered heavy losses in terms of people and technical weapons. [...] After the war, some West German military historians tried to present the withdrawal as a textbook example of a successful, planned withdrawal movement. However, the enemy's losses in this retreat prove the dubious nature of such claims. His troops, who had to rush to withdraw from Rzhev under the blows of the Red Army, never got around to evacuating the city as planned. "

prehistory

See also : Battle of Moscow

German attacks as part of the "Taifun" company until December 5, 1941

On October 14, 1941, as part of the double battle near Vyazma and Bryansk, the order for the 9th Army and Panzer Group 3 to advance to Rzhev and Kalinin was given . The 206th Infantry Division and reconnaissance units of the 26th Infantry Division occupied the city for the first time in October 1941 and were the first German units to reach the important Volga artery. The advance on Rzhev was the prelude to the advance on Moscow .

In the northern section of Army Group Center, Panzer Groups 3 and 4 advanced to Kalinin and the Moscow-Volga Canal and the Ivankovo ​​Reservoir by early December . On December 5, the Red Army counter-offensive began, led by Georgi Zhukov's Western Front and the Kalinin Front under Ivan Konev . It was a declared aim of the Soviet military leadership to remove the frontal protrusion north-west of Moscow formed by the German Panzer Groups 3 and 4 at any cost. The recapture of Rzhev was a main goal of the Soviet winter offensive of 1941/1942.

course

The Soviet winter offensive 1941/42 in the Rzhev area

Soviet advances as part of the 1941/42 winter offensive

In view of the increasing pressure of the Soviet Army during the winter offensive on the foremost German lines, the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army , Colonel General Heinz Guderian , asked Hitler on December 20, 1941 at Wolfsschanze to discuss the situation of Army Group Center. Hitler ordered that the army must keep the lines of defense around strategically important traffic junctions and supply lines. Guderian's arguments that the ground, which is up to 1.50 meters deep, would not allow any digging work in winter and that the expected material battles at fixed positions would lead to disproportionate losses were ignored. Guderian preferred an elastic defense in view of the current offensive superiority of the Red Army, so that the units in hopeless situations would have to be allowed an orderly and organized retreat to the heights of Smolensk in order to avoid senseless losses of people and material and then more from rear positions To have freedom of movement for new offensives. Hitler feared that if a tactical retreat was released, a momentum of its own could develop that could turn into general panic, a moral victory for the enemy and also a total collapse of the front of Army Group Center. For this reason he forbade any attempt to shorten the front and issued the following order:

“With the personal commitment of the commanders, commanders and officers, the troops are to be forced to fanatical resistance in their positions, regardless of the enemy who has broken through on the flank and rear. Only when reserves have occupied the expanded rear positions can one think of retreating into these positions. "

- Adolf Hitler, stop order from December 20, 1941

Hitler's stop order was initially obeyed by all general staff officers and army commanders. The 9th Army, under the command of Colonel General Adolf Strauss , was at the time on the north wing of Army Group Center in the Kalinin-Rschew area. In mid-December 1941, the 9th Army was already gradually withdrawing from Kalinin to the southwest, as the 29th and 31st Armies of the Kalinin Front launched a large-scale counter-offensive. Troop movements were made more difficult by heavy snow and temperatures down to −30 ° C. The 29th and 31st Soviet Army under the Generals Schwezow and Yushkewitsch directed their attacks in the initial phase against the XXVII. Army corps under Infantry General Alfred Wäger . The 86th Infantry Division under Lieutenant General Joachim Witthöft was able to suppress an assault by Soviet riflemen using concentrated machine-gun fire on the Volga reservoir . On the left border, in the section of the 162nd Infantry Division , several Siberian ski battalions managed to break in. Another breach of the front on the southern bank of the Volga was achieved in the 110th Infantry Division sector . The 26th Infantry Division , mainly with the 39th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Friedrich Wiese , and the 6th Infantry Division were able to maintain their 25 km long section of the front with great effort. In the meantime, Red Army soldiers in regimental strength in the 110th Infantry Division across the Volga were pursuing a III. Btl./IR 18/6. ID failed with great losses at temperatures of −40 ° C. As a result, the enemy was prevented from advancing, and an important supply route could be recaptured. On December 16, 1941, Red Army soldiers captured the city of Kalinin . This cleared the way for a pincer movement on the German promontory of Rzhev.

Colonel-General Strauss planned an orderly withdrawal movement of the 9th Army to the rearwardly developed winter position in Königsberg , which was preceded by numerous intermediate positions with the cover names of German cities such as Augsburg , Bremen , Coburg , Dresden , Essen , Frankfurt , Gießen , Hanau and Ilmenau . Hitler's uncompromising halt order of December 20 ended the withdrawal movement when the first troops had already reached the winter position in Giessen . Panzer groups 3 and 4 were at the Rusa position near Rusa and Wereja at this time . Field Marshal Günther von Kluge , who was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center as the successor to Fedor von Bocks on December 18, reaffirmed Hitler's order to halt:

“Everyone has to stop where they stand. Anyone who does not do this tears a hole in the front that cannot be plugged. Separation from the enemy only makes sense if it leads to more favorable combat conditions, if possible to the formation of reserves. My personal approval is required for each withdrawal from the division association. "

- Field Marshal General Günther von Kluge

The XXIII. Army Corps of the 9th Army under General of the Infantry Albrecht Schubert , to whose unit the 102nd , 206th , 251st , 253rd and 256th Infantry Divisions belonged, any retreat was forbidden in order to hold the front arch of Rzhev. On December 22, 1941, the newly formed Soviet 39th Army under Ivan Maslennikov stormed the defense lines of the 256th Infantry Division in front of Rzhev in a combined attack with T-34 tanks. The German division was able to hold its section against a ten times superior opponent until December 29, 1941.

Colonel-General Konev advanced with his Kalinin Front further from the north against Rzhev in order to unite with General Zhukov's units coming from the east. Rzhev was seen as a crucial cornerstone of the Eastern Front. On December 31, 1941, the front section of 256 ID and 206 ID collapsed due to increased Soviet pressure. The 26th Infantry Division was locked in at Stariza , and Rzhev became a unit that had to accommodate over 3000 seriously injured people. Strong Red Army units were concentrated in front of the village of Mologino ( Russian Мологино ), Colonel General Strauss issued the unconditional stop order for the 256th Infantry Division at Mologino. At that time the trapped 256th Infantry Division under Lieutenant General Gerhard Kauffmann only had the combat strength of a single regiment, and the soldiers already partially refused to obey the officers: “Kill us, it doesn't matter who kills us. Mologino has already been lost. ”On January 2, 1942, the radio link to the isolated soldiers in Mologino was broken, and communication was carried out by so-called shuttle patrols. On January 3, 1942, Major Mummert of Reconnaissance Division 256 gave the order to abandon Mologino.

On January 4, 1942, the Red Army achieved a breakup of the main line of the 9th Army by creating a 15 to 20 km wide gap in the section between the VI. and XXIII. Army Corps was created. Parts of the Soviet 39th Army got into the rear of the German defenders of Rzhev. At the same time threatened between the VI. and XXVII. Army Corps a Soviet breakthrough on Subzow , a few kilometers southeast of Rzhev. Rzhev could still be held for the time being, but the German troops were in a precarious situation.

Balance of power

• Red Army: 688,000 soldiers from 14 armies and three cavalry corps
• Wehrmacht: 625,000 soldiers from 42 infantry , tank , air force and SS divisions

Rzhev-Vyazma operation (January 8 to April 20, 1942)

Rzhev January to February 1942

“May I briefly brief Mr. General on the shitty situation. The Russian major attack from the Ostashkov area against the left wing of the cut off XXIII. Army corps pushed back south. At the same time stronger attacks against the left wing of the VI. Army Corps here. Our request to be allowed to withdraw the eastern front to the Gschatzk-Volga position was refused. Since January 11, strong enemy attacks from the northwest and west of Sychovka to the south, foremost parts on the western edge. Hold us Sychovka, it must not be lost. "

- General Staff Officer (Ia) Lieutenant Colonel Edmund Blaurock to Major General Walter Krüger , commander of the 1st Panzer Division on January 12, 1942

The Red Army, which was newly formed over the winter months, launched its first blow against the 9th Army on the northern pillar of Army Group Center in Rzhev in January 1942. The new commander-in-chief of the 9th Army, General of the Armored Force Walter Model , was attacked on January 12, 1942 at his headquarters in Sychovka . Soon afterwards the 9th Army was enclosed on three sides. In the east it defended a winter position and was in connection with the 4th Panzer Army via the “runway”. Rzhev became the key position of the 9th Army and was directly exposed to the offensives of the 27th, 22nd, 34th Armies, 3rd and 4th Shock Armies , which were carried out with increasing intensity.

In order to prevent the Army Group Center from being enclosed, the LIX. Army corps under Lieutenant General Kurt von der Chevallerie with the 83rd , 205th and 330th Infantry Divisions brought in from France and subordinated to the 3rd Panzer Army. As they marched into the area, which was severely endangered by partisan activities, the newly arrived units picked up escaping soldiers from the SS Cavalry Brigade , 123rd and 81st Infantry Divisions . The break-in point of the Red Army west of Rzhev, through which nine Soviet divisions infiltrated, was particularly critical. The XXIII. Corps was encircled and had to be supplied by air. Further south near Vyazma, Soviet cavalry threatened the German lines. The Rzhev-Vyazma railway line was the only possible supply connection for the 9th Army and was held by soldiers from the motorized SS infantry division “Das Reich” .

Meanwhile, motorcyclists of the 1st Panzer Division fought the Sytschowka station building, which was occupied by Red Army soldiers, and the connection to the Nowo Ougino field airfield was restored. Model ordered that the break-in point at Nikolskoje and Solomino be closed again with high priority, thereby cutting the Soviet supply routes and attacking their flanks at Sychovka. The attempt of his predecessor Colonel General Strauss to achieve this on January 8, 1942 with the Fegelein SS Cavalry Brigade failed. Model's concept of "attacking, regaining the initiative, dictating the law of trade to the enemy" had a great psychological signal effect among the officers and soldiers of the 9th Army. Furthermore, he had tank crews converted into ski hunters or set up a snowshoe company that could approach the enemy unnoticed when scouting troops. The snowshoe company was also used to secure the railway pioneers who had to constantly repair the Rzhev-Vyazma railway line, which was blown up by partisans. An armored train equipped with an anti-aircraft battery was also used to fight partisans.

Shortly before the planned counter-offensive on the Soviet break-in point west of Rzhev, temperatures fell further to −45 ° C. The officers no longer considered a successful offensive to be possible. Model encouraged his soldiers:

"Why gentlemen? Tomorrow and the day after tomorrow it won't get any warmer either. The Russians are marching too. "

- General of the tank force Walter Model

Model's change in strategy turned an almost hopeless all-round defense into an active counter-offensive with defined priorities. The 1st Panzer Division and the SS Division “Das Reich” moved out of Sychovka to take the tactically important place Ossuiskoje. On January 22, 1942, a major attack by the VI. Army Corps, which included the reinforced 256th Infantry Division, artillery, tank destroyers and anti-aircraft guns. The XXIII. Army Corps (206th ID, SS Cavalry Brigade Fegelein and Sturmgeschützabteilung 189) achieved the breakthrough and the union with the VI. Army Corps. The double strike occurred at Nikolskoje and Solomino. As a result, the connection to the 9th Army was restored and the supply routes of the 29th and 39th Soviet armies were interrupted.

The SS regiment "Der Führer" under Obersturmbannführer Otto Kumm was given the task of building the newly created connection point between VI. and XXIII. Army Corps and the land bridge of the 9th Army at all costs, as Model specifically requested. The northern locking bar was reinforced; near Osuga / Sychovka were the 1st Panzer Division, 86th Infantry Division, most of the SS Division "Das Reich", 5th Panzer Division , IR 309 and the Decker battle group under the command of General of the Panzer Troop Heinrich von Vietinghoff as XXXXVI. Army corps combined and marched in a northwesterly direction. From then on, bitter fighting broke out in the forests and snow-covered towns. A large-scale Soviet attack against the northern front of 256th and 206th Infantry Division was set in motion on January 26, 1942 and was finally repulsed with great effort. In addition to the numerical superiority of the opponent, the extreme weather changes from brief snowmelt to repeated snowstorms and a temperature drop to a minimum of −52 ° C caused major problems.

Although the Soviet troops sometimes suffered battalion- sized casualties in their attacks on the Rzhev- Olenino railway line , it was finally secured. On January 28, 1942, as a result of the Soviet counterattack, a decisive tank battle occurred, which was associated with disproportionately high losses for both sides. For example, Rottenführer Wagner was the last survivor of the 10th Company, the 2nd Company of the SS Regiment "Der Führer" was completely destroyed, and in the village of Klepenino, the command post of the 9th Army, "piles of corpses were piled up" of the Soviet fallen. On February 4, 1942, the 86th Infantry Division managed to take the key position in Ossuikoye, two days later tank grenadiers of the 1st PD crossed the railway line near Tschertolino, so that the groups Wietersheim and Zehender could unite.

The fighting between Sychovka and the "Volga Knie" near Subzow reached its preliminary climax during the snowstorms in February until the force of the major Soviet offensive waned. As a result, the Red Army had crossed the frozen Volga, pushed through the left wing of the 9th Army and the XXIII. Army corps isolated from the rest of the unit. The XXXXVI responded. Panzer Corps from Sychovka and included the Soviet 29th Army in the forest area of ​​Montschalowo. The fighting took place here from January 23 to February 17, 1942, although all Soviet relief attacks initially failed. In the course of the fighting there were high losses, for example the SS regiment “Der Führer” only had 35 soldiers left. Seven Soviet divisions were destroyed in the pocket and the opponent's winter offensive was temporarily brought to a standstill. In the OKW-Wehrmacht report of February 21, 1942, 27,000 dead and 5,000 prisoners were reported to the enemy. The 29th Army was completely wiped out and the 39th Army for the most part.

Seydlitz Company (July 1942)

Since the Red Army broke into the front of the 9th Army on January 4, 1942 and the pressure on the left wing of Army Group Center, a number of German countermeasures have been initiated. A Soviet cavalry corps, which belonged to the troop units that had broken in and threatened German supplies on the runway between Smolensk and Vyazma, could not be effectively fought by the Wehrmacht at first. The cavalry was one of the few branches of arms in impassable terrain that could still develop a sufficiently high degree of mobility. The reconnaissance departments assigned to the divisions were already so exhausted by the summer of 1942 that they were greatly inferior to their Soviet counterpart. Colonel-General Model restructured his cavalry units by converting the reconnaissance departments of various army corps into one cavalry command. b. V. brought together three cavalry regiments, each with five squadrons, and bundled their forces. Colonel Robert Holste received the supreme command of the Army Cavalry Regiments 1 (Major Laubner), 2 (Lieutenant Colonel von Baath) and 3 (Major Briegleb).

On July 2, 1942, the Seydlitz company began with the task of eliminating the threat to the supply lines of the 9th Army by Red Army soldiers or partisans. The operational area was the Velikije Luki- Rschew railway line with the 1st Panzer Division on the right and 427 Infantry Regiment on the left. The Soviet positions in the dense forests on the Lutschessa River were breached relatively quickly, after which rains set in, which severely restricted the mobility of the tanks.

On July 5, the 39th Soviet Army and the XI. Cavalry Corps (Gorin) are encircled. The Wehrmacht's attacks on the Red Army soldiers trapped in the cauldron lasted until July 16, 1942, during which 50,000 Soviet soldiers were captured and 230 tanks and 760 artillery pieces were captured. The success was largely due to the high mobility of the German cavalrymen in the forest and marshland around the Lutschessa River. In his biography of General Field Marshal Model, the German historian Walter Görlitz describes the Seydlitz company as a failed anti-partisan operation; in reality, it restored the supply situation for the 9th Army. After the end of the enterprise, the cavalry command was z. b. V. disbanded again due to a shortage of personnel at the front and the individual departments returned to their main unit.

The result of the eleven-day Seydlitz operation was 50,000 captured Red Army soldiers, 230 destroyed Soviet tanks, 760 captured artillery pieces and thousands of small arms .

First Rzhev Sychovka operation (July 30 to October 1, 1942)

On August 14, 1942, the Red Army carried out another major offensive on Rzhev, which led to such a threatening situation by September 1, 1942 that General Günter von Kluge suggested a reduction in the front arc to Hitler. Hitler refused on the grounds that Rzhev had great symbolic significance for the Eastern Front and should not be given up under any circumstances. With the help of all available reserves, Wehrmacht units were able to bring the Red Army's forward movement to a halt in the rubble of the city of Rzhev before a prolonged period of bad weather interrupted further fighting.

In the summer of 1942 the Red Army continued its pincer movement on the promontory at Rzhev, on the one hand to put further pressure on Army Group Center and on the other hand to relieve the southern section near Stalingrad and on the Caucasus by tying up German troops in the north . For this project, 41 rifle divisions, 15 rifle brigades, 38 tank brigades with over 3,000 tanks , several thousand artillery pieces and additional air support were mobilized in order to destroy Army Group Center with a superior force of personnel and material. The Stawka planned the final capture of the fortresses Rzhev and Sychovka in a large-scale summer offensive and a division of Army Group Center through a rapid advance on Smolensk and Vyazma.

Soviet attack on the northern sector of Rzhev

Rzhev Northern Front July 30 to August 10, 1942

On July 30, 1942, a Soviet artillery raid began on the northern area of ​​Rzhev. A little later the Red Army achieved a breakthrough at the junction between 256th and 87th ID. General Großmann withdrew his 6th ID from the area available west of Sychovka to be used by the VI. Army corps (General Bieler) deployed in the outbreak of fighting for the city of Rzhev. The continuous rain that had set in before turned the forest area into an impassable morass, so that the loading of the infantry battalions of 6th Infantry Division, withdrawn from the available space, was greatly slowed down. In addition, the Sychovka station area was increasingly attacked by Soviet attack aircraft.

The IR 58 under Colonel Furbach received the order to destroy Red Army soldiers who had broken through in the Galachowo area and at point 195.5 and to restore the status quo of the main battle line. On August 1, 1942, hand-to-hand combat took place in three Soviet lines of defense, and the breakthrough at Polunino, just north of Rzhev, was finally closed. Since July 31, 1942, the reconnaissance division 328 (328 ID, subordinate to 256 ID) fought under Major von Kalben on the right border of IR 58 around the village of Gribojewo. On August 15, 1942, the department was severely reduced by failures and had to be taken back to the south bank of the Volga. The left border was in the area of ​​a battalion under Major Freiherr von Recum, which belonged to the 251st Infantry Division under General Burbach and on July 31 was subordinate to the 87th Infantry Division under General von Studnitz. On August 1st, von Recums was to support Battalion IR 187 near Martjukowo. Fighting began immediately, and tough fighting developed in the villages of Gorbowo, Fedorkowo and Chanino. On August 2, 1942, a German battalion of Red Army soldiers was enclosed in Gory Kaseki. The battalion could only be liberated and the attacking Soviet tanks destroyed with the help of assault guns. On August 10, 1942, the Recum battalion consisted of only one officer and 22 soldiers and could no longer be used.

The focal point of the forest fighting north of Rzhev at Gory Kaseki – Polunino was in the sector of 6th ID between 256th and 87th ID, with Red Army soldiers now storming the German positions every day and trying to force the decision. On August 4, 1942, Soviet bombers bombed the village of Polunino and caused great damage to the German position system, which was attacked up to seven times a day by combined forces of infantry and tanks. German artillery fire, which was used specifically against massed troop concentrations of the enemy, prevented a total collapse of the badly damaged defensive lines. Pak - and Flak -Kampftrupps, combined with assault guns were given to fight the task breakthroughs of enemy infantry immediately. On August 5, 1942, mainly T-34 tanks were destroyed in the combat section of IR 58 21.

On August 4, 1942, the 6th Infantry Division had to hand over an artillery division to the 161st Infantry Division near Subzow, as strong enemy formations had also broken through there. Two days later the 6th Infantry Division was further weakened by the delivery of a cavalry squadron to secure the railway near Ossuga. The neighboring divisions 256th and 87th Infantry Division were increasingly at risk of being overrun by the Red Army, while Rzhev remained in constant artillery fire and was bombed at night. The aim of the Soviet Army was to destroy the Volga bridges in order to permanently cut off German supplies.

Battle for the Rzhev Volga Bridges

Rzhev Northern Front July 30, 1942 to March 1, 1943

Volga bridge near Rzhev

On August 10, 1942, the Red Army launched another attack on the northern sector of Rzhev. For this purpose, bombers, fighter-bombers, artillery, Katyusha rocket launchers and mortars were used, which prepared the area for a deep-tiered tank attack. The Wehrmacht countered this with its own air force , artillery , flak, anti- tank guns , grenade launchers, mortars and assault guns. German infantrymen, pioneers and cavalrymen experienced non-stop waves of attacks from the Red Army from 5:15 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. The battles were extremely tough, especially in the area of ​​the reconnaissance division 328 on the left wing of the 256th Infantry Division, which with the help of the PiBtl. 6 could be held, and in the section of IR 18 with the battalion of Recum. When 39 Soviet tanks were destroyed, the battalion commander, Captain Thummes, fell. In the end, the entire section could be held despite the strong superiority of the Red Army. August 20, 1942, however, brought about a collapse of the combat sector of the 256th Infantry Division, which had to retreat over the Matjukowo Bridge to the southern side of the Volga. Thus, the 6th ID, parts of the 129th ID and the 87th ID were the last German units left north of Rzhev. August 24, 1942 was another day of major fighting for the remaining three divisions against a far superior Soviet superiority. After intensive artillery preparation, a loss-making tank attack by the 153rd and 238th Soviet tank brigades began, which broke through the German lines at a weakened point in the area of ​​IR 18 and overran their foxholes. Despite a flank attack by I. Btl./IR 18, the Soviet advance could only be stopped on the Volga. The 6th ID was now cut off from the 87th ID. A total of 65 Red Army tanks were destroyed that day. The 6th ID secured to the west and the 87th ID to the east, whereby the 6th ID withdrew to the Neu-Kolberg position immediately in front of Rzhev because of the strong enemy pressure. On August 26, 1942, the Red Army formed a bridgehead on the south bank of the Volga near Znamenskoye.

Rzhev had been turned into a crater field by the constant artillery fire and bombing, on a scale similar to that of the Somme scene during the First World War. Until September 1942, the Red Army repeated its suicidal mass attacks, which ended with innumerable casualties without any significant gain in terrain. Rittmeister Wätjen and the motorcycle rifle battalion "Greater Germany" did not re-establish the connection to the 6th Infantry Division in Rzhev until September 21, 1942. In the city itself there were several enemy incursions in the northeast, which were extended in close combat with flamethrowers and flamethrower tanks. The I. Btl./IR 18, I. Btl. / IR 37 and PiBtl. 6 extremely high losses. The Red Army dug their tanks in the city's shell holes, which caused considerable damage with flat shots, but could not be effectively fought either from the air or from the ground.

Battles on the Rzhev-Sychovka line

Front break-in of the Red Army on the Rzhev-Sychovka line in August 1942

Defensive fighting in the Rzhev-Sychovka-Gschatsk area and counterattack by the 1st Panzer Division in the summer of 1942

The XXXXVI. As part of Army Group Center, Panzer Corps defended an approx. 100 km long section of the front from Samujlowo to Gridino with 342nd ID, 36th Motorized Infantry Division, 161st Motorized Infantry Division and 14th Motorized ID . On July 25, 1942, reconnaissance planes reported large concentrations of the enemy troops, which were no longer carried out under any camouflage measures as at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa . The Soviets openly announced their attack for July 30, 1942 over loudspeakers. The attack took place on the left wing of the Panzer Corps and only reached minor incursions of a few hundred meters in length, which were immediately sealed off again by the Wehrmacht. On August 4, 1942, the decisive advance of the Red Army took place over a division width of one to two kilometers, which was followed by a deployment of three staggered rifle regiments. Behind it, two tank brigades with 80 to 100 battle tanks approached. The German defenders had to defend large sections of the battle with minimal personnel; a single company was assigned a section of one to two kilometers.

After strong artillery preparation, accompanied by Katyusha rocket launchers , large numbers of tank squadrons were able to roll over the thinned German lines that were ready to be attacked by artillery fire and bombing. The Soviet 31st Army aimed at Pogoreloje, while the 20th Army targeted Sychovka. The offensive could not be stopped because of weak forces and delivered a major break in the front, which led to a critical situation in the 9th Army. In the north, Soviet riflemen took Subzow and separated the Karmanowo-Subzow road, so that 161 ID and 14 ID (motorized) were isolated. After that, the Red Army changed its direction of movement to the south in order to cover the flank of their advance with four to five divisions and several tank brigades. At Karmanowo the attackers penetrated the command post of the XXXXVI. Panzer Corps and tried in vain to throw the 36th Motorized Infantry Division under General Gollnick out of their positions. To relieve the burden, the 2nd Panzer Division was set in motion on August 5, 1942, but was only able to intervene in the fighting in small units without gaining contact with the 36th Motorized Infantry Division. Despite great efforts, the 36th Motorized Infantry Division held the front corner pillar at Wosskressenoje until August 7, 1942. On the same day another Soviet offensive with three rifle divisions and three rifle and four tank brigades against the 342 took place . ID. It was reported that the entire Soviet 5th Army was marching to push the front on their left wing.

The break-in of the Red Army on the Sychovka-Subzow supply line and the Sychovka-Rschew railway line was successful, which the 9th Army had to respond to with immediate countermeasures. For this purpose, the IR 84 was used with the combat group Biewald and Bülowius, which laid an all-round defense position on the edge of the Chashnikovo forest. The enemy's break-ins on August 6, 1942 made it necessary to use close combat methods, as several machine gun positions had previously been eliminated by Soviet riflemen, with both sides suffering high losses. On the night of August 8th, there were several waves of Soviet attacks near Chashnikovo. When the crew strength of a company of IR 84 had reduced to 22 people, the withdrawal was ordered. Meanwhile the 1st Btl./IR 84, followed by the rest of the regiment and the 102nd Infantry Division (General Frießner) had arrived at Ossuga, so that the remains of the company could be relieved. As a result, the supply routes to Rzhev were cleared again. With the support of the armored train, the riders of Reconnaissance Department 6 fought down Red Army soldiers on the railway embankment. By August 11, the Soviet units near the village of Shalamovo were defeated.

In the forest areas of Ossuga, the fighting continued until August 15, 1942. Losses rose rapidly on both sides, while the German defense lines were increasingly thinned by heavy loads. On August 9, 1942 alone, the 2nd Panzer Division destroyed 64 Soviet tanks, the anti-aircraft units destroyed another ten. The Red Army tried in vain in many waves of attack to take the heights of Karmanowo. On August 10, 1942, they achieved a major break-in, which forced the Wehrmacht to straighten the front. In the meantime, the 2nd Panzer Division was encircled, but was able to free itself again. The 2nd Btl./113 PR of the 2nd PD had only one officer and 12 crew ranks on August 28th. To the west of the Jausa River in Schelomiki and Krutije, three battalions of 342nd Infantry Division were included. The liberation was delayed for a long time due to the impassable forest and swamp area. The pressure on Karmanowo continued unabated, with up to 9,000 Soviet artillery shells fired in one day. The situation was extremely confusing, as attacks, break-ins and counter-attacks were constantly alternating. When 40 tanks and 700 vehicles of the Red Army approached Karmanowo on August 21, 1942, the 9th Army decided to evacuate the village and to drop off the soldiers buried there on the night of August 22 to 23, 1942. The company only succeeded with the help of the air force, which had to intervene in the ground fighting. The Red Army followed the retreating Wehrmacht to the new exchange position, where another fierce battle broke out, which resulted in the loss of a total of 460 destroyed Soviet tanks.

The Red Army's plan to advance to Vyasma on August 13, 1942 with three rifle divisions and the VIII. Panzer Corps (five tank brigades) failed due to the bitter resistance of the "Greater Germany" tank division, which in the course of the fighting has been severely decimated. The Red Army succeeded in forcing a head start at Subzow and advancing as far as the city district of Rzhev, but a complete capture failed. Rzhev and Sychovka remained in the possession of the 9th Army despite the immense use of man and material by the attackers. The battles around Rzhev were characterized by impassable terrain, extreme weather fluctuations and a precarious supply situation. The Red Army lost a total of 380,000 soldiers, 13,770 prisoners of war, 2,956 tanks, 45 artillery pieces, 101 anti-tank guns, 227 grenade launchers, 781 machine guns and 870 aircraft in the costly summer battle of Rzhev.

Second Rzhev Sychovka operation (November 25 to December 21, 1942)

In the winter battles of the Battle of Rzhev, the German soldiers also encountered militias of the People's Army, which were recruited from the residents of the surrounding towns and, together with regular Soviet armed forces, maintained the pressure on the 9th Army from three sides. This offensive also failed to meet all of the military objectives of the Soviet army command and resulted in great losses.

→ Main article : Operation Mars

Company buffalo movement

Company Buffalo Movement March 1943

Even in January 1943, the Wehrmacht in the Rzhev, Demyansk and Leningrad area was exposed to constant attacks by the Soviet Army. The Rzhev front arch was finally withdrawn from the Buffalo Movement Company. On February 6, 1943, Hitler gave the 9th Army and parts of the 4th Army permission to withdraw in an orderly manner from the Rzhev promontory.

The four-week preparation of the Buffalo Movement Company included an immense logistical task for the General Staff of the 9th Army, on the one hand the construction of a change position 300 kilometers to the west for the withdrawal of the divisions, definition of the resistance lines for the phased withdrawal movement and the evacuation of a 100 kilometers deep Combat area. For this purpose, the transport network had to be expanded, construction crews began with the construction of 200 kilometers of roads for motor vehicles and 600 kilometers of roads for sledges and horse-drawn vehicles. The occupied front ledge was evacuated: 60,000 civilians were deposed to the rear front, agricultural products, livestock and other economic goods were also transported away by train in order to leave an “empty” space and “scorched earth” for the advancing Red Army. The General Staff had an extensive movement and marching plan, which was to move 29 divisions (250,000 soldiers) and either on wheeled vehicles on passable roads or on sleds in snow. The plans of the Buffalo Movement Company were unmasked by the Soviet Union's secret service, so that propaganda units announced to the German soldiers over loudspeakers: "Your officers are packing their suitcases. Make sure you come with me. ”The buffalo movement began on March 1, 1943 in a thaw. Strong temperature fluctuations, such as a night-time frost, slowed down the backward movement. On the Volga about 2/3 of the 9th Army remained in their original positions and were supposed to simulate their supposed target strength to the enemy, for example by firing machine gun salvos from different firing positions. The Red Army checked this by means of punctuated counter-attacks and forced a smaller front break in at Lepeticha on the Volga. One day after the main troops had withdrawn, the last upstream units should also withdraw, which was answered with a major Soviet offensive. In order to delay enemy persecution in the long term, German pioneers laid out anti- tank and rifle mines on a large scale in the most varied of ignition types. For this purpose, areas were extensively mined and villages were made impassable by mine and booby traps. The Soviets suffered considerable losses from mine traps in Rzhev.

Within 21 days, the 9th Army and parts of the 4th Army were able to move 160 kilometers behind the front line and move into a new line that was only 220 kilometers wide. The saving of 330 kilometers for defense was seen as a decisive operational measure for maintaining the front for Army Group Center. At the time of the organized German retreat, the Red Army had no further break-ins, flank attacks or pursuits worth mentioning. From his headquarters in Vinnitsa, Hitler took over the monitoring of the mine command by telephone, which on March 3, 1943 blew up the great Volga bridge near Rzhev and thus further slowed the Soviet advance. It was only hours after the demolition that Soviet patrols were able to establish contact with the upstream units on the other side of the Volga. As planned, the 9th Army reached the "Buffalo Position", which had been well developed and secured with mines and wire obstacles, at Spas-Demensk  - Dorogobusch  - Duchowschtschina before the start of the mud period ( Rasputiza ) in spring. Thus the crisis of Army Group Center caused by the winter battle of 1942/43 could be defused, and the conditions for the battle of Kursk were now in place.

Consequences for the civilian population

Memorial to the Soviet fallen in Rzhev

The civilian population of the city of Rzhev suffered particularly.

“They killed my mother there. They raped her, knocked her teeth out, broke her hands and killed her with four bayonet stabs. It was an attack, the Germans themselves executed the murderers. I was lucky, an aunt saved me. ""

- Anatoly Projdakov on the atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht in the village of Maloye Pischalino near Rzhev, April 1942

After the liberation by the Red Army, 150 of the 56,000 inhabitants lived in the city, and another 200 lived in the vicinity of the city. Many of the inhabitants were deported by the Germans as workers.

There was also a concentration camp in the city. It is believed that around 70,000 people were buried in two mass graves found. The city commandant of Rzhev in 1941 and 1942, Carl Becker , was sentenced in 1945 by a military court in a war crimes trial in Kalinin to a prison term of 25 years.

losses

Red Army losses

Alexej W. Isajew assumes 392,554 dead and 768,233 wounded. Svetlana Alexandrovna Gerasimowa estimates the number of dead at 1,325,823. The high loss rates are probably due to the fact that the Soviet Army wanted to compensate for organizational faulty planning, inadequate troop leadership and the low use of technology with a disproportionately large use of people. Red Army officers ordered their unprotected soldiers repeated assault attacks at the same points on the German defense line, which ended in a military fiasco. Of the 1,000 members of the 618th Rifle Regiment, only two survived the battle, while the 29th and 39th Army suffered a total loss. As early as the first three weeks of January 1942, 80,000 Soviet soldiers died during the fighting, often 80% of the infantrymen in an assault. The 20th Army lost 58,000 men in a very short time. In the drop zone of the 8th Airborne Brigade on the Western Front, more than half of the insufficiently prepared paratroopers were killed in the poorly planned operation. Even today, the bones of around 1,000 dead are recovered every year, in some places even in "seven layers on top of each other".

Wehrmacht losses

According to German data, the losses of the Wehrmacht amount to 162,713 dead, 469,747 wounded and 35,650 missing.

Mikhail Jurjewitsch Mjagkow assumes 330,000 dead and more than 450,000 wounded.

Conclusion

Stalin's doctrine of “not giving the enemy any more breathing space” stood in the way of Hitler's rigid stop order that Rzhev was an impregnable line of the Führer. Since the Red Army did not succeed in eliminating the German front line from Rzhev, despite the large use of force, the battle was downplayed by the Stawka as an event of local importance. Originally the Soviet offensive operation was only planned for a few days, but in the course of 1942 it expanded into an expensive positional battle on a broad front line, which Moscow commented impatiently on, the liquidation of the opposing groups dragging on inadmissibly long.

Only the break-in of the cavalry on a road west of Vyasma ensured partial success, as the German supply lines were severely disrupted. In addition, some German bridgeheads on the left bank of the Volga could be eliminated in the summer of 1942.

"It is the first time in this war that I have given the order to withdraw a large section of the front."

- Adolf Hitler on January 15, 1942

In February the Wehrmacht succeeded in encircling the 29th and 33rd Armies, while 1.9 million Soviet soldiers carried out pincer attacks on the 9th Army in the course of Operation Mars . Further attempts by the Wehrmacht to advance attacks in the direction of Moscow by deploying the "Greater Germany" division in the late summer of 1942 failed. The Red Army's goal of smashing Army Group Center near Rzhev was not achieved, the 9th Army withdrew to their rear positions in the spring of 1943 as part of the Operation Buffalo Movement, and Rzhev was defeated by troops on the Western Front on March 3, 1943 captured and released.

aftermath

Since 1997, German-Russian youth camps have been taking place in Rzhev at the German and Russian war cemetery Rzhev under the motto “Reconciliation over the graves”. Both Soviet and German fallen soldiers were buried in the Park of Peace, which was built in 2002. In addition, the international student exchange “Remembering, Commemorating, Reconciling” has been taking place every year since 2014 , and received special attention in 2016 when Vladimir Putin visited.

A memorial was erected in 2020 ; The approximately 25 meter high metal sculpture of a soldier stands on a conical, flat hill. His upper body is shown realistically. At the bottom it dissolves into a swarm of cranes; the cranes are symbolic of the fallen (→ The cranes pull , film from 1957).

literature

• Horst Grossmann: Rschew, cornerstone of the Eastern Front . Podzun Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1962, ISBN 978-3-7909-0126-9 .
• Oleg A. Kondratjew: The Battle of Rzhev. Half a century of silence . Arethousa-Verlag, Munich 2001, ISBN 3-934207-11-1 .
• Svetlana Gerasimova: Ржевская бойня: потерянная победа Жукова. Jauza / Eksmo, Moscow 2009, ISBN 978-5-699-35203-6 ("Battle of Rzhev: Zhukov's lost victory").
• David Glantz: Zhukov's Greatest Defeat. The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars 1942 . Ian Allan Publishing, Shepperton 2000, ISBN 978-0-7110-2748-0 .
• Otto Dessloch: The winter battle of Rzhev, Vyazma, and Yukhnov, 1941–42 . Headquarters, European Command, Office of the Chief Historian, 1947.

Web links

Commons : Battle of Rzhev  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

• Battle of Rshew. In: rshew.de. 
• Ржевская битва 1941–1943 гг. In: narod.ru. March 3, 2013, archived from the original on April 6, 2020 (Russian). 
• Christian Neef : Eastern Front: Attack at any price. In: one day on Spiegel Online . July 6, 2010 . 
• Company Seydlitz: The Army Cavalry Command zbV of the 9th Army fighting near Rschew, summer 1942. In: zwei-weltkrieg-lexikon.de. December 9, 2009, archived from the original on July 4, 2020 . 
• Nikolai Belov, Tatjana Mikhailova: Rzhev July – August 1942: The battle for hill 200. (No longer available online.) In: informaworld.com. Formerly in the original ; accessed on July 4, 2020 (English).  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  
• Johann Althaus : The Battle of Rschew: For Hitler it was “our greatest mistake this year”. In: welt.de . July 1, 2020 . 

Documentation

• Russian TV documentary Rzhev: The Unknown Battle of Georgi Zhukov (2009)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ What happened in March 1943? In: chroniknet.de. Retrieved July 5, 2020 . 
2. ↑ "Operazja Grosa"
3. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g} Christian Neef : Eastern Front - Attack at any price. In: Spiegel Online . July 6, 2010, accessed June 19, 2019 . 
4. ^ PN Pospelow : History of the Great Patriotic War , Vol. 3, Moscow 1960.
5. ^ Raymond Cartier: The Second World War. Vol. 1 1939-1941 , Lingen Verlag, Cologne 1967, p. 416.
6. ^ "The desperate situation of Army Group Center" in Raymond Cartier: The Second World War. Vol. 2 1942-1944 , Lingen Verlag, Cologne 1967, pp. 478, 481-483.
7. ^ Klaus Christian Richter: Company "Seydlitz". An extraordinary example of military improvisation. In: Der Panzergrenadier 22/07.
8. ↑ Archived copy ( memento of the original from November 29, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
9. ^ Raymond Cartier: The Second World War. Vol. 2 1942–1944 , Lingen Verlag, Cologne 1967, p. 588.
10. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} The Summer Battle of Rzhev - The fourth battle in late July / mid-October 1942.
11. ↑ for a successful anti-tank combat were Gefreiter Schulte-Strathaus / IR 58, Unteroffizier Siekmann / IR 18 and Lieutenant Herber / PiBtl. 6 excellent.
12. ↑ http://www.infanterie-regiment-18.de.tl/Geschichte--k1-1939_1945-k2-.htm
13. ^ Raymond Cartier: The Second World War. Vol. 2 1942–1944 , Lingen Verlag, Cologne 1967, p. 686.
14. ↑ in some cases also just called the Buffalo Company.
15. ↑ История Ржевской битвы 1941–1943 гг. In: rshew-42.narod.ru. Retrieved June 29, 2016 (Russian). 
16. ↑ Надежда Бабенко: Поиск родственников солдат, погибших во время ВОВ. In: www.stapravda.ru. Retrieved June 29, 2016 (Russian). 
17. ↑ Christoph Rass: Human material: German soldiers on the Eastern Front. Interior views of an infantry division 1939–1945 . Schöningh, Paderborn 2003, ISBN 3-506-74486-0 , p. 168, 210 .
18. ↑ Jamaletdinow Ruslan alias Dime: Алексей Исаев. К ВОПРОСУ О ПОТЕРЯХ СОВЕТСКИХ ВОЙСК В БОЯХ ЗА РЖЕВСКИЙ ВЫСТУП. In: actualhistory.ru. Retrieved June 29, 2016 (Russian). 
19. ↑ Первая Ржевско-Сычевская наступательная операция 1942 года. In: rshew-42.narod.ru. Retrieved June 29, 2016 (Russian). 
20. ↑ 1942. (No longer available online.) In: ww2stats.com. Archived from the original on December 28, 2015 ; Retrieved June 29, 2016 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
21. ↑ 1943. (No longer available online.) In: ww2stats.com. Archived from the original on May 25, 2013 ; Retrieved June 29, 2016 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
22. ↑ Михаил Юрьевич Мягков: Вермахт у ворот Москвы, 1941–1942. In: militera.lib.ru. Retrieved June 29, 2016 . 
23. ↑ Kira Neumann: Remembrance, Commemoration, Reconciliation - Moscow - Rschew - Hamburg. In: Johannes-Brahms-Gymnasium Hamburg. August 20, 2018, accessed November 11, 2019 . 
24. ↑ Gernot Kramper: Rschew 1942 - why the "meat grinder" on the Eastern Front was long forgotten. In: stern.de . July 4, 2020, accessed July 5, 2020 .