Donets-Mius offensive

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Shot down Soviet T-34 tank in the area of ​​the German 6th Army on the Mius (August 1943)

The Donets-Mius Offensive was a Soviet military operation on the German-Soviet front during World War II . In the course of this, between July 17 and August 2, 1943, there were major battles between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht on the Donez and Mius rivers . The aim of the Soviet south-west and south front was to force the German leadership to withdraw from associations of the Citadel company near Kursk and to recapture the economically important Donets Basin . After minor initial successes, however, the German Army Group South managed to intercept the Soviet offensive and to restore the old front line in places.

background

A few days after the start of the German offensive on July 5, 1943 near Kursk , it became clear that the Soviet Central Front and the Voronezh Front , which were tasked with defending them, suffered great losses and came under increasing pressure. In order to relieve them, the Stawka gave the Southwest Front under Colonel General Rodion Malinowski and the South Front under Colonel General Fyodor Tolbuchin the order on July 7 to prepare an attack operation. The troops on the south-western front were to cross the Donets and then advance to the city of Stalino . The units on the southern front were given the task of advancing across the Mius and Krynka at the same time and also reaching Stalino. If these operations had succeeded, a large part of the German Army Group South would have been encircled and the economically important Donets Basin would have been recaptured.

Soviet planning

Offensive planning of the south and south-west front in July 1943

The Soviet Southwest Front comprised the 1st Guards Army ( W. I. Kuznetsov ), the 8th Guards Army ( W. I. Tschuikow ) and the 3rd Guards Army primarily, as well as the 12th Army (Major General AI Danilow ), the 23rd Panzer Corps (Major General JG Pushkin ) and 1st Mechanized Guard Corps (Major General M. D. Solomatin ) in the reserve. These forces were supported by the 17th Air Army. A total of 202,430 soldiers and 1,109 tanks were deployed. The plan of the front headquarters provided that the 1st and 8th Guard Armies should first cross the Donets from the Isjum area and break through the German defense. Your operational target should be the city of Barvenkowo . The 12th Army was then to take advantage of the breakthrough made in this way to extend the bridgehead to Krasnoarmejsk . Only after the breakthrough had been completed and a bridgehead had been erected on the other side of the river did Colonel-General Malinowski plan to use his armored reserves, the 23rd Panzer Corps and the 1st Mechanized Guard Corps, in order to advance deep into the area and reach Stalino. In support of this attack, the 3rd Guard Army (G. I. Chetagurow) was to advance aggressively further east near Privolnoye , cross the river and take the city of Artyomovsk .

At that time the 51st Army ( G. F. Sakharov ) belonged to the southern front , on the left the 5th Shock Army ( W. D. Tsvetaev ), in the center the 28th Army ( W. F. Gerasimenko ) and on the left flank the 44th Army ( W. A. ​​Chomenko ). The 2nd Guard Army ( J. G. Kreiser ) was ready as a reserve . Altogether there were five armies with 28 rifle divisions , two mechanized corps, three tank brigades and one cavalry corps. These units received support from the 8th Air Army (Lieutenant General T. T. Chrjukin ). In total, there were 271,790 soldiers and 737 tanks. The front headquarters planned to place the focus of the attack in an area about 20 km wide between the 5th Shock Army and the 28th Army. These armies were supposed to cross the Mius and break through the German defenses. The 2nd Guard Army should then take advantage of the break-in and advance into the rear area of ​​the German defense in order to encounter the units of the south-western front near Stalino . The 44th and 51st Armies had to carry out support attacks with some of their forces on the left and right wings.

In total, the Southwest Front and the South Front were able to deploy 474,220 soldiers and 1,846 tanks to attack. According to older Soviet literature, the total forces on both fronts counted far more: 1.27 million soldiers, 2,150 tanks, 20,754 artillery pieces and mortars, and 1,604 aircraft.

German location

Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein , Commander in Chief of Army Group South (1943)

Since the German Army Group South under General Field Marshal Erich von Manstein played a key role in the offensive near Kursk, it had transferred most of its forces to its north wing. Along the Mius stood the 6th Army (Colonel General Karl-Adolf Hollidt ) with the XXIX. Army Corps (three infantry divisions , one combat group), the XVII. Army Corps (three infantry divisions) and the Mieth corps ( IV. ) (One mountain division , two infantry divisions). In their reserve there was only the bulk of the 16th Panzer Grenadier Division . To the north of it stood the 1st Panzer Army (Colonel General Eberhard von Mackensen ) with the XXX. Army Corps (three infantry divisions), the XXXX. Panzer Corps (three infantry divisions) and the LVII. Army Corps (three infantry divisions) on the Donets. General Field Marshal von Manstein had held back the XXIV Panzer Corps under General of the Panzer Force Walther Nehring as Army Group Reserve . It comprised the 17th and 23rd Panzer Divisions and the SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Wiking" . These forces had a total of 223 tanks, 145 assault guns and 115 self-propelled guns .

Field Marshal von Manstein had already expected at the end of May 1943 that the Red Army would launch a relief offensive against the Donets Basin as soon as Operation Citadel had started. However, he was convinced that even then one should not withdraw any forces from the Kursk Arch. On May 24, 1943, the following assessment of Manstein's situation found its way into the war diary of Army Group South :

“In the case of 'Citadel', the decisive moment is the victory in the battle of Kursk, and the battle must be fought through, even at the risk of a serious crisis in the Donets region. It must be taken into account from the outset that the enemy will be able to break deep into the 6th Army and 1st Panzer Army on the wide-spread front of the Army Group. "

The German enemy reconnaissance recognized the intensified Soviet preparations for attack on the Mius and Donets around July 12th. This was one of the reasons for the demolition of the company Citadel near Kursk in the following days. This fact also allowed the German troops to prepare to repel the attack. South of the Donets, the defense was organized in two lines six to eight kilometers deep. Individual villages were fortified and turned into nests of resistance. At the Mius there were also developed positions with field positions and wire obstacles, including the Mius position . In addition, a few kilometers behind the front line a training area with numerous field positions had been created for training purposes, which was to be of decisive importance, since it was only in these positions that the defense against Soviet attacks was successful. In addition, the area was almost entirely covered with tall grass and corn fields. Only a few heights dominated the terrain. These and the few localities formed the only landmarks on the battlefield.

course

Soviet offensives on the Donets and Mius

Southwest front

On the morning of July 17th, the southwest front opened its offensive against the 1st Panzer Army on the Donets with artillery preparation and air strikes. The schedule provided for crossing the Donets within the first two days and building bridgeheads 20 to 30 kilometers deep. In the following five to seven days the line Krasnoarmeiskoje - Konstantinowka was to be reached, from which the capture of Stalin was planned.

General Kuznetsov's 1st Guard Army, which had a total of eight rifle divisions and three tank brigades, primarily deployed the 46th Rifle Corps (53rd Rifle Divisions and 20th Guards Rifle Divisions). After overcoming the Donets, this broke into the positions of the German 257th Infantry Division within the first hour of the attack . After that, however, the German defenders went over to counter attacks, which thwarted further progress of the 1st Guard Army. The fight took at this point now the character of a bitter trench warfare on.

The 8th Guard Army of General Tschuikow attacked between Kamenka and Sinichino. Colonel-General Tschuikow deployed his 33rd Guards Rifle Corps and 29th Rifle Corps in the first line, followed by the 28th Guards Rifle Corps as the second wave. These units met the resistance of the German 46th , 387th and 333rd Infantry Divisions . After artillery preparations and air strikes, the attack began at 7 a.m. and was supported by 100 mortars per front kilometer. In the area of ​​the 33rd Rifle Corps (50th, 230th, 243rd Rifle Division, 253rd Rifle Brigade), the German defense was soon breached and smaller bridgeheads were formed. These could also be held against the six German counter-attacks that were still taking place that day. In the area of ​​the 29th Guards Rifle Corps, which attacked further to the right, Soviet pioneers were able to erect a 16-ton and a 60-ton pontoon bridge on the first day of the attack. This made it possible to quickly strengthen the bridgeheads with a large number of additional troops. At the end of the day, German reserves north of Chrestischje stabilized the front. The following day, Colonel General Chuikov tried to force the breakthrough with the help of the 28th Guards Rifle Corps of the second wave west of Slavyansk . Since this did not succeed, the 1st Mechanized Guard Corps and the 23rd Panzer Corps were gradually thrown into battle in the following days, although these should actually have been deployed much later.

Crew of a German anti-tank gun in action

On the other hand, the German high command from the Army Group Reserve led the 17th Panzer Division and the SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Wiking" of the XXIV. Pz.K. approach. They had 84 ready-to-use tanks with which they immediately counterattacked. This enabled the Soviet intrusion to be sealed off for the time being. In the course of the fighting there were heavy losses on both sides. According to Soviet information, the Germans attacked the village of Golaya Dolina (10 km north of Chrestischje) on July 21, a total of five times without success, losing 25 tanks and around 700 soldiers. In the days that followed, the Soviet Southwest Front, despite all efforts, was unable to make any further progress. The bridgehead of the 1st Guard Army stabilized between the towns of Bolshaya Garschewka and Semjonowka at a width of 12 km and a depth of 2 to 2½ km. The 8th Guards Army had captured two bridgeheads on the first day of the attack and tried to unite them in the following days. When this was successful, this landing zone was finally 25 km wide and 2 to 5 km deep. In the area of ​​the 3rd Guard Army, which was supposed to carry out a support attack, however, it was not possible to form a bridgehead. However, the Southwest Front ceased its aggressive actions on July 27 after further progress was not expected and the front had already lost 38,690 soldiers in the previous ten days, of whom 10,310 were believed to have been killed or missing.

Soviet pioneers build a makeshift bridge over the Donets (July 1943). It was possible to transfer enough troops and expand the bridgehead to a depth of 15 km.

South front

In the meantime the southern front had also started the attack on the morning of July 17 after preparatory attacks by artillery and air forces. The 5th Shock Army and the 28th Army crossed in the area of ​​the 294th , 306th and 302nd Infantry Divisions of the XVII. Army Corps ( Gen.d.Inf. Wilhelm Schneckenburger ) the Mius and broke into the German defense lines. They soon succeeded in building a bridgehead five to six kilometers wide at the towns of Stepanowka and Marinowka. Since the 6th Army got into a difficult position as a result, the 23rd Panzer Division from the Army Group Reserve was transferred to it. But even before it even arrived, Colonel General Hollidt had the 16th Panzer Grenadier Division attack on the southern flank of the Soviet advance on July 18. However, these were meanwhile faced by twelve opposing rifle divisions and the 2nd mechanized guard corps, so that the German division itself was soon in danger of being worn out. After the 23rd Panzer Division had arrived, Colonel-General Hollidt had another counterattack launched on July 19, which again failed with great losses. The German forces had exhausted themselves and were only sufficient for pure defense tasks. On the following day nine Soviet rifle divisions and the 2nd Mechanized Guard Corps tried to achieve a breakthrough, which failed in the face of German resistance and with high losses. Colonel-General Tolbuchin had to withdraw the burnt-out attack forces and instead brought the fresh 4th Mechanized Guard Corps into position in the bridgehead. When this attacked on July 21st, the fighting became even more intense. The climax was finally reached on July 22nd, when the 4th Mechanized Guard Corps with around 140 tanks started a breakthrough attack. At this point in time, the two motorized divisions of the 6th Army were only able to counter this with 38 tanks of their own. However, through well-positioned anti-tank weapons and the 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun used in ground combat , it was possible to eliminate around 130 Soviet tanks. This German defensive success resulted in the decimation of the main Soviet attacking forces and led to the fighting gradually subsiding in the following days. Nevertheless, local Soviet advances continued, which led to minor crises on the German side. By this time, however, the Soviet 2nd Guard Army, which had been deployed in the meantime, had managed to expand the Mius bridgehead to 20 km wide and 15 km deep.

German defense measures

German soldier with anti-tank rifles
(Ukraine summer 1943)

After Hitler intended the cessation of the Citadel company on July 13, 1943 under the influence of the Soviet counter-offensive at Oryol and other Soviet preparations for attack recognized by the intelligence service , he announced that the II. SS Panzer Corps under Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser would withdraw from the Kursk area and take it in Italy (a few days earlier, the Allies had landed in Sicily ) against the Western Allies . However, he delayed the removal because he was not sure whether these troops would not be urgently needed to ward off a feared Soviet offensive in the Kharkov area . However, the German leadership assumed that the Red Army would have been weakened in the Battle of Kursk to the extent that it would need a few more days to prepare for a new operation. In the meantime, the SS Panzer Corps was available for use with Army Group South before it was to be relocated to the Kharkov area again.

Field Marshal von Manstein planned to use this reinforcement to launch attacks against the Soviet southern front on the Mius, where the situation appeared most dangerous. On their way there, however, the troops would also have to pass through the area of ​​the 1st Panzer Army, where they could also strike against the bridgeheads of the Soviet Southwest Front . Field Marshal von Manstein therefore planned to have the SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions " Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler " and " Das Reich " conduct a counterattack on the Donets, so to speak "in passing". Only then should they be used together with the SS Panzer Grenadier Division “Totenkopf” and the 3rd Panzer Division on the Mius, which were also on the march . On July 24th, the two SS divisions were deployed on the Donets opposite the Soviet bridgeheads. But shortly before the planned start of the attack, Hitler intervened, forbidding the divisions to be used in the 1st Panzer Army and instead demanded that these should only be used on the Mius. Field Marshal von Manstein was extremely indignant about this interference in his operations planning, but had to obey the orders.

On July 26th, the situation became more complicated when Hitler ordered the evacuation of the SS Panzer Grenadier Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” to Italy without this having taken effect at Army Group South . In addition, the SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Das Reich" in association with the 16th Panzer Grenadier Division and 23rd Panzer Division already standing at the Mius were still too weak for an operational counterattack, so we had to wait until July 30th had to until the other two tank divisions arrived. Only then could an operational counterattack with a chance of success be considered.

German counterattack on the Mius

Soldiers of the Waffen SS during briefing in the field (July 1943)
German counterattack on the Mius on July 30, 1943

According to Field Marshal von Manstein's account, the Soviet southern front had meanwhile gathered 16 rifle divisions, two mechanized corps, one tank brigade and two anti-tank brigades in the Mius bridgehead. The German operation plan, which in turn had drawn up by Colonel General Hollidt, provided that the XXIV. Pz.K. (23rd Pz.Gren.Div. And 16th Pz.Gren.Div.) Was supposed to conduct a diversionary attack against the southern part of the bridgehead, while the II. SS Panzer Corps (SS-Pz.Gren.Div. "Reich" and Totenkopf, 3 Pz.Div.) Should lead the main blow further north in the direction of Dmitrijewka. The IV. Air Corps was given the task of supporting the attack. A fundamental miscalculation was the fact that the SS divisions were to attack over the same area on which the unsuccessful 23rd Panzer Division had been shot down on July 19. Since then, the Soviet troops had been able to expand and strengthen their positions here.

The German counterattack began on the morning of July 30, 1943. In the area of ​​the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, the attack formations encountered stubborn resistance. It was possible to take Stepanowka, but the Soviet units repeatedly carried out counter-attacks. At the same time, the anti-tank fire from the important height of 213.9 (in the heights of Saur-Mogila ) prevented any advance of the German tanks. Minefields and the intervention of the Soviet Air Force resulted in high losses on the German side. At the end of the day the three divisions of the corps had lost 915 men and 91 of the 211 tanks and assault guns deployed. The XXIV Panzer Corps achieved greater successes. The 23rd Panzer Division and the 16th Panzer Grenadier Division were able to encircle several Soviet rifle divisions west of Garany and put 18 anti-tank guns and 44 anti-tank rifles out of action. Then, however, the German attack force also weakened here.

The second day of the attack also brought little progress and increasing losses for the German side. In further frontal attacks, the tank units of the II SS Panzer Corps were further decimated, so that in the evening there were only 20 operational tanks. At the same time, the Soviet troops intensified their attacks on Stepanowka, which was held by the division "Das Reich". In this alone, the Red Army lost 26 tanks and 1,300 prisoners . In the south of the bridgehead, the supporting XXIX. Army corps advances, albeit with heavy losses. The 294th Infantry Division deployed here lost 18 officers, 123 NCOs and 1,128 men that day. In contrast, the XXIV Panzer Corps built on the previous day's successes. After it had fought off a Soviet attempt in the morning to break through to the enclosed divisions west of Garany, it rubbed the Soviet 3rd, 33rd Guards and 315th Rifle Divisions and parts of the 96th Guards Rifle Division in the pocket. Since this lasted all day, however, the advance eastward barely gained ground.

The high command of the Soviet southern front reinforced the troops in the bridgehead. Their associations still held all commanding heights. Meanwhile, General Field Marshal von Manstein was getting nervous. He did not want to have his only mobile reserves burned out completely and arrived at the headquarters of the 6th Army himself on the evening of July 31st. After consulting with the commanders of the attack formations, he ordered the focus of the attack to be relocated. This measure proved successful the following day, August 1st. The German troops broke deeply into the Soviet position system, which led to the first major retreat on the southern front . On the evening of that day the II. SS Panzer Corps finally took the commanding height of 213.9. The 23rd Panzer Division alone recorded 4,193 Soviet prisoners that day. 

As a result of these events, the Soviet defense collapsed soon after, so that on August 2, the fourth day of the attack, German troops reached Dmitrijewka and the Mius. This removed the bridgehead on the southern front and restored the old line of defense.

consequences

A German Panzer V "Panther" is towed away (August 1943)

There is little and contradicting information about the losses on both sides. According to Soviet documents, the Southwest Front is said to have lost 38,690 soldiers in its attacks on the Donets from July 17th to 27th, of whom 10,310 were believed to have been killed or captured. According to the same records, the southern front suffered losses of 61,070 men on the Mius from July 17 to August 2, of which 15,303 were killed or captured. In total, the losses would then amount to 99,760 soldiers, of which 74,147 were wounded. Karl-Heinz Frieser pointed out that this information should be viewed as too low. In the final report of the 6th Army, 17,762 prisoners were spoken for the fighting on the Mius alone, 955 of whom were defectors. This was already more soldiers than the approximately 15,000 "irrecoverable losses" admitted by the Soviet side, in which prisoners and dead were added together. In addition, according to the final report, 732 Soviet tanks, 522 anti-tank guns, 197 artillery pieces and 438 grenade launchers were destroyed or captured. The German losses of the 1st Panzer Army on the Donets can no longer be reconstructed today. In the area of ​​the 6th Army, however, they amounted to 3,298 dead, 15,817 wounded and 2,254 missing.

The results of the battles must be viewed in a differentiated manner. According to the historian Karl-Heinz Frieser's judgment , the south and south-west fronts had "failed miserably" at the operational and tactical level , while the Germans had a "veritable success" . At the strategic level, however, the picture was different. The Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Wassilewski told Colonel General Tolbuchin that the aim of his offensive would have been achieved because the Germans had to withdraw some armored formations from the Kursk area. When a large-scale Soviet counter-offensive (→ Belgorod-Charkov operation ) began on August 3, 1943 , the divisions that had withdrawn to support the German defense were missing. As General Field Marshal von Manstein later noted in his memoirs, the Red Army at Kursk had become offensive earlier than expected. In retrospect, he therefore described the relocation of armored divisions to counterattack the Soviet bridgeheads as a "fatal" mistake. Ultimately, however, this was due to the fact that Hitler absolutely wanted to maintain the Donets Basin instead of neglecting it in favor of the Kursk battle, as Manstein had already demanded in May 1943. After the German armored divisions were hastily relocated north again, the 1st Armored Army and the 6th Army remained in their overstretched positions. Against them, the southern and southwestern fronts began a new offensive (→ Donets Basin operation ) between August 13 and 16, during which the German positions were broken and Stalino was captured on September 8. In mid-September 1943 the general retreat of Army Group South to the Dnepr began .

In Soviet historiography, the offensives of the two Soviet fronts were almost always treated separately. The attack on the south -western front was referred to as the "Isjum-Barvenkovsk operation" ( Russian Изюм-Барвенковская операция ), that on the southern front as the "Mius operation" ( Russian Миусская операция ). So it was hardly apparent that both operations were coordinated and ultimately aimed in vain to work together to include parts of Army Group South and to recapture the entire Donets Basin. Instead, it was emphasized that the only successful purpose of the offensives was to withdraw German troops from the Kursk area. To explain the ultimate failure of the operations, Soviet historiography retrospectively portrayed the Mius line as a fortress. The German defenders are said to have stood in deep position systems, of which the main line alone was six to eight kilometers deep. There would have been 1,500 to 1,800 mines per front kilometer. On the other hand, the strength of the German troops was also veiled. In Soviet representations, for example, the "Kempf Group" was always counted among the defenders, even though it was not affected by the fighting on the northern wing of Army Group South .

In German historiography, these struggles are also rarely discussed because the focus here is on the more or less simultaneous events in the Kursk Arc, near Kharkov and Oryol. Karl-Heinz Frieser stated that the defense of the Soviet offensives practically took place “in the shadow of Kursk”. He himself was the first historian to publish a brief summary of these operations, which are still little known today, in the German-speaking area in 2007. In doing so, however, he was able to rely on preliminary work by George M. Nipe, who, based on German sources, had already written an operational study on the II SS Panzer Corps in 1996, in which the fighting on the Mius (but not the one on the Donets) took up a large part .

literature

  • Советская военная энциклопедия. (8 vol.), Moscow 1976/80 (German Soviet War Encyclopedia ).
  • А.Г. Ершов: Освобождение Донбасса. Воениздат, Moscow 1973 (German AG Erhov: The Liberation of the Donets Basin. )
  • Karl-Heinz Frieser (Ed.): The Eastern Front 1943/44 - The War in the East and on the Side Fronts. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2 .
  • Erich von Manstein: lost victories. Bernard & Graefe Verlag for Defense, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-7637-5051-7 .
  • George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Fedorowicz Verlag, Winnipeg 1996, ISBN 0-921991-35-5 .
  • В.И. Чуйков: В боях за Украину. Киев 1972 (German VI Chuikov: In the fighting in Ukraine. )

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c А.Г. Ершов: Освобождение Донбасса. Москва 1973, p. 102.
  2. ↑ a b Г.А. Колтунов: Изюм-Барвенковская операция. In: Советская военная энциклопедия. Vol. 3, Москва 1977, p. 509.
  3. ^ A b John Erickson: Road to Berlin. London 1983, p. 116.
  4. ↑ a b c d Григорий Ф. Кривошеев: Россия и СССР в войнах ХХ века. Олма-Пресс, Москва 2001. ( Online version )
  5. ↑ a b c Н.А. Светлишин: Миусская Операция. In: Советская военная энциклопедия. Vol. 5, Москва 1978, p. 329.
  6. ↑ a b Karl-Heinz Frieser: The battle in the Kursk arch. In: ders. (Ed.): The Eastern Front 1943/44. Munich 2007, p. 144.
  7. ↑ See schematic structure of war, as of July 7, 1943. In: Percy M. Schramm (Ed.): War diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Vol. 3, Bonn 2002, p. 732.
  8. ↑ KTB HGr Süd from May 24, 1943, quoted in after: Karl-Heinz Frieser: The battle in the Kursk arch. In: ders. (Ed.): The Eastern Front 1943/44. Munich 2007, p. 145.
  9. ↑ Gotthard Heinrici / Wilhelm Hauck: Citadel - The attack on the Russian position lead at Kursk. In: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau. Vol. 15 (1965), p. 599.
  10. ↑ a b Г.А. Колтунов: Изюм-Барвенковская операция. In: Советская военная энциклопедия. Vol. 3, Москва 1977, p. 510.
  11. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Winnipeg 1996, pp. 15-18.
  12. ↑ А.Г. Ершов: Освобождение Донбасса. Москва 1973, p. 106.
  13. ↑ А.Г. Ершов: Освобождение Донбасса. Москва 1973, pp. 104-106.
  14. ↑ В.И. Чуйков: В боях за Украину. Киев 1972, p. 50.
  15. ↑ А.Г. Ершов: Освобождение Донбасса. Москва 1973, pp. 106-109.
  16. ↑ a b А.Г. Ершов: Освобождение Донбасса. Москва 1973, p. 109.
  17. ^ Karl-Heinz Frieser: The retreat operations of Army Group South in Ukraine. In: ders. (Ed.): The Eastern Front 1943/44. Munich 2007, p. 340.
  18. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Winnipeg 1996, p. 84 f.
  19. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Winnipeg 1996, pp. 90-93.
  20. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Winnipeg 1996, pp. 94-105.
  21. ^ Karl-Heinz Frieser: The retreat operations of Army Group South in Ukraine. In: ders. (Ed.): The Eastern Front 1943/44. Munich 2007, p. 340 f.
  22. ^ A b Karl-Heinz Frieser: The retreat operations of Army Group South in Ukraine. In: Karl-Heinz Frieser (Ed.): The Eastern Front 1943/44. Munich 2007, p. 341.
  23. ↑ a b Erich von Manstein: Lost victories. Munich 1976, p. 516.
  24. ↑ According to his own account, he reported to the Army Chief of Staff, Kurt Zeitzler : “If the Führer thinks he has a better commander in chief or an Army Group Command […] I am happy to relinquish my post to him. As long as I stand here, however, I must also have the opportunity to make use of my head. ”Cf. Erich von Manstein: lost victories. Munich 1976, p. 516 f.
  25. ^ Karl-Heinz Frieser: The retreat operations of Army Group South in Ukraine. In: Karl-Heinz Frieser (Ed.): The Eastern Front 1943/44. Munich 2007, p. 342.
  26. ↑ Erich von Manstein: Lost victories. Munich 1976, p. 517.
  27. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Winnipeg 1996, pp. 117-119.
  28. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Winnipeg 1996, p. 190.
  29. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Winnipeg 1996, p. 198.
  30. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Winnipeg 1996, pp. 210f.
  31. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Winnipeg 1996, pp. 217-219.
  32. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Winnipeg 1996, p. 220 f.
  33. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Winnipeg 1996, pp. 225-245.
  34. ^ Karl-Heinz Frieser: The retreat operations of Army Group South in Ukraine. In: ders. (Ed.): The Eastern Front 1943/44. Munich 2007, p. 342 f.
  35. ^ A b Karl-Heinz Frieser: The retreat operations of Army Group South in Ukraine. In: ders. (Ed.): The Eastern Front 1943/44. Munich 2007, p. 343.
  36. ↑ See Г.А. Колтунов: Изюм-Барвенковская операция. In: Советская военная энциклопедия. Vol. 3, Москва 1977, pp. 509f; Н.А. Светлишин: Миусская Операция. In: Советская военная энциклопедия. Vol. 5, Москва 1978, p. 328 f.
  37. ↑ А.Г. Ершов: Освобождение Донбасса. Москва 1973, p. 99.
  38. ↑ А.Г. Ершов: Освобождение Донбасса. Москва 1973, p. 101.
  39. ^ Karl-Heinz Frieser: The retreat operations of Army Group South in Ukraine. In: ders. (Ed.): The Eastern Front 1943/44. Munich 2007, p. 339.
  40. ↑ George M. Nipe: Decision in the Ukraine. Fedorowicz Publishing House, Winnipeg 1996.
This article was added to the list of excellent articles on February 13, 2011 in this version .