Operation Husky

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Operation Husky
Map of the Allied landings in Sicily
Map of the Allied landings in Sicily
date July 10 to August 17, 1943
place Sicily , Italy
output Conquest of Sicily by the Allies
Parties to the conflict

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) German Empire Italy
Italy 1861Kingdom of Italy (1861-1946) 

United States 48United States United States United Kingdom Canada
United KingdomUnited Kingdom 
Canada 1921Canada 

Commander

Italy 1861Kingdom of Italy (1861-1946) Alfredo Guzzoni Hans Hube
German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era)

United States 48United States Dwight Eisenhower George S. Patton Omar Bradley Harold Alexander Bernard Montgomery Guy Simonds
United States 48United States
United States 48United States
United KingdomUnited Kingdom
United KingdomUnited Kingdom
Canada 1921Canada

Troop strength
365,000 Italians
40,000 Germans
160,000 soldiers
600 tanks
1,800 guns
losses

German Empire:
4,678 dead
13,500 wounded
5,532 prisoners
Italy:
4,325 dead
32,500 wounded
116,681 prisoners

USA:
2,237 dead
6,544 wounded
UK:
2721 deaths
10,122 wounded
Canada:
562 dead
1,848 wounded

Operation Husky was the code name for the Allied invasion of Sicily from July 10, 1943 and the start of the " Italian Campaign " in World War II.

The strategic situation

In 1942 or at the beginning of 1943 the Allied High Command lacked an overall strategic concept as to how the “Europe first” strategy set out in the ARCADIA conference could be implemented. The only clarity was that Germany should be brought to its knees by landing on the European continent. The Roundup company met with approval from both the US planners and the British General Staff. However, after April 1942 it quickly became apparent that the Allied forces were not yet able to land on the continent - especially in France.

Rather, the offensives of the Wehrmacht in North Africa and Russia ran the risk of worsening the military situation - up to and including the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the war. The Allies could only react to the actions of the Wehrmacht and, against the background of this situation, decided in July 1942 to land in North Africa - Operation TORCH .

At the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 the situation for the Allies changed fundamentally. Due to the success of the British 8th Army at El Alamein and their subsequent advance into Tunisia , supported by the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria (Operation Torch), the tide turned in North Africa. At the same time the Red Army succeeded in enclosing and exterminating the 6th Army in Stalingrad . It became apparent for the first time that the Wehrmacht was gradually getting on the defensive. This raised the question for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which direction the Allied strategy should develop. For the USA it was clear that after the completion of the actions in Tunisia, the landing on the continent should come back into focus, the Operation TORCH was seen as a rather small deviation from the actual war goal. However, Great Britain took a different stance, the campaign in the Mediterranean should be continued. For Winston Churchill and the British army command, a continuation of the war through operations against Italy or southern France was conceivable. Approaches towards the Balkans were seen as a further option. Possible destinations included Sardinia (code name BRIMSTONE) and Sicily (code name HUSKY).

The participants of the conference in Casablanca. In the foreground Churchill and Roosevelt, behind them Allied Chiefs of Staff (including General Arnold and General Marshall)

It was in precisely this climate that the military leadership of the Western Allies met in Casablanca in January 1943 . Although US Chief of Staff George Marshall vehemently advocated the continuation of Operation ROUNDUP - albeit in a modified form - and viewed the British position as a waste of resources, the US position ultimately failed to prevail. One reason was the ongoing campaign in North Africa. Actually, the Allied High Command had insisted that Tunisia would be completely occupied by the turn of the year 1942/1943 - and that the troops would be available for actions in Europe. Instead, the fighting dragged on and it was clear that the troops would not be ready for other operations in the summer of 1943. Because of these difficulties, an invasion of Europe from Great Britain at the scheduled time was impossible.

Against this background, a decision had to be made as to which goal the attention should be directed to after the conquest of Tunisia. A continuation of the operations in the Mediterranean region seemed logical from the point of view of the British leadership. Churchill was not simply betting on weakening the Axis powers. Further attacks against Italy could not only lead to its departure from the Berlin-Rome axis . The operations in North Africa had already strengthened the German defense in southern France - which weakened the defense along the Atlantic coast. In the event that the Allies attacked the Mediterranean islands or even the Italian mainland, an even greater use of materials by the Wehrmacht was to be expected. In addition to Sicily and Sardinia, Corsica, Crete and the Balkans were available for further operations. Due to various advantages and logistical constraints, the Western Allies decided on January 18, 1943 for Operation HUSKY - an invasion of Sicily.

This was supported by the fact that, after the conquest of Tunisia, troops were available in the immediate vicinity of the island. An operation in the Mediterranean in the direction of Sicily would make it easier to procure the transport capacity necessary for the relocation of troops in comparison to other operations. In addition, an occupation of Sicily would have opened up the direct connection between Egypt and Gibraltar for the Allies - which would lead to a significant shortening of shipping routes. So far, the Allied shipping traffic from the Pacific or India - or in the opposite direction - had to take the detour around Africa, since the Axis powers could control shipping in the southern Mediterranean from Sicilian airfields.

In favor of Sicily as the next step, there was also the hope that a landing on Italian soil would influence the mood in fascist Italy to such an extent that Italy left the axis. In this case, the Allied army command assumed that the Wehrmacht would intervene in Italy, which could significantly reduce the pressure on other sections of the front. Even after their decision to land in Sicily, the Joint Chiefs of Staff left it open in which direction the Western Allies' strategy should develop.

planning

Although Sicily and Tunisia were only a few dozen kilometers apart, the difficulties were considerable from the start. One of the main problems was not the landing of the first wave, but securing supplies. The direct attack on a port as large as Catania or Messina was canceled due to the strong coastal fortifications. This meant that the landing beaches had to be selected in such a way that as little resistance as possible from the defenders could be expected, while ports were also relatively easy to reach.

Another key problem was building a command structure for the troops involved, which consisted of armed forces from the United States, Great Britain and Canada. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Commander-in-Chief , and Harold RLG Alexander was appointed as his deputy (Deputy C-in-C) , who was also given command of the ground forces. Command of the participating naval forces was given to Andrew B. Cunningham , while Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder was in command of the Allied air forces. With Operation HUSKY, the Western Allies laid the foundation for the command system that would later function well - consisting of independent planning committees for the individual armed forces. In the course of the preparations for the landing in Sicily, however, its weaknesses clearly became apparent.

The first planning steps for Operation HUSKY began at the end of January 1943 - with the establishment of Task Force 141 in Algiers. This designation was given to the responsible planning staff, from which the 15th Army Group was to emerge later. In charge of the strategic planning, TF 141 first developed a plan that deviated significantly from the later result. The Eastern Task Force (consisting mainly of British forces) was to land in the east of the island near Syracuse and Gela . The Western Task Force received Palermo or southwest Sicily as a target. This division of the invasion forces was intended to tie up the forces of the defenders and prevent concentrated attacks on the invading forces. One focus of the planners was on the south-east of Sicily around Syracuse and the airfields near Gela. In the originally drafted plans, three British divisions and one US division should be involved in the landings in the southeast of the island. Two days after this landing, further operations against Palermo were planned.

The later implemented operation plan, the form of which differed significantly, was based primarily on the intervention of Bernard L. Montgomery. From March 13, 1943 he began to actively intervene in the planning for Operation HUSKY - among other things by demanding that the eastern landing force be provided with larger contingents of troops and material. A weakening of the landing head aimed at Gela was suggested. However, Arthur Tedder insisted on taking the airfields in order to be able to support the Allied forces from the air at an early stage. Another problem arose from the limited transport capacity. The reinforcement of the operation planned for the southeast would not only have weakened the landing of the US armed forces against Palermo. The schedule would also have been disrupted.

One reason for the rejection of the original plan of operations by the commander of the 8th Army was what he saw as a false assessment of the defense of Sicily. Montgomery assumed that the Italians and the Wehrmacht would oppose violent resistance to the attackers. Based on his acceptance, Montgomery suggested changes and put forward his own plans for the invasion. A move that was criticized by many participants - including Admiral Andrew Cunningham and Arthur Tedder.

However, the reactions of some participants were also relieved. So far, the planning for Operation HUSKY has been anything but smooth. The chaos and reluctance of the commanders-in-chief became more and more of a problem. One reason for this was the fact that the military leadership of the individual planning staff - such as General Harold Alexander - was still busy with the fighting in Tunisia until the spring of 1943 . The planning authorities therefore lacked the necessary leadership authority. The landing planned for June 1943 had to be postponed to July 1943. Montgomery put his finger into an open wound with his criticism.

The commanders of the air and naval forces in particular insisted on their points of view in the dispute with Montgomery. Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder made it very clear at the end of April that effective air support would only be possible by capturing the airfields in the Gela area. And Admiral Cunningham underlined the imminent dangers of the concentration of so many ships in a confined space. At the beginning of May 1943, those involved finally achieved the breakthrough in the dispute over operational planning. The landing near Palermo was canceled. Instead, the new plan called for the US forces to land in the Gela - Licata area. Here the troops under George S. Patton were to take Ponte Olivo and Biscati and secure the port city of Licata. From General Patton's point of view, a task that primarily consisted of securing the flank of the 8th Army - and made the US armed forces extras in the 2nd row.

The operational plan for the landing in Sicily provided for a total of 5 phases:

  • Preparations by the air and naval forces to secure control of the air and sea
  • Air landings on the night of July 10, 1943, landings of the ground troops before sunrise (capture of the airfields and the ports of Syracuse and Licata)
  • Establish a safe landing head
  • Conquest of the cities of Augusta and Catania
  • Taking the entire island

In order to fulfill this operational plan, the 8th Army under Montgomery in the Syracuse / Pozzallo area, consisting of the XIII. Corps, the XXX. Corps and the 231st Infantry Brigade, land in the morning hours of July 10, 1943. The British 8th Army received support from the 1st Airborne Brigade, which was supposed to take bridges and disrupt the enemy. After securing the landing head, the XIII. Corps begin to advance towards Catania. For the XXX. Corps an advance to the northwest was planned, which should make contact with the 7th US Army.

The US forces should land in the Gulf of Gela and direct their attacks against Gela and Scoglitti, the airfields of Ponte Olivo, Biscari and Comiso and the city of Licata. Subsequently, only a cover of the flank of Montgomery was planned for the 7th Army. Patton had only three divisions, which were supplemented by units of the Ranger and 82nd Airborne Division . The 1st Infantry Division and the 45th Infantry Division took over as II Corps the advance towards Gela / Scoglitti, while the 3rd Infantry Division should go ashore in the Licata area.

Involved armed forces

In the invasion of Sicily, five states bore the brunt of the fighting: On the side of the attacking allies, Great Britain, Canada and the USA faced the defenders of the island, consisting of Italian units and parts of the Wehrmacht.

The Anglo-American units together formed the 15th Army Group, which took over the task of conquering Italy with a different composition after the end of the operation. At the time of Operation Husky, the Army Group consisted of the 7th US Army and the British 8th Army . The 8th Army under Bernard L. Montgomery were for the landing south of Syracuse the XIII. Corps and XXX. Corps subordinated. The US units under the leadership of George S. Patton originally had only one army corps. Due to a reorganization of his armed forces, Patton had two corps from mid-July 1943 - the II. US Corps and the US Provisional Corps. In addition, both armies had various reserve and support units such as command troops, tank hunting units and artillery units.

The Axis forces stationed in Sicily consisted of a mixture of strong and experienced units and units of dubious combat value. The core of the strong fighting units were two German units - the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" . The coastal divisions stationed in Sicily were rated as significantly weaker. Set up to protect the coastal areas from landing operations, their crews were recruited from the older population and members of the army who had been reactivated after retirement.

Allied forces:

Axis forces:

  • Italian naval forces in Sicily (Ammiraglio di squadra Pietro Barone)
  • Italian 6th Army (Generale d'Armata Alfredo Guzzoni )
    • XII. Army Corps (Generale di corpo Mario Arisio)
      • 26th Infantry Division "Assietta" (Generale divisione Erberto Papini)
      • 28th Infantry Division "Aosta" (Generale divisione Giacomo Romano)
      • 208 Coastal Division (Generale divisione Giovanni Marciani)
      • 202nd Coastal Division (Generale brigati Gino Ficalbi)
      • 207th Coastal Division (General divisions Ottorino Schreiber)
    • XVI. Army Corps (Generale di corpo Carlo Rossi)
      • 54th Infantry Division "Napoli" (Generale divisione Giulio Cesare Gotti Porcinari)
      • 4th Infantry Division "Livorno" (Generale divisione Domenico Chirieleison; originally army reserve)
      • 213 Coastal Division (Generale divisione Carlo Gotti)
      • 206th Coast Division (Generale divisione Achille d'Havet)
  • XIV. Panzer Corps (Wehrmacht; Colonel General Hans-Valentin Hube ; until July 18, 1943, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" were subordinate to the Italian 6th Army)

The landings

British soldiers on one of the landing beaches in Sicily on July 10, 1943
An American transport ship explodes off Sicily after an air raid on July 11, 1943

The landings took place in a storm, which made the operation considerably more difficult, but also meant an element of surprise. The British Army landed on the southeast, the US on the southwest.

Before the actual attack on Sicily, the Allies occupied the small islands of Pantelleria , Lampedusa , Lampione and Linosa from June 11 to 14, 1943 .

As the first direct operation against Sicily, paratroopers were deployed on the night of July 9th to 10th, two units each on the British and American sides. It was the first mission for the 82nd Airborne Division . Due to the storm, the planes could not hold their course and were drifted far away, so that only about half of the units dropped off reached the assembly point. The British used cargo sailors , but with similarly little success: only twelve of the 144 sailors reached the destination, some even fell into the sea. The soldiers, who were nevertheless deposed, attacked patrols and created confusion among the enemy.

The invasion fleet was already at sea when the airborne units took off and was spotted by the Axis forces' aerial reconnaissance at 4:30 p.m. on July 9. Nevertheless, the landing met with little resistance, especially since the Axis powers did not want to use their small number of ships against the far superior Allied naval forces. At 2:45 a.m. on July 10, the first US soldiers and 90 minutes later the first British soldiers set foot on Sicilian soil. The Italian troops were inadequately stationed on the coastline and offered little resistance. The British marched into the port of Syracuse with almost no problems . A large-scale counterattack only took place on the US landing stage. On July 11th, Patton sent his reserve paratroopers into action, but not every unit appeared to have been informed; shortly after an air raid by the Axis powers, the Allied planes appeared and were held for another air strike by their own ground forces. 37 of the 144 machines were shot down.

The invasion force consisted of almost 3,000 floating units - including six battleships and two aircraft carriers - as well as a good 2,500 aircraft. By the end of the first landing phase, there were around 181,000 Allied soldiers with 1,800 guns, 600 tanks and 14,000 other vehicles on the island. The Allies continued to move troops to Sicily, so that by the end of August around 470,000 soldiers had arrived on the island.

The land fight

The plans for the fight after the invasion had not been worked out in detail. Each army should pursue its own goals, only the boundary between the two armies was defined. The progress made in the first two days was overwhelming from an Allied perspective. So Vizzini was captured in the west and Augusta in the east. On July 13, the German field marshal Albert Kesselring reported to Berlin that the Italian troops had failed. The German troops would have to continue the fight alone with almost no air support. At the same time, he emphasized that he would not be able to hold the island without massive reinforcements.

However, resistance increased in the British sector after the first days of the invasion. Montgomery convinced Alexander to move the line between the two armies so that his British army could bypass the resistance and retain its key role in taking Messina while the US army took over the protection and support of its flank. Patton, however, wanted a bigger target for his army and dared to attempt to take Palermo . While a reconnaissance force was taking Agrigento , he tried to convince Alexander to continue his advance. Alexander refused, but his order was allegedly mutilated in the transmission and when the situation cleared up, Patton was already standing in front of Palermo.

Meanwhile, Kesselring had acted indecisively. Although he had declared holding the island impossible, he still refused to withdraw. It was not until the end of July that he brought in large numbers of troops from the mainland, but at the same time declared that he could not keep up with the rapid reinforcement of the Allies via the captured ports. As a strategic goal he stated to hold the northeast of the island as long as possible and thus to delay an invasion of the Italian mainland as long as possible. Hitler also gave the order that the Germans should take command of the remaining Italian units and "shut down" the Italian command. As a result of this action, there were skirmishes between Italians and Germans. On July 31, Guzzoni officially handed over command of the island to the German general Hans Hube .

British Sherman tank in the streets of Francofonte . German paratroopers holed up in this place delayed the Allied advance by two days.

After Palermo was captured on July 22nd so that all of western Sicily was under Allied control and the British army was still trapped south of Messina, Alexander ordered an attack from both sides on the city. Patton, however, wanted to take Messina before the British. He wrote: "It's like a horse race where the reputation of the US Army is at stake". Accordingly he continued his thrust eastward; there he soon met with considerable resistance. The Axis powers had built a strong defensive ring around the city, the "Etna Line", in order to allow the trapped troops to retreat to the mainland as quickly as possible. Patton began his attack on the Troina front , but this was the fulcrum of the German defense and fortified accordingly. The Allies made slow progress. Despite further amphibious landings, the Germans managed to move their troops back to the mainland with the company training course . The Germans were able to bring almost 40,000 soldiers, a good 9,000 vehicles, 27 tanks and 94 artillery pieces to safety. The Italians saved 62,000 soldiers on the mainland. Parts of the 3rd US Infantry Division entered Messina hours after the last German ship left Messina on August 17th. With that Patton had won the "race".

Consequences and consequences

On the Axis side, 4,678 German and 4,325 Italian soldiers were killed. 13,500 Germans and 32,500 Italians were wounded, 116,681 Italians and 5,532 Germans were captured. The Italians recorded 40,655 missing persons immediately after the end of the fighting, the Germans 4583. In connection with the capture of the Biscari airfield, the Biscari massacre occurred , in which US troops killed 76 prisoners of war. On the US side, 2,811 soldiers were killed, 6,544 were wounded or were taken prisoner. The British had 2,721 dead, with 10,122 soldiers wounded or captured. For many US units it was the first use. Around 21,000 Allied soldiers fell ill with malaria , which at the time was often fatal.

The Operation Husky was the largest amphibious operation of World War II in terms of landed troops and front construction. It even surpassed the Normandy landings . Strategically, the Allies were able to achieve all of their planned goals. Axis air and naval forces were driven from the island and sea routes opened in the Mediterranean.

After the capture of Palermo on July 22nd, the Grand Fascist Council deposed Mussolini on July 25th, 1943 with a simple majority vote. Mussolini, when he wanted to submit his resignation from the office of Prime Minister , was ordered by King Victor Emmanuel III. arrested and interned in different locations to make a possible liberation more difficult. In the meantime, Marshal Pietro Badoglio negotiated with the Americans and concluded with them the Cassibile armistice , which was made public on September 8, 1943. As a result, German troops occupied Italy (" Axis case ").

Sub-operations

See also

literature

  • GA Shepperd: The Italian Campaign 1943–45. A Political and Military Re-Assessment. Arthur Barker, London 1968, ISBN 0-213-76404-0 .
  • SJ Zaloga: Sicily 1943 - The debut of Allied joint operations. Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2013, ISBN 978-1-78096-126-2 .
  • AN Garland, H. McGaw Smyth: United States Army in World War II: Mediterranean Theater of Operations - Sicily and the Surrender of Italy Center of Military History US Army, Washington DC 1993, ISBN 978-0-16-080077-1 .
  • Carlo D´Este: Bitter Victory - The Battle for Sicily July - August 1943 , HarperPerennial 1991, ISBN 978-0-06-097313-1 .

Web links

Commons : Operation Husky  - collection of images, videos and audio files