Oryole operation

Oryole operation

Part of: Second World War

date	July 12 to August 18, 1943
place	Oryol
output	Red Army success
consequences	Straightening of the Oryol front arch

Parties to the conflict
Soviet Union	German Empire
Commander
Markian Popow Hovhannes Baghramjan W. D. Sokolowski	Walter Model Lothar Rendulic Rudolf Schmidt Friedrich Gollwitzer
Troop strength
1,280,000 soldiers 2,400 tanks and assault guns 3,000 aircraft 26,900 guns	300,700 soldiers, 625 tanks and assault guns, 600 aircraft, approx. 5,500 guns
losses
429,890 men 2586 tanks 892 cannons 1014 aircraft	86,400 men, 14,200 dead, 60,900 wounded, 11,300 prisoners

The Oryol Operation ( Russian Орловская операция , also known as Operation Kutuzov ) was a Red Army offensive during World War II that is considered part of the Battle of the Kursk Arch . The offensive began on July 12, 1943 and ended on August 18, 1943. As part of the offensive, the concept of “ Operation in the Depth ” was successfully implemented for the first time . Was able to attack in divergent directions while fragmentation of the German defenses to achieve that ultimately the withdrawal of German troops from the area Oryol meant.

Soviet T-34 tanks advancing in the city of Orel, 1943

prehistory

The Soviet-German front had come to a standstill at the end of March 1943 after large-scale counter offensives by the Red Army had pushed the Wehrmacht units far back in the previous winter . After the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad , the entire German south wing was in danger of being cut off and overrun before a defensive success in the Battle of Kharkov stabilized the German lines. Intentions to use this success for further counterattacks failed because of the catastrophic condition of the German divisions. However, since the Soviet troops had also suffered great losses, from the end of March 1943 both sides limited themselves to the strategic defensive and prepared to continue operations after the end of the mud period .

Soviet planning

Planning for the Oryol Operation began in late April 1943 as part of planning for the defense of Kursk . The original plan was to attack in three directions. The 11th Guard Army (General Baghramjan ) on the western front was to attack from the north together with the 4th Panzer Army (Major General Badanov ) , which was newly established in June . Two attack groups on the Brjansk Front , the 61st and 3rd Armies, had to advance from the east together with the 63rd Army (Lieutenant General Kolpaktschi ). From the south the central front with the 13th and 70th Armies was to attack northwards. The offensive was to begin when the German attack in the south of the Kursk bend had been stopped. The preparations for the attack remained largely hidden from the German intelligence.

Troop strength and deployment

Three Soviet fronts, the Bryansk Front under the command of Markian Popov , the Central Front under Konstantin Rokossowski and the left wing of the Western Front under Vasily Sokolowski , with a total strength of 1,286,049 soldiers (927,494 of them in the fighting troops), 26,379 guns, 2,409 tanks and 3,023 aircraft faced two armies of the German Army Group Center , the 2nd Panzer Army and the 9th Army . According to Frieser, the German associations had 495,000 men at the start of the Citadel enterprise. At the beginning of Operation Kutuzov, he estimates the strength of the front-line troops at 307,000. The two armies also had 5,500 guns including PaK and FlaK as well as 625 tanks and assault guns and 610 operational aircraft.

Since April 11, 1943, the German 2nd Panzer Army was nominally led by General der Infanterie Clößner on behalf of the arrested General Rudolf Schmidt . Colonel-General Model , the commander-in-chief of the 9th Army, which was stalled at the same time in the area between Ponyri and Olchowatka, was then given top command in the Orel front arch. At the time of the attack, the 2nd Panzer Army was subordinate to 3 army corps with 14 infantry divisions. The only mobile reserve was the 5th Panzer Division under Lieutenant General Fäckenstedt .

• XXXV. Army Corps (General of the Infantry Rendulic , later General of the Infantry Wiese ) 34th , 56th , 262nd and 299th Infantry Divisions
• LIII. Army Corps (General der Infanterie Gollwitzer ) 208th , 211th , 293rd Infantry and 25th Panzer Grenadier Division
• LV. Army Corps (General der Infanterie Jaschke ) 110th , 134th , 296th and 339th Infantry Division
• Army Reserve: 212th Infantry Division and 707th Infantry Division

course

Operation Kutuzov

A German Panzer III of the 2nd Panzer Division near Orel

Soviet soldiers follow a T-34 tank near Bryansk

During the attack by the German 9th Army, the Western Front under Vasily Danilowitsch Sokolowski started its attack on the German 2nd Panzer Army on July 12th. After three hours of preparatory artillery bombardment, the Soviet infantry and tank attack of the 11th Guard Army followed at around 6:05 a.m. The 36th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General AS Ksenofontow ) made several tactical break-ins into the weak front German positions relatively quickly . After six guard divisions broke through at the seam between the German 211th and 293rd infantry divisions, the 5th Panzer Corps under Major General Sachno was introduced into the gap to advance against Ulyanovo. A counter-attack by the German 5th Panzer Division was repulsed. On the right wing of Baghramjan, the 16th Guards Rifle Corps under Major General Lapschow made the breakthrough to the Resseta. The additional deployment of the 1st Panzer Corps (Lieutenant General WW Butkow ) broke 8 kilometers deep into the front of the German LIII by evening. Army Corps. On the Sucha sector opposite the Soviet 3rd and 63rd Armies, General Rendulic (XXXV. AK) had correctly assessed the danger for the 56th and 262nd Infantry Divisions and had taken adequate precautions. The between Mtsensk unexpectedly defense in depth and Oserka German defense system was the strong Soviet attacks with heavy losses shattered.

The German leadership feared that the important railway line from Orel to Brjansk would be cut off and reacted by relocating some divisions belonging to the 9th Army. As a result, the German formations, which were already making slow progress, lost even more of their strength on the northern section of the Kursk front arch. On July 14th met to reinforce the LIII. Army Corps brought in the Panzer Regiment 52 and the 20th Panzer Division on the Sorokino-Ukolizy line and brought the advance of the 36th Guards Rifle Corps to a standstill. The 34th Infantry Division held Bolchow, which had been harassed from the north and east, against the Soviet 61st Army (Lieutenant General PA Below ). On July 17, the 63rd Soviet Army attacked Bortnoye again from the area west of Novosil and broke through the newly introduced 1st Guard Panzer Corps on the front of the German 36th and 56th Infantry Divisions . The newly introduced 12th Panzer Division (Lieutenant General von Bodenhausen ) prevented the loss of Orjol and held out at the Optucha section.

To increase the attack power, the Stawka introduced the strategic reserves at the front into the battle. On July 19th the 3rd Armored Guard Army (Lieutenant General Rybalko ) on the Brjansker Front, on July 20th on the Western Front first the 11th Army (Lieutenant General Fedjuninsky ), and finally on July 26th the 4th Panzer Army (Lieutenant General WM Badanow). The 46th Rifle Corps (Major General Konstantin M. Jerastow ) of the 61st Soviet Army succeeded in conquering Bolchow on July 28th. General of the Infantry Zorn , Commanding General of the XXXXVI. Panzer Corps fell south of Oryol on August 2 in a Soviet air raid.

On August 5th, the city of Oryol fell into the hands of the Soviet 63rd Army. On August 6, the 8th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps approached from the northwest and southeast of the city of Chotynez , the 16th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Fedjunkin ) advanced simultaneously on Karachev , while the 25th Panzer Corps was deployed in the direction of Bunino. The 30th Panzer Corps (General Rodin ) was introduced by the 4th Panzer Army as a reserve . On the right wing of the 11th Guards Army, the 16th Guards Rifle Corps got stuck on the Wytebet River and had to be reinforced by the 217th Rifle Division (Colonel Ryschikow). On August 9th, the 8th Guard Corps (General Malyshev ) and the 1st Panzer Corps cut off the railway line to Karachev. The 36th Guards Rifle Corps penetrated the western part of Chotynez, which was vacated prematurely by the Germans.

Building on this success, the Soviet 11th Guard Army continued west and began attacking Karachev on August 12 from the south and east. Colonel-General Model reinforced the 293rd Infantry Division in the Karachev area with the Greater Germany Division , the 8th Panzer Division , and the 34th and 56th Infantry Divisions. From the north, the Soviet 11th Army attacked the city with the 238th and 369th Rifle Divisions. The encirclement of Karachev from the north forced the Germans to also use the 78th Sturm Division on August 13 and to give up the city on August 14.

The German leadership was no longer able to stop the superior Soviet units. Colonel-General Model fought hesitantly to get the heavy army equipment out of the front arch and steadily withdrew his troops into the depths. All Wehrmacht units withdrew in the direction of the Hagen position . The Hagenstellung was a developed position in the hinterland, it ran in a north-south direction and represented a line to be defended favorably for the Wehrmacht. In addition, this shortening of the front made it possible to free several divisions, which could either be brought directly to critical sections of the front were used as reserves.

Losses and consequences

The Red Army advanced up to 150 kilometers west on the 400-kilometer-wide front, smashed 14 German divisions (90,000 dead according to Soviet figures) and lost 430,000 soldiers (113,000 dead), 2,500 tanks, 900 artillery pieces and 1,000 aircraft. Of the employed on the German side 90 tank destroyers type "Ferdinand" 39 were lost.

Individual evidence

1. ^ Karl-Heinz Frieser: The Eastern Front 1943/44 (Volume VIII from The German Reich and the Second World War) - Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 2007, p. 154
2. ↑ Information on the Oryol operation at the Russian Defense Ministry  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (Russian)  
3. ↑ David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union. Routledge 1992, p. 143.
4. ^ David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. Routledge, 1989, p. 160.
5. ^ David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. Routledge, 1989, p. 161.
6. ↑ Frieser p. 175.
7. ↑ Oryol Operation in Hrono (Russian)
8. ↑ Frieser pp. 175–177.
9. ↑ MK Barbier: The Battle of the Kursk Arch, p. 151
10. ^ Schramm: OKW-Kriegstagebuch 2nd volume, Kriegsgliederung p. 733
11. ^ Samuel W. Mitcham : Panzer Commanders of the Western Front, p. 207
12. ↑ Battle of the Kursk Arch in Soldaty 20 weka section " Oryol Operation" (Russian)
13. ^ Walter Scott Dunn: Soviet Blitzkrieg. The Battle for White Russia, 1944. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, p. 75.

literature

• MK Barbier: The Battle of the Kursk Arch. The greatest tank battle in history Tosa Verlag, Vienna 2002, pp. 151–156.
• Karl-Heinz Frieser , Klaus Schmider , Klaus Schönherr : The German Empire and the Second World War . Volume 8: The Eastern Front 1943/44 - The War in the East and on the Side Fronts. Edited by the Military History Research Office of the Bundeswehr . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 2007, ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2 .

Web links

• GA Koltunow / BG Solowjow: Oryoler Operation , Moscow Military Publishing House 1970 (Russian)
• Oryol Operation in the Battle of the Kursk Arch (Russian)
• GF Krivošeev (ed.): Rossija i SSSR v vojnach XX veka. Poteri vooružennych sil. Statističeskoe issledovanie. ( Memento of 30 March 2010 at the Internet Archive ) series archive . Olma-Press, Moscow 2001, ISBN 5-224-01515-4 (Russian)