Battle for Kiev (1941)

Battle for Kiev

Part of: Second World War

date	August 23 to September 26, 1941
place	Kiev , Soviet Union
output	German victory

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	Soviet Union
Commander
Gerd von Rundstedt	Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny
Troop strength
500,000 men	850,000 men
losses
100,000 killed and wounded	163,600 dead and wounded 665,000 prisoners of war

The Battle of Kiev was a battle in World War II between the Soviet Union and the German Empire . The battle took place from mid-August to September 26, 1941.

background

After the rapid success of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the German-Soviet War , Hitler ordered on August 21, 1941, contrary to the General Staff's initial plans, to temporarily change the thrust on Moscow in favor of the complete conquest of Ukraine . The tank battle at Dubno-Lutsk-Rivne had eliminated most of the mechanized Soviet forces, so that the remaining forces had disproportionately few tanks. The focus of Army Group South was set against the industrial area on the Donets. The central role was assigned to the 17th Army , which should proceed in a general direction on Voroshilovgrad . The task of flank protection to the north fell to the 6th Army , and that to the south to Panzer Group 1 . It is interesting that at this point in time, instead of an encircling operation, a wedge-shaped drive was envisaged, since Chief of Staff Halder did not expect the Red Army to have a unified resistance on the other side of the Dnieper.

The possibility of an offensive merger with Army Group Center became apparent on August 20, when the 2nd Army took Gomel and thus overcame the Stalin line . Impatient because of the long clearing up of the Pripyat area, Hitler made the later momentous decision on August 21 that Army Group Center should work together with Army Group South and that it should employ as many forces as it considered necessary regardless of subsequent operations. For this purpose, the Panzer Group 2 of Colonel General Guderian was appointed, who initially argued against this approach, since he referred to the road and fuel situation and the need for refreshment of the fast troops under the premise of an early action against Moscow. Only after a conversation with Hitler did Guderian even suggest the use of the entire Panzer Group 2, which in turn caused friction with the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock , who wanted to hold together his forces for the attack on Moscow.

Operative planning

Eastern Front at the time of the Battle of Kiev

Wehrmacht pioneers erect a pontoon bridge in Kiev, September 1941

According to the plan of the German High Command, Panzer Group 2 of Army Group Center had to turn south in order to return for the four (5th, 21st, 26th and 37th) Soviet armies positioned in front of the front of the 6th Army between the Dnieper and Kiev to cut off. In Army Group South , the German 17th Army had to advance to the northeast to the Dnepr between Kanew and Kremenchug and to build a bridgehead together with Panzer Group 1 in order to be able to counter the units of Army Group Center. A favorable starting point was created by reaching and securing the Dnepr line between Kanew and Cherkassy by the IV Army Corps ( Schwedler group ) and the XXXXIV. Army Corps . At Kremenchug the XI. and LII. Army Corps of the 17th Army to build a bridgehead on the other bank of the Dnepr, from which the attack from the south was to take place later.

The Soviet Southwest Front had its headquarters in Kiev, was under the command of Colonel General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos and was increasingly narrowed with five armies in the area between the Dnieper and Desna. The Stawka had appointed Marshal Semyon Budjonny as additional Commander in Chief of the Southwest Front.

• At the beginning of August, the newly created 37th Army under General Andrei Vlasov with 7 rifle divisions was relocated to the city of Kiev for direct protection.
• The 5th Army (General Michail I. Potapow ) initially defended in the Korosten area and was pushed back across the Dnieper to Chernigov after its northern flank was threatened .
• The 21st Army (General VI Kuznetsov ) fought on the north side of the Desna river opposite Guderian's troops and were pushed onto Bachmatsch .
• The 26th Army (General FJ Kostenko ) was available as a reserve.
• The 38th Army (General DI Ryabyschew ) secured the Dnieper line in the south and blocked the German bridgehead opposite Kremenchug .

Course of operations

Guderian in front of a command post near Kiev, 1941

Western section

The German 6th Army, advancing directly to Kiev from the Shitomir area , came with the XXIX. Army Corps (General Obstfelder ) made difficult progress because it was exposed to strong attacks by the Soviet 5th Army on the northern flank. On the northern flank of the 6th Army, the 213rd Security Division secured against the inaccessible area on the southern edge of the Pripjet Marshes . The newly introduced LI. Army Corps (General Reinhard ) began pushing towards Malin , where the Soviet 22nd Mechanized Corps was building a line of defense. On the left wing the XVII. Army Corps in the direction of Korosten , where the Soviet 31st Rifle Corps secured. On August 22nd, the 62nd Infantry Division occupied Ovrutsch . The withdrawal of the northern wing of the Potapov army across the Pripyat to the Dnieper was handled through Chernobyl . The 31st Rifle Corps (193rd, 195th and 200th Rifle Divisions) took on the defense of Kolypta on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. The 15th Rifle Corps (62nd, 45th and 135th Rifle Divisions) made towards the German 2nd Army in the direction of the Chernigov Front to the northeast. The defense against Soviet counter-attacks between Teterew and the Sdwish sector was carried out by the 296th Infantry Division , the 75th Infantry Division was designated to close the southern ring around Kiev and the 113th and 168th Infantry Divisions to secure between Sdwish and Irpen moved into the Gostomel area .

Also on August 23, the 111th Infantry Division reached the great Dnieper bridge at Gornostaipol . The 11th Panzer Division behind it , which had followed her across the river, was able to quickly penetrate to Desna on August 24, but was cut off by actions of the Soviet Dnieper flotilla, which succeeded in destroying the bridge. Under strong enemy pressure on both flanks, this vanguard had to fight its way back to the bridgehead on the Dnieper by August 29th. On September 4th, the German LI. Army Corps launched the new attack from the now secured Okuninowo bridgehead in the direction of Oster on the Desna, while the XXIX. Army Corps against the southern line of fortifications of Kiev.

Northern section

The offensive of Panzer Group 2, which opened on August 25, got off to a quick start, partly because a Desna bridge was unharmed in Novgorod-Seversky . However, since this Desna bridgehead was attacked hard during the Roslavl-Novosybkower operation and the 2nd Army , which had seven divisions, made only difficult progress, the advance was delayed. On August 31, the 4th Panzer Division was drawn south after the Desna bridgehead had been secured. The 3rd Panzer Division under Major General Model crossed the south-east and headed further south to the Sejm sector. The motorized XXXXVI provided security against attacks by the Soviet 13th and 40th armies from the Trubchevsk to Gluchow area . and XXXXVII. Army Corps (motorized) the right flank of Panzer Group 2. On the left flank Guderian accompanied the XIII. and XXXXIII. Army Corps of the 2nd Army proceeded to Desna and Chernigov . When the troops of General Geyr von Schweppenburg occupied Bachmatsch on September 10, the line of the Soviet 21st Army collapsed. The troops of the German 2nd Army were able to push in the front of the Soviet 5th Army from September 8th, from right to left the 17th , 134th , 260th , 131st , 293rd , 112th and 45th Infantry Divisions overcame the Desna section and reached the area between Koselez and Neschin over the next few days . The XXIV Army Corps (motorized) had crossed the Sejm on September 9th and reached Romny a day later , with which the actual meeting point with Panzer Group 1 was planned. Panzer Group 1 made hardly any progress in the south due to the almost impassable muddy roads, so that Guderian's advance guard, the 3rd Panzer Division, had to advance even further to Lochwiza .

Southern section

On September 4, Army Group South ordered the attack of the 17th Army from the bridgehead at Kremenchug to the north in the direction of Mirgorod and Lubny in order to break through the front of the enemy forces on the central Dnieper (Soviet 38th Army). The XI. Army corps under General Kortzfleisch crossed the Dnieper with the 125th , 239th and 257th Infantry Divisions . The LII. Army Corps (General of the Infantry von Briesen ) fell on the eastern flank to protect against Soviet attacks from the Krasnograd area. In addition, the General Command LV, which had become vacant in the Radomyschl area, was taken over by the 6th Army . AK (General Vierow ) used to build the new front in the Poltava area .

From September 12th, the XXXXVIII was the first to advance north . Army Corps (motorized) (General Kempf ) and then the XIV. Army Corps (motorized) (General von Wietersheim ) at the head of the attack. The XXXXVIII. Army corps (motorized) pushed with the 9th Panzer Division , 25th Infantry Division (motorized) , 13th and 16th Panzer Division along the Sula northwards via Lubny to the north. This was followed by the XIV Army Corps (motorized) with the 14th Panzer Division and 60th Motorized Infantry Division . On September 15, the connection between the armored forces of Generals Model and Hube was established and the still thin ring closed. In addition to this extensive encirclement of the main forces on the Soviet Southwest Front, the 6th Army encircled Kiev with the Dnepr crossing, which fell on September 19th.

Finale

Marshal Budjonny and General Kirponos repeatedly demanded the evacuation of Kiev and the possible breakout in vain. Stalin's command to “stand, hold and die if necessary” inevitably led to the encirclement. According to the Soviet Colonel Kyrill D. Kalinow, Budyonny had the order to hold the positions at all costs so that the Ukrainian industrial areas can be evacuated. The outbreak was not allowed until September 10th. On September 16, Marshal Tymoshenko was given supreme command of the Southwest Front, and Major General Hovhannes Baghramjan was appointed chief of operational management . Due to new additions and units that had broken out of the pocket, the front soon had a newly formed 21st, 40th and 38th Army, which immediately began counter-attacks in the Poltava area and on the Sula section to support the ongoing attempts to break out. On September 20, Kirponos' headquarters itself was unexpectedly involved in a battle with German troops. General Kirponos led the fighting near Dryukovchina from the edge of the forest, where he was soon wounded. A short time later he suffered and his chief of staff Tupikov fatal wounds in Schumeikowo.

The battle in the east of Kiev did not end until September 26th. Around 665,000 Soviet soldiers fell into German captivity; In addition, 884 tanks, 418 anti-tank guns and 3018 guns were captured. According to other sources, the Red Army lost 700,544 soldiers (including 616,304 dead, missing and prisoners) in the Kiev defense operation from July 7 to September 26, 1941.

Occupation of Kiev

Kiev after the major fire

German sentry on the Kiev Citadel on September 19th.

German Pak on the Citadel of Kiev with a view over the Dnieper

The capture of Kiev would create serious problems for the security of the troops in the city. After the fighting was over, it turned out that not only had extensive material been removed and the rail connections had been permanently interrupted, but extensive subsequent destruction by radio-controlled explosions had also been prepared. As early as September 13, the High Command of the 6th Army ordered that the troops were only allowed to stay in the city center with written confirmation from the AOK . Through an anonymous tip, the occupation troops found out about prepared explosive devices in larger buildings suitable for staff and troop accommodation, which on September 19 triggered a partially successful search operation. On September 24th, a Soviet explosive device triggered a major fire in a loot and ammunition store next to the main post office building, which quickly seized parts of the city and could not be extinguished by the “Sachsen” fire brigade regiment. Large firebreaks had to be blown to contain the spreading fire . Only on September 29th could the big fire be extinguished with the help of the troops, the technical emergency aid, the local and the German fire brigade. Due to the great losses of the German units in the city, Hitler ordered that fortified cities should no longer be captured by direct attack, but rather besieged after being bypassed and finally brought down with artillery and air strikes. On October 12, he reaffirmed the prohibition on entry for associations with a view to Moscow and Leningrad, in order not to expose the troops to losses through explosions or sabotage. Ultimately, however, this procedure was never used - with the exception of the Leningrad blockade  - not least because the troops could not do without these traffic junctions and the accommodations for staffs, depots and other supply facilities.

The consequences

Kiev was occupied on September 19, but the fighting on the eastern Kessel front lasted until the 26th. The Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD, in cooperation with regular army units, fell victim to the Babyn Yar massacre on September 29 and 30, 1941, more than 33,000 Jews from the greater Kiev area. The end of the Kessel Battle and the high Soviet losses gave the Wehrmacht access to eastern Ukraine, the Sea of ​​Azov and the Donbass . The Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) even had the hope of being able to capture the Crimean peninsula and advance into the Caucasus before the onset of winter . The heavy losses of the Red Army led the German army command to the ultimately wrong assumption that the attack on Moscow could succeed despite the advanced season and Hitler now ordered a direct march on the Soviet capital. The city of Kiev remained occupied by the Germans for 778 days until it was liberated by the Red Army on November 6, 1943 after the Battle of Kiev .

literature

• Carl Wagener : Heeresgruppe Süd , Podzun Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1972, pp. 70–80.
• David Stahel: Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East , Cambridge University Press, New York 2012.

Web links

Commons : Battle for Kiev (1941)  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

• The battle of the Kiev cauldron was Hitler's greatest victory September 21, 2016 in: Die Welt

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann , Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller , Gerd R. Ueberschär : The attack on the Soviet Union (= Military History Research Office [ed.]: The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 4 ). 2nd Edition. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1987, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , pp. 509 ff . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
2. ^ Jacobson, Greiner, Schramm: War diary of the OKW , Volume I, Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1965, p. 1062 ff.
3. ↑ Halder strongly criticized Guderian's "falling over"; he defends himself against it in: Heinz Guderian: Memories of a soldier. , ISBN 3-87943-693-2 .
4. ↑ Appendix No. 3 to the war diary No. 5 of the 257th ID, NARA microfilm T-315 Roll 1803 Frame 000623 ff.
5. ↑ Kyrill D. Kalinow: Soviet marshals have the floor . Hamburg 1950, p. 114 f.
6. ↑ Aleksander A. Maslov: Fallen Soviet Generals - Soviet General Officers Killed in Battle, 1941–1945 , London / Portland 1998, p. 27.
7. ↑ Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann , Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller , Gerd R. Ueberschär : The attack on the Soviet Union (= Military History Research Office [ed.]: The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 4 ). 2nd Edition. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1987, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , pp. 516 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
8. ↑ КИЕВСКАЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКАЯ ОБОРОНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИЯ ( Memento from March 30, 2010 in the Internet Archive )
9. ↑ Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann , Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller , Gerd R. Ueberschär : The attack on the Soviet Union (= Military History Research Office [ed.]: The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 4 ). 2nd Edition. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1987, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 . The Pioneer Battalion 99 u. Demolition squads of the 99th Light Division and 71st Infantry Division.
10. ↑ Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann , Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller , Gerd R. Ueberschär : The attack on the Soviet Union (= Military History Research Office [ed.]: The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 4 ). 2nd Edition. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1987, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , pp. 516 ( limited preview in Google Book search).