Lower Silesian Operation

Lower Silesian Operation

Part of: Second World War

Development on the Eastern Front from February 8 to 24, 1945

date	February 8-24, 1945
place	Lower Silesia
output	Occupation of the Lower Silesian Plain by the Red Army

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	Soviet Union
Commander
Ferdinand Schörner Army Group Center	Ivan Konev 1st Ukrainian Front

The Lower Silesian Operation ( Russian Нижнесилезская операция ) was an offensive by the Red Army on the German-Soviet front of World War II , which lasted from February 8 to February 24, 1945 and by the units of the 1st Ukrainian Front against the German Army Group Center was carried out in Lower Silesia .

Starting position

As early as the end of January 1945, the Red Army had crossed the pre-war border of the German Reich in the area of Upper Silesia as part of the Vistula-Oder operation . Since the Soviet breakthrough on the Vistula in mid-January 1945, the units of Army Group Center had been in constant retreat towards the west, involved in ongoing battles with the rapidly advancing and overtaking units of the Red Army ("Wandering Kessel"). The establishment of a stable main battle line (HKL) along the Oder and stopping the enemy forces was unsuccessful. The Soviet 3rd Guard Army, 13th Army and 4th Panzer Army had failed to take the city of Breslau , but positions on the western bank of the Oder in the Steinau area had been captured and expanded. Something similar happened in the Ohlau area , where the Soviet 52nd Army and 3rd Armored Guard Army established themselves. The Soviet 59th and 60th Armies lay south from Opole to Cosel in Upper Silesia. The starting positions of these three groups then served as bridgeheads for the coming large-scale Soviet attack. The 2nd Air Army was also deployed on the Soviet side.

For the national government which was province of Silesia because of its numerous industries paramount. When the Upper Silesian industrial area was lost at the end of January 1945, Armaments Minister Albert Speer pointed out "that the performance of the military economy would drop to 1/4 compared to that achieved in December [1944]." Lower Silesia and the Moravian-Ostrava region were however evident as important as before as centers of arms production and coal mining .

Objectives of the operation

The plan of operations was drawn up at the end of January by the staff officers of the 1st Ukrainian Front under Marshal Ivan Konew and his chief of staff Vasily Sokolowski and approved by the Soviet headquarters in Stawka on January 29th. The hasty drafting of the plan is an indication of the rivalry against the competitor Georgi Zhukov , who - always preferred by Stalin - could single-handedly conquer the capital. The operation was supposed to end around February 25th to 28th with reaching the Elbe .

So it should be the last storm. The smashing of the German units around Breslau, the advance over Niederlausitz in the direction of Sprottau and Cottbus , the south-western bypass of Berlin and a coordinated action with the 1st Belarusian front against the capital were the goals of the directive of the 1st War Council of 31. Captured January 1945.

The successes of the advance through Belarus and Poland (approx. 150 km per week during operation) had seduced the Soviet high command into setting these far-reaching goals. The fighting strength of the Germans at this time was generally assessed by the Red Army as low, it was expected with a rather weak resistance and a quick conquest of the imperial capital.

The focus of the attack was formed on the right front wing northwest of Breslau four armies (3rd Guard Army, 13th, 52nd and 6th Army), two armored armies (3rd Guard Panzer Army and 4th Panzer Army) and one tank - (25th) and a mechanized (7th) guard corps. The second shock grouping with the 5th Guards Army, the 21st Army and the 4th Guards and 31st Panzer Corps concentrated around the bridgehead near Ohlau south of Wroclaw. This group received the order to advance towards Dresden and should reach the Elbe around February 25th. The third shock grouping was concentrated on the left wing of the front southeast of Opole and consisted of the 59th and 60th Armies and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. It was supposed to advance from the bridgehead in the Cosel area to the Sudetes and support the actions of the other parts of the front. The depth of the Soviet army groups was staggered accordingly: a tank army was directly followed by a rifle army.

Soviet preparations for attack

The preparation time for the new offensive after the end of the Vistula-Oder operation was limited by Marshal Konew. Although the Red Army had advanced about 400 kilometers to the west since mid-January, there were only a few days available for regrouping and refreshment and for bringing in ammunition and military equipment. The personnel and equipment levels of many Soviet units had sunk considerably, but there was still a superior force compared to the Wehrmacht units . The reason for the hasty continuation of the advance lay in several principles. At first they did not want to give the German forces the opportunity or time to stabilize the front and expand their defense. The front line reached so far, especially on the middle and lower reaches of the Oder, was also unfavorable for the Soviet army and required appropriate safeguards on the front wings. The 1st Belarusian Front had already advanced further west to Küstrin , delimited by the river Oder from the southern German units, which could pose a threat to their left flank at any time.

The Soviet-German balance of power on the Oder front developed differently depending on the section of the front. According to official Soviet sources north of Wroclaw it was 2.3: 1 for infantry units, 6.6: 1 for artillery and 5.7: 1 for tanks. South of the city fortress the superiority was 1.7: 1 with infantry, 3.3: 1 with artillery and 4: 1 with tanks. Even further south the ratio of forces was almost balanced. This information is also the only source of information about the strength of the German troops at this point in time, as information from the German side is not available. Overall, however, the strength and equipment of the 1st Ukrainian Front were well below the specifications of the Soviet high command. At the beginning of the operation, 2215 operational tanks and self-propelled guns were reported for Konev's troops, compared to 3661 when the Vistula-Oder operation began on January 12th. Of these, 379 tanks and 188 self-propelled guns belonged to the 3rd Guard Panzer Army, which represented 56% and 72% of the target stock respectively. The 4th Panzer Army had 414 tanks and artillery pieces (55% of the target). The tank corps numbered around 120–150 tanks each. In the infantry, the divisions had an average of just over 4,000 soldiers (50% of the target). The supporting Soviet 2nd Air Army had 2,815 operational aircraft. From the end of January, some commandos were parachuted to the German hinterland, whose primary task was to investigate the situation of the Wehrmacht units.

Plans of the German party leadership

After the fighting continued to encroach on the territory of the Reich, the question of command in the affected home areas arose again. According to the previous regulations, there was actually no operational area on the Reich territory. The Wehrmacht was limited to military tasks here. As Reich Defense Commissioners , the Gauleiter held administrative powers and state sovereignty in their hands up to the front, including the power of command and the transfer of responsibility from the Wehrmacht to the party preferred by Hitler . The field army was only authorized to issue instructions to the Gauleiter in a combat zone about 20 km deep. The inability of the Gauleiter Karl Hanke , Fritz Bracht and Hans Frank, as well as their uncoordinated actions, led to the neglect of the existing fortifications or their improper expansion. The representations of the population digging anti-tank trenches in the weekly news reports were intended to demonstrate perseverance rather than to prepare for the coming battle. Besides the "Oder position" from the pre-war period in the middle course of the river (Breslau-Crossen), since the end of 1944 there have been a large number of (anonymous) combat stalls, bunkers and installations along the Oder between Breslau and Ratibor , which were before an attack from the east should protect. High-quality combat equipment and weapons were not available, however, as these had been given for the Atlantic Wall and were thus lost. With a suitably trained manpower, the facilities might serve their purpose, but that again was the responsibility of the military leaders. Further problems with the competence of the Gauleiter arose in many cases with the supply or assessment of the situation and the associated measures of clearing and evacuating the civilian population and the deployment planning of the Volkssturm associations. Badly trained, called together in civilian clothes that were not winterproof or in old imperial uniforms, poorly equipped with various booty weapons, without sufficient ammunition, the predominantly older men could not stop the overpowering enemy, as the Gauleiter wanted. The competencies were not clearly regulated and the Volkssturm units were not initially subordinate to the military command organization. Only gradually did the highest party leadership recognize the problems with deploying the Volkssturm units. On January 26, 1945 Hitler's order was issued to form mixed combat groups of the Volkssturm together with units of the field army under unified leadership. On February 10th, the High Command of Army Group Center stated in an assessment that the independent Volkssturm units had not proven themselves in the HKL and recommended “integration into units of the field army, deployment in familiar home territory, in rear positions for guarding and security and for Positioning and the deployment of local Volkssturm groups in the flanks and back of the enemy. "

A propaganda photo with Volkssturm men on an MG 34 machine gun - such weapons equipment was rather the exception.

Volkssturm men near Ratibor in early February 1945

The flight of the German civilian population from the Red Army from the eastern regions was an essential feature of the fighting . The exodus affected entire circles and refugee groups were omnipresent.

In contrast to East Prussia , the Gauleiter of Lower Silesia, Karl Hanke, did not refuse to plan a possible (temporary) evacuation. If the residents left their threatened homeland too early, this was punished with heavy penalties. Often the dangers of the upcoming fighting were played down by the police or SS units present and the population was given a wrong picture of the situation. The party's evacuation orders usually came too late or not at all, initially the refugees were transported to circles barely 100 km away, which after a short time became a battle zone themselves. The poorly organized, up to 16 kilometers long refugee columns in the direction of Saxony and the Czech Republic, defying the cold, blocked the army's supply and retreat routes, sometimes got directly into military conflicts or were victims of targeted Soviet attacks. The OKW generally rejected an early evacuation. On January 28, 1945, the chief of OKW Keitel said: "Additional personal evacuation means for those affected only surrender to hunger, cold and dangers" and "in Silesia the evacuation measure over 30 km west of the Oder should not be carried out."

On January 30, 1945, Military District VIII (Deputy Commanding General Rudolf Koch-Erpach ) was subordinated to Army Group Center, which eased the disruptive relationship between the field army and replacement army . As a result of the total war effort, over 93,000 men were transferred from the reserve army to the entire eastern front from the end of January to the beginning of February. The improvised units lacked vehicles and artillery as well as combat experience. Thus the value of the units, some of which were made up of soldiers with stomach or ear disorders, was extremely dubious.

Plans of the Wehrmacht leadership

On February 3, 1945, Army Group Center recognized that the Red Army was planning a thrust from Steinau in a west and south-westerly direction to East Saxony and against Mährisch-Ostrau. Even the targets planned by Stawka were known and the day before the start of the attack were named as follows:

“The focus is now on 1. Ukraine. To see the front in the Steinau area; the thrust is assumed to be in the area south of Berlin with a side thrust towards Dresden. "

As early as December 1944, several simulation games under the direction of Generals Fritz Benicke and Wolf-Dietrich von Xylander had been carried out in the staff of the Army Group , which well illustrated the later course of the Soviet winter offensive and at the same time highlighted the deficiencies on the German side. The Soviet operation and its course did not come as a surprise to the German side.

Even before the start of the winter offensive, the Chief of the Army General Staff , Colonel General Heinz Guderian , was aware that the Eastern Front would "collapse like a house of cards if the Russian breakthrough occurred due to its thin line-up and low reserves." Upper Silesian territory had been occupied by the Red Army, suggested Guderian to withdraw divisions from the Kurland basin to Pomerania and with their help to lead a counter-attack against the 1st Belarusian Front (→  Operation Solstice ).

Hitler , on the other hand, did not see the Eastern Front as the primary theater of war . After the end of the Battle of the Bulge, the last powerful armored units on the western front that had withdrawn from there were not moved to the eastern border but to Hungary to be used in the Lake Balaton offensive . His strategy was based on holding the eastern front with the forces available there and by expanding the larger towns into "fortresses". Breakthroughs by the enemy resulted in the mobile units being thrown from one combat area to another, resulting in faster fighting. The reserves were mostly too close to the HKL, so that there was no free space for operational assignments. Immovable units were often run over because there was a lack of fuel. The combat strength of the troops was weak, as their manpower and weapons equipment no longer met the requirements. Instead of closed divisions, there were often only combat groups . The modern weapons and tanks, often shown in newsreels, were hardly available in most of the Wehrmacht units. The soldiers were again transported on foot or by horse and cart, which further restricted mobility. The lack of artillery, anti-tank weapons and, above all, ammunition had sooner or later made every Soviet advance a success.

In Silesia, too, the military tactic of passive holding was reduced, with main battle lines and “fortresses” being repeatedly redefined by the top management. The aim was to bind the Soviet forces to such and slow the advance. The guide reserved the definition of “fortresses”, “ fixed places ” and “fortress areas” .

The strategy of the Wehrmacht leadership, now without full freedom of action, aimed in the Silesian operational area as well as in the other sections of the Eastern Front at delaying the Soviet advance. It remains questionable whether the saving of the civilian population from the attacks by the Red Army, which was often emphasized by senior officers in the post-war period, was the decisive factor.

Local Wehrmacht operations in early February

On February 5, 1945, another company was carried out by the German side near Dyhernfurth . The city of Dyhernfurth and the nearby production facility for chemical warfare agents fell into the hands of the Red Army on January 25th. A German combat group under General Sachsenheimer and the workforce of the factory penetrated into the factory in one stroke over the Oder and the city in order to destroy the facilities. They then went back to the left bank of the Oder after the dangerous warfare agents had simply been pumped into the river. The ease with which the operation could be carried out led the German leadership to believe that the enemy was noticeably weakened. In the next few days, German units repeatedly carried out counterattacks against the bridgeheads that had formed. In particular, the newly established 408th Division of the Panzer Corps "Greater Germany" , the Parachute Panzer Division 1 Hermann Göring and the XXIV Panzer Corps repeatedly attacked the Soviet forces north of Steinau with their already broken units. From February 1st to 7th, the Soviet 4th Panzer Army lost 42 combat vehicles in this area. In the Grottkau area , the German 8th Panzer Division and 45th Volksgrenadier Division were used as a wedge between the Soviet 5th Guard Army and the 21st Army.

In the section between Beuthen on the Oder and Crossen , i.e. already in the area of ​​the 9th Army of Army Group Vistula , the XXXX , which had been in retreat in the Lissa area since the defeat in Poland, led . Panzer Corps the defensive battles. For a short time, on February 6, there was a dangerous Soviet thrust over the Oder in Odereck . Von Ahlfen describes the means with which such actions were carried out:

“The forces of the corps to remove this 'boil' consisted only of a 10 cm cannon, two booty guns with little ammunition and a Volkssturm [...] In a plant near Naumburg am Bober one found filling powder for V2 bullets, with that in another Place discovered ' Goliaths ' [...] have been loaded. "

The next day the attack was repulsed and the last Oder bridges in Odereck, Crossen and Fürstenberg were blown up.

Associations involved

course

Course of the Lower Silesian Operation

The entire operation today is divided into two phases. The time dividing point is the battle of the Bober, as well as the change of the original operational objectives by the Soviet high command.

• 1st phase (February 8th to 15th): The Soviet armies attack and within a week only reach the Bober - Queis line .
• 2nd phase (February 16 to 24): German units counterattack along the Bober River . The Soviet high command changes the operational objectives. The Red Army penetrates as far as the Lusatian Neisse .

The situation development between February 8th and 15th

The attack by the Soviet forces began on February 8 at 6:30 a.m. local time after a relatively short, 50-minute artillery fire from the prepared bridgeheads. There were not enough ammunition stocks for a longer bombardment. The inadequate clarification of the German positions and positions had little effect. Because of the bad weather, Soviet air support was also very limited. The German units put up stubborn resistance from the start. In the last few days before the attack, the thaw had set in, although temperatures of as low as −20 ° C had prevailed two weeks earlier. The change between frost and warming up to +8 ° C accompanied the coming conflicts. Due to the sodden ground, the attacking tanks could only advance slowly in the area.

The attack was carried forward in a half-star shape in a westerly direction from the Steinau area . Until late afternoon the German XXIV Panzer Corps and the Panzer Corps "Greater Germany" were able to hold their positions on the main west line from the Steinau bridgehead, but they gave in to growing superiority. The Soviets made their breakthrough in the north via the village of Raudten . The 408th Division of the LVII stopped south of Lüben . Panzer Corps continued their section despite the strong attack forces. At Brauchitschdorf alone , 18 Soviet tanks were fought down by an engineer battalion that day, but this did not prevent this section of road from being lost. The fierce defensive battles on the ground were supported by battle squadron 2 "Immelmann" . According to the situation report of Army Group Center, the Rudel group scored 80 tank kills that day. The commander Hans-Ulrich Rudel was seriously injured in an emergency landing.

The attacks of the Soviet 4th Panzer Army from the Steinau bridgehead were tactically aimed at circumventing the forests of the Primkenauer Forst (northwest of Lüben ) with the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps on the northern flank and with the 10th Guards Panzer Corps to the south. After the German lines had been broken, it turned out that the German divisions “ Brandenburg ”, “ Hermann Göring ” and the 20th Panzer Division were in danger of getting into a battle .

In the first two days, the tank units of the main Red Army group penetrated the Steinau bridgehead at a depth of 30 to 60 kilometers, the infantry up to 15 kilometers and a width of 80 kilometers. Despite the land gain, the Bober line was not reached as planned and the advance was not extended. The German units located there immediately took advantage of the long swing of the Soviet 10th Guard Panzer Corps around the Primkenauer Forst to head west in the direction of Sprottau against the Soviet tank traps of the 63rd Panzer Brigade (10th Guard Pz.K.) known way of the "Wandering Cauldron" fighting to drop.

The Soviet spearheads pursued the strategy of bypassing the cities in the event of stronger resistance and leaving their conquest to the advancing infantry units. On the night of February 9th, the Soviet 7th Guards Panzer Corps of the 3rd Guards Panzer Army rolled on towards Haynau . The German units of the 408th Division and the Panzer Brigade 103 ("Mummert") of the LVII lying between Lüben and Liegnitz . Panzer Corps were cut off from Lüben and lost contact with the neighboring divisions to the north. From the area around the village of Kaltwasser , however, according to Colonel General Schörner's orders, these forces were to carry out a risky counter-attack in the direction of the already lost city of Lüben on February 9, in order to cut off the opponent's fast forces from the main forces. This enterprise, which was misguided from the start, failed miserably. In the woods between Haynau and Kaltwasser, the dismembered German infantry columns, tanks and, above all, the supply columns were largely smashed by the Soviet 7th Guard Panzer Corps and the following infantry from the 52nd Army. The remnants of the German units settled south towards Goldberg . The way to Bunzlau was clear for the Soviet 7th Guard Panzer Corps. In the meantime, to the north of it, the 52nd Panzer Brigade (6th Panzer Corps / 3rd Panzer Army) took the opportunity to make a quick advance to the west. The cities of Kotzenau and Haynau were occupied by the Soviet 78th Rifle Corps and 9th Mechanized Corps on February 10 after street fighting.

In the southern section of the front in the area south of Cosel , there was no breakthrough through the German front even after two days. The German 17th Army and Army Group Heinrici proved to be too steadfast for this and the line Rybnik - Ratibor could be held by them. The two attacks that followed were repulsed by the 8th and the quickly brought up 20th Panzer Division . In the area around Brieg , i.e. in the combat area of ​​the Soviet 21st Army, there were no changes in the course of the front. The attacks of the 5th Guards Army with the 20th, 21st and 22nd Guards Tank Brigades were intercepted by the 20th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS , the 283rd Inf.Div and the 20th Panzer Division east of the Reichsautobahn . The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front could no longer support the 4th Ukrainian Front at the interface because they could not make any further progress themselves. The 59th and 60th Armies then largely ceased their offensive activities on February 9 and took up defensive positions themselves. The Moravian-Ostrava industrial area could be held by the Wehrmacht until the end of April 1945.

The break-ins into the German lines in the first days of the offensive marked the Soviet lines of attack: Haynau – Bunzlau – Naumburg am Queis on Görlitz and Goldberg – Löwenberg on Lauban . To the north of the forests, the line emerged from Primkenau - Sprottau - Sagan - Sorau on Forst - Sommerfeld . The German associations withdrew here behind the Bober. On the other hand, the Soviet attackers did not achieve great success on the wings of the central advance. In the southern section, the 6th Army still hesitated on the march towards the "Fortress" Liegnitz , where the circled Panzer Brigade 103 access the city from the north and the remnants of the 17th Infantry Division ("Kampfgruppe Sachsenheimer") from the west the city blocked. On the Soviet side, the 22nd Rifle Corps (6th Army) came to the aid of the 9th Mechanized Corps (3rd Guards Panzer Army) from the northwest on February 9, and the 78th Rifle Corps moved towards the city. The remnants of the German 408th Division had to evade from Liegnitz in a westerly direction. On this day, Liegnitz was taken without major damage. The Soviet motorized units then advanced along the highway in a south-easterly direction in order to establish a connection with the 5th Guards Army. The Sachsenheimer combat group was pushed south and in the direction of Goldberg.

In the northern section of the Soviet breakthrough, the 3rd Guard Army (under General Gordow ) encountered strong defensive positions in the Glogau area . The city was declared a fortress , which was not taken into account in the Soviet plans for conquest. Marshal Konev therefore ordered the 4th Panzer Army and the 25th Panzer Corps to support this area.

The Primkenau-Haynau line was consistently reached by the Red Army (3rd Guards Panzer and 52nd Army) in the middle section on February 10th in the north-south course. On the same day, the commander of the Soviet 6th Bomber Corps, Major General Ivan Polbin, was shot down by anti-aircraft guns in action over Breslau .

The German XXIV. Panzer Corps under General Walther Nehring and the Panzer Corps "Greater Germany" under Dietrich von Saucken in the north avoided the enemy fighting to the northwest, while in the south the LVII. Panzer Corps had been split up by several Soviet armored forces. The massive blow of the Panzer Corps "Greater Germany" between the villages of Weißig and Wolfersdorf on the edge of the Primkenauer Forest against the anti-tank traps of the Soviet 10th Guard Panzer Corps enabled the remaining troops to move into the opaque forest and escape the enemy. Even further north of this, the XXIV Panzer Corps ( 16th Panzer Division , 72nd , 88th and 342nd Infantry Divisions ) received orders on February 10th to retreat further in a north-westerly direction towards Freystadt - Naumburg am Bober and the Soviet units to forestall on the Bober River. The Soviet 25th Independent Panzer Corps used this opportunity to close the ring around Glogau on February 12th. This was followed by continuous attacks by the three Soviet infantry divisions with the help of artillery units from the south against the city, as the tank corps had been pulled further west. The siege of the "fortress" had now begun.

The fast armored Soviet forces of the 17th Guards Mechanized Brigade (6th Guards Mechanized Corps) under Colonel Leonid Tschurilow advanced from Primkenau in a northwesterly direction on February 11, bypassed the town of Sprottau extensively and after 35 kilometers south of Naumburg den Bober over a waterworks dam near Gladisgorpe. A bridgehead was immediately formed by the unit. Now the Soviet 4th Panzer Army under General Lelyushenko was the leading army on the entire front in the race to the west. The units of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of the competitor General Pawel S. Rybalko were standing on the Bober on the same day, but due to the course of the river about 20-30 kilometers further east. The open flanks of the leading tank army, however, resulted in a risky situation.

On February 12, parts of the tank corps "Greater Germany" took positions east of Sprottau after leaving the Primkenau Forest. The "Brandenburg" division formed a bridgehead in Ober Leschen and the "Hermann Göring" division set up in a triangle between Sprotte and Bober around the local airfield. The connection to the XXIV Panzer Corps, which was retreating north of the Sprat, was thereby re-established and an attempt was made to build a line of defense east of the Bober. Two armored trains were also used. The German groups under General Nehring hurried after the Soviet 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, but were themselves pursued by advancing units of the Soviet 10th Panzer Corps. It almost cost its 61st Panzer Brigade to reposition the Soviet Corps when the combat groups of the 25th Panzer Division shot at the enemy across the narrow river.

The positions in front of Sprottau were abandoned on February 12, when the Soviet 102nd Rifle Corps (13th Army) again bypassed the south-facing XXIV Panzer Corps to the east and threatened the ambushes. The Panzer Corps "Greater Germany" then withdrew below Sagan on February 13th. General Nehring's XXIV Panzer Corps had been ordered to take the longer route via Neustädel-Freiburg and had to clear the march route to Naumburg am Bober / Christianstadt . The two neighboring small towns on the Bober continued to play an important role in the entire operation. The XXXX that follows from Neusalz . Panzer Corps did not reach the double location until February 13 and moved on in a north-westerly direction.

The riflemen of the Soviet 48th Rifle Corps (52nd Army) crossed the Bober river between Ober Leschen and Bunzlau on February 10th and in the next few days even advanced with shock troops further west through the difficult forest area to Queis. Nevertheless, General Rybalko's armored units could not be crossed across the Bober, as the skilful opening of the Boberschleusen in the upper course of the river by German pioneers led to the destruction of the Soviet heavy pontoon bridges several times and thus delayed the advance for several days.

Although the German units were severely fragmented by the rapid pace of retreat, the intention was to maintain the defensive position at the Bober crossings. Furthermore, the German units from the "Lower Silesia Fortress Section" under General Adolf Bordihn had the Sagan-Bunzlau section in their hands - on February 12th, the 21st Panzer Division from the Küstrin area joined the Panzer Corps "Greater Germany" . The large forest between the two cities became a refuge for several German combat groups.

The 6th Volksgrenadier Division, newly formed together with Volkssturm units, retreated in an arc from Haynau to Bunzlau, repeatedly involved in the retreat battles against the incoming 53rd Guards Tank Brigade. In the district town, the troops were reinforced by the tank destroyer division in 1183 with a few new " Hetzer " tanks. The lack of coordination with the neighboring units (there was an intact home flak unit in the neighboring village without intervening in the fight) and the unexpected abandonment of the positions north of Bolesławiec by a police battalion led to the people's grenadiers fighting losing out. The Soviet breakthrough came on February 12th and led to the occupation of the city. In the evening this victory was greeted in Moscow with a new tradition - a 20-fold salute from 224 cannons.

On February 12th, south of Bunzlau, the entire 6th Panzer Corps of the Red Army crossed the Bober, although the German Air Force flew constant attacks with attack aircraft. The corps now received the order from Konew to take the town of Gorlitz . After the capture of Bunzlau the way now seemed free for the conquerors. However, the Soviet Marshal had to recall the main forces of the 3rd Panzer Army - the 7th Guards Panzer Corps and the 9th Mechanized Corps - and use them in the offensive south of Wroclaw. There a successful strike (of short duration) against the fortress enclosure had just been carried out by three combat groups of the Wehrmacht . The recall of Konew's best efforts to the east interrupted the advance to Görlitz for several days. The Soviet 53rd Guards Tank Brigade, advancing in the direction of Lauban, penetrated as far as Naumburg am Queis on the evening of February 13, but was involved there in two-day battles against the 6th Volksgrenadier Division. The river crossing was prevented again according to the same pattern - by opening the locks in the upper course in good time.

The parts of the Soviet 3rd Panzer Army now attacking from the west were able to advance to Goldberg and Striegau on February 13th . On this day the nearby Groß-Rosen concentration camp was liberated by the 91st Panzer Brigade (9th Mechanized Corps). A one-day connection to the fortress of Breslau was opened by the German 19th Panzer Division on February 14th . The Soviet tank units of the 3rd Panzer Army, which had come from the west, supported the attacks of the 6th Army (General Glusdowski ) that had already taken place from the east . The next day, February 15th, the ring around the state capital was closed, with the battle for Wroclaw continuing until May 6th.

In the north-western part of Lower Silesia, the German units had to leave the area between the Oder and the Bober more or less without a fight, as the Red Army was already advancing on Sagan and threatening to encircle it. From the bridgeheads on the lower Bober, the Soviet units could only advance over a narrow, several kilometers wide land bridge in the direction of the Lusatian Neisse . The left bank of the Bober was not completely occupied by the Red Army up to Cross. The dispersed groups of Division 463 found their way back to German units at Grünberg after they had to retreat from the invasion of Soviet troops at von Odereck. The city of Grünberg could not be held with its weak forces, reinforced by Volkssturm units, and was occupied on February 14 by troops of the Soviet 25th Panzer Corps and the 3rd Guard Army. In the evening, Moscow celebrated the day's victories with a 20-fold gun salute from 224 cannons.

Although the Red Army soldiers had already fought for several bridgeheads on the left bank of the Bober, the OKW still tried to restore the HKL along the two rivers Bober and Queis. The chances of this were great in mid-February. Panzer Corps XXIV. And Greater Germany stood south of Sagan on the western bank of the Bober. The Soviet 10th Panzer Corps (Colonel Nil Tschuprow) crossed the Bober on February 12 a little north of the city of Sagan at the hydroelectric power station in Greisitz, but had to wait until the 6th Mechanized Corps had expanded its own positions around Naumburg am Bober. There the defense of parts of the German brigade z. b. V. 100 led by Colonel Lothar Berger and the Wirth Police Brigade .

The Battle of the Bober

Battle of the Bober (February 13-20, 1945)

The battle between the advancing Soviet and the following German units took place in the lower course of the Bober and Neisse rivers from February 13 to February 20, 1945. This definition is mostly found in Polish military literature.
In a coordinated counterattack, the German troops briefly restored the HKL from Naumburg / Christianstadt along the Bober to Sagan and prevented the main Soviet forces from connecting to the units west of the Bober.

The detailed course of the fighting and the participating German troops are difficult to understand today due to the mixing of improvised and assembled units. The fighting units were also renamed or reassigned under orders during these days: on February 15 the Wirth police brigade in the 35th SS Police Grenadier Division and on February 14 the " Dirlewanger Brigade " in the 36th Waffen Grenadier Division the SS . Many skirmishes were carried out at night and were used as a distraction for operational actions. The Soviet and German troops were often intermingled. Since the German commanders acted freely at regimental or battalion level, the companies are also poorly documented. The combat area was predominantly in the pine forest areas, but the camouflage also offered the possibility of surprise attacks for both sides. The armored units could only roll on the paved roads because the ground had thawed. The air forces on both sides had stepped up their operations. During this period, the German Air Force flew up to 700 missions a day, since it was now established “that the focus is in the east; accordingly the gasoline allocation takes place ”. The successor to Hans-Ulrich Rudel as commander of SG 2 Immelmann , Friedrich Lang , was also wounded here during an operation.

On the morning of February 13, the two Soviet breakthrough units of the 4th Pz. Army (10th Pz.K. and 6th Gde.-Mech.K) carried out the attack from their positions near Naumburg / Christianstadt. When the Wirth police brigade unexpectedly left its positions in the direction of Sommerfeld, the Soviet 6th Mech.K. from the bridgehead. Via the village of Benau , a local railway junction, the Red Army soldiers advanced along the railway line in the direction of Neisse and stood at Sommerfeld at night . The attack of the 10th Panzer Corps on Sorau ran parallel to the south . There, on the evening of February 13th, the garrison and railway junction was broken into from the north. Since there were still about 3,500 wagons of coal in the room, the importance of the OKW's defense was underlined in the situation book of February 13, 1945.

After the Soviet 4th Panzer Army had crossed the Bober, the German XXIV Panzer Corps that followed from Neusalz had crossed the river in Naumburg / Christianstadt, took positions around the small town on the evening of February 13 and restored the HKL. The city of Sagan was continued by the units of the Volksturm (Leutnant. Archer) against from the north by Soviet troops of 117 Inf. Div. (Gen. E. Koberidse) held attacks.

In the morning hours of February 14, 1945, the Soviet 6th Mech.K. entered the town of Sommerfeld under Colonel Wasyl Orlov. The troops advanced in the space between Forst and Guben . The 61st Pz.Brig remained on the left wing of 4th Pz. A. in Sorau and a small raiding party set off towards the Neisse. The units of K.Gr. “GD” and street fighting began. On that day the fierce fighting on the Bober increased. The troops of the Soviet 13th Army were simultaneously from the Air Force and from the XXIV Pz.K. prevented from crossing the river. The Soviet 102nd Inf. Corps managed to cross the Bober to the Benau – Sorau railway line (sealed off by Volksturmbataillon 331 Sagan-Land and an armored train). The Soviet 121st Inf Div broke out of Benau to join the fast mechanized forces west of Sommerfeld, but got stuck in the fighting over the small town of Gassen . A situation arose that was typical of the fighting of those days: the Soviet spearheads had breached the defensive line and had advanced up to 45 km to the west, but without paying attention to the advancing infantry. Although they overran the German units, on the other hand the connection to their own main forces was broken and they were stuck in the forest area. The attacks of the German attack pilots in the apron to the Neisse, as well as strong defenses in the Forst - Triebel - Teuplitz area , did not allow the assault units of the Soviet 4th Panzer Army and the 10th Panzer Corps to cross the river quickly . Ultimately, both groups took up defensive positions.

The German 4th Panzer Army under General Fritz-Hubert Gräser came up with the plan on February 14th, with the help of XXXX, which stood between Neisse and Bober . Pz.Korps (25th Pz.Div) together with XXIV. Pz.K. (with the combat groups 16. Pz.Div., 72, 88 and 342. Inf.Div. ) from the north and with the K.Gr. "GD" and 20th Pz.Div. from the south and along the western bank of the Bober to cut off the Soviet breakthrough forces completely and to remove the Bober bridgehead. The troops in the strength of two regiments with 35 tank and assault guns led the counterattack on Benau, where the staff of the Soviet 4th Panzer Army (Colonel General Dmitri Leljuschenko) sat and only parts of the Soviet 102nd Inf. Corps (207 Reg .) was held. Southern counterattacks with the help of remnants of the German K.Gr. "GD" and the 20th Panzer Grenadier Division (under Major Schrapkowski) on the Sorau – Sagan road in the direction of Benau were also successful. Although the two German shock troops did not meet except for a 3 km wide gap, the Soviet units were cordoned off west of the Bober. In the evening, the Soviet troops around Benau were defeated by the 17th Guard Mech.Brig and 93. Pz.Brig. reinforced from the rear reserves. The fighting then continued overnight and part of the village came back into German hands. Regardless of this, the 49th Soviet Mech Brig , standing in front of the Neisse, had crossed the river at Groß Gastrose (near the mill works) on the night of February 15 and formed a small bridgehead.

On the morning of February 15, the German counter-attacks on the city of Sorau were carried out from three directions. According to Soviet sources, the SS police brigade Wirth advanced from the north . From the southeast came the K.Gr. "Zimmermann" (the remains of the "GD") supported by armored vehicles and the KGr. under Major Michael (from the remnants of the 16th PD - I./Pz.Gr.Regt. 64) from the south. The street fights against the Soviet 62 Pz.Brig that remained in Sorau . and the 726 Inf.Reg. (121st Inf. Div.) Increased in severity. The conditions of the improvised fighting in the Sorau area described Wolfgang Werthen in the "History of the 16th Panzer Division":

“[…] The situation was completely unresolved, the commandant's office in Sorau was helpless. […] When Sorau was attacked by Russians, he [Mjr. Michael] the leadership of several Volkssturm battalions. They consisted mainly of old World War II soldiers who were only equipped with outdated rifles. [...] Nevertheless, the Russians managed to capture the Sorau train station. A German raid troop, however, chased away the tenaciously defending enemy and recaptured their own weapons transport. The Volkssturm could be equipped with new carbines and some machine guns.
Major Michael ruthlessly captured all the units that appeared in the Sorau area. [...] She put up tough resistance against the Russian in tough house-to-house fights. […] In the Hansdorf area south of Sorau, replacement units, air force flying personnel, naval artillerymen and officers of the motor force joined the combat group. On a railway line, the men discovered new self-propelled guns with unadjusted barrels; Communication equipment, vehicles and spare parts were found on the Sagan-Sorau road. The poorly equipped and assembled combat group entered on June 18th. [February] together with a paratrooper unit ['HG'] and a 'Hetzer' division [...] on the Sorau – Sagan road to attack. "

Also, the counterattack against Benau was also on 15 February with the help of the north-standing Sommerfeld German 25th Panzer Division and from Guben be moved " Dirlewanger Brigade " continued. The units advanced against the village that day and completely occupied it. At the same time, SS Storm Regiment 2 of the "Dirlewanger" captured Sommerfeld on February 16. Thus the Soviet forces in Sorau (61st Panzer Brig. And 726 Inf.Reg.), Gassen (parts of 121st Inf.Div ) were encircled; west of Sommerfeld, the 49th Mech.Brig. with the Flak Regiment 2003 and west of Sorau the parts of the 62nd Panzer Brig. cut off from the main forces. The city of Sagan could still be claimed by the German garrison that day. The German troops secured the village of Benau against the attacking Soviets and advanced further south into the neighboring village of Reinswalde (Złotnik), where the Soviet 207 Flak Reg. was tenaciously defended. Because the Bober crossings for the Soviet 93rd, 63rd Pz.Brig, 17th Guard-Mech.Brig, 68th Flak-Div. and 22. Self-propelled Art. Brig. (both commanders Colonel Aleksandr Koslow and Wasili Prichodko fell in the fighting) were still cordoned off, Marshal Konev now recognized the threatening situation. In order to hold the bridgehead, the Soviet Marshal attacked the reserves in the morning of February 16, 1945 and at the same time called the 6th Gde.-Mech.K., which was on the Neisse. partially back. The Soviet 28th Gde.-Pz.Sturm-Reg., One regiment each of 112 Inf.Div and 49. Mech.Brig. should cross the Sommerfeld area, the 61st Pz.Brig. via Sorau from the west and at the same time the 93rd Pz.Brig. conquer the Benau – Reinswalde section from the east with 280 Inf.Div . The Soviet 121st Inf.Div from the west and the 6th Gde-Inf.Div (27th Corps) advanced against the Sorau siege ring and occupied the city again. Around 200 aircraft were captured in and around the city (Focke-Wulff's production facility).

The critical situation of the Soviet troops along the Bobers worsened on February 17th. The associations of the 6th Gde.-Mech.K. were attacked from Sommerfeld and got no further. The Soviet attacks from the east on Benau and Reinswalde could be intercepted by the German troops of KGr “Dirlewanger” and the 25th PD . Furthermore, the Soviet soldiers of the 27th Inf.K and 61 Pz.Brig. Attacked north of Sorau near Wellersdorf by the German KGr "GD" . The commander of the 4th Pz.A Gen. In the evening Lelyuschenko even asked the front commandos to call back all of his forces on the Neisse, but Konev did not approve of it, since the marshal had just drawn up new plans of attack. The heavy fighting on the Bober, with many losses on both sides, continued on February 18, and the turning point came. The Soviet 61st Pz.Brig fighting off Sorau . and the parts of the 6th Gde.-Mech.K. coming from the Neisse had now united and reached the western edge of Benau together that evening. Also on February 18, 1945, the Soviet 25th Panzer Corps crossed the Bober north of Christianstadt. There they pressed on the right wing of the XXXX Pz.K. against the brigade zbV 100 and mixed units of the Matterstock infantry division, which in turn withdrew along the road to Guben . The city of Crossen went to the Soviet 25th Pz.K. and 21st K lost. This led to the threat of encircling the XXIV. Pz.K. in the Sommerfeld-Naumburg area from the north. There were also Soviet breakthroughs to the south of Sagan as far as the Halbau and the threat of encircling K.Gr. "GD" .

On the afternoon of February 19th, supported by bombers and the 22nd self-propelled Art. Brig. the Red Army captured the village of Benau. The situation of the German troops had thus deteriorated considerably. The permanent union at the thrust of north and south along the Bobers was thus thwarted. Thereupon the commander of the 4th Army (AOK 4) gave General Fritz Gräser on February 19, 1945 the order to stop the counterattacks on the Bober and to retreat behind the Neisse. The "Dirlewanger" brigade went straight to Guben, as the enemy had already reached the city and the fighting there increased. The German 24th Pz.K. under Gen. Walter Nehring went away from the Bober as the last troop in the direction of Sommerfeld and reached the bridgehead of the XXXX Pz.K. on the night of February 21st south of Guben. A previous attack against the Soviet bridgehead around Gastrose failed. The combat group 16. Pz.Div. went to Bad Muskau over the Neisse. The fighting of the retreating units between Bober and Neisse continued for a few days.

Change of operational objectives by the Soviet high command

After a week of operations, Konew came to the conclusion that the loss-making battles against the German troops of Army Group Center did not go according to plan and that the specified goals were not achieved. In particular, the wing troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front made no progress, and if they did, they made great losses. The sieges of the two fortresses Glogau and Breslau also tied three armies (5th Gde, 6th, 21st). The German counterattack on the Bober also shook the entire company. Marshal Konev himself later recorded in his book:

“Unfortunately, our 13th Army did not use the opportunities it opened up and did not address the tank soldiers. In this case, insufficiently energetic that one can explain with the extreme tiredness of the workforce, the army did not reach the Neisse. And the Germans managed to close the broken front behind Lelyushenko's army. The battles of the infantry have taken on the protracted character and cut off the connection to the tank soldiers for a few days. "

Several factors apparently were not taken into account when planning the operation: the contested area with many densely built-up towns, forests, canals and rivers slowed the advance of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The weather conditions, the supply situation, the worn-out condition of the units and the not-to-be-overlooked declining discipline of the Red Army soldiers (looting, excessive alcohol) led to the failure of the targets. Above all, the German high command had been underestimated when it came to “the ability to restore the combat capability of the broken units and units”.

On February 16, Marshal Konew sent the plan correction to Stawka. Now the remaining units standing under him should only come as far as the Neisse, conquer the Görlitz area, clear the area of ​​the German units, take the defensive positions on the river, conquer the besieged fortresses of Breslau and Glogau in the hinterland and on the left wing as far as the Sudetes advance.

For the Soviet high command in Moscow, the ongoing attack on the Eastern Front did not develop satisfactorily. The 1st Ukrainian Front remained much further back in the east, which also endangered the advance of the 1st Belarusian Front. The 4th Ukrainian Front, operating in Slovakia, had not achieved great success during the period and had not got beyond the Carpathian Mountains. The apron up to the Sudetes was still in German hands. Konev's troops had to form the long front south of the Breslau-Berlin autobahn and take up defensive positions. On February 17, the Soviet High Command approved the change. At the same time Marshal Zhukov was given the order to stop the 1st Belarusian Front on the lower Oder from Fürstenberg to Stettin .

The situation developed between February 16 and 24

On February 16, the front line ran south of Sagan along the Queis to Bunzlau. The sections were defended by the Pz.K. "GD", the 21st Pz.D and the 6th VGD .

After the re-conquest of Sorau on February 16, the danger to the left flank of the Soviet 4th Panzer Army was not over, as it was still threatened by German forces. General Lelyuschenko had to hand over part of his available armored forces to the 13th Army and regroup. The attack against the group of the German Pz-K standing south of Sorau to Halbau along the railway line . “GD” had to be postponed for two days due to a lack of artillery ammunition and did not begin until February 19. During this time General von Saucken had recognized the Soviet intentions and relocated the positions so that they formed a semicircle from west of Sorau to Priebus. The German units had meanwhile received orders to go behind the Neisse, so that the regrouping was the preparation for the evasion of the Corps "GD". The ineffective Soviet artillery strike and the blocking of the retreat routes by German rearguard units led to very high losses in General Lejuschenko's Soviet 4th Panzer Army . His troops approached the Neisse south of Forst on February 21, and the connection to the cut units was restored. The bridgehead at Gastrose and other smaller ones were later cleared by the German troops in March 1945. A further advance across the river was unthinkable for Konew at this point. In general, his units were very worn and at the end of their tether. The superiority against the German troops could still be maintained. For example, the XXXX. Pz.K. no more tanks available at Guben at this time. The added combat group XXIV. Pz.K. from Gen. Nehring had been involved in retreat battles without interruption since mid-January and had just made contact with the troops behind the Neisse via the bridgehead.

The fierce fighting for the town of Guben began on February 18, 1945. The scattered units of the Matterstock Infantry Division (XXXX Pz.K.) had withdrawn into the town. The "Dirlewanger" brigade after the withdrawal from Benau and the brigade zbV 100 from Bobersberg also took part in the defense of the "fortress". The district on the eastern bank of the Neisse was 80% destroyed in the heavy street fighting that lasted until March 1st. In the forest area the right flank of the Soviet 52nd Army (48 Inf.K.) fought against the German 21st Pz. Div , which was still in supply. From February 17, the division received from H.Gr. In the middle, the order to move behind the Neisse and build the new HVAC there. Thus, the Queis line in the middle section was abandoned by the German high command. The division's withdrawal was then ended on February 20 in the Rothenburg / Oberlausitz area . In the center of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the Soviet infantry units 78th Inf.K reached the Neisse on February 21st. On February 23, the main forces of the 52nd Army moved to Plensk and occupied the positions on the eastern bank of the river.

Attack against Lauban and Görlitz

The well-motorized Soviet units of the 9th Mech.K. and 7th Pz.K. returned on February 16 from the Breslau area and continued the attacks with the goal of Görlitz after a three-day break. The plan was to use the 6th Pz.K. from the northeast and with the 7th Pz.K. to attack from the east. The first corps had a good chance of carrying out the plan, as the units had just crossed the Queis and were about 30 km from the city. The second Panzer Corps with the Mech. Brigade was supposed to conquer the district town of Lauban on the way. On February 17th, an initially successful counterattack by the German 6th PVGD together with parts of the 17th Pz.Div. the Red Army soldiers from 6th Pz.K. stopped on the Reichsstraße to Görlitz. Now the German armored units were suddenly called back to Görlitz by the army command in the evening. The next day, the 6th PVGD , who had been left alone , withdrew from Naumburg, but together with the Panzergrenadier Regiment 40 (17th Pz. Div) under Major Friedrich Ferdinand Prinz zu Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg, they followed the Reichsstrasse through a daring counter-attack Görlitz sealed off. Due to the lack of communication with the rest of the 17th Pz.Div. the chance was missed, the reluctant Soviet 6. Gde-Pz.K. throw back. During the entire period of the fighting it was very difficult to keep track of troop movements and occupations without functioning communication. As was the case from the beginning of the operation, the situation was often queried via the public postal telephone network or the orders passed on, but this was bugged by the Soviet intelligence services. Kohlfurt was lost on February 19 .
Due to the changeable weather, the fields beyond the paved roads were impassable for the tanks. The acting sides could not carry out any circling operations during that time. The Red Army soldiers were also unable to successfully push through any of the popular frontal attacks, as funds were now running out. As General Dragunski wrote in his memoir about the roads in Lower Silesia:

“We moved on the German earth, overcoming the impassability. 'But is that dirt - worse than ours!' The voice of [adjutant] Pyotr Koschemjakow tore me out of my deep thoughts. 'I thought we would roll on the asphalt roads to Berlin'. Pyotr is absolutely right. As soon as you turn off the path, you will immediately find yourself in the sticky mud. I just remembered the first two years of the war when the fascists tried to justify their failures at Moscow and Stalingrad […], like General 'Winter', General 'Dreck' and lack of paths as their greatest allies Russians help. [...] With difficulty, getting through kilometer by kilometer, we moved forward. "

The Soviet 7th Panzer Corps advanced with the 23rd and 56th Inf. Brig. On February 17th to the eastern districts of Lauban. The Soviet artillery and the air force began shelling the city, which led to destruction and fires. The last refugee train left the city that day. The Hitler Youth groups operating with the Volkssturm (around 40 mostly 16-year-olds) were evacuated by the commandant's office to villages to the west, as they were not allowed to take part in the direct fighting by order. In Lauban, a battle for the city of over two weeks had begun. The tough street fighting with the participation of tanks, artillery and air force on both sides led to extensive destruction. The Soviet units now controlled the Görlitz-Greiffenberg- Troppau railway line running through the city and had thus interrupted the supply routes to Upper Silesia.

The German grenadiers of the Führer-Accompany-Division in the defensive battle between Lauban and Löwenberg

The following night, February 18, the German 8th Pz.Div. was brought up to Greiffenberg by rail from the Jauer-Striegau area and the troops were considerably reinforced, which came as a great surprise to the Soviet commanders. The Soviet intelligence services had not recognized that the German 17th Pz.D and later the 8th Pz.D were meeting south-east of Lauban as far as Löwenberg , as well as the 408th Inf.D, which was between the two Soviet units of the 3rd Gde- Pz.A had been withdrawn from the Liegnitz area. Instead of starting in one direction, General Rybalko distributed his two tank corps across a broad front. It was too late to correct the mistake. The Soviet 7th Pz.K. at the time had become involved in the fighting east of Lauban against the German attacks from the south. The Stawka (i.e. Stalin) also learned of the threat to the 3rd Gde-Pz.A , and Konew was confronted, which the marshal himself noted in his book:

“On the day when the fascist parts began to attack the ambushes of the 3rd Panzer Army, Stalin called me and expressed his concern: 'What is happening with you with the 3rd Panzer Army? Where is she located? ' I replied that Rybalko's army is having very strenuous fighting at Lauban, and I mean nothing strange has happened to them. The army is fighting in a complicated situation, but for the armored forces the thing is habitual. "

Now Konew tried to regroup from 6. Pz.K. again the 7th Pz.K. with the 51st, 53rd Pz.Brig, 16th self-propelled Art.Brig and 57th Pz.Reg to support. The subsequent attacks on February 23 and 27 did not bring any decision, as they were thwarted by local counter-attacks by German units.

Location in Glogau Fortress and Wroclaw Fortress

Gauleiter Karl Hanke speaking in Breslau in February 1945

Two cities declared as “fortresses” have been besieged by the 1st Ukrainian Front since mid-February. Wroclaw was enclosed with over 45,000 defenders from the field and reserve army with 200 guns, 7 tanks, 8 assault guns and approx. 80,000 civilians. The remnants of the 609th and 269th Inf. Div. Were under the command of Major General Hans von Ahlfen. as well as Luftwaffe, Waffen-SS, police and Volksturm units. The main attacks of the Soviet 6th Army came against the 60 km long line of fortifications around the city - with 294th Inf.Div., 74th Inf.K and 22nd Inf.K., a total of around 50,000 Red Army soldiers at that time. By the end of February, the attackers were able to win only 2 km of front lines in tough street and house fights from the south. Often in literature the three months of fighting for the city are compared with those in Stalingrad.

The city of Glogau was enclosed on February 11 with around 9,000 defenders under Colonel Jonas Graf zu Eulenburg (from February 12) and around 2,000 remaining civilians. From the beginning, the city was set on fire and increasingly destroyed mainly by artillery fire and the air forces of the 2nd Air Army. The Soviet 329th Inf. Div. (3rd Gde Army) under Colonel Fiodor Abaschew was initially not strong enough (and without tank support) to carry out a quick assault. From February 21, the shelling subsided because the ammunition was running out. From the German side, supplies for the defenders came from the air to a limited extent. Due to the progressive retreat of the Wehrmacht units behind the Bober and finally the Neisse, no attempts were made to break through to the Glogau fortress and thus the occupation was left to its fate. The Soviet siege forces received support from artillery and tanks only later, after the entire operation was over.

Soviet attack on the Sudeten Wall

After the enclosure of Wroclaw in mid-February, the Soviet 32nd Corps (3rd Gde-A.) Was withdrawn and used against the German defense on the Löwenberg-Goldberg-Jauer-Striegau line. The corps supported already deployed units of the 5th Gde-A. and the 21st A on the advance towards the Sudeten. In the direction of Schweidnitz the forces of the 4th Pz.K. and 31st Pz.K. into the fighting. On the German side at Strehlen , the combat groups of the 254th, 269th Inf.Div and 19th Pz.Div, 20th Pz.Div. and the 100th Light Inf.Div. ready. In this area the Red Army advanced only 8 km to the south until February 24th and stopped near Schweidnitz. Marshal Konev, contrary to his plan of operations, had not conquered the Sudeten foothills.

Behavior of the Soviet troops in the combat zone

When the Red Army soldiers marched into Silesia, there were countless crimes of all kinds against the population and German soldiers. In addition to indiscriminate murders of individuals or groups, brutal rape and shot refugee poles, excessive alcohol consumption, looting and senseless destruction became by-products of the Soviet soldiers in the occupied territories. A reliable picture of the crimes emerged for the crime scenes where the German counter attacks such as B. in March 1945 at Lauban and Striegau were successful and the official investigations were started.

“The first season just had time to collect the 'Uhri' [the watches] and jewelry. The second season was less of a rush; she had enough time to get on with the women. For the third season there was no more jewelry or fresh women; but as the rearguard, who stayed behind in the city, she was free to stuff her suitcases with clothes and fabrics. "

- M. Koriakoff : I wanted to be human.

There were excesses in the occupied territories, especially among the rifle associations that followed and the security units. Many German counterattacks and surprise attacks were successful precisely because the delays in securing the area on the part of the looting or drunken Soviet infantry troops and they simply did not carry out their tasks.

The daily ration of 100 grams of vodka for every Soviet soldier at the front certainly played a role, but also consumed home-made booze or stolen goods. In the countless small businesses in the Silesian cities, quantities of alcohol were conquered. During the combat operation, alcohol was apparently primarily a problem for the infantry. The victims of excessive alcohol consumption were often the Soviet soldiers themselves or the officers who wanted to bring order to the units that were “on the verge of disintegration”.

Whether it was only the excessive consumption of alcohol that led to the murders, rape and robbery remains a matter of dispute. At first the soldiers fought under orders to take revenge. The feelings of hatred for everything German, which were stimulated by the Soviet military press, front-line and troop newspapers, played a considerable role. The retaliation against the Germans was also a motivational theme of the agitators for the younger and younger Red Army soldiers - by the end of 1944 almost all seventeen-year-olds were recruited. The fact that the acts of violence were carried out on the basis of special orders was refuted even by the report of the Foreign Army East Department of February 1945, stating that “the bestial behavior of individual groups of Red Army soldiers [...] was not due to orders from superior agencies, but a consequence the fanatical German baiting in the USSR ”. In the field post letters captured by the German units, the Red Army soldiers' view of the fair punishment for Germany came into play. Most of the Soviet soldiers from the areas temporarily occupied by the Germans in the years 1941–1944 were themselves affected by the German looting and reprisals, and had lost family members through Nazi crimes or deportation to Germany (e.g. Gen. Rybalko had his Daughter lost in Ukraine in 1942, Colonel Dragunski lost his entire family) and this strengthened their attitudes psychologically. In addition, there was the rapid brutalization and brutalization in the rifle associations, constant power of disposal over the weapon as a cause of violent excesses.

Another problem for Soviet commanders was the decreasing discipline of the Red Army soldiers. Although the High Command of the 1st Ukrainian Front had issued the order for “measures to restore order in the German areas liberated by our troops” on January 27, there was Violations of discipline and order in Lower Silesia. As a result of the rapid action, many villages in Lower Silesia were occupied without any significant destruction, but were then systematically devastated by fire by the Red Army soldiers. The district town of Liegnitz can be cited as an example: Only after the capitulation in May 1945, as a result of the occupiers' “victory celebration”, was the entire old town destroyed by the fires. The destructiveness also applied to historical objects or monuments of historical personalities, but also to cemeteries.

The previously unknown abundance of goods and goods found as well as the living conditions had also had a certain influence on the Red Army soldiers, which they reported in their letters home:

“Wherever you take a break, you will find wonderful wines, preserves and pastries everywhere in the cellars. Pigs, cows, chickens, etc. roam the farms. […] We eat very well, eat ten times better than the Germans lived in the Ukraine. There is everything to eat, nothing is missing. […] I wear riding boots, have more than one watch and no simple watches; in a word: I swim in wealth [...] "

The explanation for the found prosperity and the high standard of living in Germany was explained by the state and army leadership to their own soldiers with a “deceptive illusion of a pseudo-civilization” with emphasis on the Soviet soldiers as “bringers of true culture”. There was also the formula that all goods from all over Europe had been looted by the German occupiers beforehand. The high spirits, heightened by alcohol, led to an euphoria for victory and a feeling of invincibility among the soldiers. On the other hand, the contrast was heightened by emerging problems with discipline. The Soviet commanders also saw the tendency for looted German clothing, hats and even complete Nazi uniforms, which led to the imaginative appearance of some Soviet soldiers, to be unworthy. Only later, in April 1945, did the Soviet leadership begin to take discipline under stricter control, and there were even severe punishments for rape, up to and including execution.

Results

Front course

The original operational objectives of Konev were not achieved by the 1st Ukrainian Front. But they were satisfied with the modest success. From the end of February 1945, the front ran along the line west of Löwenberg, north-west of Lauban-Rothenburg on the Neisse to the confluence with the Oder and could be held until mid-April. The county of Glatz , the foothills of the mountains with Waldenburg, Reichenbach, Schweidnitz, Hirschberg, Lauban, in the Görlitz area the Silesian part west of the Lusatian Neisse remained in German hands until the capitulation in May 1945. The railway line to Mährisch-Ostrau could still be used and the supply from the industrial areas around Rybnik, Ostrau and Waldenburg could be guaranteed for the time being.

The Soviet Army had the Reichsautobahn Berlin-Breslau completely under control and used it for rapid troop movement and for deliveries of materials to the troops on the Neisse in preparation for the next offensive. The OKH under General Guderian saw the establishment of the new HKL on the Neisse and north of the Sudeten on February 21, 1945 only as a temporary and starting point for a major counter-offensive. At this point the plans were completely unrealistic. Getting the troops up on time often brought limited success, but there was a lack of supplies and, above all, fuel for the major operations. The Army Group later carried out successful local counter-attacks at Lauban and Striegau at the beginning of March 1945, but they used up the last reserves. The superior strength of the Soviet army continued despite the losses and was reinforced every day. The conquest of Lower Silesia was by no means easy for the Red Army soldiers. This advance is portrayed as a kind of stroll or completely hidden in most Western publications.

Now the front line froze for almost two months on the western Neisse. The fact that, since the Yalta Conference, Stalin's preferred future western border of Poland coincided with this front line, is not to be regarded as a coincidence. The original plan for the demarcation between Poland and Germany was again based on the front line prior to the start of the Lower Silesian operation.

losses

It has long been claimed in post-war Soviet literature that the Red Army fought against an outnumbered enemy. The numbers were often raised to justify own losses or the length of the fight. The battles at Lauban or on the Bober are not mentioned in the memoirs of the Soviet commanders in the 1980s as operational actions, but at most as difficult breakthroughs.

In some battles, almost complete Soviet tank brigades (e.g. 61st and 63 Pz.Brig / 5th Gde-Mech. Corps) were destroyed by German units. It is difficult to state the absolute number of losses of the destroyed tank units, as new machines were added every day, some were repaired and others were lost.

A particularly critical situation for the Soviet mechanized and armored forces occurred around February 21, 1945, which even found its place in the Soviet memoirs of the commanders at the time. The tank brigades had 15–20 tanks for this purpose. The 7th Gde-Pz.K. (3. Gde-PzA) had 55 operational tanks on that day, the 9th Mech.K 48 tanks (compared to the budget of 241 at the beginning of the operation). The Soviet 4th Panzer Army had 257 armored vehicles (162 Т-34, 22 JS-2, 12 SU-122, 16 SU-85, 20 SU-76, 23 SU-57 and 6 «Valentine») canceled. Most of the destruction would be due to the effects of artillery weapons (tank cannons, anti-tank guns, artillery). The losses in the 4th Pz.A. According to Soviet data, the Panzerfaust operations put 20 tanks, i.e. approx. 7.8% of the total losses. Similar sources reported that the 3rd Panzer Army had lost 268 tanks, 81 self-propelled guns, 248 cannons and mortars, 342 cars and 8,736 soldiers (1,883 of whom were killed). The latest Russian sources put their own casualties as 23,577 killed and 75,809 wounded (2.4% together) out of 980,800 Soviet soldiers involved in the operation.

In the historiography there is no total number of German losses for the time of the operation. The sizes of the participating associations for the time period are also not unanimous. It is only possible to give figures which are of limited use and which have been published by some Soviet associations. So z. B. General Rybalko's 3rd Pz.A reported 28,500 German soldiers killed and 500 prisoners of war; 3 armored vehicles, 80 self-propelled guns, 24 guns, 205 aircraft, 200 gliders and over 200 cars were captured.

The German population suffered the greatest losses. Almost every sixth inhabitant of Silesia was a victim of the war, murder or kidnapping.

literature

In German language

• Karl-Heinz Frieser (Ed.): The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 10. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt , Munich 2008.
• Hans von Ahlfen : The fight for Silesia 1944/1945. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 1976, ISBN 3-87943-480-8 . (New edition: Lindenbaum Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-938176-17-7 ).
• Percy Ernst Schramm (Ed.): War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, Part 2. Weltbild 2007, ISBN 978-3-8289-0525-2 .
• Manfred Zeidler : End of the war in the east. The Red Army and the occupation of Germany east of Oder and Neisse 1944/45. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1996, ISBN 3-486-56187-1 .
• Ulrich Saft: War in the East: The bitter end across the Vistula to Oder and Neisse. Military book publisher, Walsrode 2002, ISBN 3-9801789-6-X .
• Rolf Hinze: Last contingent - in defense of the Reich territory. Battles of Army Group Northern Ukraine, A, center. Hinze, Meerbusch 1995, ISBN 3-928322-07-9 .
• Werner Kortenhaus: History of the 21st Panzer Division. Armor Research, 2007, ISBN 978-3-935107-11-2 .
• Georg Gunter : Last laurel. 6th edition. Laumann-Verlag, Dülmen 2006, ISBN 3-89960-284-6 .
• Rolf Michaelis : Memories of the SS special command "Dirlewanger". Michaelis-Verlag, Berlin 2008, ISBN 978-3-930849-46-8 .
• Wolfgang Werthen: History of the 16th Panzer Division 1939-1945. Podzun-Pallas, Bad Nauheim 1958.
• Rolf Becker: Lower Silesia 1945. The escape - the occupation. 6th edition. Aufstieg-Verlag, Landshut 1990, ISBN 3-7612-0116-8 .
• Werner Haupt : When the Red Army came to Germany. Podzun-Pallas, Bad Nauheim 1970, ISBN 3-7909-0145-8 .
• Michael Koriakoff: I wanted to be human. Walter, Olten 1948.

In Russian language

• Ivan Stepanowitsch Konew : Сорок пятый. Воениздат 1970, (online).
  • German: The year forty-five. Translated by Arno Specht. Military publishing house of the GDR, Berlin 1989.
• Дмитрий Данилович Лелюшенко: Москва-Сталинград-Берлин-Прага. Записки командарма. Наука, 1987, (online).

  Gene. Dmitri Danilowitsch Lelyuschenko was the commander-in-chief of the 4th Panzer Army. The memoirs tell his military journey from Moscow to Prague from the point of view of a high-ranking Soviet front-line officer of tank weapons.

• Алексей Валерьевич Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя. Эксмо, 2007, (online).
• Василий Иванович Зайцев: Гвардейская танковая. Sverdlovsk 1989, (online).

  Gene. Vasili Ivanovich Sajtsew tells the story of the 61st Panzer Brigade.

• Виктор Макарович Жагала: Расчищая путь пехоте. Воениздат, 1985, (online).

  Gene. Viktor Makarowitsch Schagala was the commander of the 3rd Light Artillery Brigade. The memories tell of his military journey from Stalingrad to Czechoslovakia.

• Дмитрий Шеин: Танки ведёт Рыбалко. Боевой путь 3-й Гвардейской танковой армии. Яуза, Эксмо, ISBN 978-5-699-20010-8 , (online).

  conveys the military history of the 3rd Guard Panzer Army.

• Константин Васильевич Крайнюков: Оружие особого рода. Мысль, 1984, (online).

  Gene. Konstantin Wasiljewitsch Krajnjukow - His memoirs tell of the military journey from the Dnepr to the Elbe as part of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the perspective of a Soviet staff officer.

• Захар Карпович Слюсаренко: Последний выстрел. Воениздат, 1974, (online).

  Gene. Sachar Kaprovich Slyusarenko was the commander of the 56th Guards Tank Brigade. His memoirs tell of the military path of Brigades 54 and 56. Gd.Pz.Brig (7. Pz.K / 3. Gde-Pz.Armee).

• Давид Абрамович Драгунский: Годы в броне. Воениздат, 1983, (online).

  Gene. David Abramowitsch Dragunski - initially commander of a tank battalion, then the 55th tank brigade (7th Pz.K / 6th Gde.Pz.A) tells his military path.

• Сергей Матвеевич Штеменко: Генеральный штаб в годы войны. Воениздат, 1989, (online).
• Александр Борисович Немчинский: Осторожно, мины! Воениздат, 1973, (online).
• Илья Мощанекий: Бои за Бреслау. Вече, 2010.

In Polish

• Bolesław Dolata: Wyzwolenie Dolnego Śląska w 1945. (Liberation of Lower Silesia 1945.) Wrocław 1985.

  General presentation of the Soviet advance in Lower Silesia with the ideological burden.

• Arkadiusz Wilczyński Lubań 1945. Ostatnie zwycięstwo III Rzeszy. (Lauban 1945. The last victory of the 3rd Reich), ISBN 83-7339-036-7 .

  The battle for Lauban is conveyed to the reader in detail.

• Robert Primke, Maciej Szczerep, Wojciech Szczerep: Wojna w dolinie Bobru. Bolesławiec - Lwówek Śląski - Jelenia Góra w 1945 roku.
• Ivan Jakubowski: Ziemia w ogniu. Warsaw 1976.
• R. Majewski: Dolny Śląsk 1945. Wyzwolenie, Wrocław 1982.

In English

• Christopher Duffy: Red Storm on the Reich. Castle Books, 2002, ISBN 0-7858-1624-0 (German The storm on the Reich. The advance of the Red Army 1945, Munich 1994).
• Catherine Merridale : Ivan's War - Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945. Metropolitan Books, New York 2006, ISBN 0-8050-7455-4 .
  • German: Ivan's war. The Red Army 1939–1945 . Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2014, ISBN 978-3-10-048451-2 , as Fischer paperback: 2014, ISBN 978-3-596-19799-6 .

Web links

Commons : Lower Silesian Operation  - collection of images, videos and audio files

• Last days in Lüben.
• Excerpts from the path of the Soviet 10th Panzer Army (Russian) ( Memento from December 26, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
• Refugee experiences in the middle of the Battle of the Bober.
• Martina Löbner: "Geheime Reichssache" Christianstadt - The end of a small town between the Oder and Neisse and the explosives factory "Ulme". Dissertation at the University of Hanover, 2002
• Depiction of the Battle of the Bober (Polish)
• War experiences in the Gastrose / Cottbus area

Footnotes

1. ↑ This definition follows the official Soviet military historiography, which is also used in the more recent English and German-language literature (e.g. Duffy: Red Storm or Frieser: The German Reich and the Second World War ). In contrast, the German military literature of the post-war period only spoke of the “winter offensive” that began on January 12, 1945 and lasted until the end of February 1945, and was not further subdivided.
2. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1052. The log from January 29, 1945.
3. ↑ Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя. Pp. 124-128.
4. ↑ Штеменко: Генеральный штаб в годы войны. P. 221.
5. ↑ Шеин: Танки ведёт Рыбалко. Боевой путь 3-й Гвардейской танковой армии. P. 277.
6. ↑ Конев: Сорок пятый. P.56.
7. ↑ Конев: Сорок пятый. P. 59.
8. ↑ Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя.
9. ↑ Wilczyński Lubań 1945. p. 19.
10. ↑ Dolata: Wyzwolenie Dolnego Śląska w 1945. P. 49.
11. ↑ Dolata: Wyzwolenie Dolnego Śląska w 1945. p ??.
12. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1290 ff.
13. ↑ Hinze: Last contingent - To defend the Reich territory. P. 129 ff.
14. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1294.
15. ↑ Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. P. 30: "The governor-general Frank first forbade the Upper Silesian construction workers to cross the border, then set up a police supervision and subjected the vehicles to the building material supply to a customs control."
16. ↑ Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. P. 76.
17. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1303.
18. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1304.
19. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1099.
20. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1325.
21. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1300.
22. ↑ Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. P. 155.
23. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1068. Situation log, February 4, 1945.
24. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1076. Situation book February 7, 1945.
25. ↑ Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. Pp. 33-38.
26. ↑ Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. P. 38.
27. ↑ Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. P. 135.
28. ^ Frieser: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 10, p. 582.
29. ↑ Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. P. 131.
30. ↑ Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя. P. 126.
31. ↑ Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. P. 102.
32. ↑ Танковый фронт. 1939-1945.
33. ↑ Hinze: Last contingent. P. 243 ff.
34. ↑ Dolata: Wyzwolenie Dolnego Śląska w 1945. p ??.
35. ↑ ^{a b} Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. P. 115.
36. ^ Percy Schramm: War diary of the OKW. P. 1081.
37. ↑ Конев: Сорок пятый. P. 62.
38. ↑ Saft: War in the East. P. 365.
39. ↑ Saft: War in the East. P. XXXX.
40. ↑ Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя. P. 130.
41. ↑ Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя. P. 131.
42. ↑ PZ22 was completely destroyed here; see also Зайцев: Гвардейская танковая. P. 116.
43. ↑ Ulrich Saft: War in the East: The bitter end beyond the Vistula to the Oder and Neisse. P. 393.
44. ↑ Немчинский А. Б .: Осторожно, мины! P. 219.
45. ↑ Дмитрий Шеин: Танки ведёт Рыбалко. Боевой путь 3-й Гвардейской танковой армии. P. 279.
46. ↑ The police brigade was Staff II, whose task was probably to destroy the nearby warfare agent factory. Compare Martina Löbner: "Geheime Reichssache" Christianstadt - The end of a small town between Oder and Neisse and the explosives factory "Ulme". Dissertation at the University of Hanover, 2002.
47. ↑ Dolata: Wyzwolenie Dolnego Śląska w 1945 S. 79th
48. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, pp. 1092-7.
49. ↑ Martina Löbner: "Geheime Reichssache" Christianstadt. P. 223 ff.
50. ↑ Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. P. 138.
51. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1096. The log from February 15, 1945 reported the unification of the two groups.
52. ↑ Дмитрий Данилович Лелюшенко: Москва-Сталинград-Берлин-Прага. Записки командарма. To weigh. Lelyushenko described in his memoir, p. 241:

    “Our 6th Mechanized Guard Corps came to the Neisse River on February 14th. The scouting party of the 49th Mechanized Brigade (Colonel Peter Turkin) (9 soldiers) led by Lieutenant Gulenschajew approached the Neisse Bridge near Groß Gastrose on the night of February 15, destroyed the protection and seized the fully intact bridge. During the capture, a Russian girl helped the scouts who had previously been freed from fascist captivity in Markersdorf [Markosice] by our soldiers. She led the soldiers to the bridge and took part in the destruction of enemy protection. "

53. ↑ Зайцев: Гвардейская танковая. P. 120.
54. ^ Werthen: History of the 16th Panzer Division 1939–1945. S. ??
55. ↑ Michaelis: The SS Storm Brigade "Dirlewanger". P. 94.
56. ↑ Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя. Исаев А. В .: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя. Pp. 133-134.
57. ↑ Лелюшенко: Москва-Сталинград-Берлин-Прага. P. 240.
58. ↑ Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя. “Concerned by the situation of the leading parts, Lelyushenko sent the front staff a report on Feb. 17, 23.15, which one could call 'panicked': 'In connection with what happened in the course of two days of the army 13 and not forward have gone, I ask for permission to turn all parts of the army that are on the Neisse for the purpose of the general blow on Sorau, Benau [...] together with the parts of the 13th Army. '"
59. ↑ Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя.
60. ↑ Конев: Сорок пятый. P. 68: "The troops at the front suffered significant human losses - the rifle division numbered an average of 4600 soldiers at that time."
61. ↑ Конев: Сорок пятый. P. 60.
62. ↑ Dolata: Wyzwolenie Dolnego Śląska w 1945. P. 82 ff.
63. ↑ Конев: Сорок пятый. P. 68.
64. ↑ Dolata: Wyzwolenie Dolnego Śląska w 1945 S. ??
65. ↑ Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя. P. 134 ff.
66. ↑ Dolata: Wyzwolenie Dolnego Śląska w 1945. P. 87: The tank brigades had 15-20 tanks at the time.
67. ↑ Colonel Lothar Berger was even later (from February 28), after the previous local commander Werner Theermann had committed suicide, appointed commander of the city.
68. ^ Kortenhaus: History of the 21st Panzer Division. P. 535.
69. ↑ Wilczyński: Lubań 1945. P. 31 ff.
70. ↑ For this he was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and promoted to colonel.
71. ↑ Luban 1945, pp. 45-47.
72. ↑ Some of them, including Wilhelm “Willi” Hübner, returned to the city on their own initiative and were used as liaison boys or observers. Later, after the city was recaptured in March 1945, its commitment was highlighted in the propaganda news and awarded the “EK” by General Schörner.
73. ↑ Wilczyński Lubań 1945. p. 47.
74. ↑ Конев: Сорок пятый. P. 71.
75. ↑ In the sources, the number of defenders from the regular services varies between 35,000 - s. Duffy: Red Storm. P. 134, 46,000 - Haupt: When the Red Army came to Germany. P. 60, Мощанекий: Бои за Бреслау. (Boi sa Breslau, p. 72), up to 80,000.
76. ↑ Hinze: Last contingent - To defend the Reich territory. P. 143.
77. ↑ Becker: Lower Silesia 1945. P. 91.
78. ↑ Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1944–1945. Volume 4, p. 1113, Lagebuch February 21, 1945.
79. ^ Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 145.
80. ↑ Michael Koriakoff: I wanted to be human. P. 94. Olten, Walter 1948; likewise Zeidler: end of the war in the east. P. 147 (M. Koriakoff - a Soviet officer who fled to the West after the war).
81. ↑ For example in Dyhernfurth - cf. von Ahlfen: Der Kampf um Schlesien. P. 129.
82. ↑ ^{a b} Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 151.
83. ^ Frieser: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 10, p. 716 ff.
84. ↑ Duffy: Red Storm. P. 275.
85. ^ Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 154.
86. ^ Merridale: Ivan's War - Live and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945. P. 167.
87. ^ Zeidler: End of the war in the east. Pp. 135-142.
88. ^ Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 113 ff., P. 135 ff.
89. ^ Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 132.
90. ↑ The Soviet atrocities on German soil. Freiburg Military Archives, RH 2/2684, RH 2/2683 in Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 153.
91. ^ Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 138 ff.
92. ^ Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 136.
93. ^ Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 149.
94. ↑ In it above all the "senseless arson and destruction of shops, warehouses and houses" were named as processes that "had nothing to do with fighting". Source - Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 158.
95. ↑ Legnica. Zarys monografii miasta. Legnica-Wrocław 1998, Wydawnictwo DKTS Silesia, p. 573.
96. ↑ Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. P. 125, Saft: War in the East. P. 401.
97. ↑ So z. B. in Sprottau - source Becker: The escape. Lower Silesia 1945. p. 276.
98. ↑ Military Archive Freiburg, RH 2/2683 Bl 88 F in Zeidler. The war in the east. P. 141.
99. ^ In Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 141 ff.
100. ^ Zeidler: End of the war in the east. P. 154, p. 160.
101. ^ Merridale: Ivan's War - Live and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945. P. 167.
102. ↑ Von Ahlfen: The battle for Silesia. P. 151 ff.
103. ↑ Lower Silesia would have remained German. In: faz.net
104. ↑ So z. For example, the number of defenders in Glogau is given as 18,000 and in Breslau as 80,000 soldiers, which is double the number in the German sources; cf. Dolata: Wyzwolenie Dolnego Śląska w 1945. P. 61, P. 80.
105. ^ Compare Saft p. 393, p. 396.
106. ↑ Dolata: Wyzwolenie Dolnego Śląska w 1945. P. 87, Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя. P. 141, Шеин: Танки ведёт Рыбалко. P. 280.
107. ↑ Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя. P. 134, p. 140.
108. ↑ Шеин: Танки ведёт Рыбалко. P. 283.
109. ↑ Г. Ф. Кривошеев (Ed.): Россия и СССР в войнах XX века.
110. ^ Shein, p. 283.
111. ↑ Becker: Lower Silesia 1945. P. 382.