Wehrmacht report

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The Wehrmacht Report was a German program broadcast during the Second World War about the military situation of the Wehrmacht on all fronts. It was drawn up by the department or official group for Wehrmacht propaganda, broadcast on the midday news and was not only a report on military operations, but also an instrument of National Socialist propaganda . The relevant study by Erich Murawski, published in 1962 as part of the series of publications of the Federal Archives, is regarded as a fundamentally fact-rich, but nevertheless questionable secondary source due to its uncritical presentation.

General

July 1944: German soldiers sit down and question civilians.
"Scherl: Fight against the terrorists in France. In some parts of France, communist terrorist groups keep trying to disrupt German security measures. Suddenly carried out actions put the terrorists to a halt and almost daily the Wehrmacht report reports on the successes against the saboteurs . Again a terrorist group was found in a village in Brittany. The first interrogations take place in the market square. "

The constant announcement "The Wehrmacht High Command announces" was followed by a daily summary of the fighting from the first day of the attack on Poland to the unconditional surrender of the Wehrmacht . This Wehrmacht report was published by the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), more precisely by the Department for Wehrmacht Propaganda (WPr) in the Wehrmacht Command Staff of the OKW, and it was broadcast daily on Großdeutscher Rundfunk at noon before the following news items, as well as being printed by the daily newspapers, often on the front page ( also in the allied and occupied countries and in some cases even in neutral countries). In addition, there were special reports about outstanding successes introduced on the radio with fanfare blasts , the mentions of units or individuals who had distinguished themselves in addition to the Wehrmacht report , and finally the summary reports peppered with figures. In contrast to the Army Report of the First World War , the Wehrmacht Report contained not only the combat operations of their own but also those of the enemy armed forces, for example the Allied air strikes on war targets and cities in the Reich territory. The Wehrmacht report had an official character and was the authoritative source for commenting on the war in the media. A total of 2080 Wehrmacht reports were published. According to a relevant study by the former head of the department for Wehrmacht propaganda and later archivist at the Federal Archives Erich Murawski from 1962, they are a mixture of sober military reports and political propaganda and a valuable and questionable secondary source . Current studies emphasize the propagandistic character of the Wehrmacht report. The Israeli historian Daniel Uziel, who works at the Yad Vashem memorial , sees "the uncritical approach [Murawski's] to his subject" as the main problem of Murawski's study, in addition to the lack of sources available at the time. The German military historian Jörg Echternkamp calls the practice of portraying the "euphemistic" straightening of the front "in the Wehrmacht report" in a series of propagandistic statements that "hide" the "true facts" of the course of the war.

Before it was published, the daily Wehrmacht report passed through several instances. From the incoming reports from the three Wehrmacht parts, the "Wehrmacht Propaganda Department", headed by its chief, Major General Hasso von Wedel , put together a text for Colonel General Alfred Jodl , Chief of the Wehrmacht Command Staff and Hitler’s closest military advisor, Colonel General Alfred Jodl edited. Hitler , as Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, then personally released the text, whereupon it was sent unchanged to the newspapers via the Reich Press Chief Otto Dietrich and to the radio via Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry.

Reports were given in a concise, more detailed, concrete and sometimes exaggerated form when successes were to be reported, and more briefly, more abstractly and in more clauses when it came to setbacks and own losses. The authors always had to take into account the credibility and impact of the reports with the fighting troops, at home as well as in hostile and neutral countries. They largely avoided direct false reports, but operated with omissions and trimmings, with tendentious emphasis and trivialization as well as glossing over, delays and obscuring.

In his investigation into the content, language and credibility of the WB 1962, Erich Murawski came to the conclusion that there was a discrepancy between the military's original claim to only report the truth and the practice determined by the course of the war and political influence. He differentiates between four phases of reporting and thus the credibility of the WB:

  • Until May 1940 - cautious restraint
  • Western campaign 1940 to the end of 1941 - exuberance intoxicated with success
  • 1942 to autumn 1944 - camouflaging the setbacks
  • From autumn 1944 - sober liquidation report

The authors of the WB saw no contradiction in its dual character, serving on the one hand the "truth" and on the other hand propaganda. Von Wedel on this after the war:

“I have always considered the Wehrmacht report to be probably the most valuable propaganda instrument of Wehrmacht propaganda, albeit under the one unalterable condition that it was only allowed to bring the truth and never used lies. [...] In this opinion, I was also in agreement with the chief of the Wehrmacht command staff, a fanatic of the truth ”

The "fanatic of the truth", however, Alfred Jodl, was very well aware of the propaganda task and effect of the Wehrmacht report:

"It is sad enough that I first have to make it clear to the deputy head of the Wehrmacht Propaganda Office that the OKW report is also a means of propaganda."

In a secret decree of June 18, 1941, he instructed the reporters that “the truth is the principle for all German military reporting”. Successes are only to be published when they have been confirmed and: “Your own failures are to be published to the extent that they can be verified by the opponent and by neutral foreign countries. For the German public, with the above restriction, the publication of failures is also desirable; to educate one's own people to the necessary severity. "

history

Franco-Prussian War from 1870 to 1871

The public was informed about the course of the war in earlier wars. In the Franco-Prussian War from 1870 to 1871 , it was still mainly civil war reporters like Theodor Fontane who stayed in the stage as battle- wanderers to collect news from official sources and from second hand for their newspapers. Because of their often lacking military competence, but above all because of their disturbing curiosity, they were not particularly valued by the officers and were therefore often hindered and tamed.

In 1870 the army did not make any preparations for the information of the public, but eventually, initially hesitantly, then more and more often, issued war dispatches which were posted by the police and published in newspapers. They were brief and only reported the most important things. Unlike the French official reports, for example, they were free of propaganda and did not contain any false news. Of course, the reports did not contain everything, since they did not want to give the enemy any insight into their own operational planning. The political leadership was excluded from the military's news policy, and even Otto von Bismarck had to get more detailed information himself in a roundabout way.

First World War

Even during the First World War , war reporting was firmly in the hands of the military, who were traditionally interested in secrecy and surveillance. As before, they were poorly prepared and initially only introduced censorship . Only a few officers, for example Alfred von Tirpitz , had overcome the military aversion to the public and the press and set up offices for information work. Admiral von Tirpitz, State Secretary of the Reich Naval Office , had recognized the importance of press and public relations work long before the war. When he took over the official business in 1897, he created his own press department, the message office of the Reichsmarinamt: "Then I considered it my right and my duty to make the broader classes understand what interests were at stake here".

The government under the press-shy Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg confidently left the information policy to the military. On August 2, 1914, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General von Moltke , took the initiative and ordered the establishment of a press service, typically under the responsibility of the department for espionage and counter-espionage. The press, according to Moltke, is an indispensable means of conducting war . The first report appeared on August 5, 1914, and from August 27, the daily army report was published via the Wolff Telegraph Office. In the course of the war, the military leadership developed an increasing interest in public relations, from now on regular press conferences were held and additional press offices were set up. The following should apply to the army report: "We will not always be able to say everything, but what we will tell you is true"

Second World War

In contrast to the army report of the First World War, the Wehrmacht report was not just mere information, but also an avowed instrument of opinion cultivation and propaganda used deliberately by the state , the party and the military , for intellectual and psychological warfare in total war , in addition to the fighting troops the home front , i.e. civilian population, economy and industry, as well as all areas of public life were involved.

In 1957 the former head of the department for Wehrmacht propaganda in the Wehrmacht command staff of the OKW, Hasso von Wedel :

“In the total state, as represented by the Third Reich , the Wehrmacht propaganda also had to recognize and represent the unity of state, party and Wehrmacht to its part, without leaning on the tow of pure party propaganda. In addition, for me the total war represented a unity of political, military, economic and intellectual warfare, which also had to classify the Wehrmacht propaganda in its entire work. "

"On the one hand, the legitimate military interests had to be preserved within the framework of the general propaganda, and on the other hand, all measures had to be carried out within the Wehrmacht that were necessary to achieve the objectives of the general propaganda."

Another difference to the military information policy in World War I, in line with a totalitarian state , was that private journalists were no longer permitted on the German side. In their place came so-called Propaganda Companies (PK), which were set up in all parts of the Wehrmacht in 1938 and equipped with modern technology in order to record war events, often in the front lines. In 1943 there were 23 PK with 5,000 men, most of whom were journalists in civil life. In addition, in contrast to the First World War, the German public no longer had a legal opportunity to compare the Wehrmacht reports with those of the other side. During World War II they were not printed or broadcast, and listening to non-German news programs was prohibited. Violations were prosecuted as " destruction of military strength " or " broadcast crime " and could be punished with the highest penalties.

The last Wehrmacht report was broadcast by the Reichsender Flensburg on May 9, 1945. Soon afterwards, on May 23, the last Reich government , which had its provisional seat in the Mürwik special area in Flensburg - Mürwik , was arrested.

Rivalry between the Wehrmacht and the Propaganda Ministry

Joseph Goebbels on January 28, 1941 in conversation with Hasso von Wedel (far right in the picture) and the heads of the propaganda companies of the three Wehrmacht sections. In longer explanations he gives you a comprehensive picture of the military and political situation as well as guidelines for the current work of the propaganda companies.

A rivalry between the Wehrmacht and the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (RMVP) began early on. Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels tried to completely pull the military propaganda to himself, since he considered officers as completely unsuitable for it. However, he was only able to partially prevail. In 1938 Goebbels and Wilhelm Keitel , chief of the OKW, signed an agreement on the implementation of propaganda during the war , which regulated the interaction between the RMVP and the OKW. According to this, the members of the PKs were subordinate to the military, personnel selection and evaluation of the collected material, however, was the responsibility of Goebbels' ministry.

Shortly before the start of the war, on April 1, 1939, the "Department for Wehrmacht Propaganda (WPr)" was set up in the OKW. This completely new department was based on considerable preparations in 1937 and 1938. In addition to military censorship, the “defense against enemy propaganda” and “intellectual support for the Wehrmacht”, it was also responsible for drafting the Wehrmacht report.

Attribution in the Wehrmacht report

Since honorable mentions of lone fighters were rarely to be found in the Wehrmacht report after the German attack on Poland, the Wehrmacht Propaganda Department stated in a circular of March 26, 1940 that it was desirable “to mention the names of officers etc. more frequently than before in the Wehrmacht report who have distinguished themselves in special undertakings ”. Subsequently, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch , issued a corresponding decree on April 27, 1940 with a view to the upcoming campaign in the West: “Attribution in the Wehrmacht Report”, which should regulate this procedure for more frequent naming of soldiers of the Wehrmacht worthy of distinction.

According to von Brauchitsch's decree, those soldiers should be honored by naming their names in the Wehrmacht report who “excelled in combat in an extraordinary way”. It is "a very special distinction to be seen". Their actions should "stand out from the rest" and so justify the "mention before the German people". As clues (“clues”) for naming the names were u. a. in the event of major combat operations, if the leaders of raiding or scouting troops who had twice brought in a “considerable number of prisoners” or “weapons” under enemy influence or who procured enemy documents “under particularly difficult circumstances”. In the event that major combat operations have already taken place, troop leaders of all ranks who have decisively influenced the fighting in a way that is particularly valuable for the leadership through their personal commitment under difficult circumstances should be named.

Murawski points out in his study that these honors by naming them increased considerably during the western campaign and many times over after the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. The number of mentions eventually became so large that from the summer of 1944 they could no longer appear in the actual Wehrmacht report, but only in an appendix to this, entitled: "In addition to the Wehrmacht report is reported."

“Leader's Decree” to strengthen the role of the OKW

The establishment of the WPr strengthened the OKW's role in propaganda matters, partly at the expense of the Propaganda Ministry. The dispute over competencies continued until Adolf Hitler finally decided in a secret Fuehrer decree in February 1941 : “In matters of propaganda and military censorship, the representation of the armed forces as a whole as well as parts of the armed forces vis-à-vis all civil services and vis-à-vis the public is the exclusive task of the armed forces high command ".

See also

literature

  • Erich Murawski : The German Wehrmacht Report 1939-1945. A contribution to the study of intellectual warfare. With a documentation of the Wehrmacht reports from July 1, 1944 to May 9, 1945. Boldt, Boppard am Rhein 1962, ( Writings of the Federal Archives. Volume 9) DNB 453516904 .
  • Ute Daniel : Eyewitnesses. War reporting from the 18th to the 21st century , Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006, ISBN 978-3-525-36737-7 .
  • The Wehrmacht reports. (3 volumes) GLB, Cologne 1989. ISBN 3-423-05944-3 .
  • The reports of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. (5 volumes), Cologne 2004. ISBN 3-89340-063-X .
  • Wolfram Wette : When Germany should die. In: DIE ZEIT, 19/2000 of May 4, 2000 (online, subtitle: How the Nazi regime and Wehrmacht leadership tried to stage the great downfall in the last days of the war)
  • Jürgen Wilke : War as a media event. On the history of its mediation in modern times. In: Heinz-Peter Preusser: War in the media. Amsterdam Contributions to Modern German Studies, Volume 57, Rodopi 2005, ISBN 978-90-420-1855-6 .

Web links

Wiktionary: Wehrmacht report  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ The Wehrmacht Reports. Volume I, Cologne 1989, ISBN 3-423-05944-3 , SI
  2. ↑ Erich Murawski: The German Wehrmacht Report 1939-1945. A contribution to the study of intellectual warfare. With a documentation of the Wehrmacht reports from July 1, 1944 to May 9, 1945. Boldt, Boppard am Rhein 1962, pp. 1–3, p. 116 and p. 121 f.
  3. ↑ a b The Wehrmacht Reports. Volume I, Cologne 1989, ISBN 3-423-05944-3 , p. VIII.
  4. ^ Daniel Uziel: The Propaganda Warriors. The Wehrmacht and the Consolidation of the German Home Front . Peter Lang, Oxford a. a. 2008, p. 12 and p. 388: "The books main problem is it's uncritical approach to the subject."
  5. ^ Jörg Echternkamp : Dossier. The second World War. War ideology, propaganda and mass culture. Edited by Federal Agency for Civic Education , April 30, 2015.
  6. ↑ The Wehrmacht Reports. Volume I, Cologne 1989, ISBN 3-423-05944-3 , p. VI.
  7. ↑ a b c d The Wehrmacht reports. Volume I, Cologne 1989, ISBN 3-423-05944-3 , p. VII.
  8. ↑ Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , p. 123.
  9. ^ Murawski, The German Wehrmacht Report , p. 46.
  10. ^ Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , p. 55.
  11. ^ Murawski, The German Wehrmacht Report , Appendix 1, p. 701.
  12. ↑ a b c The Wehrmacht reports. Volume I, Cologne 1989, ISBN 3-423-05944-3 , p. II.
  13. ↑ Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , p. 13.
  14. ↑ Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , p. 13 f.
  15. ^ Alfred von Tirpitz: Memories , Leipzig 1919, pp. 95 ff. DNB 576689211 ; quoted according to Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , p. 17.
  16. ↑ a b The Wehrmacht Reports. Volume I, Cologne 1989, ISBN 3-423-05944-3 , p. III.
  17. ^ Murawski, The German Wehrmacht Report , p. 18.
  18. ↑ Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , p. 19 ff.
  19. ↑ a b c The Wehrmacht reports. Volume I, Cologne 1989, ISBN 3-423-05944-3 , p. IV.
  20. ↑ Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , p. 26.
  21. ↑ Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , p. 27.
  22. ↑ For example, the Swiss broadcaster Radio Beromünster was banned.
  23. ↑ The Wehrmacht Reports. Volume I, Cologne 1989, ISBN 3-423-05944-3 , pp. V / VI. See Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , p. 27 f.
  24. ↑ a b c The Wehrmacht reports. Volume I, Cologne 1989, ISBN 3-423-05944-3 , SV
  25. ↑ Harro Segeberg (Ed.): Mediale Mobilmachung. The Third Reich and the Film , Wilhelm Fink Verlag, Paderborn 2004, ISBN 3-7705-3863-3 , p. 155 ff.
  26. ↑ Federal Archives: Film and Photo Reporters Together ( Memento from January 20, 2010 in the Internet Archive )
  27. ↑ a b Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , pp. 34 and 137 f.
  28. ↑ Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , p. 26 f.
  29. ↑ Erich Murawski: The German Wehrmacht Report 1939-1945. A contribution to the study of intellectual warfare. With a documentation of the Wehrmacht reports from July 1, 1944 to May 9, 1945 . Boldt, Boppard am Rhein 1962 (Writings of the Federal Archives, Volume 9), p. 86 and p. 726 f. (= Copy from the Army Ordinance Gazette, 22nd year, 27th edition, Berlin, May 6, 1940, Part C: Attribution in the Wehrmacht report, Der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, April 27, 1940, signed by Brauchitsch)
  30. ↑ Murawski, The German Wehrmacht Report , Annex 6, p. 726 f. (= wording of von Brauchitsch's decree).
  31. ^ Murawski, Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht , p. 87.
  32. ^ Secret Führer Decree of February 10, 1941; Quoted in Ansgar Diller: Rundfunkpolitik im Third Reich , DTV, Munich 1980, ISBN 3-423-03184-0 , p. 334.