Bronislaw Wladislawowitsch Kaminsky

Bronislaw W. Kaminski in March 1944. On the breast pocket he wears the EK I. , the award for bravery and merit for members of the Eastern peoples, 1st class (bottom left) and the wound badge in black (bottom right)

Bronislav Kaminski ( Russian Бронислав Владиславович Каминский * 16th June 1899 in Vitebsk , †  28 August 1944 in Lodz ) was the commander of one of the German 2nd Panzer Army established at the turn of 1941/42 "municipal district" with the Russian town of Lokot ( Russian Локоть ) as the center and the commander of the militia set up to defend it, made up of Soviet citizens willing to collaborate . The German "experiment" started in the course of fighting the growing Soviet partisan movement proved to be extremely successful from the point of view of its initiators, since Kaminski and his armed force, named after him Brigade Kaminski , covered the area assigned to him and thus the hinterland of the 2nd Panzer Army could "pacify" permanently. As the son of a member of a people classified as “ subhuman ” according to Nazi racial theory , Kaminski rose to become one of the most important local allies of the German armed forces in the Soviet Union and united in his hands a unique wealth of power.

When the Wehrmacht was forced to evacuate the "Lokot self-administration district" in front of the advancing Red Army in 1943 , Kaminski's armed forces and their family members were evacuated to Belarus, where they were again used to "fight partisans". As before in Russia and afterwards as part of their “mission” in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising , Kaminski's brigade was responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity to an extent that only a few other units in German service could achieve. During the Warsaw Uprising, Kaminski was finally executed by the Germans under unknown circumstances. The 29th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS "RONA" (Russian No. 1) was to be formed from his brigade, which had already been incorporated into the Waffen SS - a project that was no longer implemented. The remnants of Kaminski's brigade were eventually absorbed into the army of Russian collaborator Andrei Vlasov .

Life

Origin, youth and persecution by the Stalinist system

The information about Bronislaw Kaminski's life before the Second World War is rather sparse, and in part also contradicting itself. What is certain is that Kaminski's father was Polish , while his mother was an ethnic German . Due to this fact, Kaminski also mastered three languages: German, Polish and Russian. As a relatively wealthy landowner, the parents were able to bring their son, born in 1899, a good upbringing, and Kaminski is said to have lived on his parents' estate until 1917/1918. Thereafter, the family was embroiled in the turmoil of the Russian Civil War , in which Kaminski is said to have participated on the side of the Red Army . This statement seems plausible insofar as it was possible for him in the 1920s to study chemistry at the State Polytechnic Institute in Saint Petersburg and then to work as a chemical engineer in the paint industry.

In July 1935 Kaminski was arrested and sentenced as an alleged member of the Bukharin group to ten years imprisonment, which he spent in a Soviet labor camp. However, after only five years he was dismissed and forcibly resettled in the Lokot area, where he worked in a distillery from then on. Why Kaminski was released remains unclear, but it is possible that his release was linked to his recruitment by the NKVD , according to Russian sources. However, it is not known what role Kaminski had to fulfill as an agent or informant for the NKVD.

Activity during World War II

The " Republic of Lokot "

The territory of the "Lokot Self-Governing District". The boundaries of the area shown here correspond to today's rayon boundaries.

The beginnings

In the late autumn of 1941, after the 2nd Panzer Army had reached the area around Lokot, the German "experiment" began here that made Kaminski one of the most famous, but also most notorious collaborators in Soviet Russia. It is not known what circumstances and individual decisions led to the establishment of the “self-governing district” of Lokot, which, in keeping with the jargon of the time, was often referred to as the “ Republic of Lokot ” ( Russian Ло́котская Респу́блика ). What is certain is that this was related to the recruitment of local forces to combat the rapidly growing partisan movement in the rear army area of the 2nd Panzer Army, which also included the remote area around Lokot. Out of his own power and disregarding all otherwise usual racial ideological premises, the district mayor of Lokot, Konstantin Woskobojnikow (also written Woskobojnik , Voskoboinikov or Voskoboinik ), the new commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, Colonel General Rudolf Schmidt , set up a largely independent Russian administration and the Provision of own police forces permitted. When Voskobojnikow was killed on January 8, 1942, Bronislaw Kaminski, who had apparently already functioned as his right-hand man, or at least one of his most important subordinates, "inherited" him in his office.

Kaminski's sphere of influence and its organization

Kaminski's rulership, whose "seat" was the 41,000-inhabitant city of Lokot, finally comprised eight Rajons of today's Oblasts Brjansk , Oryol (then spelling "Orel") and Kursk . The area, which was roughly bounded by the cities of Navlja , Sevsk , Dmitrijew and Dmitrovsk and their surrounding areas, comprised around 1.7 million inhabitants and was therefore comparable to one of the Baltic states. In his sphere of influence Kaminski was able to operate and rule almost completely autonomously and combined political, military and economic powers in his hand. One measure that made him particularly popular was the abolition of the collective farm system and the transfer of land and livestock to local farmers and to deserving fighters against the Soviet system. As private producers, they were now protected from attacks and forced requisitions by the Soviet partisans as well as German units and generated significant surpluses that enabled Kaminski to meet his delivery quotas for agricultural products and goods to his German partners. Kaminski's measures, which also included the maintenance of the school system and cultural institutions, undoubtedly made him appear in the eyes of "his" subjects as a power bearer on an equal footing with the Germans. In this way, in the exercise of his rule, he not only relied on brutal violence, which he was always ready to use ruthlessly anyway, but was also able to enjoy a certain amount of genuine sympathy and willing support from those he ruled in the beginning.

Although German officers and agencies, as well as the allied nations entrusted by them with occupation tasks, always had reservations about Kaminski, which were additionally nourished by his arrogance and insolence, Kaminski's self-governing area was considered exemplary on the German side and, compared to the usual system of occupation administration, was called " far superior ”, as a report from August 1942 shows. The Germans also tolerated Kaminski's founding of a Russian Nazi party, which was intended as a kind of replacement for the CPSU and was also intended to bring together the people he ruled politically and ideologically. Although he represented Russian-ethnic views, Kaminski had no real interest in ideological questions, which is why his party foundation ultimately remained “ a phantom and without political effects ”.

The Kaminski Brigade

Kaminski's most important instrument of power was and remained his self-defense militia, in whose recruitment he was given considerable freedom on the German side, which was shown, among other things, in the fact that he was even allowed to recruit suitable men in German prison camps. It remains to be seen whether the core of this troop were actually those heavily armed fighters who were encountered by German units tasked with repairing the railway lines. According to these representations, a force commanded by Kaminski would have started fighting the Red Army and the Red Partisans in the weeks before the arrival of the 2nd Panzer Army in the Bryansk area. An emissary Kaminski was then escorted to the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Army in Orel and had assured the Germans there that his troops, which in the spring of 1942 were said to have already comprised 1,400 men, were capable of both militarily and militarily the Soviet partisans to combat propaganda. Representations like this appear problematic insofar as they do not mention Voskobojnikov's role at all; They also leave unanswered how Kaminski's troops are said to have been able to achieve such a level of organization in this short time and why the Germans - in view of the growing acute partisan problem - the Germans to an unknown to them who had a well-armed force at their disposal Would almost inevitably have to be classified as dangerous, should have placed such trust from the start.

The badge of Kaminki's "Russian People's Liberation Army" sewn onto the upper part of the left sleeve of the uniform jacket

In contrast, it seems far more plausible to assume a quasi organic growth of Kaminski's armed forces, the nucleus of which was formed during the time when his predecessor Voskobojnikov was still in office. What is certain is that it experienced a rapid increase in personnel in the course of 1942. This was primarily related to the increasing activity of the partisans, who not only threatened to destabilize the rear of the 2nd Panzer Army, but also posed an existential threat to Kaminski's newly won position of power. Kaminski's troops were finally subordinated to the commander of the Rear Army Area ( Korück ) of the 2nd Panzer Army, who was appointed in February 1942 and was given the designation Korück 532 (Lieutenant General Friedrich-Gustav Bernhard) in April of this year and was subordinate to Army Group Center . Already in mid-1942 included the Kaminski Brigade , which itself as "Russian People's Liberation Army" ( Russian Русская Освободительная Народная Армия - Russkaya Oswoboditelnaja Narodnaya Armija abbreviated Poha or RONA ) described and as a badge, a St. George's Cross on a white background with the initials Poha wore around 5,000 men, and in the spring of 1943 it reached its maximum strength of about 10,000 men. The uniforms of the 15 battalions of the brigade were a colorful hodgepodge, the equipment consisted mainly of Soviet captured weapons. An artillery department and Soviet T-34 booty tanks were also added to support the troops .

Kaminski's combination of fortified villages as a defensive element and his own armed force, which soon made a name for itself as Kaminski's (storm) brigade , as an offensive element, proved to be extremely effective in maintaining order and security in his sphere of influence and in the " Pacification ”of the rear area of ​​the 2nd Panzer Army. As a German assessment of the "gang situation" shows, at the end of 1941 almost the entire rear area of ​​the 2nd Panzer Army was " gang area " and an estimated 7,000 partisans threatened the rail link from Bryansk to Kursk. A year later, the railway line, as well as the entire Lokot area, was considered to be "free of gangs". Kaminski's troops are said to have inflicted losses of over 2,000 men on the partisans and to have “removed” a total of 12,531 “civilians” who are considered unreliable from the area concerned. In view of these "successes", the German presence in the Lokot self-administration area was limited to a few members of the Wehrmacht, including a Korück liaison officer and a tactical advisor, as well as inspection teams who came occasionally. According to its own statements, the Wehrmacht was relieved of at least one division in its security tasks by Kaminski.

The favorable security situation in the Lokot area finally enabled the Germans to deploy Kaminski's armed forces outside their traditional area. Between May and July 1943, the brigade, in cooperation with German security units and other local contingents, took part in several “large companies” to “ fight gangs ”. Once again, Kaminski's fighters lived up to their bad reputation at these companies, which caused immense blood tolls, especially among the civilian population. Looting , rape , the extortion of testimony through torture and the indiscriminate murder of those suspected of collaborating with the partisans were commonplace among the members of the brigade . Kaminski put no reins on his men in their "missions", which is why he was extremely popular with them and could be sure of their loyalty.

In contrast to military “practice”, however, no reliable data is available on the social composition of the “Russian People's Liberation Army” and the motivation to join it. No corresponding sources can be found for the allegations that can be read again and again in the literature and various “Internet sources ” that they were mainly recruited from Russian and Ukrainian “nationalists”, a number of Kalmyks and even Jews . It can only be said for certain that most of Kaminski's men were former Soviet citizens.

“Fight against partisans” in Belarus

Belarus, March 1944: Kaminski among his men

Since the area of ​​Lokot had to be evacuated by the German Wehrmacht in autumn 1943, Kaminski's brigade and its civilians - a total of between 30,000 and 50,000 people - were evacuated to Lepel in Belarus, where they were until June 1944, according to internal reports from the SS and Wehrmacht was used "very successfully" against partisan groups in the area designated by the Germans as the general district of "White Ruthenia" . Like the area around Lokot Kaminski, Lepel and the surrounding area were left as a "domain". Here, too, his unit proceeded with merciless brutality against partisans and their supposed supporters and often did the “dirty work” of the German police units. The more clearly the German defeat began to emerge, the more brutal Kaminski's unit became, since its members, as traitors in the Soviet Union, could not expect any mercy. Instead of the original resistance against the Soviet regime, self-enrichment at the expense of the Belarusian population was now increasingly in the foreground.

The heavy losses that Kaminski's brigade suffered in January 1944 in fighting against strong partisan units, prompted the high command of the 3rd Panzer Army (Colonel General Georg-Hans Reinhardt ), in whose hinterland Kaminski was active, and which apparently had been acting for some time of her “protégé” was dissatisfied with an intervention that aimed to get Kaminski under better control. Reinhardt's liaison officer reacted only with disdain to Kaminski's indignation at this “interference” in his affairs, which seriously injured Kaminski's vanity and ultimately led to his relationship with the Wehrmacht cooling down more and more and he began to ingratiate himself with the SS . After they began to attract the anti-partisan agents more and more, they had already become aware of Kaminski and now saw an opportunity to expand their own sphere of influence at the expense of the Wehrmacht.

At the behest of Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler , Kaminski was awarded the Iron Cross 1st class on January 27, 1944 for his “achievements” (skipping the 2nd class). In March of this year his brigade was renamed the People's Army Brigade Kaminski and in the following month it was subordinated to the Gottberg Combat Group , on whose side it was involved in a number of "gang fighting operations ". The protection of Kaminski by the SS ultimately led to his combat troops being fully integrated into the Waffen SS in June 1944 as the Waffen-Sturm-Brigade "RONA" . As the name implied, it was not yet considered a full combat division of the Waffen SS. Nevertheless, Kaminski, who had never completed any military training, was promoted to Waffen-Brigadführer of the SS on August 1, 1944 , and thus had the rank of major general.

Warsaw uprising and death sentence

During the Soviet summer offensive , Kaminski and his brigade and relatives fled from Lepel to Poland from the Red Army in July 1944. There they suddenly found people who were much wealthier than they had previously seen on the territory of the Soviet Union. The order personally given by Heinrich Himmler to take part in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising that broke out on August 1st offered the 1,700 men of the Kaminski Brigade under Major Jurij Frolow, who were assigned to this task, ideal opportunities to pursue their usual "craft". This troop "fought" from August 3rd to 27th in the Warsaw districts of Ochota and Wola and then until September 4th in the vicinity of Warsaw. The Kaminski men killed numerous residents of the city , especially in the context of the Wola massacre , raped, tortured and looted to an extent that the Germans no longer considered tolerable, which is why the Kaminski brigadists should be removed as quickly as possible. The persistent protest of the German military about the attacks by the Kaminski men, especially in a case in which two girls allegedly belonging to the BDM or the KdF organization were raped and murdered (other sources also speak of the murder of members of the Wehrmacht), brought Kaminski ultimately before a German court martial . On August 28, 1944, he was sentenced to death and shot in Łódź, which was then called Litzmannstadt . It was alleged to Kaminski's subordinates that their commander had fallen victim to a partisan attack.

Possible reasons for Kaminski's execution

The true background to Kaminski's shooting has not been fully clarified, but Kaminski's conviction is certainly not to be seen as a punishment for the war crimes committed by his unit. Kaminski may have been executed because his orgies of looting involved property claimed by the SS or because they wanted to get rid of an annoying witness to the crimes committed in the Warsaw area. Moreover, unlike Oskar Dirlewanger , the commander of the notorious SS special unit named after him, who was responsible for at least as numerous and gruesome crimes against the Polish civilian population in Warsaw , he did not have a powerful advocate who always stood up for him. It was also speculated that Kaminski's execution might have occurred because he was seen as a potential rival of General Vlasov, who has now been favored by German authorities, and his Russian Liberation Army . Against this assumption, however, Kaminski's bad reputation and the fact that Vlasov turned down the majority of Kaminski's men, whom he contemptuously referred to as "mercenaries", when they were offered to him for his newly formed liberation army. Another possible explanation for Kaminski's death would be that he was "accidentally" shot as a looter when he was stopped by the Gestapo loaded with watches and jewels from Warsaw on the way to Litzmannstadt .

Afterlife

In circles of the Russian extreme right at the beginning of the 21st century, Kaminsky was celebrated as a role model for his struggle against the Bolsheviks. 2005 Kaminski and Woskobojnikow were of the "Russian catacomb of true Orthodox Christians" ( Русская катакомбная церковь истинно православных христиан ), one not recognized by the church leadership sect canonized .

See also

• Republic of Lokot

literature

• Alexander Dallin : The Kaminsky Brigade. A Case Study of Soviet Disaffection. In: Revolution and Politics in Russia (= Russian and East European Series, 41), pp. 243-280, Indiana University Press 1972.
• Zenon Rudny: Kontrowersje wokół Brigadführerera Bronisława Kamińskiego . In: Dzieje Najnowsze 38 (1996), Heft 3–4, pp. 87–97.
• Franz W. Seidler: The collaboration 1939–1945. Historical documentation in biographies. 2nd, reviewed and expanded edition, Herbig-Verlag, Munich a. a. 1999, ISBN 3-7766-2139-7 , pp. 280–284 (keyword: Kaminski, Bronislaw Wladislawowitsch ).

Web links

Commons : Bronislaw Kaminski  - collection of images, videos and audio files

• RONA - Russian National Liberation Army (Russkaya Osvoboditelnaya Narodnaya Armiya) (Info on Warsaw Uprising 1944 )

References and comments

1. ↑ Occasionally, the years 1901 or 1903 can also be found in the literature as the years of Kaminski's birth, although the authors almost always fail to provide appropriate references. In the vast majority of cases, especially in Dallin, The Kaminsky Brigade , the standard work on Kaminski and his brigade, 1899 is given as the year of birth.
2. ↑ Seidler, Die Kollaboration , p. 280.
3. ↑ There is some disagreement in the literature regarding the reason for his arrest. Are mentioned u. a. also espionage, rebellion against the Stalinist agrarian order or - in general - membership of a counter-revolutionary group. The information about the place where he served his sentence (both the Bryansk region and the Ural region are mentioned ) also differ from author to author.
4. ↑ According to documents of the NKVD Brjansk he was recruited in 1940, like Dieter Pohl : Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht. German military occupation and local population in the Soviet Union 1941–1944. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-486-58065-5 , p. 180. In contrast, one can often read that Kaminski was only released a few months before the German attack on the Soviet Union. According to Rolf-Dieter Müller : On the side of the Wehrmacht. Hitler's foreign helpers in the “Crusade against Bolshevism” 1941–1945 . 1st edition, Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2007, ISBN 978-3-86153-448-8 , p. 212, he was even released from camp detention by the Germans.
5. ↑ Müller, An der Seite der Wehrmacht , p. 213, and Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht , p. 180.
6. ↑ There are two versions of Voskobojnikov's death. One says that he was killed while fighting with Russian partisans, the other that he was the victim of a targeted assassination attempt by the NKVD. There are also different statements about the relationship between Voskobojnikow and Kaminsky. According to some views, the two friends should have been and Kaminski have virtually taken from the beginning, the number two in the chain of command, according to Seidler, Collaboration , p 281, have to Kaminski Mayor Woskobojnikow later " available asked" which probably connected was that he first had to “work his way up” in the hierarchy.
7. ↑ Seidler, Die Kollaboration , p. 281, and Theo Schulte: The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia. St. Martin's Press, New York 1989, p. 173.
8. ↑ Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia , p. 174, and Müller, An der Seiten der Wehrmacht , p. 212.
9. ^ Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia , p. 175, footnote 95. Back translation of the quotation from the English.
10. ↑ Müller, An der Seite der Wehrmacht , p. 212. - It is significant that the fact that the exact name of this party is apparently not even known is significant. Müller speaks of the " National Socialist Russian Workers' Party ", whereas Seidler, Die Kollaboration , p. 282, speaks more generally of a " Russian National Socialist Party ".
11. ^ Edgar Howell: The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944 (= Center for Military History Publication 104-19). US Department of the Army, Washington, DC 1989, p. 89.
12. ↑ Alexander Pronin: Guerilla Warfare in the German Occupied Soviet Territories, 1941-1944. Phil. Diss., Georgetown University 1965, p. 211. - The representation in Erich Hesse is very similar: The Soviet-Russian partisan war 1941 to 1944 in the mirror of German combat instructions and orders (= studies and documents on the history of the Second World War 9). 2nd, revised edition, Verlag Muster-Schmidt, Göttingen u. a. 1992, ISBN 978-3788114107 , p. 190, where it is said that " [t] he establishment of a permanent connection between Kaminski and the command posts of the German army ... [took place] quickly and almost smoothly. According to this, " [Kaminski] had created a private army of 1,400 men, which was in uninterrupted combat against partisans and scattered units of the Soviet army " and " [ruled] a considerable part of the area south of Bryansk ."
13. ↑ Müller, On the Side of the Wehrmacht , p. 212 f.
14. ^ Pronin, Guerilla Warfare in the German Occupied Soviet Territories , p. 208.
15. ^ Ronald M. Smelser and Edward J. Davies II: The Myth of the Eastern Front. The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture. Cambridge University Press 2008, ISBN 978-0-521-71231-6 , p. 245.
16. ↑ Müller, On the Side of the Wehrmacht , p. 213.
17. ↑ Seidler, Die Kollaboration , p. 282.
18. ↑ See Rudny, Kontrowersje wokół Brigadführerera Bronisława Kamińskiego , pp. 87–97.
19. ^ RONA - Russian National Liberation Army (Russkaya Osvoboditelnaya Narodnaya Armiya) , accessed November 29, 2012.
20. ↑ Sven Steenberg : They called me "Gospodin ...": Memories of a Baltic German 1941–1945 , 1991, pp. 174f. ISBN 3-7844-2376-0 .
21. ↑ Müller speaks of a " plot by his masters " in connection with Kaminski's execution, An der Seiten der Wehrmacht , p. 213.
22. ^ Mark Mazower : Hitler's Empire. Europe under the rule of National Socialism. CH Beck, Munich 2009, ISBN 9783406592713 , p. 426.
23. ↑ http://wyborcza.pl/alehistoria/1,132072,13813044.html Wódz RONA i kat warszawskiej Ochoty, in: Ale historia . (Supplement to Gazeta Wyborcza ), April 29, 2013, p. 13.
24. ↑ http://www.reakcia.ru/article/?893 Паства адольфа германского выходит из катакомб, in: Изображение порока , № 5, February 16, 2006.