Rudolf Schmundt

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Portrait of Schmundts
Rudolf Schmundt as Lieutenant General (around 1942/43)

Rudolf Schmundt (born August 13, 1896 in Metz , Reichsland Alsace-Lorraine , † October 1, 1944 in Rastenburg ) was a German officer , most recently General of the Infantry of the Wehrmacht . For more than six years during the Nazi era from 1938 to 1944, he was Chief Adjutant of the Wehrmacht to Adolf Hitler and thus one of the dictator's closest associates and confidants. From 1942 he also headed the Army Personnel Office and in this position was largely responsible for the army's personnel policy , which he also designed from a National Socialist perspective. Schmundt died of injuries sustained in the failed assassination attempt on July 20, 1944 . His loyalty to Hitler and his National Socialist personnel policy on the one hand and his commitment to the interests of the army and his charismatic demeanor on the other make Schmundt a highly controversial representative of the Wehrmacht leadership.

He is best known for the creation of the Schmundt Protocol , which became one of the key documents of the prosecution in the Nuremberg trial of the main war criminals in 1945/46.

Life

Origin and youth

Rudolf Schmundt was born as the son of the later Lieutenant General Richard Schmundt and his wife Hedwig (née Seyffardt). When his father was transferred to Brandenburg an der Havel ( Kingdom of Prussia ) in June 1913 as the new commander of the fusilier regiment "Prince Heinrich von Preußen" (Brandenburgisches) No. 35 , the entire family followed him, including the younger one since 1898 Brother, the later social scientist and anthroposophist Wilhelm Schmundt counted. Schmundt attended the Von-Saldern-Realgymnasium in Brandenburg until the outbreak of the First World War . In order to be able to register himself as a volunteer , he passed the secondary school diploma and entered his father's regiment on August 4, 1914 as a flag junior .

After a short training period, Schmundt and his regiment came to the Western Front on September 30, 1914 . A few months later, on March 22, 1915, he was promoted to lieutenant . During the ongoing fighting, he was wounded on May 20, 1915 and was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd class for his services on that day . After he had earned himself as a troop officer, he was on March 15, 1916 battalion adjutant . In November of the same year he was also awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class. On July 11, 1917, he was transferred to the regimental staff as adjutant to the commander , where he remained until the end of the war. During these years Schmundt took part in many battles and skirmishes, the largest of which were the Autumn Battle in Champagne , the Battle of the Somme and the Marne .

Ordinance and troop officer

Promotions

  • 4th August 1914 flagjunker
  • March 22, 1915 Lieutenant
  • May 1, 1926 First Lieutenant
  • February 1, 1932 Captain
  • January 1, 1936 Major
  • October 1, 1938 Lieutenant Colonel
  • 4th August 1939 Colonel
  • January 1, 1942 Major General
  • April 1, 1943 Lieutenant General
  • September 1, 1944 General of the Infantry

After the armistice , Schmidt's regiment was relocated back to Brandenburg an der Havel. In January 1919 Schmundt joined the "Detachement Graf Stillfried", a free corps formed mainly from former army soldiers that took part in street fights in Berlin , for example against the Spartacus uprising . In June 1919 the Reichswehr Infantry Regiment 5 was formed from the detachment and the Fusilier Regiment No. 35. In this new formation, Schmundt served as an orderly officer from August 25, 1919 .

When the Reichswehr received its final organization on January 1, 1921, Schmundt was transferred to the 9th (Prussian) Infantry Regiment in Potsdam, which had been newly established from parts of the 5th Infantry Regiment . On December 28, 1921 he became deputy regimental adjutant. In 1923 and 1924 Schmundt served as a troop officer in the regiment before taking part in a course at the Army Weapons School from April to August 1925. During this time he made up for officer training, which had not been possible during the war. After successfully completing his degree, he was promoted to first lieutenant a few months later on the basis of his war merit and returned to the field of activity that was most important to him - the adjutantage. On June 1, 1926, he became adjutant of the 1st Battalion and on August 1, 1927 of the regiment itself.

“As adjutant of IR 9, Schmundt had achieved a position that clearly set him apart from the ranks of his comrades: The adjutant of the regiment near the capital had a social function as well as a military one, and Schmundt seems to have asserted himself on the social floor. In any case, his superiors became aware of him and this should have a positive effect on his career. "

- Reinhard Stumpf

On October 14, 1926, Schmundt married Anneliese von Kummer in the Potsdam garrison church . The children Barbara Wilhelma (born November 8, 1927), Henning (born August 15, 1931), Gisela (born June 1, 1933) and Jürgen (born August 18, 1940) resulted from the marriage. Anneliese Schmundt later described the years 1926 to 1929 as "the most beautiful years of my husband's military life and our private life."

In staff deployment and armed forces leadership

Group photo of Hitler's staff with Schmundt
Hitler's staff in June 1940; Schmundt right behind Hitler

On March 8, 1929 Schmundt passed the military district examination , which was the basic requirement for training as a general staff officer and mandatory for every Reichswehr officer. On October 1, he was transferred to the staff of the 1st Division or Military District I in Königsberg in East Prussia , where he completed the training of assistant leaders over the next few years . The commander of this unit at the time was Lieutenant General and later Reich Minister of War Werner von Blomberg ; In the spring of 1931, Lieutenant Colonel Walter von Reichenau became chief of staff . During this time Schmundt was promoted to captain on February 1, 1931 .

On October 1, 1932 Schmundt was transferred to the Army Organization Department (T2) of the Troops Office in the Reichswehr Ministry. The head of this department at that time was Colonel Wilhelm Keitel , who later became the head of the Wehrmacht High Command . Another office group was headed by Major Alfred Jodl , who later became the chief of the Wehrmacht command staff. Schmundt was now directly involved in the organizational preparations for armament and came into close contact with people who later belonged to Hitler's closest circle . Since it was customary to assign general staff officers to the troops for some time again and again, Schmundt was transferred to the 2nd Infantry Regiment in Allenstein on June 1, 1935 as company commander . There he was promoted to major before he was transferred to the General Staff of the 18th Infantry Division on October 6, 1936 , which was formed under Major General Hermann Hoth in Liegnitz .

In January 1938 he was appointed "Chief Adjutant of the Wehrmacht to the Führer and Reich Chancellor". Schmundt's sudden appointment was due to the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis , in which Hitler found his army adjutant, Colonel Friedrich Hoßbach , to be not loyal enough to him. Hitler had said to Keitel, who was now head of the Wehrmacht Office in the Reich War Ministry: "I want a new adjutant who is my confidante and yours and not someone else's." Keitel then recommended Schmundt, whom he was in from his time as regimental adjutant Potsdam and from the military office. Schmundt took up his new post on January 29, 1938, where he was officially transferred to the Wehrmacht High Command. While he became one of Hitler's closest collaborators and confidants over the next few years, he rose rapidly in rank. In October 1938 he became a lieutenant colonel , in August 1939 a colonel, on January 1, 1942 major general and finally in April 1943 lieutenant general . In his role he acted as a mediator between the higher officer corps on the one hand and Hitler on the other, often trying to corrective action in both directions. Soon he was also perceived by Hermann Göring as "the only open and trustworthy character in the F [uehrer] H [aupt] Qu [artier]". When General of the Infantry Bodewin Keitel was replaced as head of the Army Personnel Office because he no longer sufficiently considered the intentions of the Fuehrer , Hitler appointed his confidante Schmundt as the new head of office on October 1, 1942 - in addition to his duties as chief adjutant. For almost two years, Schmundt had a decisive influence on the army's personnel policy in this position (details of these activities in the Aspects section below).

Circumstances of death

Photo of the barracks destroyed on July 20, 1944
The destroyed barracks in which Schmundt was seriously injured on July 20, 1944.

On July 20, 1944, Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg detonated a bomb during a briefing at the Fuehrer's headquarters in Wolfsschanze , which was supposed to kill Adolf Hitler. The attack missed its target, but several staff officers, including Schmundt, were seriously wounded. He lost his left eye and was burned and seriously injured from splinters on both legs. On July 25, Hitler visited his confidante in the Carlshof military hospital near Rastenburg and promoted him to general of the infantry. Over the next few days, too, Hitler kept asking about Schmundt:

“It always has to hit the best hardest. [...] Hopefully Schmundt will make it, he's the most indispensable of my adjutants and one of my favorite employees. "

- Adolf Hitler

At the end of September 1944, however, Schmundt's health deteriorated rapidly. He remained unconscious for hours and suffered long delirium from fever. On October 1, 1944, he finally died in Rastenburg.

According to a request that Schmundt had made before his death, his body was transferred to the Tannenberg Reich Memorial on October 5, 1944 , where the funeral service took place the following day. The funeral speech was given by Field Marshal Ernst Busch , a former friend of Schmundt's 9th Infantry Regiment. He emphasized the importance of National Socialism and Adolf Hitler for the deceased. He also announced that Schmundt would posthumously be honored with the Golden Cross of the Teutonic Order , the highest distinction of the German Empire. The body was then transferred to Berlin and buried on October 7, 1944 in the Invalidenfriedhof . Here Colonel General Heinz Guderian spoke a few words about Schmundt. He drew the picture of a Prussian idealist whose endeavor had been to reconcile Prussia and National Socialism. He was an "indispensable companion" of Hitler and believed in him.

Working in the Wehrmacht leadership

Schmundt and the Wehrmacht adjutantage

"Apparently he [Schmundt] was the ideal adjutant: communicative and comradely, skillful in writing, with talent and memory in personnel matters, discreet and self-confident enough to be able to survive in the difficult position between commander and comrade. So the adjutant career was mapped out for him. "

Reinhard Stumpf

When Schmundt took up his new position as chief adjutant to Hitler on January 29, 1938, this was accompanied by a reorganization of the adjutantage. While Colonel Hoßbach, a representative of the High Command of the Army, was previously the most influential military in Hitler's environment, Schmundt, as Keitel's subordinate, represented the new High Command of the Wehrmacht. As such, he met with rejection in the army leadership, which had been deprived of its influence. Although he himself had been an admirer of the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Artillery, Ludwig Beck , when he received a report, he was received only coolly. Colonel Hoßbach even refused to introduce him to his new official position. In principle, Schmidt's tasks now included all processes that affected the entire Wehrmacht. In addition to several non-commissioned officers' ranks as typists, he was subordinate to an adjutant of the army (Major Gerhard Engel ), the air force (Colonel Nicolaus von Below ) and the navy (Rear Admiral Karl-Jesko von Puttkamer ). Each of these adjutants was responsible for their own section. Engel processed requests for clemency from members of the Wehrmacht on racial issues , below matters of the Fiihrer's headquarters and business trips, and Puttkamer was responsible for protocol issues and Wehrmacht jurisdiction. Schmundt himself, however, reserved requests for clemency from army officers. The great importance that Schmundt's work was due to had its cause in Hitler's idiosyncratic working style. He seldom worked at a desk and gave his instructions and orders verbally to the adjutants. Their task was then to put the intentions of the "Führer" into concrete written orders. They played an important mediating role between Hitler and the Wehrmacht. As a result, Schmundt in particular, as chief adjutant, was increasingly confronted with political questions.

Schmundt soon became, as Colonel Nicolaus von Below put it, through “his personal modesty and altruism and his loyalty” to a close confidante of Hitler: “The more trust Hitler had in Schmundt, the more intensely he drew him in as an advisor.” Schmundt understood this position as a military mediator between Hitler and the army command. So he tried to push back the influence of the NSDAP and SS on the Wehrmacht. On the other hand, he also tried to bring the army command closer to Hitler. In 1937/38 he accused the generals of “lack of stability”, through which “a lot of trust [among the leaders and the people] had been shed”. From this point of view, after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement in the autumn of 1938, he regretted that there had been no war in Czechoslovakia because such a war would have strengthened the connection between the Wehrmacht and "Führer". Schmundt was in clear contrast to other members of the Wehrmacht who were planning a coup at that time, precisely to prevent a new war. But Schmundt's special position allowed him deep insights behind the scenes of the regime, since he was present at practically all important meetings from 1938 onwards. In this context, the so-called Schmundt Protocol was created , a record of Schmundt's speech to the military leadership on May 23, 1939 in the New Reich Chancellery . Since Hitler announced his unconditional decision to unleash a war against Poland , this transcript from Schmundt's Nuremberg trial against the main war criminals in 1945/46 - entitled "Document L-79" - turned out to be one of the key documents of the prosecution.

Photo of the signing of the Munich Agreement with Schmundt in the background
The man in the background: Schmundt (on the back of the wall) signing the Munich Agreement

The mediator role that Schmundt played between the higher command of the army and Hitler gained in importance, especially after the outbreak of World War II . He often visited the front on Hitler's behalf and was thus able to gain personal impressions that he later tried to convey to Hitler. The German army commanders often tried to influence the dictator in his military decisions through Schmundt. An example of this was Schmundt's influence on the offensive against France in 1940. During a visit to the front at the end of January 1940, he found out about the operational plans of Lieutenant General Erich von Manstein , which had been rejected by the Army High Command . He then organized a meeting between Manstein and Hitler, and the former managed to enforce his concept. This " sickle cut plan " later became the basis for the success of the German offensive in the west . In another case, Schmundt accompanied the German troops to North Africa in February 1941 in order to reinforce Hitler's personal interest in this theater of war. Things were similar when Schmundt, as Hitler's personal envoy, brought donations to individual top military personnel. And even before his appointment as head of the Army Personnel Office, Schmundt had influence on important personnel matters. In the spring of 1942 he recommended Kurt Zeitzler as Chief of Commander-in-Chief West and a few months later as the new Chief of the General Staff.

However, this mediating role also had its limits. During his numerous visits to the front, especially during the later phases of the war, Schmundt was concerned about the conditions in the troops and promised to give Hitler an unvarnished picture of the situation. But he doesn't seem to have passed everything on consciously. He is said to have said to an acquaintance on his return from the Eastern Front :

“I can't tell the Führer all of the negative impressions I've gathered. If you knew how much he torments himself and how hard he works, then you would understand that one cannot tell him that in all harshness. "

Schmundt tried several times to protect other senior officers from the SS and the Gestapo as much as possible. In 1943, for example, he warned Lieutenant General Adolf Heusinger , the head of the operations department at the OKH, that Hitler's official responsible for war history, Major General Walter Scherff, had reported him to the SS because of defeatist statements , as the historian Marcel Stein made reference to Heusinger's memoirs published after the war represents. In another case, the Gestapo had launched an investigation against the wife of Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb after she had spoken critically about Hitler to her dentist. Schmundt allegedly prevented further prosecution of the case and advised the Field Marshal that his wife should better change her dentist.

Schmundt and the Army Personnel Office

On October 1, 1942, Schmundt was appointed head of the Army Personnel Office while retaining his position as Chief Adjutant of the Wehrmacht . This gave him decisive influence on the army's personnel policy and, a short time later, on that of the General Staff Service. In order to do justice to both positions, Schmundt appointed Major General Wilhelm Burgdorf as deputy head of the Army Personnel Office and thus his most important employee. Schmundt was chosen by Hitler to eliminate what he believed to be a structural mistake in the officer corps and to replace the old generals with a new type of National Socialist officer.

The most pressing problem for the Wehrmacht in this new area of ​​work was the expansion of the officer corps . 16,000 officers had been killed or wounded since 1939, which was 30 percent of the active population at the time. In order to compensate for these losses, the principle of promotion of seniority had to be softened by shortening the service times in the individual ranks. The period of service up to the rank of captain decreased by an average of 40 percent up to April 1942, that up to the rank of major by up to 50 percent. On June 7th, 1942, the power transport was finally introduced. But Schmundt was the first to translate these guidelines into concrete orders, which Hitler put into effect on October 4 and November 4, 1942 by order of the Fiihrer : “In the future, every young German should only read from all sections of the population regardless of origin being able to become an officer on the basis of personality and probation before the enemy. ”With this, Schmundt's ideas of a rejuvenation of the officer corps were in line with Hitler's ideas, according to his social Darwinist view that bravery, willpower and“ fanatical belief ”were the virtues of the "new officer" should be. Those who proved themselves at the front and showed the right political attitude should be promoted. In this context, the previous requirement of a higher school qualification for officer candidates was dropped and university courses for officers were no longer provided. For Hitler this was an expression of the National Socialist equality of opportunity in the " Volksgemeinschaft ", while for Schmundt it was more the fact that the high school graduate classes were no longer sufficient to cover the need for officers. It was only against this background that numerous “lightning careers” became possible in the second half of the war, from which people like Walter Model or Ferdinand Schörner benefited. Dietrich Peltz became the youngest major general in the Wehrmacht at the age of just 29.

Sketch of the barracks before the bomb explosion on July 20, 1944
Always close to Hitler. At the briefing on July 20, 1944, Schmundt (7) stood right in front of the bomb.

The officers of the General Staff were an exception. Hitler wanted to abolish all class differences and to include this long-time trained elite of the officer corps in the new regulations. They should lose the " red stripes ", their external distinguishing feature, and also prove themselves on the front. However, since there was already a shortage of general staff officers, such a rotation was not possible, which must lead to a disadvantage for general staff officers. Schmundt therefore advocated the more frequent promotion of this group and also convinced Hitler not to touch their status symbols.

However, in the “new personnel policy” of the army, increased emphasis was placed on the political attitude of the officer corps. Schmundt made National Socialist principles a key element of his policy, which went far beyond the initially emphasized equal opportunities and defending the front. The influence of Hitler must also be taken into account, as he insisted that the National Socialist worldview should be a basic requirement for every officer. With this in mind, Schmundt tried to bring the officers' corps closer to Hitler and thus swear them to a National Socialist course. In October 1942 Schmundt took two cases of officers who were in contact with Jews as an opportunity for an order from the Army Personnel Office. One officer had maintained personal correspondence with a former Jewish schoolmate, the other had shown himself several times in public with a Jew, a former officer of the First World War, who now had to wear the Star of David, in a German city, which was what the dismissal meant for both officers the army service. In his activity report of October 31, Schmundt noted that "several incidents [gave] cause to clearly point to the officer's attitude towards Judaism as a decisive part of the officer's national, soc [ialist] attitude". In his order dated the same day, he demanded:

“Every officer must be permeated by the realization that primarily the influence of Judaism is making the German people dispute their claim to living space and standing in the world and for the second time compelling our people to face a world with the blood of their best sons to enforce by enemies [...] There is no difference between so-called decent Jews and others. Just as little consideration should be given to relationships of any kind that existed at a time when the knowledge of the danger of Judaism was not yet common property of the German people. Accordingly, there must be no connection, no matter how loose, between an officer and a member of the Jewish race. The present tough struggle against the Jewish-Bolshevik enemy of the world shows with particular clarity the true face of Judaism. Out of inner conviction, the officer must therefore reject Judaism and with it any connection with it. Anyone who violates this uncompromising attitude is unacceptable as an officer. The subordinate officers are to be instructed in a suitable manner. "

Schmundt repeated this orientation on November 17, 1942 in front of the first course participants of the new "Higher Adjutantur". From the above-mentioned points on Judaism, a consistent attitude can also be derived with regard to the "executions that the Wehrmacht would not have to carry out". In this way, Schmundt had declared the attitude to Judaism to be the decisive criterion for the war, but with an order of January 5, 1944, he made the officer corps one of the pillars of the regime:

“The fanatical determination to fight and the persistence of believing in victory is based on our National Socialist worldview […] The officer is particularly bound by his oath to the Führer and his idea of ​​the state. He is thus just as much a supporting element of the state as the sovereign of the party. "

In practice, ideological prerequisites soon found application. The proposals for performance promotions should come from the command authorities at the front. That is why Schmundt created the institution of a 'senior adjutant' in this division upwards. These adjutants dealt with such personnel issues and were instructed to give their National Socialist attitudes a central role in their assessment of officers. Furthermore, this 'Higher Adjutantur', which was to stand on an equal footing with the General Staff, represented an attempt by Schmundt to gain a “house power”.

Schmundt and the resistance

Photo by Henning von Tresckow
Henning von Tresckow, Schmundt's confidante and leading head of the military resistance

Schmundt was in close contact with the military resistance in the Wehrmacht, but did not belong to it. His close relationship with Henning von Tresckow , one of the leading figures in the resistance movement, was a key moment. Both had served as young lieutenants in Infantry Regiment 9 and had hidden the flags of the Guard Corps from the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission . As Hitler's chief adjutant, Schmundt visited several times the headquarters of Army Group Center , in which Tresckow served and which was considered to be a center of the military resistance. During the relatively frank speeches held there, Schmundt noted that Tresckow “rejects the Führer”, but he continued to trust him and did not pass on his views.

"Tresckow took advantage of this unbelievable naivety to implement personnel changes in the sense of the conspiracy, to learn about events and intentions from the" Führer "headquarters and to influence them for the purpose of his own plans."

- Major General Freiherr von Gersdorff

For example, Colonel Graf Stauffenberg , whom Schmundt considered very capable and who was therefore injured from Africa, was transferred to the staff of the reserve army at Tresckow's instigation with Schmundt's help . This was the only way he could later attend the briefing at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Schmundt had also inadvertently provided the resistance movement with important information beforehand. In March 1943, for example, the conspirators learned from him when Hitler wanted to visit an exhibition of looted weapons in the Berlin armory . He also campaigned for his longtime acquaintance, Lieutenant Colonel Freiherr von Gersdorff, the assassin-designate that day, to accompany the "Führer" during the tour. The assassination failed, however, because Hitler left the building too quickly.

Tresckow is said to have tried to be transferred to the Fuehrer's headquarters by Schmundt in 1944, where he could better participate in the overturning plans. However, this failed. At this point, the relationship between the two friends had already cooled noticeably. A few weeks before the assassination attempt on July 20, 1944, the two got into a heated argument about ending the war. Nevertheless, Tresckow tried again in the summer of 1944 to get a transfer with the help of Schmundt, this time to the staff of his former superior and now Commander in Chief West in France General Field Marshal Günther von Kluge . He hoped to be able to open the front for the Allies there after the coup. However, Kluge knew Tresckow's conspiratorial attitude and refused.

Judgments about Schmundt

Photo of Schmundt's grave slab
Rudolf Schmundt's grave in Berlin's Invalidenfriedhof

When he was appointed Hitler's chief adjutant, Schmundt was not only welcomed. His predecessor, Colonel Friedrich Hoßbach, strictly refused to train his successor in the course of business. The then Chief of the General Staff, General of the Artillery, Ludwig Beck , gave him “the cold shoulder”, seeing in him a “renegade” who now belonged to Hitler and the OKW and thus in opposition to the army command. But beyond that, his reputation in the officers' corps was not consistently negative even in later years, even if he was widely regarded as a Hitler observer, which earned him the derisive name "Jünger Johannes". The reason for this was that Schmundt had “a heart for the troops”, listened to their worries and needs and tried to mediate between them and Hitler. He also found support in the endeavor to keep party influences out of army personnel. In addition, there was his humanly sympathetic manner with which he won over his surroundings. Nicolaus von Below, Schmundt's long-standing colleague, reported that Schmundt was the opposite of his predecessor Hoßbach in this regard: “Just as he lacked any warmth, Schmundt had the open-minded commitment that an officer must have for his comrades and subordinates. Schmundt could be extremely happy. "

However, there were also extremely critical voices among contemporaries. Another temporary employee in the Wehrmacht High Command was Helmuth Greiner . Schmundt described Schmundt after the war as “anxiously trying not to let the slightest shadow fall on his masters”. His biggest mistake was to have constantly reinforced Hitler's belief in his own infallibility. He was also responsible for numerous wrong appointments in the upper military leadership.

The historian Reinhard Stumpf assumes that Schmundt belonged to the Germans who believed that old and new, Prussianism and National Socialism could be combined. While the majority of the officers waited, Schmundt, like Keitel, Blomberg or Reichenau, endeavored to bring the army closer to Hitler.

“However, despite all his enthusiasm for Hitler's genius, Schmundt always felt himself to be a member of the army more than Keitel and Jodl; He always repulsed interventions that came from outside and did not directly affect Hitler, and one must grant him the fact that, out of his optimistic, always cheerful and comradely character, he was of the honest opinion, only the independence of the army to be able to preserve by following Hitler. "

- Reinhard Stumpf (historian)

Manfred Messerschmidt, on the other hand, sees Schmundt as merely “a compliant tool for Hitler”. With his personnel policy from 1942 onwards he made such a strict concept of loyalty an obligation for the officers' corps “that absolutely no deviating impulses could be possible that would not have violated 'loyalty to the Führer'. The limit of betrayal was brought forward beyond acting and willing into thinking. ”Hermann Weiß goes one step further and characterizes Schmundt as“ a staunch National Socialist and unconditionally devoted to Hitler. ”The military historian Wolfram Wette also sees Schmundt as a“ staunch National Socialist in the Generalität des Heeres ”, which, with its order of October 31, 1942,“ demanded a clearly anti-Semitic attitude from the officers ”. The historian Johannes Hürter also emphasizes in his contribution to the New German Biography that the example of this ruling shows “how much S [chmundt] accepted the ideological guidelines”. Hürter also emphasizes the ambivalent character of Schmundt's work: “The fact that Hitler called him his 'best man' after his death, while General Heinz Guderian praised him as a 'Prussian idealist', illustrates S [chmundt] s position between Tradition, modernity and a criminal government. "

literature

Web links

Commons : Rudolf Schmundt  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Reinhardt Stumpf: General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Ed.): Hitler's military elite , Vol. 2, Darmstadt 1998, p. 227.
  2. ↑ a b c d e f Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (ed.): Activity report of the Chief of the Army Personnel Office General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt , Osnabrück 1984, p. 15.
  3. ↑ For a detailed description of the regiment and its operations: The Fusilier Regiment Prince Heinrich of Prussia “Brandenburgisches” No. 35 in the World War , Berlin 1929.
  4. ^ Georg Tessin : German associations and troops 1918–1939 . Osnabrück 1974, p. 110.
  5. ↑ a b c Reinhardt Stumpf: General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite . Vol. 2, Darmstadt 1998, p. 228.
  6. ↑ Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (eds.): Activity report of the Chief of the Army Personnel Office General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt , Osnabrück 1984, p. 16.
  7. ↑ Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (eds.): Activity report of the Chief of the Army Personnel Office General der Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt , Osnabrück 1984, p. 17.
  8. ^ Friedrich Hoßbach: Between Wehrmacht and Hitler , Wolfenbüttel / Hanover 1949, p. 123.
  9. ↑ Cf. the quote from Keitel in: Walter Görlitz: Generalfeldmarschall Keitel - Criminal or Officer? Memories, letters, documents from the chief OKW , Berlin 1961, p. 109.
  10. ↑ a b Johannes Hürter: Schmundt, Rudolf. In: Neue Deutsche Biographie , Vol. 23, Berlin 2007, p. 267.
  11. ↑ Quoted from: Walter Warlimont: In the headquarters of the German Wehrmacht 1939 to 1945 , Augsburg 1990, p. 291 fn. 5.
  12. ↑ Reinhardt Stumpf: General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Ed.): Hitler's military elite , Vol. 2, Darmstadt 1998, p. 232.
  13. ↑ a b Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (eds.): Activity report of the Chief of the Army Personnel Office General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt , Osnabrück 1984, p. 21.
  14. ↑ Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (eds.): Activity report of the Chief of the Army Personnel Office General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt , Osnabrück 1984, p. 22.
  15. ↑ See Busch's speech in: Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (ed.): Activity report of the Chief of the Army Personnel Office General der Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt , Osnabrück 1984, p. 59 ff.
  16. ↑ The speech is printed in: Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (eds.): Activity report of the Chief of the Army Personnel Office General der Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt , Osnabrück 1984, p. 61 f.
  17. ↑ Karl-Heinz Janßen / Fritz Tobias: The Fall of the Generals - Hitler and the Blomberg-Fritsch Crisis , Munich 1994, p. 137.
  18. ↑ a b Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (ed.): Activity report of the Chief of the Army Personnel Office General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt , Osnabrück 1984, p. 18.
  19. ^ Nicolaus von Below: As Hitler's Adjutant 1937-1945 . Mainz 1980, p. 32 and 71.
  20. ^ Nicolaus von Below: As Hitler's Adjutant 1937-1945 . Mainz 1980, pp. 32, 71 and 106.
  21. ↑ See Helmut Krausnick: On the military resistance against Hitler 1933 to 1938 - possibilities, approaches, limits and controversies. In: Thomas Vogel (ed.): Aufstand des Gewissens - Military Resistance against Hitler and the Nazi regime 1933–1945 (6th edition), Hamburg / Berlin / Bonn 2001, pp. 135–185. Schmundt's quotations can be found on p. 171.
  22. ↑ On the origin and transmission of the document cf. Nicolaus von Below: As Hitler's Adjutant 1937-1945 , Mainz 1980, p. 164 f.
  23. ↑ a b c Reinhardt Stumpf: General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Ed.): Hitler's military elite , Vol. 2, Darmstadt 1998, p. 229.
  24. ^ Karl-Heinz Frieser : Blitzkrieg Legend - The Western Campaign 1940 . Munich 1996, p. 80 f.
  25. ↑ Erwin Rommel: War without hatred . Heidenheim / Brenz 1956, p. 12 f.
  26. ↑ An example can be found in: Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff: Soldier im Untergang . Frankfurt / Main 1977, p. 124.
  27. ^ Walter Warlimont: At the headquarters of the German Wehrmacht from 1939 to 1945 . Augsburg 1990, p. 270.
  28. ^ A b c Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff: Soldier in the downfall . Frankfurt am Main 1977, p. 118.
  29. ↑ Marcel Stein: Field Marshal Von Manstein - A Portrait: The Janus Head , Solihull 2007, p. 188 f.
  30. ↑ Geoffrey P. Megargee: Hitler and the Generals - The Struggle for the Leadership of the Wehrmacht 1933-1945 . Paderborn / Munich et al. 2006, p. 224.
  31. ↑ Reinhardt Stumpf: General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite . Vol. 2, Darmstadt 1998, p. 226.
  32. ↑ Geoffrey P. Megargee: Hitler and the Generals - The Struggle for the Leadership of the Wehrmacht 1933-1945 . Paderborn / Munich et al. 2006, p. 225; Reinhardt Stumpf: General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite . Vol. 2, Darmstadt 1998, p. 230.
  33. ↑ Cf. Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (ed.): Activity report of the chief of the Army Personnel Office General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt . Osnabrück 1984, p. 8 f.
  34. ↑ Reinhardt Stumpf: General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite . Vol. 2, Darmstadt 1998, p. 231.
  35. ↑ Geoffrey P. Megargee: Hitler and the Generals - The Struggle for the Leadership of the Wehrmacht 1933-1945 . Paderborn / Munich et al. 2006, p. 225 for fn. 80.
  36. ↑ Reinhardt Stumpf: The Wehrmacht Elite - Structure of Rank and Origin of German Generals and Admirals 1933-1945 . Boppard am Rhein 1982, pp. 322-328.
  37. ↑ a b Geoffrey P. Megargee: Hitler and the Generals - The Struggle for the Leadership of the Wehrmacht 1933-1945 . Paderborn / Munich et al. 2006, p. 226.
  38. ↑ Wolfram Wette: The Wehrmacht. Enemy images, war of extermination, legends. S. Fischer. Frankfurt a. M. 2002, p. 134.
  39. ↑ Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (eds.): Activity report of the Chief of the Army Personnel Office General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt , continued by General of the Infantry Wilhelm Burgdorf, October 1, 1942 - October 29, 1944, Osnabrück 1984, entry from October 31 1942, p. 16.
  40. ↑ Quoted from Wolfram Wette: Die Wehrmacht. Enemy images, war of extermination, legends. S. Fischer. Frankfurt a. M. 2002, p. 134 f .; in the wording also with Manfred Messerschmidt: The Wehrmacht in the Nazi state. Time of Indocrination , Hamburg 1969, p. 355.
  41. ↑ Jürgen Förster: Spiritual warfare in Germany . In: Ralf Blank et al: The German War Society 1939 to 1945 - First half volume: Politicization, Destruction, Survival . Stuttgart 2004, p. 547.
  42. ↑ Quoted from: Dermot Bradley / Richard Schulze-Kossens (eds.): Activity report of the Chief of the Army Personnel Office General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt . Osnabrück 1984, p. 20.
  43. ↑ Reinhardt Stumpf: The Wehrmacht Elite - Structure of Rank and Origin of German Generals and Admirals 1933-1945 . Boppard am Rhein 1982, p. 330 f.
  44. ↑ More on this relationship: Bodo Scheurig: Henning von Tresckow - Ein Preuße gegen Hitler , Berlin 1987, pp. 58, 67, 79f, 98, 181.
  45. ↑ Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff: Soldier im Untergang , Frankfurt / Main 1977, pp. 128-131.
  46. ↑ Hans Speidel: From our time - memories , Berlin 1977, p. 192.
  47. ^ Friedrich Hoßbach: Between Wehrmacht and Hitler . Wolfenbüttel / Hanover 1949, p. 123.
  48. ^ A b Nicolaus von Below: As Hitler's adjutant 1937–1945 . Mainz 1980, p. 71.
  49. ↑ Frido von Senger and Etterlin: War in Europe . Cologne / Berlin 1960, p. 307 f.
  50. ↑ Helmuth Greiner: The highest Wehrmacht leadership 1939-1943 . Wiesbaden 1951, p. 14 f.
  51. ↑ Reinhardt Stumpf: General of the Infantry Rudolf Schmundt. In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite . Vol. 2, Darmstadt 1998, p. 233.
  52. ↑ Reinhardt Stumpf: The Wehrmacht Elite - Structure of Rank and Origin of German Generals and Admirals 1933-1945 . Boppard am Rhein 1982, p. 321.
  53. ↑ Manfred Messerschmidt: The Wehrmacht in the Nazi State , Hamburg 1969, p. 239 and 311.
  54. ↑ Hermann Weiß: Biographisches Lexikon zum Third Reich , Frankfurt 2002, p. 411.
  55. ↑ Wolfram Wette: The Wehrmacht. Enemy images, war of extermination, legends. S. Fischer. Frankfurt a. M. 2002, p. 134 f.
This article was added to the list of excellent articles on February 17, 2011 in this version .
personal data
SURNAME Schmundt, Rudolf
BRIEF DESCRIPTION German officer, most recently general of the infantry; Chief Adjutant of the German Wehrmacht to Adolf Hitler; Chief of the Army Personnel Office
DATE OF BIRTH August 13, 1896
PLACE OF BIRTH Metz
DATE OF DEATH October 1, 1944
Place of death Rastenburg